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Abstract
Recent research has confirmed that giving evidence in criminal proceedings is often a 
degrading and gruelling ordeal for complainants in rape cases. This study seeks to 
establish the extent to which the secondary victimisation of rape complainants in court 
is an inevitable consequence of the adversarial trial process. It explores the conflict 
between the needs and interests o f rape complainants and the basic assumptions o f the 
adversarial fact-finding process and concludes that the adversarial system creates 
intractable problems for vulnerable complainants. This study questions whether our 
commitment to the adversarial process can and should continue given its onerous 
implications for victims of crime.
This study examines rape trials in the Netherlands, a country with an inquisitorial trial 
process. It identifies the fundamental differences between Dutch and English trial 
procedures and explores their significance for complainants in rape cases. This study 
seeks to establish whether inquisitorial style proceedings hold significant advantages 
for vulnerable complainants.
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1Introduction
“I would like to know why you are raped again, again, again and again, 
because that’s what they did to me. They allowed me to be raped again 
and again.”1
The treatment o f rape victims within the criminal justice system of England and 
Wales has been the subject of considerable research. This research has consistently 
shown that the ordeal of rape complainants is frequently exacerbated by their 
experience o f the criminal trial process. The experiences of rape complainants in court 
have also been the subject o f a number o f studies. These have been based largely upon 
the observation o f rape trials, interviews with victims o f sexual assault and interviews 
with legal practitioners.2 Researchers have reported that giving evidence in court is 
frequently a painful, traumatic ordeal for victims of rape. Women have described their 
treatment in court as further victimisation, in some cases, worse than the rape itself. In 
seeking to account for the treatment of rape complainants in court, trial judges, 
defence barristers and prosecutors have all been the targets of criticism. So too the 
ineffective limits placed upon cross-examination and the role played by cultural myths 
and stereotypes in rape trials.3
One of the aims of this research is to fill a perceived gap in the analysis o f rape trials. 
In an insightful article published in 1983, McBarnet identified the limitations of
Victim o f rape interviewed by Victim Support and asked to describe her experience o f the 
criminal justice system, Victim Support, Women, Rape and the Criminal Justice System, (1996, 
London:Victim Support), at 39
Adler, Z., Rape on Trial, (1987, London:Routledge& Kegan Paul), Brown, B., Burman, M., 
Jamieson, L., Sex Crimes on Trial, (1993, Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press), Chambers, G., 
Millar, “Proving Sexual Assault:Prosecuting the Offender or Persecuting the Victim?”, in (eds) 
Carlen, P., Worral, A., Gender, Crime and Justice, (1987, Milton Keynes:Open University Press), 
Lees, S., Carnal Knowledge Rape on Trial, (1996, London:Hamish Hamilton), McColgan, A., 
“Common Law and the Relevance o f Sexual History Evidence”, (1996a), 16 O.J.L.S. 300, 
Temkin, J., Rape and the Legal Process, (1987, London:Sweet & Maxwell), Victim Support,
Women, Rape and the Criminal Justice System, (1996, London: Victim Support),
2victimological analysis with regard to the treatment of victims within the criminal trial 
process.4 Victimology, McBarnet argued, had failed to examine the deeper structural 
issues at play in the treatment of victims o f crime in court. Victimology had focused 
heavily on the role o f social prejudices, especially in rape trials, and how defence 
lawyers treat victims. According to McBarnet, this partial analysis has led to a flawed 
understanding of the treatment of victims within the criminal justice system.
“The prevalent focus in victimology on rape victims is too narrow, and 
the prevalent model o f the victim in court too simple. In focusing on 
what is done to the victim, explaining it by immediate and observable 
informal behaviour in court, and presenting court experience only from 
the victim’s point o f view, victimology underplays the complexity of 
its subject, encourages a stereotype of the victim and produces a 
distorted explanation of both the victim’s experience and the functions 
o f the court.” 5
McBarnet sought to locate the source o f victims’ experiences in court in the structure 
and function of the criminal trial. This research seeks to explore further the questions 
raised by McBarnet, to explore the relationship between the adversarial process and 
the plight o f rape complainants in court. This study seeks to establish why rape 
complainants are treated in the manner documented by researchers.
In this study it is argued that the secondary victimisation of rape complainants in court 
may, in large part, be attributed to the adversarial process. It is argued that the 
experiences o f rape complainants in court are shaped, to a large extent, by the 
assumptions that inform adversarial proceedings. While not denying the role certainly 
played by individual criminal justice professionals, including defence barristers and 
trial judges in the treatment of rape complainants in court, or the important role played 
by the cultural myths and stereotypes which surround rape, it is argued that the 
criminal trial process itself plays a major part in the ordeal of rape complainants, a 
part that is invariably overlooked. This failure to identify and explore the role played
See Lees, S., (1996), op cit, McColgan, A., The Case fo r  Taking Date out o f  Rape, (1996b, 
London: Pandora)
McBarnet, D., “Victim in the Witness Box -Confronting Victimology’s Stereotype”, (1983), 7, 
Contemporary Crises, at 293 
ibid
3by the adversarial process in the ordeal of rape complainants in court has meant that 
the basic assumptions o f the adversarial process, the traditional safeguards of the 
adversarial trial, have largely escaped examination and escaped criticism. A central 
aim o f this research is to challenge the assumptions o f the adversarial fact-finding 
process, to question the claims made for adversarial proceedings, claims which are so 
rarely contested. This study seeks to re-evaluate a number of the fundamental 
evidentiary safeguards of the adversarial process. Research into the conduct o f rape 
trials has shown that rape victims seeking justice are compelled to submit themselves 
to a gruelling courtroom ordeal. This study seeks to demonstrate that the case for 
subjecting women, traumatised by rape, to such an ordeal is not a strong one. For 
example, it is argued in this study that the justifications for compelling rape 
complainants to give evidence in court lack convincing foundation.6
The Victim Movement
In criminal proceedings the central relationship is that between the state and the 
defendant. The victim stands outside this relationship. The victim of crime has been 
marginalised within the criminal justice system, relegated to the periphery of the 
criminal trial process. In recent years there has been an increasing focus upon the 
victims o f crime and promises have been made to improve their treatment within the 
criminal justice system. The plight of the victim of crime has received widespread 
recognition. In 1985, the United Nations adopted the Declaration o f  Basic Principles 
o f  Justice fo r  Victims o f  Crime and the Abuse o f  Power. The Declaration established 
basic standards for the treatment of victims of crime. One hundred and fifty-seven 
Governments, including the UK Government, declared their commitment to 
improving the treatment of victims of crime. In 1986, the Council o f Europe issued 
Recommendation R (85) 11 o f  the Committee o f  Ministers to the Member States on the 
Position o f  the Victim in the Framework o f  Criminal Law Procedure. The Council of 
Europe proposed means by which the needs o f victims may be taken into account at 
each stage of the criminal justice process. The issues identified as o f particular
See Chapter Two
4importance to victims of crime have been summarised as “the victim’s right to be 
informed of the process; the victim’s right to have his view and concerns presented; 
the victim’s right to obtain proper assistance in the proceedings; the possibilities of 
minimising inconvenience and maximising the protection of the victim; the avoiding 
o f unnecessary delay; and the sensitisation of those concerned to the needs o f the 
victim.”7 Organisations concerned with the treatment of victims of crime have also 
issued statements of victims rights. The European Forum for Victim Services, an 
organisation set up to promote the rights of victims of crime in Europe, has issued the 
Statement o f  the Victim’s Rights in the Process o f  Criminal Justice. The rights 
outlined by the European Forum include a right to; respect and recognition at all 
stages o f the criminal justice process; receive information and explanation about the 
progress of their case; provide information to officials responsible for decisions 
relating to the offender; have legal advice available, regardless of their means, 
protection both for their privacy and their physical safety; compensation both from the 
offender and from the State.
In the UK, Victim Support, a national charitable organisation that offers victims oi 
crime emotional and practical support and campaigns for victims rights, issued a 
policy paper The Rights o f  Victims o f  Crime 1995.} The statement sets out the 
following rights. The right to be free of the burden oi decisions relating to the 
offender; to receive information and explanation about the progress ol their case and 
to have the opportunity to provide their own information about the case lor use in the 
criminal justice process; to be protected in any way necessary; to receive 
compensation; to receive respect, recognition and support.
The UK Government has issued basic standards for the treatment of victims now 
contained in the Victim’s Charter 1996™ The first Victim’s Charter was announced 
by the Home Secretary on 22 February 1990." The Victim’s Charter 1990 claimed to
Joutsen, M., The Role o f  the Victim o f  Crime in European Criminal Justice Systems, (1987, 
HEUNI:Helsinki), at 171
European Forum for Victim Services, Statement o f  Victim’s Rights in the Process o f  Criminal 
Justice, (1996)
Victim Support, The Rights o f  Victims o f  Crime A Policy Paper, (1995, London:Victim Support), 
Home Office, The Victims’s Charter: A Statement o f  the Service Standards fo r  Victims o f  
Crime,{1996, London :HM SO)
Home Office, Victim’s Charter: A Statement o f  the Rights o f  Victims o f  Crime, (1990, 
London:HMSO)
5set out the rights and expectations of victims of crime. The declared guiding principles 
of the Victim’s Charter 1990 were that victims deserve to be treated with both 
sympathy and respect and that any upset and hardship connected with the victim’s 
involvement with the criminal justice system should be minimised. The foreword to 
the Victim’s Charter 1996 states;
“All the people involved in the criminal justice system are working 
together to make sure that victims get a better deal. Victims who report 
crime and give evidence in court play a crucial role in making the 
criminal justice system more effective. We are striving to make sure 
that in return, the criminal justice system treats them with respect and 
gives them what they need.”12
The Victim’s Charter 1990 and 1996 basically provide a framework of good practices 
for criminal justice agencies including, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and 
the Courts.
While it appears to be generally accepted that the treatment of victims of crime should 
be improved, important questions have remained unanswered. Missing from the 
debate has been any discussion of whether the adversarial process may in fact 
accommodate the interests and needs of complainants. The extent to which the 
interests of complainants, especially vulnerable complainants, conflict with the basic 
tenets o f the adversarial process has not been addressed. This study argues that the 
adversarial process is unable to accommodate the interests o f rape complainants and 
other vulnerable complainants. The assumptions of the adversarial fact-finding 
process, it is argued, dictate that little may be done to improve the treatment of 
complainants in court. Any moves to lessen the ordeal o f rape complainants would 
necessarily be very limited. This study argues that the adversarial process simply may 
not deliver key ‘victim rights’ called for by campaigning organisations such as Victim 
Support. Even the limited aims set out in the Victim’s Charter 1996, it is argued, can 
not be met within the existing framework o f adversarial proceedings. For example, the 
Victim’s Charter 1996 states that the victim of crime may expect to be treated with
2 Home Office, (1996), op cit
6respect and sensitivity. 13 The view that victims of crime should be treated with 
dignity and respect is supported in the Council of Europe Recommendation. Guideline 
8 states;
“At all stages of the procedure, the victim should be questioned in a 
manner which gives due consideration to his personal situation, his 
rights and his dignity.”14
However, in England and Wales, the complainant in a rape case, indeed any 
complainant, can not expect to be treated with respect and sensitivity in court. As 
argued in this study, there is an irreconcilable conflict between treating rape 
complainants with dignity and decency and the use o f cross-examination as the 
mechanism for testing evidence in rape trials.15
The bounds imposed upon the improvement o f the treatment of victims of crime 
within the adversarial process should be recognised. This study argues that while 
attempts to improve the treatment of victims outside the courtroom, such as through 
the provision o f information, may be successful, the treatment o f complainants in 
court will remain basically unchanged. Moves to improve the position of 
complainants in court will be necessarily piecemeal and limited. This study argues 
that solutions to the plight of rape complainants in England and Wales lie outside the 
existing framework o f adversarial criminal procedure.
Criminal Justice in Crisis
Following the miscarriage of justice cases which prompted the appointment of the 
Runciman Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, it appeared that a radical re- 
evaluation of the adversarial trial process would take place. In the event, the basic 
assumptions o f the adversarial system were not challenged. The criminal justice 
system of England and Wales now faces another crisis. Namely, its failure to serve
13 ibid  at 4
14 Cited in Joutsen, M., (1987), op cit at 212
15 See Chapter Six
7vulnerable victims of crime.16 There is now considerable evidence showing that 
involvement in the criminal justice process frequently exacerbates the ordeal of rape 
complainants and of child victims. Long delays in cases coming to court translate into 
months o f anxiety for women traumatised by rape. Last minute adjournments cause 
considerable distress. Once in court, rape complainants are subjected to a gruelling 
ordeal that has been termed “judicial rape”.17 Women find themselves portrayed by 
defence lawyers as vindictive liars, as ‘tarts’. Their personal lives are scrutinised in 
what amounts to a public character assassination. Women are denied the opportunity 
to describe what happened to them in their own words and to describe the impact of 
crime upon their lives. In England and Wales, victims of rape are put through this 
ordeal with little chance of seeing a conviction. The conviction rate for rape has 
drastically declined over the past twenty years. The conviction rate for reported rapes 
fell from 24 per cent in 1985 to 10 per cent in 1993. Such a decline has led Lees to 
describe rape trials as “cruel hoaxes”.18 Due to the high attrition rate in rape cases, 
Lees maintains, that the real conviction rate is lower;
“Some cases do not even enter into the Home Office statistics, as they 
are discontinued or ‘no-crimed’. In effect this means that the 
conviction rate is even lower than the 10 per cent of reported rapes.”1 ’
The number o f women reporting rape and sexual assault has doubled over the past 
decade in Britain.20 In 1985, 1,842 reports o f rapes were recorded by the police. In 
1993, this had increased to 4,589. However, it is claimed that this continues to 
represent the “tip of the iceberg”.21
“All the many surveys that have been carried out, both here and in the 
US, show that rape is vastly more common than the official figures 
show.”22
16 The term ‘vulnerable’ is used throughout this study to denote children, adults with learning 
difficulties and those made vulnerable by the crimes committed against them; victims o f sexual 
violence.
17 Lees, S., “Judicial Rape”, (1993), 16, Womens Studies International Forum, 11-16
18 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at xiii
19 ibid  at 95
20 ibid at 23
21 ibid  at 24
22 McColgan, A., (1996b), op cit at 94
8Women are still reluctant to report rape. One reason for this it is submitted, 
undoubtedly lies in the unwillingness of women to submit themselves to a gruelling 
courtroom interrogation during which their private lives are publicly scrutinised and 
judged. Helena Kennedy QC, reports conversations with fellow barristers which 
suggest that the belief that the present trial process exacts too high a price from 
victims o f rape is one shared by those with first hand experience of the adversarial 
trial;
“When I ask women magistrates and lawyers who know the system 
what they would do if they were raped by an acquaintance, many say 
that they would think twice before exposing themselves to the legal 
process. Men in law express the same reservations for their wives and 
daughters, though often more vigorously.”23
The criminal justice system is failing victims of rape. It is failing women in its failure 
to convict rapists;
“The widespread failure of the criminal justice system to convict men 
who are guilty of rape amounts to a significant shortfall in its service to 
women who, after all, comprise half of those whose protection justifies 
its very existence.”24
and also failing women in its treatment o f complainants in court. The publication of 
the Victim’s Charter 1990 together with other recent developments would appear to 
mark the long awaited recognition of victims of crime and the vital role they play 
within the criminal justice system. Finally, victims are being seen as individuals, as 
persons who have suffered, who should consequently, be treated with dignity and 
respect. Unfortunately, concern that the ordeal o f victims should not be exacerbated 
by their experience o f the criminal justice system has not extended to their treatment 
in court. In court, victims continue to be seen and treated as tools o f evidence with no 
special status. This study argues that if  victims of crime are to be treated fairly within 
the system their experiences in court cannot be ignored.
23 Kennedy, H., Eve was Framed, (1992, London:Chatto & Windus), at 138
24 McColgan, A., (1996a), op cit at 297
9“a system of criminal justice that ignores the victim overlooks the most 
fundamental tenets o f ‘justice’.”25
This study argues that a trial process that fails to reflect the interests and needs of 
complainants is not a fair process.
“Criminal law and criminal procedure could never really lead to justice 
being administered unless and until the system pays respect to the 
interests of victims of crime. This means that the victim should not just 
be viewed as an instrument enabling the prosecutor to procure 
convictions. Rather then dealing with the victim as a tool, which can be 
used in the process of reporting the crime and later on as a witness, he 
or she should be considered the injured party, as a human being with 
rights o f his own that should be structurally taken into account at all 
stages o f the criminal investigation and eventual tria l.,26
At the heart o f this research is the claim that the adversarial trial process fails to 
achieve fairness for complainants and defendants. As a result, this study calls for an 
investigation into the possibility of devising a procedure that does achieve this dual 
objective. A procedure which balances fairness for defendants with the legitimate and 
competing rights of victims to be treated with respect, to have their voices heard and 
to be spared unnecessary anxiety and distress.
“For a legal system to be fair it is o f course, vital that the rights o f the 
defendant to a fair trial be protected, but it is equally important for the 
complainant to be able to obtain justice. The rights o f both defendants 
and complainants must be balanced. Women should be enabled to 
obtain justice without jeopardising the rights of the accused.”27
Rape Trials in the Netherlands
25 Waller, I., “ International Standards, National Trail Blazing and the Next Steps” , in (eds), 
Maguire, M., Pointing, J., Victims o f  Crime- A New Deal?, (1988, Milton Keynes:Open 
University Press), at 105
26 Groenhuijsen, M., Conflicts o f  Victims Interests and Offenders Rights in the Criminal Justice 
System- a European Perspective, (1994, paper presented at Eighth International Symposium on 
Victimology, Adelaide, Australia), at 1
27 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at xi
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This investigation for an alternative procedure should be informed by comparative 
research of the experiences and treatment of rape complainants in other criminal 
justice systems, by a survey of the protection afforded rape complainants in other 
jurisdictions. There has been very little comparative research of the conduct of rape 
trials in other jurisdictions. Some commentators have looked to measures introduced 
in the United States as possible models for reform in England and Wales. The 
experiences o f rape complainants in non-adversarial or inquisitorial systems have 
received little attention. In the search for an alternative procedure this study examines 
rape trials in the Netherlands, a country with an inquisitorial trial process. The basic 
assumptions that inform the Dutch fact-finding process in criminal proceedings 
contrast sharply with those that underlie the adversarial process. The form in which 
evidence is presented in Dutch criminal proceedings and the evidentiary safeguards of 
the Dutch system are very different. This study examines these fundamental 
distinctions between adversarial proceedings in England and Wales and the 
inquisitorial system of the Netherlands and their implications for complainants in lape 
cases. This study seeks to determine whether Dutch criminal procedure holds any 
advantages for rape complainants and other vulnerable victims of crime. It exploies 
whether the adoption of inquisitorial style proceedings would result in a significant 
improvement in the treatment of rape complainants.
Adversarial vs Inquisitorial
Throughout this study the labels ‘inquisitorial’ and ‘adversarial’ are used to denote the 
criminal justice processes of the Netherlands and England and Wales respectively. 
The appropriateness of the labels ‘adversarial’ and ‘inquisitorial’ for contemporary 
comparative study has been questioned. It has been argued that these terms are out­
dated and have confusing associations. It is certainly true that no system is an 
embodiment o f either model. There is no archetypal adversarial system and no system 
which conforms entirely to the inquisitorial model of criminal procedure.
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“The old labels do not stick anymore. The systems have grown 
together and will continue to do so.”28
The criminal justice system of England and Wales today, if  indeed ever, does not 
represent a pure embodiment of adversarial principles.
“The English legal system, often regarded as the paradigm o f the 
adversarial tradition, is not a perfect example by any means; on close 
examination it is found even in criminal courts to allow deviations 
from the proper adversarial structure, more significantly in recent 
times.”29
The rules regarding pre-trial disclosure may for example, be seen as a departure from 
orthodox adversarial tradition.
“The classic adversary system was based on the concept of trial by 
ambush in which each side was free to conceal its evidence until the 
trial itself.” 30
Criminal proceedings in England and Wales may therefore constitute a diluted 
version o f adversarial theory yet they are still very much within the adversarial 
mould;
“The key characteristics which remain are sufficient to make the 
Anglo-American criminal trial the most adversarial o f criminal 
proceedings.” 31
The Dutch criminal justice system has also evolved but it still remains firmly planted 
within the inquisitorial tradition. Jorg et al, in a comparative examination of the nature 
of Dutch and English and Welsh criminal procedure, argue that the criminal justice 
systems of England and Wales and the Netherlands “may be regarded as typical 
examples o f adversarial and inquisitorial systems respectively.”32
28 Vogler, R., “Learning from the Inquisitors”, (1994) June, L.Ex. at 29
29 McEwan,J., Evidence and the Adversarial Process, (1992, Oxford:Blackwell), at 5
30 Zander, M., Cases and Materials on the English Legal System (1992, London:Butterworths) 327
31 McEwan, J., (1992), op cit at 4
32 Jorg, N., Field, S., Brants, C., Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging? in Harding,
C., Fennel, P., Jorg, N., Swart, B., (eds) Criminal Justice in Europe A Comparative Study, (1995, 
Oxford:Clarendon Press),43
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The label ‘inquisitorial’ also suggests a homogeneity between European continental 
legal systems that does not exist. There is no single identifiable model o f continental 
criminal procedure. There are fundamental differences for example, between criminal 
proceedings in France, Germany and the Netherlands. Similarly, there are important 
differences between criminal procedure in England and Wales and the United States 
although both are firmly embedded within the adversarial tradition. Basic distinctions 
between criminal proceedings in adversarial and inquisitorial systems however 
remain.
Contest vs Inquiry
Adversarial proceedings are structured as a dispute; a conflict between two sides.
“The fundamental matrix is based upon the view that proceedings 
should be structured as a dispute between two sides in a position of 
theoretical equality before a court which must decide on the outcome 
o f the contest. The procedural aim is to settle the conflict stemming 
from the allegation o f commission of a crime.”33
Confrontation is at the heart of adversarial theory;
“The fundamental expectation o f an adversarial system is that out o f a 
sharp clash o f proofs presented by litigants in a highly structured 
forensic setting will come the information upon which a neutral and 
passive decision maker can base a satisfying resolution of a legal 
dispute.”34
The adversarial trial is not structured as an investigation into the truth but to reach a 
just settlement between the parties. The adversarial trial is a contest to see if the 
prosecution can prove guilt to the requisite standard. The distinct objects o f 
adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings are identified by Damaska;
Damaska, M., “Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal ProcedureiA 
Comparative Study”, (1973) 121 U. Pa. L.Rev. 563
Landsman, S., “From Gilbert to Bentham:The Reconceptualisation o f  the Evidence Theory”, 
(1989) 36 Wayne. L.Rev. at 1150
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“Consider the “contest” model first.. The judgment itself is not so 
much in the nature o f a pronouncement o f the true facts of the case, it, 
rather, a decision between the parties. If  however, proceedings are 
structured as an official inquiry, the concern for ascertaining the truth 
of the case is much more central.”35
Inquisitorial criminal proceedings are structured as an official investigation. It is 
assumed that the truth is found through the independent inquiry of public officials 
with no partisan allegiance.
“Non-adversary proceedings emerge from the following central 
structural idea. Rather than being conceived of as a dispute, they are 
considered an official inquiry, triggered by the initial probability that a 
crime has been committed. The procedural aim is to establish whether 
this is in fact the case, and whether the imposition o f criminal sanctions 
is justified.”36
Within the inquisitorial system public officials are engaged in what may be accurately 
termed as a search for the truth.
“An inquisitorial system assumes that the truth can be, and must be, 
discovered in an investigative procedure, and, because it may be in the 
interests of the parties to conceal it, that the state is best equipped to a 
carry out such investigations.” '7
The emergence o f adversarial procedure is frequently attributed to the historical 
distrust o f public officials in common law jurisdictions. Fear o f arbitrary prosecution 
by an all powerful State, it is argued, has shaped the adversarial process. 1
“ ..the adversary system in its modern variant is inspired to a great 
extent by an attitude of distrust o f public officials and its 
complementary demand for safeguards against abuse.”39
35 Damaska, M., (1973), op cit at 581
36 ibid  at 564
37 Jorg, N., et al, (1995), op cit at 43
38 See Damaska, M., (1973), op cit at 506
39 Damaska, M., (1973), op cit at 583
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“The adversary criminal trial can be understood as a check on a 
significant risk of persecution or an otherwise too enthusiastic 
prosecution policy.”40
Within the adversarial system investigation is motivated by self interest as a opposed 
to public interest and it is argued that this best serves the citizen;
“The argument is that zealous adversary advocacy of those accused of 
crimes is the greatest safeguard of individual liberty against the 
encroachment of the State.”41
In continental systems, including the Netherlands, there is little evidence of distrust of 
public officials;
“The legitimacy of the inquisitorial procedure in a democratic context 
requires an inordinate amount of faith in the integrity of the State and 
its capacity to pursue truth unprompted by partisan pressures of 
individual self interest and untrammelled by equality of arms.”4-
Centre of Gravity
The emphasis in adversarial proceedings is on the public trial. Proceedings are 
structured as a continuous hearing in which evidence is presented to an unprepared 
fact-frnder. The trial, in contrast, generally plays a less significant role in inquisitorial 
proceedings. The heart of the process is the pre-trial stage.
“the public trial is by no means as important in an inquisitorial system 
as it is in our own. It is merely the final procedural act of a lengthy and 
continuous judicial investigation conducted largely in private.”43
“Unlike inquisitorial systems, which represent a continuous process of 
proof, with perhaps a number of phases of investigation supervised and
40 Goodpaster, G., “On the Theory o f American Adversary Criminal Trial”, (1987) 78 J. Crim.L. & 
Criminology, at 135
41 Luban, D., Lawyers and Justice:An Ethical Study, (1988, Princeton:Princeton University Press), 
at 58
42 Jorg, N., et al, (1995), op cit at 43
43 Vogler, R., (1994), op cit at 28
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conducted by judicial figures in serious cases, the adversarial system 
focuses on one particular event - the contested trial.” 14
The centre of gravity o f inquisitorial criminal proceedings can be said generally to lie 
earlier in the process.
Role of the Trial Judge
The role of the trial judge in adversarial proceedings is that of impartial umpire. It is 
the parties who dominate proceedings. The court is largely dependent upon the 
evidence presented by the parties. In contrast, the trial judge in inquisitorial 
proceedings plays a very active role. The court dominates proceedings and actively 
searches for the truth;
“The fundamental idea o f inquisitorial proceeding is that the judge 
himself must investigate a complaint.” 43
Vogler, commenting on the contrasting role of the trial judge in inquisitorial 
proceedings states;
“In its essence, the inquisitorial method of fact-finding is based upon 
the almost unlimited power of the judge to obtain and evaluate 
evidence. Whereas, in an adversarial system, the evidence is called by 
the parties and the judge sits as neutral umpire, in inquisitorial process 
the roles are reversed. It is the judge who calls and examines the 
evidence and it is the lawyers who are there largely to ensure that the 
proceedings are fair.”46
If the experiences of rape complainants in both adversarial and inquisitorial 
proceedings are to be fully understood and compared it is however necessary to go 
beyond these commonplace distinctions. Comparative research of adversarial and
44 Jackson, J., “Trial Procedures”, in (eds) Walker, C., Starmer, K., Justice in Error, (1993,
London :Blackstone), at 131
45 Spencer, J.R., Jackson’s Machinery o f  Justice, (1989, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press), at
20
46 Vogler, R., (1994), op cit at 28
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inquisitorial procedure has rarely had as its focus the experiences of victims or 
witnesses. Consequently, fundamental distinctions between the two traditions that 
have an important bearing of the treatment of these groups have remained largely 
unexplored. An aim of this research is to promote a fuller understanding of the 
differences between adversarial and inquisitorial systems. This study identifies and 
examines a number o f features traditionally neglected within comparative research. 
These are features which must be considered when evaluating criminal proceedings 
from the perspective of the complainant. These include the role of storytelling in 
adversarial criminal trials, the law of evidence, the role of advocates and the nature of 
advocacy, the role o f victims, the combativeness o f the adversarial trial.
Methodology
As stated above, the treatment o f rape complainants in court in England and Wales 
has been the subject of considerable research. Most recently research conducted by 
Sue Lees and recorded in Carnal Knowledge Rape on Trial (1 9 9 6 )^ , and by Victim 
Support.48 This study draws extensively upon these two studies.
Sue Lees, together with Lynn Ferguson of the Channel 4 Dispatches programme, 
monitored all rape trials at the Old Bailey over a 4 month period in 1993. Researchers 
also took verbatim transcripts of a sample o f ten trials and studied the court transcripts 
of eleven trials. In all, 31 trials were analysed. Through the observation of rape trials 
and the analysis of transcripts, Lees draws upon a unique body of data. Lees also 
distributed lengthy questionnaires through rape crisis centres, student unions, and 
counselling services to victims of rape. Out of 116 completed questionnaires, 21 of 
the cases had gone to trial. The aim of these questionnaires was to provide 
information, until now largely hidden, on the tactics used by rapists, who assailants 
were and how they behaved before, during and after the alleged rape.49
47 Lees, S., (1996), op cit
48 Victim Support, (1996), op cit
49 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at xxiv
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Victim Support is a national charity which offers support and information to victims 
of crime and campaigns for victims’ rights. It is an organisation that has had 
considerable experience of helping victims of rape. In 1995, Victim Support schemes 
helped 3,431 rape victims.50 Concerned with the treatment of rape complainants in 
court, Victim Support conducted a survey into the experiences of rape victims who 
had been in contact with Victim Support schemes or Witness Services in 1995. 
Questionnaires were sent to Victim Support schemes and Witness Services and 
completed by Victim Support staff. The questionnaire results are based upon the 
experiences o f 938 rape victims in contact with Victim Support schemes and 590 rape 
cases with which Witness Services were involved. In addition, in-depth interviews 
were conducted with a small sample o f women who had been raped and had been in 
contact with a local Victim Support scheme. The interviews focused on women s 
experiences o f the criminal justice system. The Victim Support study does not purport 
to be statistically representative of the experiences o f all victims oi lape. 
Acknowledging for example, that Victim Support sees more women who have 
reported rape than those who do not. It is submitted however, that the research 
conducted by Victim Support provides an invaluable insight into the treatment of 
victims o f rape within the criminal justice system.
Much has been written in recent years on specific aspects of Dutch criminal procedure 
and the status o f the victim in the Netherlands. In its description of Dutch criminal 
procedure, this study draws extensively upon this recent work. The literature available 
on Dutch criminal procedure however offers only a limited analysis ol the 
significance or meaning of formal legal rules for complainants and their treatment 
within the Dutch trial process. In order to corroborate the position described in the 
limited literature semi-structured interviews were conducted with two groups o f Dutch 
legal practitioners, examining magistrates and lawyers from all women law firms 
based in Amsterdam. The decision to interview examining magistrates was made due 
to the decisive role played by examining magistrates in the treatment o f rape 
complainants in the Netherlands. Interviews were conducted with this group o f Dutch
50 Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 6
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lawyers due to the insight these practitioners have into the experiences of rape 
complainants within the Dutch trial process.
From the complainant’s perspective, a crucial stage of Dutch criminal proceedings is 
the pre-trial hearing. It is here that rape complainants are generally examined. 
Generally present at the pre-trial hearing are the complainant, the examining 
magistrate and the defence lawyer. The pre-trial hearing is not open to the public. It is 
the examining magistrate who governs the conduct of the pre-trial hearing, he or she 
is the primary interrogator of the complainant. If the complainant is legally 
represented her lawyer may attend the pre-trial hearing at the discretion of the 
examining magistrate, although she is not permitted to play an active role in the 
proceedings. The lawyers interviewed had represented victims of rape and had 
attended pre-trial hearings in rape cases. Both groups o f practitioners were therefore in 
a position to provide a valuable insight into the treatment of rape complainants in the 
Netherlands, to explain how specific features of Dutch criminal procedure shape the 
experiences of complainants. The aim of these interviews was to provide support for 
the limited analysis of the treatment of complainants, and rape complainants in 
particular, contained in the literature. The aim was to advance knowledge in this area 
through bringing together a consolidated analysis of the legal situation corroborated 
by original interviews with Dutch criminal justice professionals.
Chapter one o f this study provides a guide to the fundamental features of English and 
Dutch criminal procedure. By examining the two systems from the perspective o f the 
complainant, Chapter one seeks to provide a broader insight into the differences 
between criminal proceedings in England and Wales and the Netherlands. The 
relationship between the features identified in this chapter and the treatment of rape 
complainants in criminal proceedings in both countries is the subject of subsequent 
chapters.
Chapter two examines the insistence upon direct oral evidence in English criminal 
trials and explores its implications for complainants in rape cases. The assumptions 
underlying the principle o f orality are examined and challenged. This chapter argues 
that the interests o f vulnerable complainants conflict with the basic evidentiary
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safeguards o f adversarial proceedings and consequently, the protection that can be 
offered vulnerable complainants is very limited.
Chapter three explores how the very different assumptions which inform Dutch 
criminal procedure shape the experiences of rape complainants in the Netherlands. 
Key advantages of the Dutch system for rape complainants are identified. Chapter 
three also discusses the possible future impact of the European Convention on Human 
Rights on Dutch criminal procedure. This chapter argues against a forced shift 
towards adversarial style proceedings.
Chapter four examines the inability of rape complainants in English criminal 
proceedings to tell their stories. This chapter describes how complainants are tightly 
controlled by advocates in court and explains why the narrative freedom of witnesses 
must be severely curtailed in adversarial criminal proceedings. Chapter four also 
discusses the recent introduction of a scheme aimed at giving complainants the 
opportunity to describe the impact of a crime upon their lives.
Chapter five explores whether the different form in which evidence is presented in 
Dutch criminal trials allows rape complainants greater narrative freedom to tell theii 
stories. This chapter also examines whether the existence of the adhesion procedure in 
the Netherlands which enables complainants to join a civil claim to criminal 
proceedings gives complainants a voice in criminal trials.
Chapter six examines the cross-examination of rape complainants in criminal trials in 
England and Wales. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the treatment o f rape 
victims during cross-examination is largely attributable to the structure and 
assumptions o f the adversarial process. Chapter six argues that cross-examination is 
an inappropriate mechanism for testing the evidence of rape complainants.
Chapter seven seeks to explain the limited protection afforded rape complainants in 
court in England and Wales by both prosecution barristers and trial judges. It is 
argued that the vulnerability of rape complainants during cross-examination is largely 
a structural consequence of the adversarial process. Chapter seven also examines the 
case for legal representation for rape complainants in criminal proceedings.
Chapter eight explores the examination o f rape complainants at pre-trial hearings in 
the Netherlands. This chapter addresses criticism of the treatment o f rape 
complainants by both defence lawyers and examining magistrates. Chapter eight seeks
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to explain differences in the questioning o f rape complainants in England and Wales 
and the Netherlands as well as providing reasons for similarities in the treatment o f 
rape complainants.
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Chapter One - Fundamental Features of English and Dutch 
Criminal Procedure Compared
1.1. Introduction
Comparative research has rarely had as its focus the experience and treatment of 
victims within a given system. While the basic distinctions between adversarial and 
inquisitorial criminal procedure have been identified, their meaning for victims is 
invariably unexplored. This failure to consider the victim has meant that fundamental 
differences between adversarial and inquisitorial processes have either remained 
undeveloped or have escaped examination altogether. In English legal texts on 
criminal procedure the position of the victim/complainant within the trial process 
rarely features. Where the role of the victim is considered it is a matter dealt with only 
briefly. Similarly, while much has been written in recent years on Dutch criminal 
procedure, the position and treatment o f the complainant rarely features prominently. 
As a consequence, features of English and Dutch criminal proceedings which have an 
important bearing on the experience of victims have escaped full examination.
This chapter provides a comparative guide to criminal procedure in England and 
Wales and the Netherlands that focuses on those features that hold particular 
significance for complainants in both systems, specifically rape complainants. 
Examining criminal procedure from the perspective of the complainant, it is 
submitted, yields, if  not new, broader insights into criminal procedure in both 
countries.
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1.2. The English Criminal Trial
Criminal procedure in England and Wales focuses upon the trial, the day in court.
“Unlike the continental system of trials, based on the Civil Law, the 
English system is an adversary system, in which the contest is waged 
on a day in court.”51
The court bases its decision upon evidence presented at the trial.
“The crucial stage in adversarial proceedings is the public hearing.
Here the process culminates, more or less isolated from the pre-trial 
investigation. It is the oral screening of evidence for which the public 
hearing is designed and the oral performance of witnesses, the defence, 
and the prosecution that is decisive. With a few exceptions, evidence 
gathered during pre-trial investigations is of no value unless tested at a 
public hearing.”52
This is not to underestimate the importance of pre-trial processes that 1 educe the 
likelihood o f a criminal case coming before a court, or to ignore the fact that the 
majority of defendants never experience the English criminal trial in all its glory . In 
England and Wales, the majority of cases result in a guilty plea and no trial follows at 
all. O f cases that go to trial, most will be tried in the magistrates court because they 
involve summary only offences or, if  triable either way offences are involved, because 
the defendant failed to elect trial by jury in the Crown Court. Ashworth argues that the 
adversarial trial is merely the tip o f the iceberg and that a misplaced emphasis on the 
trial itself fails to acknowledge the importance of the pre-trial process.53 Ashworth 
rejects the traditionally held view that the trial is the centrepiece of the English
51 Egglestone, R., Evidence, P roof and Probability (1978, London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson), at 35
52 J5rg, N., Field, S., Brants, C., ‘Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging’ in (eds) 
Harding, C., Fennell, P., Jorg, N., Swart, B., Criminal Justice in Europe:A Comparative Study, 
(1995, Oxford: Clarendon Press), at 52
53 Ashworth, A., “Criminal Justice and the Criminal Process”(1988) 28 Brit. J. Criminol. at 113
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criminal justice system and argues that the focus should now shift to pre-trial 
processes;
“But an accurate description of the criminal process must now take 
account o f the pressures toward the avoidance of the very adversary 
procedure which is said to characterise it - pressures to confess, to 
accept summary trial in many cases and to plead guilty to one or more 
charges.”54
“A full-dress trial may be less of a centrepiece than a monument to the 
failure of the many pre-trial machinations to produce a guilty plea.”'’5
When a case actually comes before the Crown Court however, it is the evidence 
presented in court and the performance of witnesses and barristers on the day, that 
count. In this sense, the trial remains the centrepiece of English criminal pioceedings.
1.2.1. A Contest
The English criminal trial is structured as a contest between the prosecution and 
defence. A contest in which the prosecution bears the burden of proof. The criminal 
trial is a hearing to decide whether the prosecution have discharged the burden oi 
proof and proved the defendant guilty.
“The trial itself is not an investigation into events or allegations, but 
rather a hearing to decide, within a complex set of rules, whether the 
defendant is proved to be guilty of the particular offences which the 
prosecution have charged him with.” 6
“The trial is an adversarial one; a contest between prosecution and 
defence as to whether the prosecution can prove guilt to the requisite 
standard, rather than an inquiry by the state into certain events.
The legal burden o f proof stated simply is the obligation to prove.58 The party upon 
whom the legal burden is placed must satisfy the court on that issue to the requisite
54 ibid
55 ibid
56 Walker, R., Walker and W alker’s English Legal System, (1994, London: Butterworths), at 433
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standard. The standard of proof required to discharge the legal burden in criminal 
proceedings in England and Wales is beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the evidence 
presented satisfies this standard will be decided by the jury. The trial judge will direct 
the jury on the standard the prosecution are required to meet. When the defendant 
bears the legal burden the appropriate standard of proof is proof on a balance of 
probabilities. The party bearing the burden of proof will lose if he or she fails to 
discharge the burden. In general the legal burden of proving a fact essential to the 
prosecution case rests upon the prosecution.39
“Under the adversarial method, the person (or body) with the duty of 
deciding guilt or the lack of it leaves the responsibility to the 
prosecution and defence to present their case. It is inherent in such a 
system that one side or the other must bear the burden of proof. It is 
central to our version of the adversarial system that in a criminal case 
that burden is upon the prosecution, who must discharge it beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’’60
There are certain exceptions to the general rule that the prosecution will bear the legal 
burden. These are where a statute expressly or impliedly places the legal burden on 
the defence and where the accused raises the defence o f insanity.
1.2.2. Competing Stories
The English criminal trial is fundamentally a contest between competing versions of 
events; competing stories. Evidence is presented in the form of conflicting stories told 
by advocates in court. It was the researchers Bennett and Feldman who first analysed 
the organisation of criminal trials around storytelling. Bennett and Feldman studied 
the American criminal trial process and concluded that stories constitute an analytical
57 Blake, N., “The Case for the Jury”, in (eds), Findlay, M., Duff, P., The Jury Under Attack (1988,
London:Butterworths), at 140
58 Keane, A., The M odem  Law o f  Evidence, (1996, London:Butterworths) at 68
59 See Woolmington v DPP  [1935] AC 462 (HL)
60 Sprack, J., “The Trial Process”, in (eds) Stockdale, E., Casale, S., Criminal Justice Under Stress 
(1992, London:Blackstone), at 68
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device which enables lay participants, particularly jurors, to manage the complex 
arguments and large amount of information presented in court.
“The story is an everyday form of communication that enables a 
diverse cast of courtroom characters to follow the development of a 
case and reason about the issues in it. Despite the image o f legal 
jargon, lawyers’ mysterious tactics, and obscure court procedures, any 
criminal case can be reduced to the simple form of a story. Through the 
broadly shared techniques of telling and interpreting stories, the actors 
present, organise, and analyse the evidence that bears on the alleged 
illegal activity.”61
The proximity o f stories to everyday conversation, it is argued, enables jurors to play 
an effective role in criminal proceedings.
“Stories are the stuff of courtroom interaction as they are the stuff of 
everyday conversation, so it is not difficult for untrained lay persons to 
enter into the spirit o f the occasion and the task of judgment.”6"
The unique nature of courtroom stories must however be recognised. Unlike everyday 
stories, the stories told in court are shaped by complex rules of evidence and strategic 
considerations. The contest framework has a significant impact upon the stories told.
The presentation of evidence in English criminal proceedings in the form of 
competing stories told by advocates in court has implications for complainants. In this 
study it is argued that courtroom storytelling plays an important role in the denigration 
and humiliation of rape complainants during cross-examination.6 The presentation of 
evidence in this form also explains in part, it is claimed, why complainants in criminal 
proceedings are denied the opportunity to tell their stories in their own words.64
61 Bennett, W.L., Feldman, M., Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom (1981, New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press), at 4
62 Stephenson, G., The Psychology o f  Criminal Justice (1992, Oxford:BlackweIl), at 136
63 See Chapter Six
64 See Chapter Four
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1.2.3. Principle o f Orality
A defining characteristic of English criminal procedure is adherence to the principle 
o f  orality .65
“English law, and more widely the Anglo-American common law, it is 
commonly asserted, rests on the orality of the trial process, and the 
primary place which oral evidence has within it.
“Perhaps the most important feature of an English trial, civil or 
criminal, is its ‘orality’. Much greater weight is attached to answers 
given by witnesses in court on oath or affirmation than to written 
statements previously made by them.’ 67
Within adversarial theory direct oral evidence is regarded as intrinsically more reliable 
than written evidence. Sworn oral testimony is preferred to written depositions.
“One of the fundamental assumptions behind the rules of evidence in 
the English speaking world is that the oral testimony of live witnesses 
at trial is greatly superior to any other type of evidence.”68
The examination o f witnesses in court is consequently central to the English criminal 
procedure. As a general rule, witnesses are required to attend and give evidence m 
court;
“The elucidation of the facts by means o f questions put by parties or 
their representatives to witnesses summoned, for the most part, by 
them, called mainly in the order of their choice, before a judge, acting 
as umpire rather than inquisitor, is the essential feature of the English 
‘adversarial’ or ‘accusatorial’ system of justice.”69
65 “The centrepiece o f the adversary system is the oral system...” Devlin, P., The Judge (1979, 
OxfordiOxford University Press), at 54
66 Honere, Tony., ‘The Primacy o f Oral Evidence?’ in (ed) Tapper, C., Crime, P roof and  
Punishment Essays in Memory o f  Sir Rupert Cross (1981, London: Butterworths) at 172
67 Tapper, C., Tapper and Cross on Evidence (1995, London:Butterworths), at 284
68 Spencer, J.R., Flin, R., Evidence o f  Children.the Law and the Psychology, (1993, 
London:Blackstone), at 266
69 Tapper, C., (1995), op cit 265
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This insistence upon direct oral evidence is grounded in the basic assumptions that 
inform the adversarial fact finding process. One assumption is that truthful testimony 
is promoted by a witness giving his or her evidence in public. It is assumed that a 
witness is less inclined to lie in court in the presence of an audience;
“Awed by the presence o f outside on-lookers, fearing exposure o f any 
falsehoods, persons called to give testimony will do so more 
conscientiously than if they were totally shielded from scrutiny.”70
A second assumption is that truthful testimony is promoted by the presence of the 
defendant. It is assumed that an accuser is less likely to lie in the physical presence of 
the accused. A confrontation between the defendant and the complainant is thought to 
be truth enhancing in adversarial theory. The formality and austerity of the courtroom 
are also believed to enhance the truth-finding process. It is assumed that the 
intimidating and imposing environment of the courtroom will deter dishonest 
testimony. Exposure to the truth promoting presence of defendant, the public and the 
intimidatory surrounding of the courtroom means that direct oral testimony in couit is 
judged more reliable.
According to adversarial theory, live oral testimony is also exposed to three further 
important safeguards. The first of these is that the witness gives evidence upon oath. 
The sanction of perjury is assumed to deter dishonest testimony. Unsworn evidence is 
consequently viewed as less reliable. A second safeguard is the court s opportunity to 
observe the witness. Within adversarial theory great importance is attached to the 
observation o f witness demeanour by the tribunal of fact;
“It is accepted in courts that a witness’s demeanour is a significant 
factor in the assessment of the credibility of his evidence.”71
“Traditionally, much stress has been placed on the importance o f being 
able to observe the witness’s demeanour.”72
70 Berger, V., “M an’s Trial, W oman’s TribulatiomRape Cases in the Courtroom” [1977] 1 Colum. 
L.Rev. at 89
71 Stone, M., The P roo f o f  Facts in Criminal Trials (1984, Edinburgh:Green), at 150
72 Spencer, J.R., “Orality and the Evidence o f Absent Witnesses” [1994] Crim. L.R. at 637
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It is believed that the demeanour o f witnesses provides an insight into their sincerity. 
This assumption is based on the belief that the dishonest witness will betray herself 
through facial expression and other non-verbal behaviour.
“The notion that viewing the appearance and demeanour of a witness 
significantly assists a trier of fact to determine the truthfulness of the 
witness’s testimony appears to be as ancient as testimony itself. The 
supposed ability o f jurors and judges to discern sincerity or deception 
from non-verbal manifestations has had an important role in legal 
discourse and doctrine.”73
The demeanour of witnesses, it is assumed, enables the tribunal of fact to judge the 
credibility o f testimony. The testimony o f a witness whose demeanour has not been 
observed is consequently viewed as less reliable.
The primary claimed safeguard to which direct oral evidence is subjected is however, 
cross-examination. Cross-examination is extolled within adversarial theory as the 
most effective test of veracity.
“For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system ot 
Evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross- 
examination as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no safeguard 
for testing the value of human statements is comparable to that 
furnished by cross-examination.74
“ it is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented toi the 
discovery o f truth.”75
The effectiveness of cross-examination as a device for exposing inconsistency and 
deceit is mostly taken as read by common law lawyers. Much faith is placed in the 
capacity of cross-examination to expose the dishonest, mistaken, and unreliable 
witness, to uncover inconsistency, contradiction and inaccuracy in oral testimony. 1 he 
confidence placed in cross-examination is exemplified by the little weight attached to 
evidence elicited in examination-in-chief from a witness who dies before cross­
73 Wellborn, Olin Guy., “Demeanour” (1991) 76 Cornell. L.Rev. at 1104
74 Wigmore, J.H., A Treatise on the Anglo-American System o f  Evidence in Trials at Common Law  
(1940, 3rd ed., Boston:Little Brown) vol. 5 at sec. 1367
75 ibid
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examination.76 Testimony that has not been subjected to the rigours o f cross- 
examination is considered to be of less probative force. It is seen as a fundamental 
right o f the accused in a criminal trial to have the evidence of prosecution witnesses 
tested by cross-examination.
“English law lays great store on the examination of witnesses in open 
court in the presence of the trial judge and regards it as o f the utmost 
importance that they should be subject to cross-examination, so that 
opposing counsel may ‘test the credit’ of the witness.”77
In this study it is argued that much o f the distress caused rape complainants in 
criminal proceedings stems from the insistence upon direct oral evidence. It is argued 
that the experiences of complainants in court raise important questions about the 
validity of those assumptions which underlie the principle of orality, assumptions 
which are rarely challenged.
1.2.4. The Law of Evidence
A complex and elaborate set of rules of evidence is a defining characteristic of 
adversarial proceedings. The law of evidence in England and Wales is of a laij_,ely 
exclusionary character and is largely designed to regulate the presentation of evidence 
in court. Much of the law of evidence concerns the concept of admissibility. Clearly, 
considerations o f time and cost ensure that limits must be set on what evidence can be 
heard irrespective o f the model of criminal justice concerned,
“In litigation, the facts must be ascertained by taking evidence and the 
exigencies of the legal process require that somewhere in the search for 
truth a halt must be called; otherwise litigation would become 
interminable.” 7S
76 R V  Doolin [1882] 1 Jebb CC 123 cited in Keane, A.,The Modern Law o f  Evidence ( 1996, 
London:Butterworths)
77 Egglestone, R., (1978), op cit at 35
78 ibid  at 4
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The concept o f relevance allows a line to be drawn on the evidence to be introduced in 
court. However, the law of evidence in England and Wales excludes relevant 
evidence.
“One of the chief differences between the English and the continental 
systems is that the English excludes various categories of evidence in 
spite o f the fact that they are relevant to the matters in dispute.”79
According to Zander, the exclusionary rules of evidence fall into three mam 
categories; unduly prejudicial evidence, inherently unreliable evidence and evidence 
excluded because it is against the public interest that it be admitted.''0 The reason most 
often cited for the existence of such evidentiary rules is the jury system. Fear that lay 
persons were incapable of according the appropriate probative force to classes of 
evidence led to its exclusion.
“In the seventeenth century there were few controls over the evidence 
that a criminal jury could hear, and no treatises dealing with the 
subject. Modern juries, on the other hand, hear only evidence that has 
been filtered by a system of exclusionary rules, the assumption being 
that they have to be protected from evidence that might be in some way 
prejudiced.”81
“The adversarial trial system plays an important part in determining the 
rules that govern admissibility: many o f the technical rules o f evidence 
that exist do so because it has been considered necessary to legulate the 
type of evidence that can properly be put before a jury, in order to 
ensure a fair trial.”8"
Other commentators attribute the development of an exclusionary law o f evidence to 
the dominant role played by the parties in adversarial proceedings. These 
commentators link the growth of exclusionary rules with the corresponding
79 Zander, M., Cases and Materials on the English Legal System  ( 1996, London:Butterworths) at 
321
80 ibid
81 Beattie, J.M., Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800, (1986, Oxford:Clarendon Press) at 
36
82 Walker, R., (1994), op cit 54
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ascendancy o f lawyers in criminal trials and contentious advocacy. Evidentiary rules 
were required to ensure fairness between the parties;
“The adversary system grew as a consequence of the steady narrowing 
o f judicial authority. Lawyers supplanted judges as managers of the 
courtroom contest. The rules of evidence limited judicial discretion, 
and contentious examination replaced the inquisition.”83
“At the beginning of the century, non-adversarial methods were 
ascendant. Strong willed judges dominated the examination of 
witnesses while parties played only a modest role in the interrogative 
process. Few rules of evidence or procedure cabined judicial activity at 
trial.. Over the course of the century all of this changed. The parties, 
or more accurately, highly skilled advocates on their behalf assumed 
ever greater responsibility for interrogation, while the judges retreated 
from inquisitorial activism and accepted a far more neutral and passive 
role. Rules of evidence and procedure multiplied and a contentious
mechanism arose.”84
Much of the complexity of the law of evidence is owed to the rule against hearsay 
evidence with its numerous exceptions. Wigmore has described the hearsay rule as,
“the most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law o f Evidence- a 
rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest contribution 
of that eminently practical legal system to the world's methods o f 
procedure.”83
Basically, the hearsay rule states;
“an assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral 
evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence o f any fact 
asserted.” 86
83 Landsman, S., ‘Rise o f the Contentious Spirit:Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century 
England’ (1990) 75 Cornell L.Rev 604
84 Landsman, S., “From Gilbert to Bentham:The Reconceptualisation o f Evidence Theory” (1990)
36 W a y n e  L.Rev. at 1150
85 Wigmore, J.H., (1940) op cit at sec. 1364
86 Tapper, C., (1995), op cit at 564
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Hearsay evidence is evidence that has not been exposed to the truth promoting and 
truth testing mechanisms of the adversarial trial and is therefore regarded as 
intrinsically unreliable.
“(Hearsay) is not the best evidence and it is not delivered on oath. The 
truthfulness and accuracy of the person whose words are spoken to by 
another witness cannot be tested by cross-examination, and the light 
which his demeanour would throw on his testimony is lost.”87
Significantly, the acceptance of out o f court statements by the courts as admissible 
evidence would deprive the court o f the opportunity to test the veracity of the 
statement and the integrity of the maker through cross-examination. The exclusion oi 
hearsay evidence is attributed largely to the fact that juries can not be trusted to attach 
the appropriate weight to such evidence.
“Legal historians are divided between those who ascribe the 
development of the rule predominantly to the distrust of the capacity of 
the jury to evaluate it, and those who ascribe it predominantly to the 
unfairness o f depriving a party of the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.”88
“It is largely because of the increased dangers of impaired perception, 
bad memory, ambiguity and insincerity, coupled with the decreased 
effectiveness o f conventional safeguards, that hearsay is regarded as so 
particularly vulnerable as to require a special exclusionary rule.
The hearsay rule has obvious implications for complainants. The rule dictates that 
witnesses appear in court to give evidence in all but a number of very limited 
circumstances.
“Although certain common law and statutory exceptions do exist, the 
hearsay rule provides a major obstacle for those seeking to introduce 
anything other than the direct oral evidence of witnesses at the trial.
87 per Lord Normand Teper v R [1952] AC 480, 486
88 Tapper, C., (1995), op cit at 565
89 ib id  at 514
90 Beijer, A., Cobley, C., Klip, A., “Witness Evidence, Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Principle of Open Justice , in (eds), Harding, C., Fennell, P., Jorg, N., 
Swart, B., C r im in a l  Justice in Europe: A Comparative Study, (1995, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 
285
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The exclusionary character of the law o f evidence also explains in part, why the 
narrative freedom of complainants/witnesses is severely curtailed when giving 
evidence in court. It explains why complainants find themselves abruptly interrupted 
or skilfully manipulated by both prosecution and defence barristers as they attempt to 
tell their stories from the witness-box.91
1.2.5. The Course of the Trial
The first stage in the criminal trial is the arraignment where a defendant is asked to 
plead guilty or not guilty. Within the adversarial system a guilty plea brings the fact­
finding process to a halt. A ‘not guilty’ plea is not necessarily synonymous with a 
positive assertion o f innocence. Rather it can be seen as a challenge to the prosecution 
to prove the case against a defendant. Following an arraignment, the prosecution will 
deliver its opening speech in which the prosecutor will outline the prosecution case to 
the jury and will summarise the evidence she or he intends to call, hollowing the 
opening speech the prosecutor will call witnesses. Witnesses give evidence on oath, 01 
alternatively by affirmation, in accordance with the Oaths Act 1978, The prosecution 
witness will firstly, be examined by the prosecutor; examination-in-chief. It will then 
be the turn of defence counsel to cross-examine the witness. Following cross- 
examination the prosecutor will have the opportunity to re-examine his or her witness. 
Once all the prosecution witnesses have been called, the defence may make a 
submission of no case to answer. It is for the judge to decide whether any jury 
properly directed could convict upon the evidence. The defence case will then follow. 
Defence witnesses will be called and examined. Counsel for the prosecution and then 
for the defence will make their closing speeches. The closing speeches are followed 
by the judge’s summing up. In the summing up, the trial judge will give a summary of 
the facts of the case and will comment on the evidence presented before the court. The 
judge will also instruct the jury on points of law. This will include explaining to the 
jury all the matters that the prosecution have to prove to establish guilt. The trial judge
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will also advise the jury of their respective roles. It is for the jury to decide whether 
facts have been proved while it is the role of the trial judge to decide on matters of 
law. The summing up will include instruction on the burden and standard of proof. 
Following a period of deliberation the jury will deliver their verdict. Verdicts may be 
majority verdicts in accordance with the Juries Act 1974 section 17. In general the 
judge has no power to reject a jury’s verdict however much he may disagree with it. 
Once the defendant has pleaded guilty or been found guilty in the Crown Court, the 
next stage is sentencing. Responsibility for sentencing rests solely with the trial judge. 
It is not open to the prosecuting counsel to suggest an appropriate sentence. I he court 
will also be informed of the offender’s antecedents which will include previous 
convictions. The court will consider any reports compiled on the offender such as pre­
sentence reports prepared by probation officers. The defence will then make a speech 
in mitigation. The court will then impose a sentence.
1.2.5.1. Open Court Principle
The open court principle is a central feature of the English criminal trial and the 
majority o f criminal trials are held in open court.
“It is an old adage that justice must not only be done but be seen to be 
done. It is therefore axiomatic that judicial business should be 
transacted in public.”92
The general principle that courts should sit in public was laid down in Scott v Scott 
[1913J.93 The presence o f the public it is argued, acts as an effective check on abuse;
“Without publicity all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of 
publicity all other checks are of small account.”94
91 See Chapter Four
92 Zander, M., (1996), op cit at 315
93 [1913] AC 417 HL
94 Bentham, J., (1827) Rationale of Judicial Evidence vol 1 523-4 cited in (ed) Twining, W„ 
Rethinking Evidence:Exploratory Essays, (1994, Evanston:Northwestern Press), at 183
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There are exceptions to the rule, for example, cases involving matters o f national 
security are conducted in camera. Criminal proceedings in youth courts trying young 
offenders do so in private. Courts also have statutory powers to remove the public 
when a child is giving evidence in criminal proceedings.9’ This power is however 
rarely exercised. Victims of sexual violence are generally compelled to relive their 
ordeal, to give evidence of an explicitly sexual nature, in public.
1.2.6. The Jury
Criminal cases tried in the Crown Court are tried by a jury.
“Trial by jury is at the heart of the Anglo-Saxon system of criminal 
trial. The institution of the jury has moulded the whole of English 
criminal procedure.”96
The jury is the final arbiter of matters o f fact in criminal trials. A jury consists of 
twelve people randomly selected between the ages of 18-70. Certain groups are 
excluded from sitting on a jury such as the judiciary and the clergy. The jury system 
has been celebrated as a guardian of civil liberties, a symbol of participatory 
democracy. Increasingly however, the traditional justifications of the jury system aie 
being questioned.
“Adulation of the jury is based on no justification or spurious 
justification. It has fed public complacency with the English legal 
system and distracted attention from its evils: a systematic lack oi due 
process pre-trial and post-trial and certain deficiencies in the trial 
process itself It has distorted the truth. The truth is that for most 
people who pass through the criminal justice system this palladium is 
simply not available and for those who can and do submit themselves 
to its verdict, it will not necessarily safeguard their liberties.”99
95 Children and Young Persons Act 1933 s.37
96 Blake, N., (1988), op cit at 140
97 Juries Act 1974 s.l
98 Juries Act 1972 s.l and Parts I and II o f Schedule 1 to the Act.
99 Darbyshire, P., “The Lamp That Shows That Freedom Lives- Is it Worth the Candle?” [1991] 
Crim.L.R. 740, at 741
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Criticism of pro-jury rhetoric centres, in part, upon the fact that only a small number 
of cases are tried before a jury prompting the question - if  jury trial is second to none, 
why is it reserved for so few?
“O f criminal cases, about 5 per cent, are dealt with by the Crown 
Court. O f those cases, over two thirds are resolved in a guilty plea, 
leaving just 2 per cent, to be tried by jury.” 100
There has for some time been debate as to whether juries should be used in long, 
complex, fraud cases and concerns expressed as to whether juries comprehend 
complicated jury directions. A major obstacle to evaluation of the jury system is the 
effective ban on research into jury decision-making. The Contempt o f Court Act 1981 
section 8 made it contempt to publish or solicit for publication details of what happens 
in the jury room. The need for such research is clear;
“It is absurd to continue in the present state of ignorance in the 
pretence that the functioning o f the jury is one o f the great mystiques 
of the law which is so sacred that it cannot be questioned.”101
The Runciman Commission are among those to recommend the abolition of section 
8.102 At present, the role played by the jury in the treatment o f rape complainants in 
court remains a matter o f speculation and surmise.
1.2.7. Summary
The assumptions which inform the adversarial fact-finding process that culminate in a 
contest waged in court where direct oral evidence is largely insisted upon shape the 
experiences o f rape complainants in criminal proceedings. The importance attached to 
witness demeanour, performance and public confrontation, combined with the faith
100 ibid  at 746
101 Bannington, A., “The Jury- a suitable case for treatment?” (1995) 145(i) N.L.J. 848
102 Home Office, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report (1993, London :HMSO)
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placed in live cross-examination, all have important roles to play in the secondary 
victimisation of rape complainants.
38
1.3. Dutch Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure
The focus of criminal proceedings in the Netherlands is very much upon the pre-trial 
investigative stage and not upon the trial.
“..the trial stricto sensu plays a rather limited role in the Dutch 
prosecution process. The main emphasis lies upon the preliminary 
stages, and what has been found out there is o f decisive importance for 
the trial itself.”10’
Inquisitorial criminal proceedings are structured as a continuous process of proof,
“Proof is not constituted at the post-investigation stage, but throughout 
the entire process.”104
At the heart of Dutch criminal procedure is the dossier. The decision o f the trial court 
will be based primarily upon its contents. At each stage of the investigative process 
the dossier is added to and then handed on. The pre-trial stage of Dutch criminal 
procedure is centred around ensuring that the dossier contains all relevant evidence 
and ensuring that the dossier is a sound basis for judgment at trial.
“It is not an internal unofficial document, as case files are in England 
but an official and legally competent basis for prosecution and 
conviction.”105
A summary of the possible contents of the dossier is provided by Field et al;
“(1) the police file: this consists of a formal account of arrest, search 
and seizure, police detention, witnesses statements, the appearance of
103 B e e r l i n g ,  H . W . R . ,  “An Outline o f Dutch Criminal Procedure” , (1976) 5 Anglo-Am.L.Rev 50 at
60
104 Jackson, J., Doran, S., Judge Without Jury Diplock Trials in the Adversary System, (1995, 
Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 68
105 Field, S., Alldridge, P., Jorg, N., “Prosecutors, Examining Judges and the Control o f Police 
Investigations”, in (eds), Harding, C., Fennell, P., Jorg, N., Swart, B., Criminal Justice in 
Europe.A Comparative Study (1995, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 234
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counsel, (various) statements of the accused, police evidence from the 
scene o f the crime, summary of the results of wire-tapping, and (where 
applicable),
(2) the file o f the investigating judge: a statement of the accused, and 
of witnesses interrogated by the investigating judge on request by the 
prosecutor or defence counsel; forensic expert evidence; social and 
psychiatric reports; results of wire-tapping and an inventory of seized 
objects.
(3) the pre-trial detention file: a formal account of all the decisions 
taken on such detention, together with statements by the defendant 
before the examining judge and possibly before the court in chambers 
when further extended detention is requested,
(4) a file of pre-trial proceedings: wire-tapping orders, seizure of 
property orders, record of appeal against pre-trial detention oiders 
and/or decisions on requests to discontinue the prosecution.”106
The decision o f the trial judge(s) is made largely on the basis of these reports. Where 
no instruction has taken place, as in the majority of cases, the police file is clearly 
crucial.
“Judges expect all relevant and exculpatory and inculpatory evidence 
to be already in the file.”107
A number o f officials are charged with ensuring that the dossier is thorough and 
complete including the public prosecutor, the examining magistrate and the defence 
lawyer. The role o f these figures and the part they play in the compilation of the 
dossier is examined below.
1.3.1. The Public Prosecutor- (Officier van justitie)
All criminal cases commence with an investigation by the police. Following a 
complaint, the police will interview witnesses and the suspect. The police will then 
make a written record of these interviews, proces-verbal. These written records 
become the police file. The police file then becomes part of the dossier. The 
provisionally closed police file will then be passed on to the public prosecutor. The
106 ibid
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public prosecutor plays a crucial role in Dutch criminal proceedings. It is the public 
prosecutor who decides whether to prosecute a case and directs the investigation until 
the point o f the trial.108 One of the roles o f the public prosecutor is chief o f 
investigation.109 The public prosecutor heads the investigation right up until the case 
comes to trial at which point responsibility passes to the court. The public prosecutor 
is however, rarely directly involved in the police investigation. As director of the 
investigation, the task of the prosecutor is to ensure that all germane evidence is 
contained in the file and to monitor the evidentiary quality o f the dossier. The 
prosecutor must seek out both exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence. The 
prosecutor may direct the police to pursue lines of inquiry favourable to the defence 
and may request a pre-trial hearing before an examining magistrate. The key to 
understanding the role of the public prosecutor within Dutch criminal proceedings is 
to understand both the institutional incentives which operate upon public prosecutors 
and that public prosecutors are regarded, and more importantly regard themselves, as 
judicial figures in the Netherlands.
1.3.1.1. Institutional Incentives
“Dutch prosecutors are under pressure to use their power within the 
system to ensure that the dossier is thorough and complete as a 
statement o f germane evidence pointing to both conviction and 
acquittal.”110
It is open to defence lawyers to request further investigation into perceived 
ambiguities or alleged impropriety. If a public prosecutor fails to act upon such a 
request, the trial judge may postpone the trial for such investigation to be conducted. 
For the public prosecutor, this carries the stigma of failing to display proper judicial 
impartiality and of bureaucratic inefficiency. Where postponement leads to a lengthy 
delay o f proceeding this may lead to a discharge. The importance of these incentives 
is emphasised by Field et al;
107 ibid
108 C.C.P Art 148
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110 Field, S., et al (1995), op cit at 325
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“It is institutional incentives to thoroughness in the of investigation of 
both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence that are the strength of the 
system.”1"
I.3.I.2. Judicial Figures
In the Netherlands, public prosecutors are seen, by the public and criminal justice 
professionals, as judicial figures;
“ ..the prosecutor must not attempt to secure the conviction of the 
accused at all costs, but must approach the case impartially.”112
“In relation to his role in the pre-trial stage o f the process, the 
prosecutor is legally seen as a public agent serving the general interest 
rather than a party.”113
A twelve month study carried out by Van de Bunt, cited in Field et al, reports that 
Dutch public prosecutors do, in fact, perceive themselves as judicial figures and not as 
a contending parties."4 Van de Bunt states that prosecutors are;
“ ..keen to present themselves as magistrates; according to their own 
statements, they do not see themselves as one of the contending parties, 
but as dignitaries of the court, engaged in an impartial weighing of the 
different interests involved, just like any judge who passes right 
judgments.”115
This view is confirmed by other Dutch commentators;
“According to the view generally held in the Netherlands, the 
prosecutor may not simply think in terms of winning and losing.
1,1 ibid
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“Strictly speaking, there are no parties in Dutch criminal procedure. As 
far as public prosecutors are concerned, the term is inappropriate, for 
they represent the public interest which will benefit most from the 
correct and just application of law.”
The self image of public prosecutors is undoubtedly influenced by their judicial
function and training;
“It is particularly important in the Dutch system for the public 
prosecutors to be educated and trained together with future members 
o f the Bench, both being future members of the judiciary. Although the 
two careers develop differently, and the Public Prosecutor s 
Department is seen as the administrative arm of the judiciary- and has 
accordingly to improve its managerial capabilities- it is to the benefit 
o f a democratic and independent administration of justice that public 
prosecutors should think and operate in a judicial manner.”1
1.3.2. The Examining Magistrate -(Rechter-Commissaris)
In the Netherlands the examining magistrate has a number o f important functions. It is 
the examining magistrate who authorises coercive measures such as search and 
seizure, wire-tapping and the interception of mail. The examining magistrate also has 
an investigative role and directs pre-trial hearings. The function o f the pre-trial 
hearing is to gather further information and the task of the examining magistrate is to 
ensure that the dossier contains all germane evidence and is a legally competent basis 
for judgment at the trial.
“The preliminary judicial investigation is aimed primarily at clarifying 
the case to such an extent that the public prosecutor can duly decide 
whether or not to take the prosecution case further. A second aim is to 
collect relevant information that may help the trial judge to reach a 
correct decision.” ' 18
117 Holthuis, H., “The Role of the Public Prosecutor in the Netherlands” in NACRO International 
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The pre-trial hearing also represents an opportunity for early intervention by the 
defence, where the suspect may tell his story and the defence raise any concerns about 
the evidentiary quality of the dossier. Pre-trial hearings are however, only held in 
serious cases;
“Actual criminal instruction, in which the examining magistrate gets 
personally involved in the investigation process and questions 
witnesses and the defendant, only takes place in about j  per cent of the 
cases that go to court.” ' 19
“In general, the main task of the examining magistrate is to carry out 
the investigation in more serious and complex cases so that the trial 
judge is no longer confronted with disputed matters of fact.
It is the public prosecutor who decides whether or not to refer a case to the examining
magistrate. Referral to the examining magistrate is never mandatory whatever the
offence. Defence counsel may also request an instruction, lhe trial judge may also
refer a case to the examining magistrate if he or she decides further investigation is
required. At the hearing the examining magistrate will examine the accused,
witnesses, including the complainant, and interview any experts. As a general rule, an
examining magistrate will examine witnesses and the accused separately although a
confrontation may be arranged at the discretion of the examining magistrate or at the
121request of the defence or the public prosecutor.
Neither the accused nor the defence lawyer have an absolute right to attend the 
examination o f witnesses. The wide discretion of examining magistrates to exclude 
defence lawyers extends to the examination of witnesses who will not appear in 
court.122
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“Though there are statutory criteria which normally entitle the defence 
lawyer to be present, the exceptions to the principle are very vague, 
giving great discretion to the investigating judge.”123
Field et al identify this as a point of weakness in the Dutch system.1"' A recent study 
cited by Lensing and Rayer reports that defence lawyers attended the witness 
examination in 58 per cent of cases.1-5
A verbatim record o f the hearing is made and is signed by witnesses as accurate. The 
record then forms part of the dossier. The examining magistrate will close the inquiiy 
when she or he believes it to be complete. Both the prosecutor and defence counsel 
may request the reopening of the inquiry and if refused by the examining magistrate 
either may apply to the district court to grant a reopening.
The role of the examining magistrate is not to draw conclusions but to collect 
information. It is clear that the function o f the examining magistrate in the 
Netherlands is more limited than that of the juge d estru c tio n  in France. The 
examining magistrate makes no judgments as to the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant or whether there is sufficient evidence for the case to go to trial.
The thoroughness of the investigation and the impartiality o f the examining magistrate 
are safeguarded by institutional incentives to seek out exculpatory evidence. These are 
similar to those which operate upon public prosecutors. If a trial judge decides that 
further investigation should have been conducted the case will be referred back to the 
examining magistrate;
“And the embarrassment o f repeated referral back for further 
investigation should not be underestimated. RCs want to be seen to be 
efficient in their processing of cases and judicial in their decision­
making. This provides a strong motive for them to show distance and 
impartiality in their day to day dealings with police and prosecutor.
123 ibid
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1.3.3. The Defence Lawyer
The defence lawyer plays a vital role at the pre-trial investigative stage o f Dutch 
criminal proceedings. It is the role o f the defence lawyer to identify any evidentiary 
weaknesses in the dossier, including allegations of impropriety, and ensure that the 
dossier contains all germane evidence. Once the police have passed the investigative 
file to the public prosecutor the complete file must be made available to the defence.'-7 
The defence will therefore have early access to the statements of prosecution 
witnesses.
“The principle o f full disclosure is regarded as being o f great
importance in the Netherlands.”128
The defence may request that the public prosecutor or the examining magistrate 
carries out further investigation. In the Netherlands, a vital function of the defence 
lawyer is to monitor that the public prosecutor and the examining magistrate have 
acted impartially and have pursued exculpatory evidence. At pre-trial hearings, the 
examining magistrate is the primary interrogator of the accused and witnesses 
however, the defence lawyer may ask questions and draw the attention oi the 
examining magistrate to any perceived deficiencies in the file.
1.3.4. Co-operation
“Inquisitorial systems aim at the state actively discovering the truth, 
and the most salient feature of the pre-trial process in the Netherlands 
is probably the degree to which all parties cooperate in arriving at a
127 ibid  at 235
128 ibid
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pre-prepared version of it that is subsequently recorded in a dossier as 
the basis for coming to trial.”129
Criminal procedure in England and Wales reflects adversarial theory’s central 
assumption that partisan investigation, motivated by self-interest, will bring most 
evidence to light. In the Netherlands, in contrast, great faith is placed in investigation 
motivated by public interest. Dutch criminal procedure ultimately relies upon 
cooperation and relationships o f trust between key criminal justice professionals, the 
police, public prosecutor, examining magistrate, and defence. All are entrusted with 
the task of compiling a dossier that will form a competent basis for judgment and 
limiting areas of ambiguity before the court. The diverse influences upon the dossier 
operate as an important safeguard in Dutch criminal proceedings,
“At different times, prosecutor, defence counsel and judge will be 
looking at it for evidence of weakness with the prospect of further 
investigation by police or rechter commissaris.”130
Leigh and Hall Williams studied the role of prosecution and defence lawyers in a 
number o f jurisdictions including the Netherlands, and expressed surprise at the 
“consensus mentality” they encountered.131 This mentality, so foreign to the 
adversarial tradition, is the key to Dutch criminal procedure;
“In the end much of the system depends on the development of a 
relationship of mutual trust between the police, prosecutor, and court in 
the context of institutional incentives very different from those in the 
adversarial system.”132
The emphasis upon the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings in the Netherlands has 
important implications for complainants. In the Netherlands, witnesses are generally 
examined pre-trial. In a rape case, the complainant will generally be questioned at a 
pre-trial hearing held before an examining magistrate rather than in court.
129 Jorg, N., Field, S., Brants, C., ‘Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems Converging?’ in (eds) 
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1.4. The Dutch Criminal Trial
The Dutch criminal trial is structured as an inquiry and not as a party contest. The 
emphasis upon the pre-trial investigative stage o f proceedings in the Netherlands 
diminishes the importance of the trial and means that the criminal trial in the 
Netherlands has a very different function. The criminal trial is not a forum for oral 
argument but for the evaluation of the written evidence contained in the investigative 
file. The Dutch criminal court is engaged in a verification of the evidence contained in 
the dossier rather than an active inquiry. The Dutch trial is not a hearing of fresh 
evidence;
“In short, the trial is not seen as the occasion for an independent 
judicial investigation, nor the occasion for the finding of the truth 
presented by conflicting witnesses. Rather it is the occasion at which it 
is demonstrated that the truth has been found elsewhere by prosecuting 
officials.”133
“Generally speaking the fact finding process is carried out before the 
trial. The trial itself tends toward an evaluative phase in respect to the 
evidence, mainly provided in written form, included in the files.”
In fact, if  fresh evidence comes to light during the course o f the trial the trial judge is 
likely to refer a case back to the examining magistrate or to the public prosecutor for 
further investigation. The English criminal trial is an arena of ambiguity, conflict, and 
disputed facts. In contrast, in the Netherlands, the pre-trial stage of criminal 
proceedings is centred upon limiting areas of dispute before the trial. Stiuctuied as an 
official inquiry, there is no burden of proof as such;
133 Rossett, A., “Trial and Discretion in Dutch Criminal Justice” (1972) 19 UCLA L. Rev. 353 at 376
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48
“A ‘burden of p roof in the Anglo-American meaning as a burden of 
convincing the decision maker, does not exist in the Netherlands.”135
The fact that Dutch criminal proceedings are structured as an inquiry and not as a 
contest has an important bearing on the treatment of rape complainants in the 
Netherlands. In this study it is argued that the competitiveness and combativeness of 
the adversarial contest play a significant role in the secondary victimisation o f rape 
complainants in court in England and Wales. These features are largely lacking in the 
Dutch criminal trial process.
1.4.1. The Use of Written Evidence
In Dutch criminal proceedings direct oral evidence is not viewed as intrinsically more 
reliable than written evidence. Dutch courts rely heavily upon written statements 
made by witnesses during the preliminary investigation. One reason for this is that the 
traditional safeguards of the adversarial fact-finding process are not accorded the same 
importance within Dutch proceedings but are substituted by alternative safeguards. In 
England and Wales, the presence of the defendant and the public, the oath and the 
formality o f the courtroom are all assumed to promote truthful testimony. In the 
Netherlands there is no assumption that the presence of the public when a witness 
gives evidence acts as an incentive to tell the truth. There also appears to be no 
assumption that a physical confrontation between accuser and accused will promote 
truthful testimony.
“Traditionally, legal systems belonging to the civil law tradition have 
attached less weight to the right of accused to interrogate witnesses 
than those belonging to the common law tradition.
In addition, the solemn and formal environment of the courtroom, and the oath are not 
recognised as important safeguards in Dutch criminal procedure. Witnesses who
135 Hulsman, L.H.C., et al (1993) op cit at 323
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appear in court do give evidence on oath but Dutch criminal courts routinely accept 
unsworn evidence. Consequently, evidence that has not been exposed to these 
‘safeguards’ is not viewed with the same suspicion as in English adversarial 
proceedings.
The observation o f witness demeanour is also not accorded much importance within 
the Dutch fact-finding process. It is assumed that trial judges are capable o f assessing 
the reliability and credibility of evidence without observing the source of the 
evidence. This represents a marked difference between the fact-finding processes of 
both countries. Perhaps a more striking difference is the limited role of confrontation 
in the Dutch fact-finding process. In the Netherlands faith in the competence and 
thoroughness of public officials replaces faith in the power of confrontation and 
adversarial examination. In England and Wales live cross-examination is considered a 
crucial safeguard and evidence that has not been subjected to this truth testing 
mechanism is deemed to be unreliable.
The Dutch fact-finding process has its own distinct safeguards. The dossier itself acts 
an important safeguard which serves as a record of the pre-trial investigative stage of 
proceedings. The judicial function of the public prosecutor and the examining 
magistrate and their duty to actively seek out exculpatory evidence are further 
important safeguards. So too is the level of cooperation between all the professional 
participants. The institutional pressures upon the defence, the public prosecutor and 
the examining magistrate to present the court with all germane evidence in the form o f 
the investigative file are another strength of Dutch criminal procedure. Perhaps the 
most fundamental safeguard in the Dutch fact-finding process is the care taken by the 
trial judge(s) in assessing the evidence. In England, juries are not trusted to accord 
hearsay evidence with the appropriate probative force. In the Netherlands all criminal 
trials are bench trials. There is also no jury in the Netherlands, the jury system was 
abolished in 1813. Juries are replaced by professional judges, there is no lay element 
in the Dutch judiciary which consists solely of career judges. 1 rial judges are trusted 
to identify weaknesses in evidence and assess reliability accordingly. Within the
136 Swart, B , Young, J., ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal Justice in the 
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Dutch fact-finding process it is assumed that any failings in the evidence can be 
compensated for by judicial care in evaluating evidence.
The emphasis upon written evidence in the Netherlands, in contrast to the insistence 
upon oral evidence in England and Wales, is therefore attributable to the very 
different assumptions that inform the fact-finding process in both countries.
The emphasis on written evidence in Dutch criminal trials has obvious implications 
for complainants. Rape complainants in the Netherlands are largely spared the ordeal 
o f giving evidence in public, of confronting the defendant and giving evidence in the 
intimidatory surroundings of the courtroom.
1.4.2. The Law of Evidence
English criminal procedure is characterised by complex evidentiary rules governing 
the admissibility o f evidence in court. The rules o f evidence in the Netherlands, 
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Welboek van Slrafvord.e.1 ing, are 
conceived not as rules regulating the presentation ol evidence but rather as a set of 
decision-making rules.
“Whereas the Dutch courts decide without jury, it is clear that the rules 
o f evidence (in the Code of Criminal Procedure) do not regulate the 
presentation of evidence from the perspective to prevent the disclosure 
o f prejudicial or unreliable evidence. The rules o f evidence form a set 
o f regulations for the decision of the court rather than for the 
presentation of evidence as they are in the common law tradition.
“The Dutch trial has different roots from its common law counterpart.
If  the Anglo-American process is based on the model of the full jury 
trial, and thus is preoccupied with questions of procedure and evidence, 
the Dutch trial is dominated by dossiers containing formal written 
statements and the personal history of the accused, and thus is
Criminal Justice in Europe:A Comparative Study (1995, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 71
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preoccupied with the substantive correctness of the disposition to be 
made.”138
The Dutch law o f evidence is essentially concerned with rules laying down what 
evidence may form the basis of a decision and not with questions o f admissibility.
“Where the emphasis is not on presentation, concepts such as 
admissibility are in certain ways meaningless. The commentaries do 
not even know concepts such as admissibility, relevancy and 
materiality. That, however, does not mean that all evidence would be 
admissible in the sense that it may form the basis o f a valid decision, 
there are exclusionary rules - as decision rules. For instance, a 
defendant cannot be convicted on his own confession without 
corroborative evidence.”139
Professor Nijboer, a legal scholar and Dutch judge, contends that the Dutch rules ot 
evidence can be summarised in eight principles. (l)The rules o f evidence in their 
strictness only apply to the decision whether or not it has been proved that the 
defendant committed the alleged crime. (2)Only five means of proof are authorised by 
the legislation to be used as legal proof, these include; observation by the court itself, 
confessions/statements made by the defendant, statements made by witnesses, 
statements made by experts and written materials. (3)The court’s verdict has to be 
based on information discussed during the trial. (4)The Code never compels the couit 
to convict the defendant. (5)The Code sometimes compels the court not to acquit the 
defendant. (6)A statement by a witness, a single piece of written evidence or the 
confession of the defendant on its own can never be full proof, corroborative evidence 
is required. (7)The decision of the court must be argued extensively in written form. 
(8)Rules o f general experience and generally known facts do not need any special 
proof. The fact that the court is obliged to give precise written reasons for its decision 
means that the Supreme Court may review the decision and ensure that it was based 
upon legally accepted means o f proof. This contrasts with the inscrutability of jury 
verdicts in England and Wales.
138 Rossett, A., (1972), op cit at 356
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The lack o f exclusionary, presentational, rules of evidence in Dutch criminal 
proceedings is, in part, attributable to the absence of the jury.
“In countries where juries operate, the rules o f criminal evidence 
normally regulate- and restrict- how and to what extent evidence is 
presented to the jury. In the Netherlands the parties are rarely restricted 
by rules from introducing evidence they would like to offer. The law of 
evidence deals with the assessment of the available evidence by the 
court.” 140
In the Netherlands, great faith is placed in the capacity of judges to weigh the 
evidence contained in the dossier. The lack of presentational rules may also be 
ascribed to the role o f the judge as an active seeker of the truth.
“As an affirmative investigator he (the judge) is likely to be less 
impressed by formal rules of evidence. Questions of admissibility, 
competence, relevance and sufficiency o f proof tend to be 
submerged.”141
In inquisitorial proceedings, “such rules would impede the inquirer in the quest for the 
truth.”142
1.4.2.1. Code of Criminal Procedure vs. Practice
Mere examination of the Code of Criminal Procedure would deliver a misleading 
picture of the law of evidence in the Netherlands. There is a considerable divergence 
between day to day practice and the provisions of the Code. According to the Dutch 
Code o f Criminal Procedure a criminal court may only rely on upon “legal means of 
evidence” in reaching its decision.143. According to Article 339, statements made by
140 Nijboer, J.F., ‘Protection o f  Victims in Rape and Sexual Abuse Cases in the Netherlands’ in (ed) 
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witnesses are listed as a legal means o f evidence. Statements made by witnesses are 
defined in Article 342;
“ 1. A statement by a witness is understood to be his statement, made in 
the investigation of the trial, of facts or circumstances which he himself 
has seen or experienced.”
Article 295 C.C.P provides an exception to Art. 342;
“An earlier statement by a witness who, having been sworn in or 
admonished to speak the truth in accordance with Article 216(2), has 
died or, in the opinion of the court, is unable to appear at the trial shall 
be considered as having been made at the trial, on the condition that it 
is read aloud there.”
Article 187 provides;
“If the examining magistrate is of the opinion that there are grounds for 
assuming that the witness or expert will not be able to appear at the 
trial, he shall invite the public prosecutor, the defendant and counsel to 
be present at the hearing before him, unless, in the interests ol the 
investigation, that hearing cannot be delayed.”
The designers o f the Code clearly envisaged a procedure in which witnesses would be 
called to trial and in which hearsay evidence would be excluded. The style oi 
procedure as contained in the Criminal Code, would have placed the emphasis upon 
oral evidence and upon direct confrontation in court. A decision by the Supreme Court 
on 20 December 1926 ensured that Dutch criminal procedure in practice would be 
very different from that envisaged by the drafters of the Code. The Supreme Court 
held that the pre-trial statements of witnesses were acceptable forms o f evidence 
irrespective o f whether the examining magistrate had complied with Art. 187.144 The 
Court also held that it was permissible to use witness police statements as evidence. 
The pre-trial statements o f witnesses are acceptable as evidence as long as they are 
recorded in the investigative file and read out in court. This decision enabled the
144 cited in Nijboer, J.F., (1995), op cit at 97
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traditional emphasis upon written evidence and upon the pre-trial stage within Dutch 
criminal procedure to remain in place.
“At the introduction of the present Code of Criminal Procedure (1926) 
this code was said to facilitate a kind of ‘fair’ or even ‘England-like’ 
procedure. The practice, however, upheld old traditions, such as the 
emphasis on written materials.” 145
“As a result of the lenient attitude of the Dutch High Court, the 
criminal judge has been almost totally free in the choice and weighing 
o f evidence. For the accused there seemed to be only one general 
safeguard left: the judge must weigh and use the evidence “with due 
care”.”146
The out-of-court statements of witnesses are accepted therefore irrespective of 
whether that witness will be present and examined in court.
“The written records o f the police and the rechter-commissaris , 
including statements of other declarants to them, are - notwithstanding 
the contrary view of the legislature in 1926 - in practice the most 
important means o f evidence after the confessions ot the deiendant.
The assumptions o f the Dutch fact-finding process mean that hearsay evidence is not 
considered to be as unreliable as in common-law jurisdictions. It is also assumed that 
any weaknesses in hearsay evidence are compensated for by the care taken by the 
judiciary.148
The acceptance o f hearsay evidence in the Netherlands, together with an emphasis on 
written evidence rather than oral testimony, means that witnesses will rarely be 
required to attend court. In Dutch criminal proceedings written evidence largely 
replaces live oral testimony.
145 Nijboer, J.F, (1993), op cit at 303
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“Instead of relying on live testimony given at trial, Dutch courts base 
their judgments in a large majority of cases mainly on the dossier.” l4;
The general absence of witness examination in court is perhaps the most striking 
difference between criminal trials in England and Wales and the Netherlands.
The fact that the Dutch law of evidence is conceived largely as a set of decision­
making rules rather than presentational rules also has important implications for the 
ability o f complainants in the Netherlands to tell their stories in criminal 
proceedings.150
1.4.3. The Course of the Trial
In Dutch criminal proceedings the defendant is not obliged to appeal at trial. The 
defendant is also not obliged to answer any of the questions put to him during the 
trial.151 If  the defendant does elect to give evidence then he or she does not give 
evidence under oath. There is no rule forbidding the use of the accused s silence 
against him .152 Witnesses giving evidence in court testify under oath and may be 
compelled to answer questions. The first stage sees the arraignment of the defendant. 
The defendant’s identity is verified by the trial judge and the public prosecutor then 
reads the accusation. There is no formal plea; the guilty plea is unknown in Dutch 
criminal procedure.153 What follows resembles a conversation between the tiial 
judge(s) and the defendant. The trial judge will then question any witnesses present. 
After the trial judge has completed questioning, the defence lawyer, the defendant and 
the public prosecutor may ask questions. Written evidence is read out to the court. A 
brief outline o f a Dutch criminal trial is provided by Osner et al;
o f  the European Convention on Human Rights. The possible implications for Dutch criminal 
procedure are examined in Chapter Three
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“The trial procedure is conducted by the presiding judge who first asks 
the defendant his name, address, etc. The prosecutor then reads the 
indictment or a summary of it. Then there is the “investigation into the 
facts”. The court inquires primarily on the basis of the written evidence 
included in the dossier. The witnesses, if  any and then the accused are 
then questioned by the presiding judge. The Public Prosecutor and the 
defence lawyer are allowed to ask supplementary questions. However, 
there is no system of cross-examination and re-examination to test the 
veracity of witnesses. The written evidence is read aloud. After the 
investigation into the facts, the prosecutor and the defence make 
closing speeches. The defence always has the last word. The court then 
gives its verdict.”154
Witnesses and experts may be brought to trial by the prosecutor, the defendant and 
defence counsel and the judge.155 Witnesses are however generally not examined in 
court. The standard of proof in Dutch criminal proceedings is that o f the English 
criminal trial. The court must be convinced on the basis of admissible evidence, that 
the defendant committed the offence he was charged with.
“In essence, the requirement that the court should be convinced of the 
defendant’s guilt is the equivalent of the Anglo-American requirement 
that the court or jury should be convinced beyond reasonable doubt.
The court must give precise written reasons for its decision. The accused s criminal 
record which will be contained in the dossier is relevant only when determining the 
sentence and not the guilt. The maximum penalty for each crime is set out in the Penal 
Code. There are no mandatory sentences for certain crimes.
1.4.3.1. Open Court Principle
153 Lensing, H., Rayar, L., (1992), op cit at 625
154 Osner, N ., et al (1993), op cit at 152
155 Hulsman, L.H.C., (1993), op cit at 348
156 Lensing, H., Rayar, L., (1992), op cit at 624
157 Nijboer J.F., (1992), op cit at 65
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As in England and Wales, the open court principle is an important feature o f Dutch 
criminal proceedings. The majority of criminal trials in the Netherlands are held in 
open court though there exceptions to the general rule."8
“All trials in the Netherlands, with a few exceptions, such as in 
proceedings concerning minors, are open to the public.”159
I.4.3.2. Length of Trials
On average, English criminal trials last much longer than Dutch criminal trials. In one 
study it was estimated that typically Dutch trials are of 10% duration oi English 
trials.160
“Where a panel o f judges sit in judgment, the trial usually takes 
between half an hour to one hour, with the exception of difficult or 
serious cases.”161
“Trials themselves, in the Netherlands, are often very short and 
efficient, since most defendants do not deny the allegations and since 
witnesses are not extensively examined in court.
A typical rape case will last one hour in the Netherlands whereas in England a 
complex case may last for days. 163
1.4.4. Summary
158 C.C.P. Art. 273
159 Nijboer, J.F., (1995), op cit at 93
160 See Fionda, J., Public Prosecutors and Discretion. A Comparative Study (1995, 
Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 96
161 Hulsman, L.H.C., et al (1993), op cit at 349
162 Nijboer, J.F., (1995), op cit at 93
163 Fionda, J., (1995), op cit at 96
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Very different assumptions inform the Dutch fact-finding process. Proceedings are 
structured as a inquiry and not as a contest. The Dutch criminal trial is not a forum for 
stories told by advocates. Written evidence replaces oral testimony. The rules o f 
evidence are conceived not as presentational rules but decision making rules. These 
factors all have important consequences for rape complainants in the Netherlands 
which are explored in this study.
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1.5. The Role of the Advocate and the Nature of Advocacy
1.5.1. England and Wales
The English criminal trial is structured as a contest and the contestants dominate the 
proceedings. The parties are charged with the presentation of evidence and it is the 
advocates who call and examine witnesses. The court relies largely on the evidence 
presented by the advocates.
“Few laymen realise how extensive, indeed, how dominant the powers 
given to the advocates on the two contending sides in our adversarial 
system. It is these powers which have given a special place to 
advocacy in our common law trial system in both civil and criminal 
courts.”164
Despite the overshadowing importance of the advocate in English criminal 
proceedings, the role of the advocate and the nature of advocacy are themes that aie 
never fully developed in comparative literature. This is also true ol research ot rape 
trials. The treatment of rape complainants in court may not be explained however, 
until the nature of advocacy in adversarial proceedings is understood.
Evidence in adversarial proceedings is presented in the form of conflicting stories told 
by advocates in court. The primary role of the advocate in adversarial pioceedings is 
that o f storyteller. Advocates play a pivotal role in the shaping of courtroom stories. 
The advocate in the adversarial trial is not engaged in a search for the tiuth. As Evans 
informs aspiring barristers;
“ ..we are not principally concerned with getting at the truth in the 
courtrooms of the English-speaking peoples. What we are doing as
164 Du Cann, R., The Art o f  the Advocate (1993, London:Penguin), at 2.
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advocates is trying to get the fact-fmder to arrive at an opinion, an 
opinion in our favour.”165
The role o f the advocate is to persuade, to tell a story that persuades the fact-finder. 
The advocate in adversarial proceedings is also a performer. In court, the 
performances of all the central protagonists can prove decisive. Acting ability is 
considered a desirable attribute in a courtroom advocate. Advocates are advised to be 
likeable and entertaining.166 The adversarial criminal trial is structured as a conflict, a 
contest, and this inevitably shapes the nature of advocacy and the role of the advocate. 
The advocate is frequently portrayed as a combatant, a gladiator engaged in a war of 
words. It is a battle in which the witnesses of the opposition are largely the targets. In 
the ‘win’ or ‘lose’ adversarial contest there is necessarily competitiveness between 
advocates which also influences the nature of advocacy in adversarial proceedings.
In this study it is argued that the part played by the advocate in the English criminal 
trial and the nature of advocacy in adversarial proceedings play a fundamental, and 
yet largely unexplored, role in the courtroom ordeal of rape complainants in England
and Wales.
The above description of the role of the advocate applies equally to prosecution and 
defence counsel however, there are important distinctions between the role ot the 
prosecutor and the defence lawyer in the English criminal trial.
1.5.1.1. Role of the Prosecutor
The prosecutor in criminal proceedings represents the Crown. It is traditionally 
asserted that the prosecutor is to regard him or herself as a minister of justice. The 
aim o f the prosecutor is not to secure a conviction at all costs. It was stated in Bunks 
that prosecutors;
165 Evans, K., The Golden Rides o f Advocacy (1993, London:Blackstone), at 8
166 ibid
167 Puddick (1865) 4 F & F 497 per Crompton J
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“ought not to struggle for the verdict against the prisoner but they 
ought to bear themselves rather in the character of ministers of justice 
assisting in the administration o f justice.” ",8
The Farquaharson Committee, appointed to consider the duties and obligations o f 
prosecuting counsel, confirmed that earlier judicial pronouncements as to the nature of 
the role o f prosecuting counsel still hold;
“Great responsibility is placed upon prosecution counsel and although 
this description as a “minister o f justice” may sound pompous to 
modern ears it accurately describes the way in which he should 
discharge his function.”16^
In one of the few articles detailing the role of prosecution counsel Humphreys 
advocates neutrality on the part o f the prosecutor;
“His attitude should be so objective that he is, as humanly possible, 
indifferent to the result,”170
“It not the duty of the prosecuting counsel to secure a conviction, nor 
should any prosecutor ever feel pride or satisfaction in the mere fact of 
success.”171
For many a higher duty to justice precludes a impassioned campaign for a conviction;
“Thus the aim o f the prosecutor is to secure a result to which, on his 
view, the evidence fairly leads; his methods and his motivation should 
be dispassionate.”172
As a minister o f justice the prosecutor should conduct her or his case moderately, 
dispassionately, fairness to the accused being a constant and paramount consideration.
168 Banks [ 1916] 2 KB 621 per Avory J see also General Council o f  the Bar o f  England and Wales, 
Code o f  Conduct o f  the Bar o f England and Wales (1991, London:Bar Council), Annexe H 11.1
169 Farquharson Committee, “The Role o f  Prosecution Counsel” L.S.G. (1986) 26 Novem ber, at 
3599
170 Humphries, C., “The Duties and Responsibilities o f  Prosecuting Counsel ’ [1955] Crim.L.R. 741
171 ibid at 740
172 Ashworth, A.J., “Prosecution and Procedure in Criminal Justice” [1979] Crim. L.R. 482
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“In action, both counsel are impersonal, but whereas some element of 
the theatrical, or forensic emotion is still permitted to the defence, any 
passion o f argument, any grandiloquence of phrase or “playing to the 
gallery” is out of place in the representation of the Crown.’ 173
It is however maintained that the prosecutor’s duty to justice should not preclude 
effective advocacy. The prosecutor may still prosecute;
“None of this means that prosecutors should not present a strong case 
strongly.”174
“The obligation to act fairly does not mean that the prosecuting counsel 
is compelled to avoid advocacy. 17:1
The task of the prosecutor is to achieve a balance between effective advocacy and 
fairness to the accused;
“The principle is that the prosecutor should be scrupulously fair to the 
accused, but need not be quixotically generous.”176
It is submitted that an accurate description of the role of the prosecutor is provided by 
Weinreb;
“The prosecutor is not expected to be quite as single-mindedly intent 
on a conviction as defence counsel is on avoiding one. For him also, 
however, the outcome of the trial is what counts. He views a case in 
which the jury does not convict or convicts o f too minor a crime as a 
Toss’ and wonders how he might have done better.” 177
Fundamentally, prosecutors are trained as lawyers and regard themselves, and are 
regarded as contenders in the party contest.
173 Humphries, C., (1955), op cit at 746
174 Ashworth, A.J., (1979), op cit at 482
175 Pannick, D., Advocates (1992, Oxford:Oxford University Press), at 115
176 Sprack, J., Emmins on Criminal Procedure (1995, London:Blackstone), at 1 18
177 Weinreb, L.L., Denial o f  Justice (1977, LondomFree Press), at 103
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1.5.1.2. Role of Defence Counsel
The defence advocate is not subject to the same constraints that apply to prosecution 
counsel in the sense of regarding himself as a minister o f justice. Defence counsel do 
however, owe a duty to the court as do prosecution counsel, and must not deceive or 
knowingly or recklessly mislead the court. According to the Code o f Conduct o f the 
Bar o f England and Wales, a practising barrister;
“must promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper and lawful 
means his lay client’s best interests and do so without regard to his 
own interests or to any consequences to himself or to any other 
person.”178
The role o f defence counsel may accurately be described as obtaining an acquittal 
within procedural and ethical boundaries.
“The Crown is interested in justice; the defence in obtaining an 
acquittal within the limits of lawful procedure and bar etiquette.” '7y
The distinct roles played by defence and prosecution barristers in criminal trials also 
have a bearing on the treatment of complainants. In this study it is argued that rape 
complainants often feel let down by both their lack of contact with prosecution 
barristers and the performance of prosecution counsel in court.180 This study argues 
that the detachment and perceived passivity of prosecution barristers in relation to 
defence counsel in court can, in part, be attributed to the prescribed role o f the 
prosecutor in the English criminal trial.
178 General Council for the Bar o f  England and Wales, (1991), op cit at 203
175 Humphries, C., (1955), op cit at 746
180 See Chapter Seven
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1.5.2. The Netherlands
The trial judge dominates the Dutch criminal trial and the advocates play a subsidiary 
role.
“The influence of the ‘parties’, the prosecutor and the defendant, on the 
course of the trial itself is not an important one compared to the 
influence of the court.”181
Compared to their English counterparts the Dutch prosecutor and defence counsel are 
largely passive figures within the criminal trial. The lesser role o f the advocate is a 
defining characteristic of inquisitorial proceedings.
“The contestants are relegated to the role of objects of inquiry, instead 
of being the subjects of the action who have charge of their own case. 
Contestants may suggest that certain lines of inquiry be followed and 
that certain witnesses be questioned, and they may be given some 
freedom in presenting evidence. Lawyers representing the contestants 
may therefore have a limited role in the process, but they do not have 
the central role which they occupy in the contest model. Ultimate 
control rests with the inquirer.”182
As stated above, the Dutch criminal trial is not a forum for the presentation o f fresh 
evidence but for the evaluation of the dossier compiled during the pre-trial stage.183 
Witnesses are generally not examined in court. Consequently, the nature of advocacy 
and the role o f the advocate are entirely different in the Netherlands.
“Diametrically distinct purposes thus lie behind the trial process and 
affect the atmosphere of the courtroom and the function of the 
participants.”184
Evidence is presented not by the advocates but in the dossier. The Dutch advocate is 
not charged with the task of persuading the court, he or she is not a stoiyteller. The
181 Nijboer, J.F., (1993), op cit at 310
182 Jackson, J., Doran, S., (1995), op cit at 67
183 See Chapter One at 1.4.
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trial judge is the primary interrogator of the accused and any witnesses called. Neither 
is the Dutch advocate a performer. The court bases its decision largely on written 
evidence, the oral performances of witnesses do not inform the Dutch fact-finding 
process. In England and Wales the desirable attributes of the courtroom advocate 
include eloquence, a commanding presence, an ability to play to an audience. In the 
Netherlands, the effective advocate will have endeavoured, at the pre-trial stage of 
proceedings, to ensure that the dossier contained all germane evidence tor the 
deliberation of the court.
The fact that advocates in the Netherlands do not play a central role in the presentation 
o f evidence has important implications for rape complainants. In this study it is 
argued that the storytelling function of advocates in adversarial proceedings plays an 
important role in the secondary victimisation of rape complainants in England and 
Wales. So too the combative, competitive nature o f advocacy. Advocates in the 
Netherlands play a very different role and the nature of advocacy is consequently
distinct.
1.5.2.1. Role of the Public Prosecutor
In the Netherlands, the public prosecutor is expected to remain an impartial and 
judicial figure at the trial with the public prosecutor continuing to represent the public 
interest.
“ ..in inquisitorial systems the judge is more active in examining 
witnesses at trial and the prosecutor plays a genuinely neutral, 
objective role in providing all relevant information to the court.'’18:1
The prosecutor plays a comparatively passive role at the trial but may ask the accused 
and any witnesses supplementary questions.
184 Fionda, J., (1995), op cit at 7
185 Fionda, J., (1995), op cit at 6
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“Because the judge is an independent, active investigator the 
prosecution is relatively passive during the trial, in contrast to the 
Anglo-American model o f criminal trial.”186
The prosecutor will make a closing speech and will also recommend an appropriate 
sentence but this is in no way binding on the court.187
1.5.2.2 Role of Defence Counsel
The role of the defence lawyer in the Netherlands to ensure that all exculpatory 
evidence is contained in the dossier continues into the trial. The task o f the defence 
counsel is to point out any deficiencies in the investigative file and if necessary, 
request further investigation. In this way, the defence lawyer safeguards the interest of 
his or her client. The defence lawyer may question the defendant and any witnesses 
but the trial judge will dominate any examination with the advocates playing a 
subsidiary role. The defence will also make a closing speech.
1.5.3. Summary
The role o f the advocate and the nature of advocacy have an important bearing on the 
experience o f complainants in criminal proceedings. The dominance of advocates in 
English criminal proceedings and the comparatively lesser role played by advocates in 
Dutch criminal proceedings are used in this study to help explain differences in the 
treatment o f rape complainants in both countries.
186 Hulsman, L.H.C., et al (1993), op cit at 323
187 Fionda, J., (1995), op cit at 104
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1.6. The Role of the Trial Judge
1.6.1. England and Wales
The role of the trial judge in adversarial proceedings is that of impartial umpire of a 
party contest. The English trial judge is not engaged in a search for the truth but is 
largely confined to the evidence presented by the parties in court. The parties bear the 
burden o f presenting evidence and control the construction and presentation of their 
competing stories. It is the parties who call and conduct the examination and cross- 
examination of witnesses. The trial judge acts as a referee, ensuring that the parties 
abide by the rules that govern the adversarial trial. In England and Wales, the trial 
judge plays no part in the preliminary investigative stages o f criminal proceedings. In 
fact the “Olympian ignorance”188 or unpreparedness of the trial judge is viewed as one 
of the strengths of the adversarial system. The classic statement of the role of the 
judge in the adversarial trial appears in Jones v National Coal Board; 189
“In the system o f trial which we have evolved in this country, the judge 
sits to hear and determine the issues raised by the parties, not to 
conduct an investigation or examination on behalf of society at large, 
as happens , we believe in some foreign countries.. The judge’s part 
in all this is to hearken to the evidence, only himself asking questions 
of witnesses when it is necessary to clear up any point that has been 
overlooked or left obscure; to see that the advocates behave themselves 
seemly and to keep to the rules laid down by law; to exclude 
irrelevancies and discourage repetition, to make sure by wise 
intervention that he follows the points that the advocates are making 
and can assess their worth; and at the end to make up his mind where 
the truth lies. If he goes beyond this, he drops the mantle of the judge 
and assumes the robe of an advocate; and the change does not become 
him well.”190
188 Frankel, M., “The Search for the Truth An Umpireal V iew” (1975) 123 U. Pa.L.Rev. 1031 at 
1042
189 [ 1 9 5 7 ] 2  QB 55,63 per Denning LJ;
190 This was a civil case but it applies equally to the role o f  the trial judge in criminal proceedings.
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Clearly, the English trial judge is not a passive figure in criminal trials. The trial judge 
clarifies obscure points for the benefit o f the jury and ensures that testimony is audible 
and comprehensible. The trial judge may also exclude irrelevant evidence, encourage 
counsel not to engage in repetition and generally ensure that time is not unnecessarily 
wasted. The trial judge may also call and examine witnesses. However, there are 
limits upon judicial intervention. Excessive intervention can lead to a conviction 
being overturned. The trial judge must be wary of appearing less than impartial 
through intervention and be sure not to compromise the ability of the advocates to 
present their versions of events.
“Judicial intervention is considered particularly dangerous^ in jury
trials, because the judge may then unduly influence the jury.
In this study it is argued that the umpireal function of the trial judge in English 
criminal proceedings has an important bearing upon the protection afforded rape 
complainants during cross-examination. There is a conflict, it is argued, between the 
trial judge’s duty to protect witnesses from improper questioning and his or her role as
an impartial arbiter.
1.6.2. The Netherlands
In Dutch criminal proceedings the trial judge plays a very active, domineering role. 
Whereas the English trial judge relies largely upon evidence presented by the parties, 
the Dutch trial judge actively seeks out the truth.
“The Anglo-American model of the criminal trial expects the judge to 
sit as the relatively passive and impartial listener. The judge’s job is 
not to find the truth independently by launching his own investigation, 
but to determine(sometimes with a jury) whether the party has
191 J a c k s o n ,  J . , ‘Trial Procedures’ in (eds) Walker, C., Starmer, K., Justice in Error (1993, 
London:Blackstone), at 144
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sustained his burden of persuasion. If not, relief is denied and the case 
is over. In contrast, the Dutch judge is supposed to be an independent 
active seeker of the truth. He is not expected to sit and await proof but 
to move on his own initiative with the help of the advocates.” 192
The trial judge may call witnesses to trial and is the primary interrogator of the 
accused and witnesses with the advocates playing a subsidiary role. Unlike the 
English trial judge, the trial judge in the Netherlands will have read the investigative 
file before the trial and therefore be familiar with the facts. If the trial judge decides 
that further investigation is required he or she may refer a case back to the examining 
magistrate or public prosecutor. As in England and Wales, the impartiality o f the trial 
judge is crucial in Dutch criminal proceedings;
“The trial itself is dominated by the court. The impartiality of the couit 
is a basic assumption in the whole system.
Adversarial theory demands a sharp distinction between the functions ol prosecution 
and judgment and perceives judicial intervention as a threat to impartiality. 
Adversarial theory assumes that the decision-maker would be inevitably influenced by 
involvement in the investigation of evidence.
“Psychologically, the argument says, a non-adversanal trial is like
. i r* ??194trying to play chess against yourselt.
In the Netherlands, great faith is placed in the neutrality of trial judges despite their 
active and inquiring role.
“As yet, there has been very little discussion or debate about whether 
the very active role of the judge in Dutch proceedings violates the 
standards o f impartiality implicit in the very notion that the state is 
obligated to provide fair process.”195
192 Rossett, A ., (1972), op cit at 371
193 Nijboer, J.F ‘The Requirement o f  a Fair Process and the Law o f  Evidence in Dutch Criminal 
Proceedings’ in (ed) Nijboer, J.F., Forensic Expertise and the Law o f Evidence (1992,
Amsterdam:Elsevier), at 168
194 Luban, D„ Lawyers and Justice:An Ethical Study ( 1988, Princeton:Princeton University Press), at
71
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1.6.2.1. Constitution of the Judiciary
The constitution o f the judiciary in England and Wales and the Netherlands differs 
considerably with regard to the proportion of women among the ranks and the average 
age o f judges. The English judiciary remains predominantly white, male and over the 
age of sixty.
“The average age of judges in this country is between 60 and 65, which 
coincides with the time when most other people are retiring.”19'’
Judges tend be younger in the Netherlands where it is usual to train as a judge directly 
after university for a period of six years.u7 In England and Wales, only a small 
percentage of judges are women;
“In 1995 there were no women Law Lords among ten in the House of 
Lords, only one in the Court of Appeal, only six among ninety five 
high court judges and twenty nine among 514 circuit judges.
In contrast, in the Netherlands nearly half of the sitting judiciary are women.1'”
1.6.3. Summary
The role played by the trial judge in criminal proceedings can have important 
ramifications for the treatment of complainants. The umpireal role of the trial judge 
and the limits placed on judicial intervention in English criminal trials, for example, 
explain in the part the lack o f protection afforded rape complainants during cross- 
examination.
195 Nijboer, J.F., (1992), op cit 165
196 Kennedy, H., Eve was Framed (1992, London:Chatto & Windus), at 30
197 Osner, N ., et al (1993), op cit
198 Lees, S., Carnal Knowledge Rape on Trial (1996, London:Hamish Hamilton) at 246
199 Holthuis, H., The Role o f  the Public Prosecutor in the Netherlands in International Comparisons 
in Criminal Justice (1993, London:NACRO), at 19
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1.7. The Combativeness of Adversarial Proceedings
A factor invariably unexplored in comparisons of adversarial and inquisitorial 
criminal proceedings is the combativeness of the former. The adversarial trial is 
structured as a dispute, a fight, and proceedings are therefore combative and 
competitive. The inherent hostility of the criminal trial is evidenced by the language 
employed by writers in its description. The trial is often referred to as the ‘fight or 
‘battle’;
“The centrepiece of the adversary system is the oral trial and 
everything that goes before it is a preparation for the battlefield.”200
Practising advocates adopt similar terminology when describing the criminal trial in 
numerous advocacy manuals. Napley, for example, employs military metaphors to 
capture the essence of the criminal trial.
“The conduct o f a trial at law is in many respects comparable with the 
conduct of a military operation. Going to law is a great deal like going 
to war.”201
The weapons of the adversarial battle are words;
“There is an element of verbal pugilism which is so characteristic of 
the British trial which is entirely absent from the dossier systems.” 0"
According to Danet and Bogoch, researchers who conducted a study of the adveisaiial 
trial, combativeness is a prerequisite o f a successful adversarial system.
200 Devlin, P., The Judge, (1979, Oxford:Oxford University Press), at 54
201 Napley, D., The Technique o f  Persuasion, (1991, London:Sweet & Maxwell), at 74
202 Devlin, P., (1979), op cit at 58
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“..to work properly, the adversary model of justice requires the 
attorneys representing each side to be highly combative and moreover 
to be evenly matched in combativeness.”201
Dutch criminal proceedings lack the combativeness and competitiveness o f the 
adversarial trial. Dutch criminal proceedings are structured as an official inquiry.
“Simply put, the trial is much more of an investigation than a 
contest.”204
The Dutch process relies ultimately upon co-operation and relationships o f trust 
between officials rather than placing its trust in partisanship. Confrontation is at the 
heart o f the adversarial trial where conflicting stories clash. Conversely, the Dutch 
process aims at limiting areas o f dispute before the trial stage.
“Prosecutors, police and examining magistrates endeavour to limit the 
area o f ambiguity before the court. So far as possible, they seek to 
ensure that at least prima facie conclusions on disputed matters of fact 
go before the trial court.”205
Criminal proceedings in the Netherlands lack the drama, the cut and thrust of the 
adversarial trial;
“The court proceedings are ordinarily cut and dried, stripped of most 
conflict and strong emotion.”206
1.7.1. Summary
203 Danet, B„ Bogoch, B., “Fixed Fight or Free For All? An Empirical Study o f  Combativeness in 
the Adversary System o f  Justice” in (1980) 7 British Journal o f Law & Society at 41
204 Walker, R, (1994), op cit at 433
205 Leigh ,L.H., Hall Williams, J.E., (1981), op cit at 70
206 Hulsman, L.H.C., et al (1993), op cit at 352
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As stated above, the combative nature o f adversarial criminal proceedings is rarely 
explored in comparative literature and yet, as this study seeks to demonstrate, it has an 
important bearing on the treatment o f complainants in court.
74
1.8. The Role of the Complainant in Criminal Proceedings
“Traditionally, the victim has not occupied a prominent position in the 
criminal justice system in either the Netherlands or England and
Wales.”207
In England and Wales, the victim has no special status in criminal proceedings. The 
role o f the complainant in criminal proceedings is restricted to that of witness.
“In a public prosecution in England the victim has no special status. He 
will be a witness if the prosecution cares to call him - otherwise he is a 
nobody.”208
The complainant is unrepresented in court with the prosecutor representing the State 
and not the victim of crime. The complainant plays a very passive role in criminal 
proceedings and is confined to answering the questions of counsel and trial judge.
1.8.1. Recent Developments in the Treatment of Victims of Crime in the 
UK
Recent developments in the treatment o f victims of crime in the UK have centred 
largely on improving the provision of information and support to victims. Research 
conducted into the experiences of victims of crime within the criminal justice system 
in the 1980’s found that victims were dissatisfied with their treatment.20; Lack oi
207 Morgan, J., Willem Winkel, F., Williams, K.S., “Protection o f  and Compensation for Victims o f  
Crime”, in Harding, C., Fennell, P., Jorg, N ., Swart, B., Criminal Justice in Europe:A 
Comparative Study (1995, Oxford, Clarendon Press), at 301
208 Spencer, J.R.S., “French and English Criminal Procedure” in (ed) Markesinis, B.S., The Gradual 
C o n v e r g e n c e :  Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences and English Law on the Eve o f the 21st Century, 
(1994, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 38
209 Shapland, J., Willmore, J., Duff, P., Victims in the Criminal Justice System (1985, Aldershot: 
Gower), at 63
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information was identified as one of the main causes o f victim dissatisfaction with the 
trial process. Victims were provided, it was claimed, with insufficient information as 
to the progress o f a case and their role within the criminal process.210 Concern was 
also expressed about the lack of facilities for complainants attending court, primarily, 
separate waiting areas for victims.211 The lack of support for victims attending court 
was also identified. The experience of being a witness was presented as an isolating 
and lonely one. In the UK attempts have been made to improve the provision of 
information to victims.212 Most recently, The Victims Charter 1996, states that victims 
can now expect to receive information about the progress of their case,
“The police will tell you if someone has been caught, cautioned and 
charged. You will be asked if you wish to receive further information 
about the progress of your case. If you do, you will be told about any 
decision to drop or alter the charge substantially. You will also be told 
the date o f the trial and the final result, even if you are not required as a 
witness. The arrangements for doing this already exist in some areas.
Where they do not, arrangements are being made and should be in 
place nationally by April 1997.”213
The impact such schemes will have on the provision of information for victims awaits 
to be seen .214 In the UK, Victim Support plays a major role in the provision of support 
for victims of crime.
1.8.1.1. Victim Support
Victim Support is a national, voluntary organisation that seeks to help victims oi 
crime.215 The service offers free, confidential advice and support to victims. Victim
210 ibid at 69, see also NAVSS, The Victim in Court: Report o f a Working Party, (1988, 
London:NAVSS), Raine, J.W., Smith, R.E., The Victim/Witness in Court Project: Report o f  a 
Research Programme, (1991, London:NAVSS)
211 See Shapland, J., et al, (1985), op cit at 176, also Shapland, J., Cohen, D., “Facilities for 
Victims:The Role o f  the Police and the Courts”, [1987] Crim.L.R. at 28
2,2 Home Office, Victims o f  Crime, HO Circular 20, (1988, London:HMSO) Home Office, Domestic 
Violence, HO Circular 60 (1990, London:HMSO)
213 Home Office, The Victim's Charter: A Statement o f  Service Standards fo r  Victims o f  Crime, 
(1996, London:HMSO)
214 In cases involving serious sexual or violent offences, the Victim’s Charter 1996 also states that 
the probation service will inform the victim when a prisoner is to be released, ibid at 12
215 Victim  Support, Annual Report, (1994, London: Victim Support),
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Support also campaigns for the greater recognition of the crime victim within the 
criminal justice system. Amongst those helped by the organisation are victims o f 
serious offences such as rape, and the families o f murder victims. This help may take 
the form of a telephone call, a home visit or the sending o f a letter. Where needed 
longer term support is also provided. The first Victim Support scheme was established 
in Bristol in 1974 and in 1979 the National Association of Victim Support Schemes, 
now known as simply Victim Support, was formed. During the 1980 s the 
organisation grew both in size and standing and a close relationship with the Home 
Office developed. Today Victim Support has 376 schemes covering England, Wales 
and Ireland.216 In 1994 Victim Support offered help to over one million victims of
217crime.
In 1994, Victim Support received 3,068 rape referrals.“1!i In the case of complainants 
of sexual offences including rape, Victim Support operates a consent refenal policy. 
The victims consent is required before Victim Support is involved. Victim Support 
works to a nationally agreed Code of Practice.“i; The Code states that volunteers who 
work with women who have been raped must have successfully completed a specialist 
training programme.220 In 1994, Victim Support had 1.500 volunteers trained to help 
victims of crime. In addition, contact with women must always be made by a female 
volunteer.221 Victim Support also produces a number o f information leaflets, including 
a leaflet specifically aimed at victims of rape; Rape and Sexual Assault, infot mat ion 
for women.
1.8.1.2. The Witness Service
216 For the history o f  Victim Support see Rock, P., Helping Victims o f  Crime, (1990, 
Oxford :Clarendon Press)
217 Victim Support, (1994), op cit at 4
218 ibid at 14
219 Victim Support, Code o f Practice, (1995, London: Victim Support)
220 ibid
221 ibid
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Since April 1996, there has been a Witness Service in every Crown Court Centre. The 
Witness Service is run by Victim Support and funded by the Home Office.222 The 
Witness Service was established to provide victims attending court with information 
and support. Witness Service volunteers provide information to victims and witnesses 
when they attend court. Victims may be told what to expect in court, the role they play 
in proceedings. The Service also arranges familiarisation visits to empty courtrooms 
before the trial.223 The establishment o f the Witness Service has been generally 
w elcom ed.224
A recent study conducted by Victim Support into the treatment of rape victims within 
the criminal justice system suggests that victims of rape still face difficulties in 
obtaining information.2-5 The same study also suggests that facilities for victims in 
court are still lacking and that women are still experiencing problems with 
overcrowded or inadequate waiting areas and meeting defendants and their 
supporters.226 Despite the growth of Victim Support it has been argued that the support 
provided for victims of crime is inadequate. Some commentators have questioned the 
appropriateness of a single organisation assuming responsibility for all victims of 
crime and argued that the service Victim Support is able to provide will be inevitably 
limited due to its reliance on volunteers'"7 It has also been argued that the growth ol 
Victim Support has had a deleterious impact upon other victim assistance 
organisations such as Rape Crisis."8 It has been argued that many women who have 
been raped are often left stranded” and calls have been made for the urgent funding ol 
Rape Crisis.229 Research conducted by Victim Support also indicates a continuing lack 
o f professional support for victims of rape.230
222 See Victim Support, (1994), op c i t , Raine, J.W., Smith, R.E., (1991), op cit
223 See Victim Support, (1994), op cit
224 See Rock, P., “The Victim in Court Project at the Crown Court in Wood Green”, (1991), 30, 
Howard Journal, at 309
225 Victim Support, Women, Rape and the Criminal Justice System, (1996, LondomVictim Support), 
at 10
226 ibid at 15
227 For example see Mawby, R. I., Walklate, S., Critical Victimology, (1994, London:Sage), at 195
228 Dobash, R.E., Dobash, R., Noaks, L., Gender and Crime, (1995, Cardiff:University o f  Wales 
Press), at 352
229 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 5
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1.8.2. Summary
Victim policy in the UK has focused on the provision of services for victims o f crime 
rather than the allocation of legally enforceable rights. Recent developments in the 
UK have not strengthened the legal position of the victim. Following the publication 
o f the Victims Charter 1990, commentators were quick to point out that the Charter 
had not accorded the victim of crime any legally enforceable rights.
“This document is a statement of what it is good practice for the police, 
the Crown Prosecution Service and the court to do: but there is 
nothing, needless to stay, that gives the victim any legal leg to stand on 
if a good practice is not followed, and his interests are ignored.”231
While the victim of crime is increasingly the focus of attention, the treatment of 
complainants in court has remained unaddressed and unchanged. There have been 
some changes in the treatment o f child witnesses but the position of rape complainants 
in court has not altered.2 ’2
1.8.3. The Netherlands
As in England and Wales, the complainant in the Netherlands serves only as a witness 
in criminal proceedings and plays a very passive role;
“The term ‘victim’ does not occur in the Code of Criminal Procedure 
nor in any other criminal law statute. The victim has a procedural role 
only in the capacity of witness, informer or injured party.”233
Again, the Dutch public prosecutor represents the state and not the complainant. An 
option available to Dutch complainants however, is to join criminal proceedings under
230 Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 52
231 Spencer, J .R .S , (1994), op cit at 39, See also Tucker, D., “Victims' Rights?-Wrong”, (1991) 
141  (i) N.L.J. at 192, and Fenwick, H., “Rights o f  Victims in the Criminal Justice 
System:Rhetoric or Reality?”, [1995] Crim.L.R. at 852
232 See Chapter Two
233 Tak, P., (1993), op cit at 28
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the adhesion procedure. The adhesion procedure enables the victim o f crime to join a 
claim for civil damages to the public prosecutor’s action for criminal sanctions.234 The 
complainant will then join the criminal proceedings as a partie civile. The role o f 
partie civile does not however, furnish the complainant with many rights. The 
complainant continues to play an essentially passive role. The adhesion procedure and 
its benefits for complainants are examined further in Chapter five.
1.8.3.1. Recent Developments in the Treatment of Victims of Crime in The 
Netherlands
As in the UK, measures have been introduced in the Netherlands to improve the 
position o f victims of crime. Victim policy in the Netherlands has largely taken the 
form of guidelines. The guidelines in place are based on the recommendations o f three 
committees. In 1979 the Committee on Victims of Violent Sex Crimes, chaired by L. 
de Beaufort was established to develop guidelines on the treatment of victims of 
violent sexual offences.2’5 In 1983, the Committee on Judicial Policy and Victims, 
chaired by F.A. Vaillant, was established to examine how the treatment of victims 
could be improved. The recommendations of the Committee, together with the 
recommendations o f the Committee de Beaufort, formed the basis ol guidelines 
introduced in a circular to the police and public prosecutors in April 1986. As in 
England and Wales, the guidelines have focused on improving the provision of 
information and support to victims of crime. The guidelines imposed duties upon both 
the police and public prosecutors and dealt largely with improving the provision of 
information to victims of crime.237 Initially the guidelines were directed at victims of 
serious offences but in 1987 were extended to all victims. A survey conducted one
234 C.C.P. Art.332
235 Ministry o f  Justice, Rapport van de werkgroep aangifte sexuele geweldsmisdrijven, (1981)
236 See Wemmers, J.M., Victims in the Criminal Justice System, (1996, Amsterdam:Kugler 
Publications), at 4 1 ,Wemmers, J.M., Zeilstra, M.I., ‘Victim Services in the Netherlands’, (1991), 
3, Dutch Penal Law and Policy, at 2
237 Van Dijk, J.M.M., “Recent Developments in the Criminal Policy on Victims in the Netherlands”, 
in HEUNI, Changing Victim Policy: The United Nations Declaration and Recent Developments 
in Europe, (1989, Helsinki:HEUNI), at 75, Penders, L., “Guidelines for Police and Prosecutors;
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year after the Vaillant Guidelines were introduced revealed that victims were still not 
receiving information.238 The third committee, the Committee for Legal Provisions for  
Victims in the Criminal Justice Process, (Commissie wettelijke voorzieningen 
slachtoffers in het strafproces), chaired by C.A. Terwee-van Hilton, was established 
to examine means of expanding possibilities for victims to obtain restitution within 
the Dutch criminal justice system. The committee’s report also led to new guidelines 
aimed at improving the provision of information to victims of crime. Research 
conducted by Wemmers into the operation of the new guidelines indicates that 
progress has been slow.239 Wemmers concludes;
“ ..the implementation of the guidelines has been problematic. Police 
officers are not always aware of the existence of the guidelines and 
often fail to treat victims in accordance with them. Similarly, the public 
prosecution often fails to notify victims of the developments in their
ease..”240
“At present, the implementation of the victim guidelines is extremely
The main victim assistance organisation in the Netherlands is Landelijk Buro 
Slactofferhulp, L.O.S. The organisation has developed along the lines of Victim 
Support in the UK242 Substantial government grants have led to the rapid expansion of 
the service. Today there are 72 regional offices in the Netherlands and in 1994, the 
service assisted 105, 000 victims of crime.243 The Service is free, consists mainly o f
an Interest o f  Victims; a Matter o f  Justice”, in First European Confernce o f Victim Support 
Workers .Guidelines for Victim Support in Europe (1989, Utrecht:the Netherlands), at 83
238 Van Hecke,T„ Wemmers, J.M., Junger, M„ Slachtofferzorg bij het openbaar ministrie, (1990),
cited in Wemmers, J.M., (1996), op cit at 49
239 See Wemmers, J.M., The Dutch Victim Guidelines:Their Impact on Victim Satisfaction, (1994, 
paper presented at Eighth International Symposiyum on Victim ology, Adelaide), Wemmers, J.M., 
“Victim s in the Dutch Criminal Justice System: The Effects o f  Treatment on V ictim ’s Attitudes 
and Compliance”, [1995] 3 , 1.R. V., 323, Wemmers, J.M., (1996), op cit
240 Wemmers, J., (1996), op cit at 215
241 ibid at 210
242 ibid at 35
243 ibid at 39
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volunteers, and provides information and advice on all kinds of practical matters, 
emotional support, help in filling in forms and writing letters and petitions.
1.8.4. Summary
Recent developments in the Netherlands have also failed to strengthen the legal 
position o f victims of crime. The Dutch guidelines are not backed by legislation and 
victims have been provided with services and not rights. Van Dijk reports;
“The legal position of the victim is still very weak.”-4’
Victim policy in the UK and in the Netherlands has followed a similar course. In both 
countries victim policy has focused on the provision of services for victims of crime 
rather than the allocation o f legally enforceable rights. The role of the complainant in 
criminal proceedings has also remained the same, that of witness.
244 Leaflet published by the Dutch Ministry o f  Justice, Support and Compensation to Injured Parties 
for Victims o f  Burglary, Violent Crime, Discrimination etc. (1995)
245 Van Dijk, J.M.M., (1989), op cit at 70
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1.9. Conclusion
Fundamentally opposed assumptions inform the criminal trial processes o f England 
and Wales and the Netherlands. These assumptions translate into marked differences 
in criminal procedure. The function o f pre-trial proceedings and the trial itself are very 
different. So too are the roles played by the prosecutor, the defence, and the trial judge 
and the relationships between them. The emphasis upon written evidence and the 
general acceptance of hearsay evidence in the Netherlands contrasts starkly with the 
insistence upon live oral evidence in England and Wales. The role played by the 
victim in criminal proceedings in both countries is however similar. Victim policy has 
also followed a very similar course in England and Wales and the Netherlands.
This chapter has identified fundamental features of English and Dutch criminal 
proceedings. In following chapters the extent to which the experiences of rape 
complainants in England and Wales and the Netherlands are shaped by these features 
is explored. It will be argued that the focus on the trial, the insistence upon direct oral 
evidence, the exclusionary character of the law of evidence, the nature ol advocacy 
and the combativeness o f adversarial proceedings all have important implications ioi 
complainants in England and Wales. Similarly, it will be argued that the emphasis 
upon the pre-trial stage, the reliance upon written evidence in court and the centrality 
o f the dossier as a record of a thorough and impartial investigation have significant 
implications for complainants in the Netherlands.
The focus of this study is the treatment of rape complainants in criminal proceedings. 
The attrition rate and the conviction rate in rape cases and surrounding issues are not 
explored in this study. It is submitted that a trial process may not be judged simply in 
terms o f successful prosecutions but also by the regard and respect shown all those 
involved, defendants, witnesses and complainants.
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Chapter Two - Rape Complainants and the Adversarial Fact- 
Finding Process
2.1. Introduction
In Chapter one, the fundamental assumptions of the adversarial fact-finding process 
were examined. An insistence upon direct oral evidence was identified as a defining 
characteristic of adversarial criminal proceedings. The primacy o f oral evidence is, in 
part, explained by the structure of adversarial proceedings where the emphasis is very 
much upon the trial where evidence is presented before an unprepared fact-finder and 
tested in court. The insistence upon direct oral evidence in criminal trials may also be 
attributed to the faith placed in the power of cross-examination to expose the truth and 
the great importance attached to the observation of witness demeanour in court. The 
assumption that a physical confrontation between complainant and defendant, the 
presence of the public and the solemnity o f the courtroom all promote truthful 
testimony is a further factor. This chapter explores the implications of this insistence 
upon direct oral evidence for rape complainants. These include having to relive the 
rape in public, facing their alleged attackers and his supporters in court, and enduring 
bruising cross-examination.
Those concerned with the plight of rape complainants in court have invariably sought 
solutions within the existing trial structure. This study argues that for a procedure that 
is fair to both defendants and complainants it is necessary to look outside the 
framework of the adversarial process. There is a conflict between the interests of 
vulnerable complainants and the evidentiary safeguards o f the adversarial trial. As a 
result, the interests of vulnerable complainants can not be accommodated within 
adversarial criminal proceedings. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that the 
assumptions of the adversarial fact-finding process dictate that little may be done to 
lessen the ordeal of a courtroom appearance for rape complainants. It is argued that
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any modifications to procedure to reduce the stress on vulnerable complainants in 
court are seen either to prejudice the interests of defendants or to diminish the 
reliability of evidence.
In order to emphasise the limited protection that the adversarial system can offer 
vulnerable complainants, this chapter examines the modifications to trial procedure 
that have been introduced to ameliorate the position o f child witnesses in criminal 
cases.
The basic assumptions that inform the adversarial process and underlie the insistence 
upon direct oral evidence are rarely challenged. This chapter examines mounting 
evidence that suggests that the faith placed in oral evidence may be misplaced. It is 
argued that the case for compelling rape complainants to give evidence in court is not 
a strong one.
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2.2. Experience of Rape Complainants in Court
“Once inside the courtroom, the experience o f standing in the witness- 
box can seem Kafkaesque and terrifying. Witnesses who may still be 
suffering badly from the effects of the offence have to enter a room full 
o f strangers, some in costume. Then they have to relive the incident 
and recount the events in detail, usually under the gaze of a gallery 
packed with spectators.’’246
The treatment of rape complainants in court has been the subject o f a number of 
studies.247 Research has demonstrated that giving evidence in court can be a traumatic, 
degrading experience for complainants. The research of Sue Lees, Carnal Knowledge 
Rape on Trial, provides an invaluable insight into the experiences o f rape victims 
within the criminal justice system. Reporting the results of the 116 questionnaires 
distributed by Lees and completed by victims of rape, Lees claims;
“The majority of women found their experiences in court humiliating 
and distressing.”248
Lees reports that 72% of women whose cases had gone to court, complained of being 
treated unsympathetically in court and 83% of women felt as though they were on trial 
and not the defendant.249 In the questionnaires, some women described their treatment 
in court;
“It’s horrible, because your mouth goes dry and you walk into that 
court and they’ve all got wigs on and it’s awful really. I thought I was 
going to drop. I must have a strong heart not to have had a heart attack
246 Corbett, C., Hobdell, K., “Volunteer-Based Services to Rape Victims:some Recent 
Developm ents” in (eds) Maguire, M., Pointing, J., Victims o f Crime A New Deal? (1988, Milton 
Keynes:Open University Press)
247 See for example Lees, S., Carnal Knowledge Rape on Trial (1996, London:Hamish Hamilton), 
Victim Support, Women, Rape and the Criminal Justice System, (1996, London:Victim Support), 
Adler, Z., Rape on Trial, (1987, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), Temkin, J., Rape and the 
Legal Process, (1987, London: Sweet & Maxwell)
248 Lees, S., (1996) op cit at 31
249 ibid
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from all this. When I get night terrors, I think I’m going to get a heart
attack.”250
“There’s no such a thing as justice. That’s what I truly believe. And 
especially in this circumstance where it’s a rape trial. They don’t 
understand that the person sitting there is looking you in your face. 
You’re standing up there and you’re trying to put your questions and 
your feelings across to what’s happening and they refuse to listen. I 
don’t think they listened to anything I’d said to them. I understand why 
a lot o f women don’t take rape to court, because it’s a lot o f stress. 
There are a lot of women out there who refuse to go to court.”251
Recent research conducted by Victim Support confirms the plight of rape 
complainants in court.23” The Witness Service survey found that common reactions to 
experiences in court included feeling re-victimised, embarrassed, and as though on 
trial.253 1 2% of Witness Services reported that women stated that the trial was worse 
than the rape.254 The personal testimonies of rape victims provided by in-depth 
interviews conducted with a small sample of rape victims in contact with Victim 
Support reinforce these findings;
“They don’t compensate you for going through Crown Court trials and 
they should do. It was worse than the attack itself - certainly it was a 
darn sight longer.”255
“It was horrible. It’s like you are up on stage. I am very shy and sitting 
there and having to talk about that, with everyone staring at you, it’s 
vile. I wanted the ground to open up. I had to look at his face. It was 
horrible having to be in the same room as him. I hadn t done anything 
and he had - but he didn’t have to say anything - his barrister did 
everything for him, and I had to keep talking, saying it again and again.
He had everything on his side, it was like rubbing salt in your wounds.
It was a nightmare. Sometimes I still think it must have been a bad 
dream.”256
250 ibid at 142
251 ibid at 173
252 Victim Support, (1996), op cit
253 ibid at 16
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The plight o f rape complainants in court was highlighted recently by two cases which 
received extensive press coverage. In one case, the complainant, Julia Mason, was 
subjected to a six day cross-examination conducted by the defendant himself, Ralston 
Edwards. Julia Mason, it is reported, wept in court, was prescribed a tranquilliser at 
one point to help her through the ordeal, and was sent home after Old Bailey medical 
staff ruled she was too unwell to continue.257 Julia Mason waived her right to 
anonymity in order to call for a change in the law;
“I feel like I have been raped twice: once in his filthy den and once in
front o f judge and jury in a British court of law.’'2' 8
In the second case, a Japanese student who had been gang-raped, endured twelve days 
in the witness-box, spending a total of thirty one hours giving evidence. 1 hese cases 
prompted immediate calls for legal reform from women’s groups, including Justice 
for Women,259 and Helen Reeves, director of Victim Support.260 The president o f the 
Association of Chief Police Officers, Roy White, also called for curbs on the 
aggressive cross-examination of women by defence barristers." Criminal lawyeis 
were equally quick to warn of the dangers of knee-jerk reactions and to argue that 
concessions made to rape complainants would jeopardise the rights ot defendants.
257 The Daily Telegraph, 23 August 1996
258 ibid
259 The Times, 7 September 1996
260 The Guardian, 7 August 1996
261 ibid
262 The Daily Telegraph, 24 August 1996
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2.3. Giving Evidence in Court
The insistence upon direct oral evidence in criminal trials in England and Wales, 
means that rape complainants have to give evidence in court. This section identifies 
those aspects of a courtroom appearance that contribute to the ordeal of rape 
complainants. This section also explains that as these elements are assumed to 
enhance the reliability o f evidence and to safeguard the interests ol detendants, the 
ordeal of giving evidence in court may not be lessened for vulnerable complainants.
2.3.1. Before an Audience
The assumption that truthful testimony is promoted by the presence of an audience 
and a defendant’s right to a public hearing mean that rape complainants must give 
their evidence in public. Chambers and Millar conducted interviews with women who 
had attended a court hearing and reported that the experience of giving evidence 
before a courtroom of strangers represents a significant source of distiess loi lape 
complainants.263 The public gallery may contain relatives and friends o f the defendant, 
members of the press, as well as spectators satisfying a prurient interest. The 
courtroom will already contain the trial judge, the jury, lawyers, the court ushers, the 
short-hand recorder and the defendant. Research conducted by Victim Support 
confirms that standing in the witness-box and announcing to a courtroom of strangers 
intimate details about a sexual attack is extremely difficult and distressing for rape 
complainants. 35% of Witness Services reported that women felt embarrassed at 
having to relate intimate details in court.264 30% of Witness Services reported that 
women experienced problems having to face the defendant and his supporters whilst
263 Chambers, G., Millar, A., “Proving Sexual Assault:Prosecuting the Offender or Persecuting the 
Victim ?” in (eds) Carlen, P., Worral, A., Gender, Crime and Justice, (1987, Milton Keynes:Open 
University Press), at 64
264 Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 16
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giving evidence.265 One woman interviewed described the experience o f giving 
evidence in public;
“ ..paralysed by everybody - all their friends and family - staring and 
looking at me. It shouldn’t have been so bad if they hadn’t been in the 
room when I gave evidence, that should not have been allowed. They 
were laughing and calling me a liar. No-one told them to shut up.
Not only must the complainant relate extremely sensitive information to the court but 
she must do so in a loud voice audible to all present. Her testimony will be interrupted 
with calls to ‘speak up’ from the judge and from counsel if she fails to do so. No 
concessions are made for the embarrassment, distress, and humiliation this may cause. 
Lees’ research confirms that recounting personal details in court is a source ol 
considerable anguish for many women;
“Explicit description is very difficult for many women... Women 
describe having to speak loudly about such intimate questions as one of 
the worst aspects of taking a case to court.
This aspect o f criminal trials is not only a source o f embarrassment and discomfort loi 
complainants in rape cases but for witnesses generally, as observed by Rock,
“Witnesses, had, in effect to trumpet what they almost certainly wished 
to state quietly or not at all.”268
Oral testimony is, in addition, recorded throughout the trial by a shorthand writer and 
notes are made by the trial judge. The complainant must therefore ensure not only that 
she speaks loudly but also at a speed that allows verbatim transcription. In the 
adversarial trial the rape complainant is compelled to relive her attack in court and to 
do so slowly and loudly in the presence of the public and the press. A painful task is 
made infinitely more difficult.
265 ibid at 15
266 ibid at 28
267 Lees, Sue., “Judicial Rape” (1993) 16 Womens Studies International Forum at 26
268 Rock, P., The Social World o f the English Crown Court, ( 1993, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 49
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Courts have a discretion to hold criminal trials wholly or partly in camera if necessary 
in the interests of justice. In the main, the interests of justice have not extended to 
ameliorating the distress of vulnerable complainants in court.269 Rape complainants 
may not be spared the ordeal o f giving evidence before strangers as the exclusion of 
the public while a complainant gives evidence would be regarded as an infringement 
a defendant’s right to a public hearing. In addition, the complainant who gave 
evidence in such circumstances would not have been exposed to the truth-promoting 
presence of an audience. The assumptions o f the adversarial fact-finding process 
dictate that rape complainants endure the embarrassment and distress o f giving 
evidence in public.
2.3.2. Confronting the Defendant
The assumption that truthful testimony is promoted by the presence of the defendant 
has translated into a defendant’s right to confront his accusers. Although not 
enshrined in English law, this ‘right’ is protected by the courts. Consequently, within 
the English adversarial criminal trial the complainant is forced into relatively close 
proximity to the defendant. She is required to render the details of her attack in the 
presence o f her assailant. The experience of seeing her attacker again in the courtroom 
will however, undoubtedly cause a victim of rape fear and great distress. This is 
confirmed by the research of Victim Support. In response to the Victim Support 
survey, 47% of Witness Services reported that women felt fearful of facing the 
defendant and his supporters.270 One woman interviewed stated;
“I was absolutely terrified, I had never been to court before in my life. I 
was very scared about the fact that I would have to look at him again, 
to see his face.”271
269 An exception is the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, section 37.
270 Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 16
271 ibid at 45
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2.3.2.1. Screens and TV Links
The belief that the presence o f the defendant acts as an incentive to tell the truth 
means that a complainant will be spared the distress of seeing her assailant in court 
only in very limited circumstances. Screens are generally not available to rape 
complainants and neither is close circuit television (CCTV).
“At the moment the use of screens for adult witnesses is very rarely
allowed in practice.”272
The use o f screens for adult witnesses was raised in the case of Cooper and Schaub.-1' 
This case involved a 21 year old rape complainant. The court held that where an adult 
is giving evidence a screen should be used in only “the most exceptional 
circumstances” as the use of a screen is prejudicial to the defendant even where an 
appropriate direction is given. In the later case ol Foster a screen was used wheie the 
complainant was a 20 year old rape victim.-74 In dismissing an appeal, the court stated 
that the test to be applied was that the judge should endeavour to see that justice was 
done. The trial judge had warned the jury not to be influenced by the use of the screen 
and it was therefore held that the defendant had not been prejudiced in this case. The 
Court of Appeal held that the court in Coover and Schaub had not put a gloss upon 
the test for the use of screens. The risk o f prejudice is a factor to be considered by the 
judge in striking an appropriate balance but it is no more than that. As trial judges 
appear rarely to exercise this discretion in favour of rape complainants it must be 
assumed that the majority consider the use o f screens too prejudicial to defendants. 
This calculation o f risk is based, in part, upon the assumption that a complainant 
shielded from the defendant by a screen, or removed from the courtroom by the use of 
CCTV, will be less inclined to tell the truth.
272 ibid at 54
273 [1994] Crim.LR. 531
274 [1995] Crim.L.R. 333
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2.3.2.2. Removing the Defendant
The defendant’s right to confront his accusers ensures that he will not be removed 
from the courtroom while the complainant gives evidence. In England and Wales, 
only in exceptional circumstances may any part of criminal proceedings take place in 
the absence of the defendant.275
“In Britain it seems to be generally assumed that it would be quite out 
o f the question to exclude the defendant in a criminal case while a 
witness is giving evidence against him.”276
The exclusion of the defendant in a criminal trial is permitted in foreign jurisdictions 
including France and Germany. The exclusion of the defendant is also allowed in 
Denmark, a country with an adversarial criminal justice system, where the practice is
277not restricted to child witnesses but also occurs in rape cases.
Objections to the use o f screens, CCTV, and the removal of the accused are in part, 
explained by the importance attached to a face to face confrontation within English 
adversarial proceedings. A physical confrontation is assumed to promote truthful 
testimony and consequently, to deny defendants this right is considered prejudicial. In 
England and Wales therefore, rape complainants and victims of other horrific, violent 
crimes may not be spared the distress of confronting their alleged attackers in coui t.
2.3.3. Cross-examination
The insistence upon direct oral evidence in adversarial criminal trials is largely 
attributable to the faith placed in the effectiveness o f live cross-examination in court. 
As discussed in Chapter one, in England and Wales, cross-examination is believed to
275 Preston and Others [1994] 2 AC 130 HL, The removal o f  the defendant is permitted in some civil 
proceedings involving children.
276 Spencer, J.R., Flin, R., Evidence o f  Children: The Law and the Psychology, (1993, 
LondomBlackstone), at 112
277 ibid
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be the most effective method of testing the veracity of witnesses and it is considered a 
fundamental right of defendants to cross-examine the witnesses against them in court. 
The experience of rape complainants during cross-examination is fully examined in 
Chapter six. Research has shown that cross-examination is a distressing ordeal for 
many women. The research o f Lees and Adler has revealed that women’s lifestyles, 
behaviour, and also sexual history continue to be scrutinised and judged during cross- 
examination. Defence advocates continue to depict rape complainants as disreputable, 
promiscuous and vindictive. Chapter six examines how women are deliberately 
harassed and degraded by defence barristers in order to undermine their performance 
in court. Recent research by Victim Support confirms that women find cross- 
examination one o f the worst aspects of giving evidence in court;
“Interviewees described their experiences of cross-examination as: 
undermining, patronising, insinuating, humiliating, as if they were on 
trial and worse than the rape.”278
41% o f Witness Services reported that women experienced problems with the nature 
o f questioning during cross-examination, including feeling it was character 
assassination and feeling re-victimised by the defence barrister.27 9 
In Chapter six, it is argued that there is an irreconcilable conflict between cross- 
examination as a mechanism for testing evidence and the decent treatment ol 
vulnerable complainants. In England and Wales, however, no reform in the method ol 
examining witnesses is entertained on the grounds that the interests of defendants 
would be prejudiced.280
278 Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 56
279 ibid  at 15
280 Recommendations o f  the Advisory Group on Video Evidence that child witnesses should be 
examined at a pre-trial hearing where questions would be relayed by a third party were rejected 
by the Government, see Chapter Two at 2.5.3.2
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2.3.4. Defendant’s Right to Self-Representation
The right of defendants to represent themselves is considered a fundamental right in 
England and Wales.281 An exception to the general rule was introduced in the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 section 55(7), which provides that defendants may not cross-examine 
children in abuse cases. The ordeal o f Julia Mason who was cross-examined for six 
days by her rapist, has led to calls for this exception to be extended to rape 
complainants. Observers at the trial have claimed that the defendant exercised his 
right to self-representation in order to intimidate the complainant and to relive the 
rape. Julia Mason was forced to describe the attack in minute detail and face the man 
who subjected her to a sixteen hour ordeal, dressed in the same clothes he wore when 
the attack took place. Det. Sgt. Milne Davidson who led the investigation, was among 
those who claimed that Edwards seemed to relish the opportunity to further degrade 
and humiliate Julia Mason in court;
“No doubt he was getting some kind of sexual gratification from it.”~8~
Edward’s decision to defend himself also meant that he had access to intimate details 
o f her personal life including her medical history.
The Home Office is considering a change in the law but criminal lawyers have argued 
that making professional representation a mandatory requirement in rape cases would 
have serious and damaging repercussions for defendants. Adrian Fulford, QC, a 
criminal barrister claimed;
“There would be endless miscarriages of justice if  further fetters were 
placed upon cross-examination.’ ~8’
In place of reform, some commentators have urged stricter control by trial judges of 
defendants who represent themselves in rape cases. The difficulties oi this proposed 
solution are discussed in Chapter seven where it is argued that the role o f the trial
281 Criminal Procedure Act 1865
282 The Daily Telegraph 23 August, 1996
283 The Daily Telegraph 24 August, 1996
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judge in the English adversarial trial conflicts with the judicial duty to protect 
complainants during cross-examination.
2.3.5. Courtroom Environment
2.3.5.1. Formality
Criminal proceedings in an English Crown Court are formal and ceremonious. 
Barristers and trial judges don wigs and robes. The architecture o f the courtroom 
separates and isolates the courtroom participants. The defendant sits in the dock and 
the witnesses, including the defendant, give their evidence from the witness-box. The 
judge’s seat places him or her above the other courtroom inhabitants. This elevated 
position reflects the authority of the judge and also provides him or her with a degree 
o f aloofness. The jury are enclosed in the jury box; “placed roughly like a spectator at 
a theatre.”284 In fact, the pomp and ceremony that characterises court proceedings 
lends a certain theatricality to events.
“There is punctilious attention to decorum, barristers addressing the 
judge as “My Lord” and bowing to him when entering or leaving the 
courtroom.”285
The courtroom is designed to impress upon the participants the solemnity o f the 
proceedings and it is assumed that the austerity and formality of the courtroom 
promote truthful testimony. However, researchers, such as Spencer, have argued that 
the imposing surroundings also serve to intimidate the already apprehensive 
witness.286
“Courts are deliberately designed to be user-unfriendly places in order 
to ensure a suitable degree of respect for the seriousness o f the 
proceedings. Whatever the effect the formality and ceremony have on
284 Weinreb, L.L., The Denial o f Justice, (1977, London:Free Press), at 104
285 Karlen, Delmar., Anglo-American Criminal Justice, (1967, Oxford), at 170
286 Spencer, J.R., Flin, R., (1993), op cit at 370
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the criminal fraternity the design of most courtrooms tend to intimidate 
innocent witnesses, particularly child witnesses.”287
A study conducted by Flin at el 1988, asked criminal justice professionals to identify 
those aspects o f the layout o f the courtroom that, in their opinion, would contribute to 
the anxiety o f children.288 The isolation o f the witness-box, the elevated position of the 
judge, and the size of the courtroom were frequently cited. It is not unreasonable to 
assume that these aspects of the courtroom have a similar effect on adult witnesses.
“Criminal courts are deliberately designed to emphasise the majesty of 
the law, and the layout of most courtrooms is more likely to increase 
rather than assuage the anxiety of nervous witnesses.”289
As well as the architectural design of the courtroom itself, the professional 
participants in the trial add to the ceremonious theatricality of criminal trials by 
donning robes and wigs. Only rarely will the Courts depart from rigid formality in the 
interests of vulnerable complainants. In the case of R v Williamson, which involved a 
24 year old witness who was mentally handicapped, both the trial judge and counsel 
removed their wigs and gowns.2 ^ This is not a concession afforded to rape 
complainants. Resistance is, in part, based on the assumption that the formality of the 
courtroom promotes truthful testimony.
2.3.5.2. A Combative Arena
In England and Wales, rape complainants are compelled to give evidence in a hostile 
and combative arena. The adversarial trial is structured as a dispute and the 
examination of witnesses reflects the norms of competition and aggression upon 
which the criminal trial is based.291 Within the adversarial criminal trial witnesses are
287 ibid
288 Flin, R., Davies, G., Tarrant, A., The Child Witness Final Report to the Scottish Home and Health 
Dept, (1988) cited in Spencer, J.R., Flin, R., (1993), op cit
289 Flin, R., (1993), op cit at 287
290 The Guardian 10 June 1992
291 See Chapter Six
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divided into two opposing camps. Those called by the prosecution and those by the 
defence. Witnesses appear for one side and are consequently the target o f attack o f the 
other side. Rock argues that within the adversarial system all witnesses are “translated 
into objects in conflict”;292
“It was dedicated to pitting the testimony, credibility and reputation of 
victims and defendants against one another.”29’
Similarly, Brown et al report;
“All complainers giving evidence become the site of a battle between 
the defence's and prosecution's version of events.”294
In the adversarial conflict, the complainant is cast as the ally o f the prosecution and 
the enemy o f the defence. Advocates are professional adversaries, familiar with the 
rules, the formalities and the language o f courtroom conflict. The complainant enters 
the combative arena from a vulnerable and disadvantaged position.
As identified in Chapter one, combativeness is an inherent element o f the adversarial 
trial. The adversarial trial could not operate effectively without a degree of 
belligerence, indeed, partisanship is considered the strength of adversarial 
proceedings. Consequently, the level of combativeness may not be reduced in cases 
involving vulnerable complainants. In fact, in serious cases such as rape cases, the cut 
and thrust of the adversarial criminal trial is likely to be intensified. The rape 
complainant is thrust into a combative and hostile arena where the risk of secondary 
victimisation is high.
292 Rock, P., (1993), op cit at 86
293 ibid
294 Brown, B., Jamieson, L., Burman, M., Sex Crimes on Trial, (1993, Edinburgh:Edinburgh 
University Press), at 18
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2.3.6. Summary
Insistence upon direct oral evidence has clear and distressing implications for 
complainants of rape. Complainants are compelled to relive their ordeal in the 
presence of their attackers, possibly endure being cross-examined by them, in an 
intimidating environment before strangers. Complainants may not give their evidence 
in advance o f the trial and consequently, for the months before the trial have no choice 
but to keep the details o f the attack alive to ensure an effective performance in court. 
A rape complainant may wait over a year before the case comes to court;
“a delay o f around 8 months is average, but some women have to wait 
as long as a year and a half before being called upon to appear in 
court.”295
Any discrepancies, however incidental, between the rape complainant s evidence in 
court and her previous statement to the police will be fully exploited in cross- 
examination. At the trial she may be required to recall the smallest of details. 1 he 
English adversarial trial process demands that complainants keep the distressing 
details o f their ordeals at the forefront of their minds for months. Complainants may 
not begin the slow process of recovery. An insistence upon direct oral evidence 
translates into months o f anxiety and stress for complainants. It is dilficult to imagine 
an arena more inappropriate for a woman, traumatised by rape, than the adversarial 
trial. The assumptions of the adversarial fact-finding process ensure that any 
modification to trial procedure to lessen the ordeal of vulnerable complainants is seen 
as prejudicing the interests of defendants or as diminishing the reliability of evidence. 
Consequently, vulnerable complainants may not be afforded even minimal protection.
295 Adler, Z., (1987), op cit at 50
99
2.4. Calls for Reform
Calls for reform in the way rape cases are conducted have focused largely upon 
offering complainants protection in court. These have included the increased use of 
screens and CCTV, removing the defendant’s right to self-representation in rape 
cases, and restricting the use of sexual history evidence in court.296 However, some 
commentators concerned with the plight of vulnerable complainants, have advocated 
their removal from the courtroom altogether.
2.4.1. Criminal Justice Act 1988 Section 23
McEwan argues that, with a relaxation o f the rules, vulnerable complainants could 
seek refuge in the documentary hearsay exceptions. McEwan argues that vulnerable 
complainants could be spared a courtroom appearance using the documentary hearsay 
exceptions contained in section 23 Criminal Justice Act 1988." 7 Under this provision 
a statement made by a person in a document shall be admissible in criminal 
proceedings provided;
“(2)(a) that the person who made the statement is dead or by reason of 
his bodily or mental condition unfit to attend as a witness;
(b) that-
(i) the person who made the statement is outside the United Kingdom; 
and
(ii) it is not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance; or
(c) that all reasonable steps have been taken to find the person who 
made the statement, but that he cannot be found; or
(3)(a) that the statement was made to a police officer or some other 
person charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging 
offenders; and
296 See for example, Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 59
297 McEwan, J., “Documentary Hearsay Evidence-Refuge for the Vulnerable W itness”, [1989] 
Crim.L.R. 629
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(b) that the person who made it does not give oral evidence through 
fear or because he is kept out of the way.”
Statements that have been prepared for the purposes of criminal proceedings will only 
be admissible with the leave o f the court.298 Leave will not be granted unless the court 
believes the statement ought to be admitted in the interests of justice. McEwan argues 
that in cases involving vulnerable victims, including rape complainants, where the fact 
that the offence took place is not disputed and the only issue is that o f the identity of 
the assailant, documentary evidence could replace a courtroom appearance by the 
complainant without unfairness to the accused. McEwan claims that in such cases 
cross-examination is rendered unnecessary. However, even if the documentary 
hearsay rules were relaxed to this extent, they would benefit only a small number of 
complainants. Where the defendant claims consent in a rape case the refuge created by 
section 23 would not be available.2^
2.4.2. Reform of the Hearsay Rule
Spencer has advocated reform of the hearsay rule to enable vulnerable complainants 
to stay out of the courtroom.300 Spencer argues that such reform would be in the 
interests of justice;
“If  we do not create some means by which the evidence of the old, the 
young, the sick and the foreigner can be taken on commission, we are 
faced with two equally unappealing possibilities: failures of justice 
because vital evidence is missing, or filling the evidential gap with the 
statements the absent witness made to the police - for letting in 
evidence from people whom the defence have had no chance to cross- 
examine, and probably infringing Article 6 (3) (d) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.”301
298 Criminal Justice Act 1988 Setion 26
299 It is possible that the introduction o f  hearsay statements at trial, in line M cEwan’s 
recommendations, where the defendant has had no opportunity to challenge and examine the 
maker, may constitute a violation o f  the defendant’s right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 
European Convention on Human Rights - see Chapter Three
300 Spencer, J.R., “Orality and the Evidence o f  Absent Witnesses”, [1994] Crim.L.R. at 629
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Spencer advocates the introduction o f a procedure for taking the evidence of 
vulnerable complainants on commission at a pre-trial hearing. Spencer argues that 
evidence recorded at a preliminary hearing would not exhibit any o f the professed 
dangers o f hearsay evidence. For example, there would be no risk o f errors in 
transmission as the hearing would be videotaped. This would also enable the court to 
observe the demeanour o f the complainant. The complainant would be examined and 
cross-examined in the normal fashion at the pre-trial hearing and evidence would be 
given on oath. The defendant would presumably not be present but be able to observe 
the hearing via a TV link. The videotaped hearing would replace a courtroom 
appearance.
The procedure envisaged by Spencer has many attractive features. The complainant 
would give evidence in the absence of the defendant and the public. The pre-trial 
hearing would be held in a less formal environment, wigs and gowns for example 
would not be worn. If  pre-trial hearings were not subject to the same lengthy delays as 
trials, the complainant could also be spared months of unnecessary anxiety. However, 
the complainant would continue to be cross-examined by defence counsel. It is 
presumed that the structure o f the pre-trial hearing would parallel that o f the that of 
the criminal trial. The proceedings would be structured as a conflict between the 
defence and the prosecution. Many of the stressful aspects of adversarial proceedings 
would thus be retained.
301 Spencer, J.R., “Hearsay Reform:A Bridge N ot Far Enough?”, [1996] Crim.L.R. at 32
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2.5. Child W itnesses and Modifications to the Fact-finding process
The plight o f child witnesses has been the subject of considerable research.102 Concern 
for the welfare o f child witnesses has led to a number of modifications to trial 
procedure. This section examines these modifications and argues that the limited 
reform in this area illustrates the minimal protection the adversarial system can offer 
vulnerable complainants
2.5.1. Avoiding Confrontation
2.5.1.1. Screens and Television Links
As early as 1919, the possible intimidation of a child witness by the presence ol the 
accused was recognised by the courts.303 The Court of Appeal held in Smellie that if 
there was a fear that a witness may be intimidated, the witness could give evidence 
out o f sight. In this case the defendant was allowed to remain in the courtroom but 
required to sit out of the sight of the child witness. Screens, to shield the child from 
the sight of the accused, were first introduced in 1987. The practice was upheld in the 
case o f X.Y.Z  . The argument that the use of screens may prejudice a jury against a 
defendant was rejected.304 The court held that the trial judge was under a duty to see 
that the system operated fairly not only to the defendant but also to the prosecution 
witnesses; and sometimes the trial judge had to make a decision where the balance of 
fairness lay. One problem associated with the use of screens has been that the decision 
to allow their use was not made until the day o f the trial by the trial judge. Hence, 
child witnesses could not be reassured before the trial that they would not have to face
302 See Dent, H., Flin, R., Children as Witnesses, (1992, ChicestenW iley), Goodman, G., Bottoms, 
B., Child Victims’ Child Witnesses, (1993, London:Guilford Publications ), Spencer, J.R., Flin,
R., Evidence o f Children. The Law and the Psychology, (1993, London:Blackstone)
303 (1919) Smellie 14 Cr APP R 128
304 (1990) X Y Z 91 CR APP R 36
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a defendant in court. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, gives 
judges the power to make a binding ruling as the use of screens and CCTV at a Plea 
and Direction Hearing before the trial.105
According to research conducted by Chandler and Lait, the number of applications for 
screens and the success o f applications decreased in 1995.306 As CCTV is not 
available in all court centres the researchers claim that this implies that less protection 
is being offered to child witnesses.307
A recognition of the distress associated with giving evidence in public, in the 
intimidating environment of the courtroom, led to the introduction of the television 
link in criminal cases involving child witnesses. The Criminal Justice Act 1988 
section 32, provided for children up to 14 years old in cases alleging violence or 
sexual offences to give their evidence from an adjacent room by way of a two-way 
closed circuit link. The Criminal Justice Act 1991 section 55 extended the age to 17 in 
sex cases. Confrontation between the child and the accused is thus avoided although 
the defendant is able to observe the child witness throughout. The child witness also 
gives evidence is a more informal environment outside the public gaze. The use of 
television links in criminal trials is however problematic. There is conflicting research 
on the effect o f the TV link on juries. Some studies indicate that a jury feels less 
sympathy for a witness who appears on screen than one who stands in the witness- 
box.
“There is a belief in some quarters that once the child is removed trom 
the courtroom, her testimony becomes less effective.
It is therefore possible that prosecuting counsel will decline to make use of the video 
link, especially where older children are involved, to avoid jury alienation. In 
addition, the removal o f the child witness from the couitroom does not solve othei
305 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996
306 Chandler, J., Lait, D., “An Analysis o f  the Treatment o f  Children as Witnesses in the Crown 
Court”, in Victim Support, Children in Court, (1996, London:Victim Support)
307 ibid at 104
308 Birch, P., “Children's Evidence”, [1992] Crim.L.R. 273
309 ibid 21A
104
problems associated with giving evidence within the English adversarial criminal 
proceedings. The child witness is still subjected to cross-examination by defence 
counsel.
“The television link can do little to affect the tone of the proceedings 
and the way in which cross-examination is conducted. It will be 
business as usual except that the child is physically removed from the
This viewpoint is shared by leading researchers in the area ol child witnesses. Dent 
and Flin, although acknowledging that the TV link avoids confrontation between the 
complainant and the accused, maintain;
“It seems unlikely that technology alone will remove the genuine lears 
and anxieties o f children testifying under the adversarial system.
Despite its limitations, the live-link has generally been welcomed;
“Overall, the verdict on the live link in England seems to be that it is 
helpful. It enables more children to give more and clearer evidence, 
and whilst suffering less stress; though at the possible cost - if  it is a 
cost - of reducing the emotional impact ol their evidence.
Chandler and Lait report that the success rate of applications lor CCTV remained high 
in 1995, but that CCTV is not available in all Crown Court centres.313
2.5.2. Courtroom Environment
The anxiety and apprehension instilled in the child witness by the court environment 
has also been recognised by the courts. In some Crown Court centres there have been
310 Temkin, J., “Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal Justice”, (1990) 140(i) N.L.J. at 410
311 Davies, G., Westcott, H., “Videotechnology and the Child Witness” in (eds) Dent,H., Flin,R. 
(1992), op cit at 226
312 Spencer, J.R., Flin, R ,(1993), op cit at 111
313 Chandler, J., Lait, D., (1996), op cit at 102
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departures from rigid formality.314 Wigs and gowns have been removed and the child 
witness seated in the well o f the court rather than in the witness-box. This is a matter 
o f discretion for the trial judge.
2.5.3. Advisory Group on Video Evidence
Concern for the plight o f children in court led to the establishment of a committee to 
examine whether courtroom appearances could be made less o f an ordeal. The 
Advisory Group on Video Evidence was established in 1988 to consider the use of 
video recordings as a means o f taking the evidence of children and other vulnerable 
witnesses at criminal trials. The chairman of the group was His Honour Judge Thomas 
Pigot QC. The Pigot committee reached the unanimous conclusion that videotapes of 
previous interviews with child witnesses should be more widely admissible.
The Pigot committee concluded that the arena of the English adversarial criminal tiial 
is so distressing for child witnesses that they should be removed entirely;
“We have concluded that children who come within the ambit of our
proposals.... ought never to be required to appear in public as witnesses in the
Crown Court, whether in open court or protected by screen or closed circuit TV, 
unless they wish to do so.” 315
The Pigot Committee proposed that when an alleged offence is reported by a child the 
child should be interviewed. This interview would be informal but carried out by a 
trained interviewer in line with an official code of practice. The interview would be 
videotaped and would replace examination-in-chief at trial. This would relieve the 
child o f having to repeat all the facts of the offence months later in court. The 
admissibility o f the interview would be decided by the judge at a preliminary hearing
314 Morgan, J., Zedner, L., Child Victims, Crime, Impact and Criminal Justice, (1992, 
Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 133
315 Home Office, Pigot Committee: Report o f the Advisory Group on Video Evidence, (1989, 
London:HMSO), at para 2.25
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attended by the advocates, the accused but not the child witness. At a subsequent 
preliminary hearing the judge would provide for the examination and cross- 
examination of the child witness and this would again be videotaped. The videotape of 
this pre-trial hearing would replace cross-examination at trial. The defendant would 
not be present at the hearing but view the proceedings via a live link or a two-way 
mirror. In the interests of the child witness, the Pigot Committee also recommended 
that the formality o f the criminal trial be dispensed with at the preliminary hearing.
“The arrangements, we think, should be within the judge's discretion, 
but we propose that wigs and gowns should always be removed and 
that he should control cross-examination with special care.
The majority o f the Pigot Committee recommended that questions should be relayed 
by a third person approved by the court. The child witness would be cross-examined 
by a social worker or psychologist and not the defence advocate. 1 he only dissenting 
voice was unsurprisingly, the representative of the Bar.
2.5.3.1. Reaction to Pigot Committee Recommendations
The Pigot Committee recommendations were deemed too radical a depaituie from the 
adversarial fact-finding process. Following the Criminal Justice Act 1991 a pie- 
recorded interview with a child may replace examination-in-chiel at the trial.
“(3) Where a video recording is tendered in evidence under this 
section, the court shall ( subject to the exercise o f any power of the 
court to exclude evidence which is otherwise admissible) give leave 
under subsection 2 unless-
(a) it appears that the child witness will not be available for cross- 
examination;
(b) any rules of the court requiring disclosure of the circumstances in 
which the recording was made have not be complied with to the 
satisfaction of the court, or
316 Home Office, (1989), op cit at para. 2.29
317 Section 54 amends section 32 Criminal Justice Act 1988
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(c) the court is of the opinion, having regard to all the circumstances o f 
the case, that in the interests of justice the recording ought not to be 
admitted;
and where the court gives such leave it may, if  it is of the opinion that 
in the interests o f justice any part of the recording ought not to be 
admitted, direct that that part shall be excluded.”
The Government decided that a video recorded interview may be admitted in place of 
examination-in-chief as an exception to the hearsay rule. However, the leave o f the 
court will only be granted if the child witness is available for cross-examination at the 
trial. One o f the main advantages of the Pigot recommendations was that child 
witnesses would have been able to give their evidence in advance ol the trial. The 
videotaped interviews would replace live testimony in court. Child witnesses would 
therefore avoid the stress of lengthy delays in a case coming to court. This would have 
undoubtedly constituted a significant improvement in the treatment of child witnesses. 
This advantage was however lost. A recent study by Chandler and Lait teports that a 
significant percentage o f video recorded interviews is not accepted as evidence, 
meaning that a child having made a video tape is still required to give both
• • 318examination-in-chief and cross-examination.
The interposing o f a third party between the advocate and the child witness was also 
rejected. Undoubtedly, it was feared that the potency of cross-examination would be 
compromised in such circumstances. It would appear that testimony, not exposed to 
the truth promoting safeguards of the courtroom, is only redeemed by vigorous verbal 
advocacy by defence counsel. There was never any possibility ol the Pigot Committee 
questioning the appropriateness or effectiveness of cross-examination as a mechanism 
for testing the credibility of child witnesses. The terms of reference of the inquiiy 
precluded such debate.
“O f course we agree that cross-examination is essential. Indeed, in 
appointing the group the Home Secretary made it clear that did not 
allow for this would be unacceptable.” ,|t)
318 Chandler, J., Lait, D., (1996), op cit at 104
319 Home Office, (1989), op cit at para. 2.22
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Despite the distress associated with cross-examination no change to cross- 
examination was countenanced;
“Cross-examination is likely to be the worst part of a witness's ordeal, 
yet it is the very part which it has been decided that she cannot be
spared.”320
The central tenet of the Pigot Committee’s recommendations was that child witnesses 
should not appear in court. However, child witnesses will only escape a court 
appearance when a TV link is available. AVhere TV links are not used the child wdl be 
thrust into the adversarial arena and the advantages of the reforms are lost.
“It is ironical that a child is able to give his or her story in examination- 
in-chief in an atmosphere less formal and pressured than that prevailing 
in the court, yet he or she has to endure the much more traumatic and 
fraught experience of being cross-examined in the formal court 
atmosphere.”321
2.5.3.2. Other Vulnerable Complainants
The plight o f other vulnerable complainants in criminal proceedings was recognised 
by the Pigot Committee. The Committee recommended that the proposed reforms for 
child witnesses should be extended to other "vulnerable" witnesses in the near future;
“We have concluded that in a small number of serious cases elderly, 
handicapped, badly traumatised and similarly affected witnesses 
should, eventually, be able to give evidence on the same general terms 
as we have proposed for child witnesses.
The plight o f complainants in sexual offence cases was a particular concern of the 
committee. The ‘vulnerability’ of such complainants was considered indisputable.
320 Birch, P., (1992), op cit at 275
321 Law Commission, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings:Hearsay and Related Topics:A 
Consultation Paper No. 138, (1995, London:HMSO), at para. 13.23
322 Home Office, (1989), op cit at para. 3.4
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“There should, we think, be a rebuttable presumption that all alleged 
victims of serious sexual offences are vulnerable witnesses. The 
general evidence on this point seems to be overwhelming.” ’~3
An appreciation of the ordeal experienced by sexual offence complainants in court led 
the committee to recommend reform in this context as a priority ;
“If changes of the sort which we have suggested cannot be introduced 
reasonably soon in respect of all adult vulnerable witnesses we would 
propose that the earliest provision should be made for victims of 
serious sexual offences, who face special and generally recognised 
difficulties.”324
Despite the concern voiced for vulnerable complainants by the Pigot Committee no 
reform has followed. Vulnerable adult complainants continue to be treated as ordinary 
witnesses.
2.5.4. Summary
The reaction to the Pigot Report clearly illustrates the limits of protection for 
vulnerable complainants within adversarial criminal proceedings. The Ci iminal 
Justice Act 1991 has been described as a lost opportunity by those hoping for far- 
reaching reform;
“With this limited scheme, most of the advantages of the Pigot scheme 
are thrown away.”325
It is however submitted, that the Pigot Committee had set itself, or was indeed set, an 
impossible task in seeking solutions within the framework of the adversarial fact­
finding process. The direct conflict between the interests of vulnerable complainants 
and the evidentiary safeguards of the adversarial trial means that reform will only ever
323 ibid at para. 3.5
324 ibid at para 3.15
325 Spencer, J.R., “Children’s Evidence and the Criminal Justice Act: A Lost Opportunity”, (1991), 
Novem ber, Magistrate at 182
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be piecemeal and inadequate. In the following section the value of these evidentiary 
safeguards is examined.
I l l
2.6. Valuable Safeguards?
Many of the problems faced by complainants stem directly from the insistence upon 
direct oral evidence. The assumptions that underlie this belief in the superiority o f oral 
evidence are rarely examined. This section questions the faith placed in oral evidence. 
It examines mounting psychological research that suggests that non-verbal behaviour 
is an unreliable guide to sincerity and that stress can impair the ability to recall and 
relay information. This section also questions whether the tactics routinely employed 
by advocates during cross-examination really assist the fact-finding process.
2.6.1. Demeanour: a reliable test of credibility?
It is assumed that a trial judge or jury denied the opportunity of observing the 
performance o f a witness, is deprived of valuable clues as to his or her credibility. I he 
importance attached to witness demeanour in adversarial theory has significant 
implications for rape complainants. Firstly, it encourages juries to engage in crude 
popular psychology and draw upon stereotypes of appropriate behaviour. In a rape 
case, the credibility of the complainant will, in part, be judged by the extent to which 
her behaviour conforms to that of the stereotypical rape victim. Assessments are 
necessarily based upon the erroneous assumption that there is a typical, genuine 
response to rape. Whereas, research has shown that responses vary, some women may 
appear upset, others calm.326
“There is a further contradiction in that the complainant should appear 
upset as a victim but controlled and calm as a court witness. If in court 
she appears lucid as a witness, she is in danger o f not coming across as
326 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 121
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a victim. If she appears too upset, she runs the risk o f being seen as 
hysterical and therefore not believable.”32'
The complainant who appears composed may be deemed too impassive and therefore 
unbelievable. Tears and emotion may be interpreted as signs of sincerity or judged 
due to fear o f exposure. In addition, the observation of a witness in court may lead a 
jury to attach significance to irrelevant details such as the physical appearance of a 
witness. Barristers are aware o f the importance of presenting the right image in court. 
This point is illustrated by the advice given by Evans to aspiring advocates;
“The colours you wear, and that your client and witnesses wear^ are 
much more significant than most of us ever pause to think about.” -
The importance attached to witness demeanour also encourages barristers to engage in 
tactics to influence the behaviour of witnesses in court. The practice of defence 
advocates deliberately seeking to fluster and upset complainants in order to undermine 
their performance in court is examined in Chapter six.
The assumption that witness behaviour is an indicator o f veracity is however, not 
supported by the evidence. In fact, there is considerable evidence to undermine such a 
contention. For demeanour to be a reliable factor in determining credibility, there 
would need to be recognised signs or indicia of dishonesty. In addition, those 
determining credibility would need to be efficient in the detection and interpretation 
o f these signs. Research in the fields of physiology and psychology has shown that 
behaviour commonly interpreted as signs of untruthfulness are in fact signs of stress 
and that observers commonly misinterpret non-verbal behaviour.3-' The witness in a 
criminal trial is likely to experience a high degree of anxiety and therefore the 
potential for misinterpretation is great.
327 ibid at xiii
328 Evans, K., The Golden Rules o f  Advocacy, (1993, London:Blackstone), at 11
329 See Wellborn, O.G., “Demeanour”, (1991) 76 Cornell.L.Rev. at 1075
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In Demeanour, Wellborn reviews the research on non-verbal behaviour and lie 
detection and claims that mounting experimental evidence contradicts orthodox legal
330assumptions as to utility of demeanour in assessing veracity.
“If ordinary people in fact possess the capacity to detect falsehood or 
error on the part of others by observing their non-verbal behaviour, 
then it should be possible, indeed easy, to demonstrate such a capacity 
under controlled conditions. Over the past twenty-tive years, a large 
number o f experiments involving thousands of subjects have searched 
for this capacity. With remarkable consistency, the experiments have 
shown that it simply does not exist.’" 3'
Rather than providing valuable clues to the veracity of witnesses, Wellborn concludes 
that demeanour is misleading;
“According to the empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot make 
effective use of demeanour in deciding whether to believe a witness.
On the contrary, there is some evidence that the observation of 
demeanour diminishes rather than enhances the accuracy of ciedibility 
judgments.”332
Stone, in a sceptical appraisal of the reliability of demeanour as an indicator of 
sincerity, also argues that the risks of misinterpretation are high,
“Even where signs of anxiety or relaxation exist and are detectable, to 
equate them to sincerity or deception automatically, is unjustified and 
dangerous.”333
Stone concedes that demeanour may have some significance in normal relationships 
where people are familiar with each others’ normal behaviour and therefore may 
observe deviations. In the courtroom the observers do not have this background 
knowledge. Stone concludes;
“There is no sound basis for assessing credibility from demeanour.” 334
330 ibid
331 ibid at 1104
332 ibid \01‘S
333 Stone, M., “Instant Lie Detection? Demeanour and Credibility in Criminal Trials” [1991] 
Crim.L.R. at 827
334 ibid at 829
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Scepticism about the role of witness demeanour in court is shared by members o f the 
judiciary;
“The great virtue of the English trial is usually said to be the 
opportunity it gives to the judge to tell from the demeanour o f the 
witness whether or not he is telling the truth. I think this is 
overrated.”335
The Law Commission recently reviewed the importance of demeanour as a 
justification of the hearsay rule and appeared to accept its deficiencies;
“A sizeable body of research indicates that physical signs that people 
often think are indicators that a person is telling lies are really signs of 
stress; and a witness may be stressed because he finds it uncomfortable 
to tell a lie, or because she finds it uncomfortable to tell the truth, the 
chances o f the observer correctly guessing that someone is lying from 
his or her “demeanour” are little better than the chance of doing so by 
tossing a coin.”336
Research therefore suggests that the fact-finder, deprived of the opportunity to 
observe the demeanour of a witness is, in fact, deprived o f very little. Despite the 
evidence of research, barristers and judges continue to remind juries ol the importance 
o f demeanour and it continues to be used as a justification lor denying vulneiable
• • 337complainants protection in court.
2.6.2. Confrontation
There is no evidence that a confrontation between a complainant and a defendant 
encourages the complainant to tell the truth. There is however considerable evidence 
that a face to face confrontation with defendants causes complainants significant 
anxiety and distress. Psychological research has demonstrated that stress has an
335 Devlin, P., The Judge, (1979, Oxford:Oxford University Press), at 63
336 Law Commission, (1991), op cit at para. 6.24
337 Rock, P., (1993), op cit at 70
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adverse effect on an individual’s ability to recall facts.338 The stress of seeing the 
defendant may impair a complainant’s performance in court and cause her testimony 
to be accorded less weight. The presence of the defendant may also intimidate a 
complainant and inhibit testimony.
“It should be obvious that it makes it harder rather than easier to tell 
the truth about another to have that person there, particularly if  the 
truth is unpleasant.” 13;
It is also likely that fear of facing their attackers again in court deters some women 
from reporting rape. It is fundamental that defendants have the right to challenge the 
witnesses against them. However, it is submitted that this challenge need not take the 
form of a face to face confrontation and that a physical confrontation does little to
assist the fact-finding process.
2.6.3. Cross-examination: the most effective test of veracity?
The effectiveness of cross-examination is rarely challenged within common law 
jurisdictions. It is however possible to argue that cross-examination as a mechanism 
for testing evidence may in fact, be truth-distorting. One possible challenge to the 
effectiveness o f cross-examination concerns suggestibility. During cross-examination 
the examiner will use leading questions, questions that assert more than they ask. 
Advocates use leading questions to enable them to elicit speciiic responses Irom 
witnesses. Psychological research has identified a potential toi the distoition of 
testimony in this method of interrogation.340 In suggesting answers within their 
questions, cross-examiners may be leading witnesses to give answers that more 
closely accord with the truth as advanced by the advocate lathei than the actual truth.
338 Spencer, J.R., Flin, R., (1993), op cit at 268
339 ibid at 278
340 See Spencer, J., Flin, R., (1993), op cit at 271
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“All the work that psychologists have done on suggestibility and 
questioning shows that the more the questioner suggests a particular 
answer, the less reliable the answer is likely to be.” ’41
The control exerted by the cross-examiner over a witness may also have a distortional 
effect on witness testimony. In both examination-in-chief and cross-examination 
questions are strategically framed by advocates to limit the possible responses of 
witnesses. Witnesses who attempt to offer more information than their examiner 
requires will find themselves abruptly silenced. Advocates skilfully deny witnesses 
the opportunity of presenting the court with the whole truth.14" Cross-examination is a 
device that may be used to prevent the truth in certain instances from emerging as 
well as exposing it.
As stated in Chapter one, great importance attaches to the performance of witnesses in 
court. The performance of a witness during cross-examination can prove decisive. 
Advocates employ an array of tactics to undermine a witness’s performance in court. 
These may not appear in texts on advocacy but their use has been obseived and 
reported by researchers o f criminal trials.343 Advocates deliberately seek to embarrass, 
intimidate and humiliate witnesses so that they are unable to answer questions 
effectively. Advocates engage in lengthy questioning and concentrate upon obscure 
points in order to confuse witnesses.
“Cross-examination of witnesses is regarded by many Commonwealth 
lawyers as the perfect method of establishing the truth, hence the 
reluctance to abolish the hearsay rule. But is frequently used to confuse 
witnesses, to get them to contradict themselves, showing their 
unreliability.”344
Advocates attempt to catch witnesses on the detail and thereby tarnish their entire 
evidence. Comments made by Ron Thwaites QC in an interview with David Rose 
illustrate this point;
341 ibid
342 See Chapters Four and Six
343 See Chapter Six
344 McEwan, J., (1992), op cit at 16
117
“I will acknowledge that the witness-box is a very lonely place. It is 
hard to withstand good cross-examination, even if you are telling the 
absolute truth. The art o f good cross-examination is to seal all the exits, 
leaving only the chimney. Then smoke em out.
Sometimes police officers do make innocent mistakes. It can be easy to 
convert mistakes into sinister lies. It’s not being hard, it’s not being 
soft. It’s only doing my job. You must go to the heart of the case by 
going for the witnesses - not its big toe.” 345
The question inevitably raised but rarely examined is whether a confused, intimidated 
and distressed witness is the best source of evidence and also whether ‘converting 
mistakes into sinister lies’ really aids truth discovery.
Although challenges to cross-examination are rare some commentators have 
questioned its effectiveness. The American judge, Judge Frankel has claimed
“We should be prepared to inquire whether our arts of examination and 
cross-examining, often geared to preventing excessive outpourings of 
facts, are inescapably preferable to safeguarded interrogation by an 
informed judicial officer.”346
The Australian Law Revision Committee concluded that cross-examination is far from 
an effective device for testing the reliability of testimony,
“so far as obtaining accurate testimony is concerned it is arguably the 
poorest of the techniques employed at present in the common law 
courts.”347
2.6.4. Right to Self-Representation
345 Rose, D., In the Name o f  the Law The Collapse o f Criminal Justice, (1996, London:Jonathan 
Cape), at 311
346 Frankel, M„ “The Search for the Truth: The Umpireal View”, (1975) 123 U. Pa. L.Rev. at 1053
347 ALRC Research Paper No. 8, Manner o f Giving Evidence, (1982), at para 5, cited in Zuckerman, 
M.,“Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 138 on Hearsay: The Futility o f  Hearsay ”, [1996] 
Crim.L.R. at. 9
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It would appear, that Ralston Edwards exercised his right to self-representation to 
intimidate Julia Mason in the hope that she would break down and the case would 
collapse. Following the case, criminal lawyers continued to declare self-representation 
an inalienable right of defendants. The defendant required to have professional 
representation gains a qualified and experienced advocate to fight his case, lhe rape 
complainant cross-examined by her attacker is put through a painful and humiliating 
ordeal. It is submitted that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would not be infringed il 
professional representation were to be made mandatory in rape cases.
2.6.5. Before an Audience
There is no persuasive evidence that giving evidence in public promotes truthful 
testimony in court. There is however evidence that this is a distressing aspect ol trials 
for vulnerable complainants. Given the effects of stress and anxiety on witness 
testimony discussed above, compelling vulnerable complainants to give evidence 
before a courtroom of strangers may have negative implications for truth discovery. 
The right o f defendants to a public hearing is a fundamental right and one to be 
guarded. It is however submitted, that excluding the public while rape complainants 
give evidence would not prejudice the interests of defendants. It would not in any way 
impair a defendant’s ability to mount an effective defence but would lepiesent an 
important recognition of the interests of vulnerable complainants.
2.6.6. Courtroom Environment
There is no evidence that giving evidence in an imposing environment deters 
dishonest testimony. The formality of the courtroom has however, been identified as 
one aspect o f the criminal trial that adds to the distress o f complainants. Researchers 
concerned with the welfare o f child witnesses in criminal proceedings have argued
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that the formality of the courtroom may have serious implications for the course o f 
justice.348 The stress induced by the surroundings may inhibit the testimony o f the 
child witness to the extent that the court is unable to obtain the full facts of an offence. 
With regard to the formality o f the courtroom, the Pigot Committee stated;
“It seems to us that this means the formality and solemnity of the court 
room context which are often thought to promote truthfulness by 
witnesses may actually have a deleterious effect on the fullness and 
accuracy of children's testimony.”349
Unwillingness to dispense with wigs and gowns, it would appear, has its foundations 
in the conservatism of the legal profession rather than in a belief that such attiie steers 
witnesses from the path of perjury. Further, it is submitted it is not a necessary feature 
of a fair trial that witnesses be compelled to give evidence in the formal surroundings 
of a courtroom.
2.6.7. The Hearsay Rule
The hearsay rule represents a major obstacle to vulnerable complainants giving 
anything but direct oral evidence in court. The hearsay rule has been the focus of
350
considerable criticism and has, as a result, been referred to the Law Commission. 
The Law Commission examined the main criticisms of hearsay rule and has 
summarised the present state of the law on hearsay as the following,
“There is no unifying principle behind the rule, and this gives to 
anomalies and confusion. Court time is wasted because of the lack of 
clarity and complicated nature of the rule. Cogent evidence may be 
kept from the court, however much it may exonerate or incriminate the 
accused, because the fact-finders are not trusted to treat untested 
evidence with the caution it deserves, but if  hearsay is admitted there is 
nothing to prevent them convicting on it alone. Witnesses may be put
348 Spencer, J.R., Flin, R., (1993), op cit at 370
349 Home Office, (1989), at para. 2.17
350 See Zuckerman, A .A .S., “Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 138 on Hearsay.The Futility 
o f  Hearsay”, [1996] Crim. L.R. at 4, Spencer, J.R., “Orality and the Evidence o f  Absent 
W itnesses”, [1994] Crim. L.R. 629
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off by interruptions in the course of their oral evidence. Whether 
evidence will be let in or not is unpredictable because o f the reliance 
on judicial discretion. The admission or exclusion of hearsay evidence 
could mean that the Strasbourg Court would conclude an accused had 
not had a fair trial.” 351
The Law Commission questioned a number of the traditional justifications of the 
hearsay rule namely, the observation of witness demeanour and the oath. The 
Commission concluded that the right to cross-examine witnesses remained a 
legitimate safeguard and thus a valid justification for retention of the hearsay rule. 
Comments made by the Commission make it clear that the plight of vulnerable 
complainants was considered beyond the scope of their report;
“we believe that the introduction of a system for taking evidence on 
commission would constitute a radical change to English criminal 
procedure, and should perhaps be considered in the context of a 
separate enquiry into the evidence of vulnerable witnesses.
2.6.8. Summary
It is submitted that the faith placed in live oral evidence within common law 
jurisdictions lacks convincing foundation. Claims that the out-of-court statement of a 
witness is necessarily inferior to direct oral testimony in court are unpersuasive. The 
importance attached to demeanour and public confrontation appear misplaced and the 
claims made for cross-examination overstated. The case for compelling rape 
complainants to give evidence in court, it is submitted, is not a strong one.
351 Law Commission, (1996), op cit at para 7.84
352 ibid at para. 11.41
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2.7. Conclusion
A fair procedure, it is submitted, would recognise and treat the victim as an 
individual, a person who had suffered, who was worthy of respect and whose concerns 
were worthy o f consideration. It would, as a consequence, seek to protect 
complainants from unnecessary distress and anxiety and respond to the special 
interests and needs o f vulnerable complainants. The English adversarial system 
clearly fails in this regard;
“ ..our method of trial signally fails to protect from psychological 
damage any of the weaker members of society who may find 
themselves important witnesses for the prosecution. Elderly people 
who may have been victims of violence, women who have been 
sexually attacked, may feel doubly punished if the conduct of the trial 
effectively throws them to the wolves.”353
The plight o f rape complainants in England and Wales is attributable largely to the 
insistence upon direct oral evidence in criminal proceedings and yet, the justifications 
for compelling complainants to give evidence in court are not convincing. It is 
submitted that the experiences of vulnerable complainants, documented by 
researchers, represent a significant challenge to key assumptions which underlie the 
adversarial fact-finding process.
It is clear that the interests of complainants may not be accommodated within 
adversarial proceedings. If the fair treatment of defendants and complainants is to be 
achieved it will be necessary to look outside the existing framework of the adversarial 
trial. The possibility o f devising a procedure that protects the interests of defendants 
but is also sensitive to the legitimate needs and welfare of complainants must be 
investigated. This path to reform is urged by McEwan;
353 McEwan, J., (1989), op cit at 629
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“It would be a great step forward if they could grasp the nettle and 
investigate the possibility of a completely different procedure, rather 
than look for flexibility within the straitjacket of the traditional 
criminal trial.'”34
354 McEwan,J.,(1988), op cit at 822
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Chapter Three- Dutch Criminal Procedure and the Rape 
Complainant
3.1. Introduction
Chapter two dealt with the insistence upon direct oral evidence in criminal 
proceedings in England and Wales and identified the implications foi rape 
complainants. In the Netherlands oral evidence is not regarded as more reliable than 
written evidence. In Dutch criminal trials oral testimony is replaced by written 
evidence. The trial judge(s) base their decision largely upon the evidence contained in 
the dossier. Hearsay evidence is largely accepted. This tolerance of hearsay evidence 
has extended to the almost unlimited use of the statements of anonymous witnesses. 
The use of such statements was accepted by the Dutch Supreme Court in 1980.'
Very different assumptions inform the Dutch fact-finding process. For example, little 
importance is attached to witness demeanour. Instead, great faith is placed in the care 
taken by trial judges in evaluating evidence. The meaning o I these distinctions foi 
rape complainants in the Netherlands are examined in this chapter. An aim of this 
chapter is to establish the extent to which Dutch criminal procedure achieves the dual 
objectives of fairness to defendants and complainants. It is argued that Dutch criminal 
procedure has many advantages for rape complainants. This chapter contrasts the 
experience of rape complainants giving evidence in the Netherlands with that ol 
complainants in England and Wales. It is claimed that the structure and evidentiary 
safeguards of the Dutch fact-finding process allow the interests of vulnerable 
complainants to, in part, dictate procedure.
355 HR, 5 February 1980, [1980] NJ 319, cited in Beijer, A., Cobley, C„ Klip, A., ‘Witness Evidence, 
Article 6 o f  the European Convention on Human Rights and the Principle o f  Open Justice in 
(eds) Harding, C , Fennell, P., Jorg, N ., Swart, B., Criminal Justice in Europe:A Comparative 
Study, (1995, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 293 Following the case o f  Kostovski, conditions have 
been laid down for the use o f  statements o f  anonymous witnesses. These are discussed below.
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Recent rulings of the European Court o f Human Rights have sparked a debate in the 
Netherlands as to whether Dutch criminal procedure is incompatible with the concept 
o f a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
This chapter examines the case law and the implications of the Court’s rulings for 
Dutch criminal procedure are explored. This chapter argues against the ECHR 
imposing a standard based upon adversarial values which fails to give due weight to 
the evidentiary safeguards of the Dutch fact-finding process and to take into account 
the interests o f vulnerable complainants.
As stated above, although much has been written in recent years on specific aspects of 
Dutch criminal procedure the experiences o f complainants within Dutch criminal 
proceedings have not been fully examined. To provide supporting evidence for the 
limited Dutch literature on the treatment of rape complainants, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with two groups of Dutch practitioners; examining 
magistrates and lawyers who had represented rape complainants in criminal 
proceedings. An aim of these interviews was to gain further information on how the 
assumptions and safeguards o f the Dutch trial process shape the experience ol rape 
complainants in the Netherlands. The practitioners were also asked their views on the 
potential impact o f the ECHR on Dutch criminal procedure.
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3.2. Keeping Rape Complainants out of Court
“From the witness’s point of view the Dutch practice has many 
advantages. In most cases a witness does not have to appear at court, 
which means he does not have to travel or spend many hours in a 
waiting room, and victims of violent crimes such as rape or robbery are 
spared the trauma of being compelled to testify in the presence of the 
accused.”356
The primary advantage o f Dutch criminal proceedings is that rape complainants are, in 
the main, spared a courtroom appearance.
“One will rarely find victims of rape as witnesses in the courtroom.
Their statements to the police or to the investigative magistrate are still 
crucial evidence. This kind of evidence is not barred by any restriction 
o f hearsay, at least in practice.”357
A defendant may request that a complainant appears in court. According to Article 
263 o f the Code o f Criminal Procedure the prosecutor may refuse to call a witness
where;
“it must be reasonably assumed that the defendant can not be hampered 
in his defence when (his witness) is not heard in court.
The defendant may appeal to the court to overrule the decision of the public 
prosecutor under Article 280 CCP. In deciding whether the request o f the defendant 
should be upheld or not, attention will be paid to the interests of the complainant. This
356 Beijer, A ., et al (1995), op cit at 288
357 Nijboer, J.F., “Protection o f  Victims in Rape and Sexual Abuse Cases in the Netherlands , in (ed) 
Nijboer, J.F., Proof and Criminal Justice Systems Comparative Essays, (1995, Frankfurt:Peter
Lang), at 117 . . . . . . .
358 Cited in Henket, M., “European Human Rights and the Pragmatics o f  Criminal Adjudication ,
(1992) 15 I.J.S.L. at 256
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was illustrated in a case before the Dutch Supreme Court in 1991.359 The complainants 
were victims of sexual abuse. They had been examined by the police and by the 
examining magistrate. The Supreme Court upheld the decision to refuse the defendant 
the opportunity to have the complainants appear in court because of the emotional 
strain a court appearance would cause them. In this case the statements o f the 
witnesses were supported by other evidence and the defendant had had an oppoitunity 
to confront and examine the complainants at a pre-trial hearing through his lawyer. 
Nijboer claims that typically in cases involving sexual offences the court is hesitant to 
have a complainant examined in court.360 Nijboer explains that the reasoning behind 
keeping rape complainants out of court is to do with the avoidance ot a direct
confrontation.361
The Dutch practitioners interviewed confirmed that as a general rule rape 
complainants are kept out of the courtroom. It was explained that where a defendant 
had had an opportunity to examine a complainant at a pre-trial hearing he must have 
special reasons before a rape complainant will be called as a witness at the trial. A 
possible instance provided was where the defence provides strong reasons why the 
trial judges should observe the complainant themselves. If  the reasons are sufficiently 
persuasive a request may be successful. One practitioner stated that examining 
magistrates and public prosecutors occasionally recommend that rape complainants 
appear as witnesses at trials to enable trial judges to observe their demeanour. This 
was confirmed by an examining magistrate interviewed who explained that if he was 
particularly unsure about the reliability of a complainant he would suggest to the coui t 
that they see her themselves. However, all the practitioners confirmed that it is 
generally very uncommon for rape complainants to appear at court and the distress 
caused rape complainants by a court appearance is an influential factor in any decision 
made by the court. The practitioners also expressed the view that the interests of 
defendants were not prejudiced where such requests were denied. In rape cases, it was 
explained, it was very likely that the complainant would have been questioned by the
359 Cited in Groenhuijsen, M., Conflicts o f  Victims Interests amd Offenders Rights in the Criminal 
Justice System-a European Perspective (1994, paper presented at Eighth International 
Symposium on Victim ology, Adelaide, Australia), at 17
360 Nijboer, J .F .,(1995), op cit at 105
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examining magistrate and defence lawyer at a pre-trial hearing. The defendant will 
have had the opportunity to put questions at that stage and therefore had little to gain 
from questioning the complainant in court.
3.2.1. Summary
In England and Wales, the structure and evidentiary safeguards of the adversarial 
process mean that victims are compelled to appear in court. In the Netherlands, the 
emphasis on pre-trial procedure and the general tolerance of hearsay evidence, means 
that rape complainants may generally, be spared this ordeal.
361 ibid  at 116
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3.3. The Pre-Trial Hearing
Due to the seriousness of the offence it is very likely that the complainant in a rape 
case will be compelled to attend a pre-trial hearing.3'’2 Here the complainant will be 
questioned by the examining magistrate and the defence lawyer and a verbatim record 
o f the interview forms part of the dossier. As discussed in Chapter one, the role oi the 
examining magistrate is to gather further information and not to draw conclusions as 
to the weight of evidence. The experience of rape complainants in the Netherlands, 
giving evidence at a pre-trial hearing, is very different from that o f rape complainants 
in England and Wales in court.
3.3.1. No Physical Confrontation
A belief that a face to face confrontation adds little to the fact-finding process, 
together with the lack o f importance traditionally accorded direct examination of 
witnesses by the defence, means that rape complainants are rarely compelled to 
confront defendants in the Netherlands. Whether a defendant attends the examination 
o f a witness is a matter of discretion for the examining magistrate. An examining 
magistrate may elect to exclude a defendant in order to spare a complainant the 
distress o f seeing her alleged attacker. Nijboer claims that sometimes a direct 
confrontation is considered necessary in rape cases.363 There are no figures available 
on the frequency with which direct confrontations are staged in rape cases. The 
practitioners interviewed were asked whether they understood this to be a common 
practice. The examining magistrates interviewed all claimed that they never allowed a 
defendant to be present when the rape complainant was being examined. The 
practitioners claimed that they avoided such confrontations as it would not be in the 
interests of the complainant to see the defendant. It was also claimed that defendants
362 Nijboer, J.F.,(1995), op cit at 104,
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would gain nothing from such a confrontation. The defendant’s lawyer would be 
present and relay any information to his client. The practitioners appeared to perceive 
no intrinsic value in a face to face encounter. It was assumed that the interests of the 
complainant could be respected without unfairness to the accused.
3.3.2. In Private
In the Netherlands, the examination of witnesses in open court is not deemed a 
necessary component of a fair trial and there is no assumption that an audience deters 
dishonest testimony. Pre-trial hearings are held in camera. Rape complainants are 
therefore spared the ordeal o f giving evidence in public. Complainants will be 
required to render sensitive and embarrassing details only in the presence ol the 
examining magistrate, the defence lawyer and the court clerk who compiles a 
verbatim account of the hearing. Complainants are therefore not forced to speak 
unnaturally loudly. Although giving evidence is undoubtedly a painful process for 
complainants they are spared the embarrassment and humiliation of telling all to a 
room full o f strangers. Women are not forced to give evidence in front of the 
defendant’s family and friends and whoever else wanders into the public gallery. This 
undoubtedly constitutes a major advantage for rape complainants in the Netherlands.
3.3.3. Examination
At a pre-trial hearing a rape complainant is questioned by an examining magistrate 
and by the defendant’s lawyer. In the Netherlands, the examination of witnesses does 
not resemble cross-examination. Few rules regulate the questioning of witnesses at 
pre-trial hearings. The examining magistrate dictates the course of the hearing and the 
questions which are put to a complainant. The examination of rape complainants at 
pre-trial hearings is examined fully in Chapter eight.
363 ibid at at 117
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3.3.4. Informality
The pre-trial hearing takes place in the office of the examining magistrate which is 
simply an ordinary room usually situated within the courthouse building. Compared to 
the criminal trial, the pre-trial hearing is an informal affair and there are few 
procedural rules. The rape complainant answers questions seated at an ordinary desk 
with the examining magistrate and the defence lawyer rather than from the isolation ot 
the witness-box. The examining magistrate and the defence lawyer do not wear gowns 
or wigs. It is also possible, at the discretion of the examining magistrate, for a 
supporter o f the complainant to attend the pre-trial hearing to lend moral suppoit. 
The practitioners interviewed stated that it was their belief that the anxiety of rape 
complainants was appreciated by themselves and their colleagues and that attempts 
were made to put complainants at ease. The practitioners however conceded that this 
depended on the individual examining magistrate. There appeared to be no concerns 
however, that a complainant put at ease was less inclined to tell the truth. It would 
appear that the Dutch pre-trial hearing constitutes a less intimidating and stressful 
environment in which to give evidence than the adversarial trial.
3.4. In Court
In the rare instance that a rape complainant is compelled to give evidence in court, her 
experience will more closely parallel in some ways, that ot the complainant in 
England and Wales. As Dutch criminal trials are, as a general rule, tried in open court 
it is possible that the complainant will have to give evidence in public. The public 
prosecutor may apply to the court for the public and press to be excluded however 
there must be very strong reasons before such a request will be granted.163 Interviews
364 See Chapter Eight 8.6.2.
365 Art. 273 CCP.
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with Dutch practitioners confirmed that while it was possible for the public to be 
excluded at the request of the prosecution this was far from a frequent occurrence;
“It is very rare, the public will be excluded only in very limited
circumstances.”
One practitioner explained that if  a case was considered exceptionally shocking the 
public may be excluded. In the Netherlands it is also open to the defence to request 
that a trial be held in camera. One interviewee recalled a case in which the delendant 
had made a successful application based on the fact that he had Aids and was 
concerned about this becoming public knowledge.
It is also possible that a rape complainant will have to face her alleged attacker in 
court. As a general rule, in the Netherlands the defendant has a right to be present at 
the trial. The public prosecutor may request that the witness be heard in the absence ol 
the defendant.366 If the court feels that the witness will be intimidated by the presence 
of the defendant he may be excluded from the courtroom. However, once again there 
need to be strong reasons before the court will depart from the general mle. 11 the 
defendant is removed while a witness gives evidence the Code ol Criminal Procedure 
provides that he should be immediately told what happened in his absence.
Where the complainant attends court she may also have to answer questions put 
directly by the defendant himself. The defendant in the Netherlands has a right to put 
questions when a witness appears in court.
In recognition o f the distress caused rape complainants by the presence oi the public 
and press and confronting the defendant, the Dutch Supreme Court held that lape 
complainants may give evidence via a TV link rather than in court ' The willingness 
o f the Court to allow rape complainants use of close circuit television leflccts the 
assumptions that a face to face confrontation adds little to the fact-finding process and 
an audience and formality o f the courtroom do not promote truthful testimony.
366 Art. 292 CCP.
367 Art. 280 CCP.
368 HR 22 June 1993 cited in Nijboer, J.F., (1995), opcit at 117
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3.4.1. Summary
The structure and evidentiary safeguards of the adversarial fact-finding process create 
intractable problems for rape complainants in England and Wales. Within the 
framework of the adversarial trial any protection afforded vulnerable complainants is 
necessarily very limited. Dutch criminal procedure creates fewer problems loi 
complainants, primarily because witnesses, as a rule, do not appeal in coutt. Wheie 
problems arise, the assumptions of the Dutch fact-finding process allow the interests 
of rape complainants to influence procedure. Primarily, through avoiding a diiect 
confrontation between a complainant and the defendant.
“Dutch practitioners have shown a large creativity in finding ways to
protect alleged victims of presumed sexual crimes.
The impact all this has on the willingness o f women to report rape is impossible to 
judge. Rape remains an under-reported crime in the Netherlands. Research has 
however shown that women do not report rape for many reasons, their likely treatment 
within the criminal justice system being only one.
The Dutch criminal process has clear advantages for vulnerable complainants. It is 
submitted that in rape cases, the Dutch system manages to recognise the needs ol 
complainants and offer them some protection while safeguarding the interests of 
defendants. A defendant’s right to a fair trial, it is submitted, should guarantee 
defendants among other rights, the right to a public hearing, the right to legal 
representation and the right to challenge the witnesses against him. It is submitted 
however, that the right of a defendant to a fair trial is not necessarily infringed when a 
complainant/witness is examined at a pre-trial hearing from which the public aie 
excluded or where professional representation is declared mandatory. It is further 
submitted that the observation o f witness demeanour by the fact-fmder is not a 
necessary component of a fair trial and neither is a physical confrontation between a
369 Nijboer, J.F., (1995), op cit at 105
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defendant and the witnesses against him. Finally, it is submitted, that a defendant s 
right to a fair trial is not necessarily infringed when the challenge to opposing 
witnesses does not take the form of live cross-examination in court but rather 
examination at a pre-trial hearing conducted by an impartial inquisitoi.
370 See 6.2.3.2.
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3.5. D utch Crim inal Procedure and Article 6 o f The European  
C onvention on H um an Rights
Recent rulings of the European Court of Human Rights have led to a debate as to 
whether Dutch criminal procedure is at odds with the concept o f a fair trial contained 
in Article 6 o f the European Convention on Human Rights. In this section the case 
law is examined and the likely impact of the rulings on Dutch criminal procedure is 
discussed. It is argued that to compel a shift towards a more adversarial procedure 
would be to fail to give due weight to the evidentiary safeguards of Dutch criminal 
proceedings and to ignore the interests o f vulnerable complainants.
3.5.1. Article 6
Article 6 o f the ECHR guarantees a defendant the right to a fair trial.
“ 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but 
the press and the public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in 
the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private 
life o f the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion o f the court in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following 
minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in language which he understands and in 
detail, of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation ol his
defence;
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(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, 
to be given it free when the interests of justice so require,
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and so obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behall under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him;
(e) to have free assistance of an interpreter if  he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court.’'
3.5.2. Status of ECHR
In assessing the potential impact of the recent rulings of the European Court of 
Human Rights on the conduct of criminal trials, it is necessary to understand the status 
of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, 
the ECHR is incorporated into domestic law. The Convention is therefore enforceable 
in the courts. Consequently, the European Convention on Human Rights plays an 
important role in the Dutch legal system;
“The European Convention is now to Dutch case law what the national 
constitution is to courts in countries like the US or the Federal 
Republic o f Germany.”371
The Convention also plays an important role in criminal proceedings.
“The Convention is at the heart of every debate in the Netherlands on 
the quality of criminal justice. It is invoked in court proceedings on an 
almost daily basis. The road to Strasbourg has become familiar to
defence lawyers.”372
Dutch lawyers regularly appeal to the provisions found in Article 6 in criminal 
proceedings and are well versed in the relevant case law. According to Henket, since 
the early eighties the principles guiding the Convention have become entrenched on 
the minds o f Dutch defence lawyers;
Swart B Youne J ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Criminal Justice in the 
Netherlands and the U K ’ in (eds) Harding, C„ Fennell. P., Jorg, N „ Swart, B„ Criminal Justice in 
Europe:A Comparative Study (1995, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 60
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“Nowadays, you can wake up the average criminal lawyer in  ^the 
middle o f the night and he will mumble (in English) “due process” or 
“equality of arms”.373
Clearly, the European Convention on Human Rights already exerts a considerable 
influence upon Dutch criminal procedure.
3.5.3. Case Law
The current debate was sparked by the European Court’s ruling in Kostoyski v 
Netherlands™ In Kostovski the applicant was convicted “to a decisive extent’ on the 
statements o f two anonymous witnesses. The applicant had no opportunity to 
challenge and question the witnesses either directly or through his legal 
representative. The applicant could only submit written questions through the 
examining magistrate, or put questions to those who heard the witnesses. The 
European Court held that the Netherlands was in violation of Article 6(1) and 6(3)(d).
The Court stated;
“In principle, all evidence must be produced in the presence of the 
accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument. This 
does not mean however, that in order to be used as evidence statements 
of witnesses should always be made at a public hearing in court: to use 
as evidence such statements obtained at the pre-trial stage is not in 
itself inconsistent with paragraphs (3)(d) and (1) o f Article 6, provided 
the rights of the defence have been respected. As a rule, these rights 
require that an accused should be given an adequate and propei 
opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either at 
the time the witness was making the statement or at some later stage of 
the proceedings.”
In the Netherlands it is believed that the inability of the defendant to question a 
witness can be compensated for by the care with which a court evaluates the available
372 ibid at 61
373 Henket, M., (1992), op cit at 282
374 2 0 Novem ber 1989, Series A No. 166
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evidence. In Kostovski, the Court held that that judicial care was not a proper 
substitute for direct examination. The Court held that the use of pre-trial statements 
was not in itself inconsistent with Article 6 as long as a defendant had had the 
opportunity to challenge the witnesses against him at some point during 
proceedings. This challenge could, the Court held, legitimately take place at a pre-trial
hearing.
The Court also referred to the importance of the criminal court observing the 
demeanour o f witnesses. The Court stated that caution in evaluating the evidence does 
not compensate for the trial court observing the demeanour of witnesses and thus 
forming its own impression on their reliability.
There have been a number of other cases before the Court in which an applicant has 
claimed that he was denied the opportunity of challenging and examining witnesses 
against him and thereby, denied a fair trial. There has however been a degree of 
inconsistency in the approach of the European Court. In Unterpertinger v Austria 
where the conviction of the applicant was based “mainly on the statements ol 
witnesses that the applicant had had no opportunity to examine, the Court held that 
there had been a violation of Article 6.376 In Windisch v_Austria, the applicant’s 
conviction was based “to a large extent” on two statements of anonymous witnesses 
who again the applicant had not been given the opportunity to examine either at the 
trial or at the pre-trial stage.377In this case, the Court held that there had been a 
violation o f Article 6(3)(d). In Delta v France, the conviction of the applicant was 
based “solely” on the written statements of two witnesses who the applicant had had 
no opportunity to question and again the Court found in favour of the applicant.” * 
However, in Asch v Austria the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 
6(3)(d) where the hearsay police statement of a witness who the defendant had not 
examined was used at the trial. In this case the conviction was not based only on the
375 ibid at para. 43
376 2 4 Novem ber 1986, Series A No. 110
377 2 7 September 1990, Series A N o .186
378 1 9 December 1990, Series A No. 191
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witness’s statement but also on other corroborative evidence.379 This decision seems to 
be inconsistent with the Court’s approach in Unterpertinger and Windisch.
The Court’s task is to determine whether the proceedings taken in their entirety were 
fair. Following Asch it would appear that the existence of other corroborative evidence 
is a factor when the Court considers whether the defendant received a lair trial. 
However, in Ludi v Switzerland the applicant’s conviction was based only partly on 
the written statements o f an anonymous witness who the defendant had had no 
opportunity of examining. Despite the existence of other evidence the Court held that
the defendant’s rights had been violated.
From the case law it is therefore unclear whether the use of a witness statement where 
the defendant has had no opportunity to examine the witness will amount to a 
violation only when the statement is the sole basis of a conviction or even where the 
conviction is based, in part, on other evidence.
The case o f Car dot v France has added to the uncertainty that surrounds this area. The 
significance o f Cardot lies, not with the decision of the European Court, but with that 
of the European Commission on Human Rights. The European Commission judges 
the admissibility of applications in which violations of the Convention are alleged. 
The Commission then refers a case to the European Court which will decide the 
merits of the complaint. In Cardot, the applicant claimed that he had been denied the 
right to a fair trial as his conviction was based on the evidence of witnesses who he 
had not had the opportunity o f examining. The Commission concluded that there had 
been a violation o f Article 6(1) in conjunction with 6(3)(d). The Commission referred 
to the Court’s decision in Kostovski and stated;
“In the light o f this case law, the Commission considers that the 
requirements of a fair trial and equality of arms generally make it 
necessary for all the prosecution witnesses to be heard at the trial court 
and during adversarial proceedings.
379 26 April 1991, Series A  N o.203
380 1 5 June 1992, Series A N o.238
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It is also o f the utmost importance that those courts should be able to 
observe the witnesses’ demeanour under questioning and to form their 
own impression of their reliability.”381
The Commission, in its decision, advances a stricter test than that adopted by the 
Court in Kostovski. The Commission states that prosecution witnesses should be 
questioned at the actual trial. This was not the ruling of the Court in Kostovski where 
the Court stated that the challenging of witnesses could take place at a pre-trial 
hearing. The observation of demeanour is also described by the Commission as of the 
“utmost importance”.
Ultimately, the Court never discussed the merits of the Cardot case as the Court 
decided that the application was inadmissible. The Court held that Cardot had faded 
to exhaust domestic remedies and therefore the application was inadmissible under 
Article 26 o f the Convention.
3.5.4. The Impact of the Kostovski Judgment
The Kostovski judgment has not led to a radical reappraisal of the use of anonymous 
witness statements, or hearsay evidence generally, in the Netherlands. 1 he impact of 
the decision was dissipated, in part, by the significant degree of interpretative freedom 
the national courts may exercise when applying European Court decisions. The 
decisions o f the Court are also always presented as decisions on a particular set of
facts;
“The European Court is very reluctant in formulating general rules and 
always makes it clear that its decision is dependant upon the facts of 
the case.”382
381 European Commission on Human Rights, (1990), Report o f  the Commission 3 April 1990; 
application no. 11069/84; Jean-Claude Cardot against France, para. 50
382 Henket, M., (1992), op cit at 265
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This allows for the a restrictive interpretation of Court rulings. The Dutch High Court 
gave the Kostovski ruling a strict interpretation which permitted the continued use ol 
the statements o f anonymous witnesses.183 The inconsistency of case law emanating 
from the Court also provides a haven for states that are unwilling to accept the wider 
implications of decisions.
“ ..a lack o f clarity in the case law of the European Court provides 
national courts with an opportunity to play down the importance o f the 
Court s judgments. This is what has happened in the Netherlands.
Following the Kostovski judgment the Dutch Supreme Court laid down conditions for 
the use o f statements of anonymous witnesses. These are provided by Beijer et al;
“(i) the statement has been made before a judge who knows the identity 
o f the witness; and
(ii) the judge has expressed his opinion about the reliability of the 
witness in an official report; and
(iii) the defence has been given the opportunity to examine the witness; 
in practice this means that the defence is given the opportunity to 
submit written questions or to examine the witness by means ol 
telecommunication.”385
In 1993, legislation was enacted making the use of anonymous statements legitimate 
subject to certain conditions. Beijer et al report that, where corroborative evidence is 
available, anonymous statements continue to be used in the Netherlands.
Reports that following the Kostovski decision, requests by defence lawyers for 
witnesses to be examined in court have increased suggests that the ruling has had 
some influence on Dutch criminal procedure. According to Nijboer,
“The right of the defendant to examine the witness himself or have him 
examined is taken much more seriously.
383 HR 2-7 1990, NJ 19990, 692 cited in Henket, M., (1992), op cit
384 Swart, B„ Young, J., (1995), op cit at 72
385 Beijer, A ,  et al, (1995), op cit at 296
386 ibid
387 Nijboer, J.F., (1995), op cit at 115
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The practitioners interviewed were asked whether the Kostovski decision had had an 
influence on Dutch criminal procedure and whether they had witnessed any evidence 
of a shift towards summoning witnesses to court. 1 he practitioners claimed that as yet, 
the Kostovski ruling has had little real impact upon Dutch criminal procedure. It 
was acknowledged that the rulings of the European Court had sparked off a lively 
debate but maintained that talk had not yet translated into action. Two of the 
practitioners claimed that they had not noticed any real increase in the number oi 
witnesses appearing in court. Other practitioners claimed to have identified a small 
scale shift towards hearing witnesses at trial but as yet, only small numbers were 
involved.
388 m oment there is proposed legislation about the so-called 'protection of witnesses , in
which the Government tries to organise the examination o f  witnesses in a way that meet the 
requirements set out by the Strasbourg court. Nijboer, J.F., (1995), op cit at 116
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3.5.5. Possible Future Influence of the ECHR on Dutch Criminal 
Procedure
In this section an attempt is made to assess the possible future impact of the ECHR on 
Dutch criminal procedure.
3.5.5.1. Article 6: an Embodiment of Adversarial Values
An important factor when predicting the future impact o f the ECHR on Dutch 
criminal procedure, is the extent to which Article 6 embodies adversarial values. The 
concept of a fair trial, as advanced by the Commission in Cardot, clearly draws 
heavily upon adversarial values. The importance attached to confrontation in the form 
of oral argument in court and to the observation of witnesses amounts to an equation 
o f fairness with the evidentiary safeguards of the adversarial fact-finding process. In 
its interpretation o f Article 6, the European Court also draws upon assumptions and 
concepts that inform adversarial theory. Henket argues that the Convention has always 
been of Anglo-Saxon character.389 Originally, Henket explains, the Convention was a 
collection o f principles and the adversarial bias of the Convention was overlooked by 
contracting states from civil law traditions, including the Netherlands. However, these 
principles have developed into detailed rules and consequently the Anglo-Saxon 
character o f the Convention has become more transparent. Nijboer also supports this
view;
“These provisions are basically founded upon a kind of ‘adversarial 
model, with an emphasis on the independent role of the parties.
389 Henket, M., (1992), op cit at 264
390 Nijboer, J.F., ‘Common Law Tradition in Evidence Scholarship Observed from a Continental 
Perspective’ (1993) 41 Am.J. Comp.L. 299 at 11
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The role of the Court is to decide whether proceedings on the whole were fair. 
Traditionally, while setting out basic requirements of a fair trial, the Court has not 
sought to dictate the procedures by which national courts meet those requirements;
“The right to a fair hearing in Article 6(1) does not require that any 
particular rules o f evidence are followed in national courts in either 
criminal or non-criminal cases; it is for each state to lay down its own 
rules.” 391
The Court has respected the individual character of criminal procedure of the states;
“Given the great diversity of practice in European criminal justice 
systems concerning, for example, the rules of evidence, the Court has 
applied a very wide margin of appreciation as to the conduct ot trials 
by national courts.”392
However, by equating fairness of criminal procedure with the evidentiary safeguards 
o f the adversarial process the Court is, in effect, dictating the conduct of criminal 
trials. This conception o f a fair trial has potentially far reaching implications tor Dutch 
criminal procedure.
“While it is not yet possible to say whether the Court will really adopt 
a common law approach to the hearing of witnesses, its Irequent 
emphasis on the importance of the defence having the opportunity to 
question witnesses as an essential element of fairness has significant 
implications for civil law systems.’ 393
3.5.5.2. A Fundamental Shift?
Some commentators have claimed that the Report of the European C o m m is s io n  in  
Cardot and recent rulings of the European Court, herald an inevitable shilt to a moie
391 Harris, D.J., O ’Boyle, M., Warbrick, C., Law o f the Convention on Human Rights, (1995, 
London :Butterworths), at 210
392 ibid at 273
393 Swart, B., Young, J., (1995), op cit at 86
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adversarial model o f procedure. Nijboer claims that radical reform ot Dutch criminal 
procedure is a realistic possibility;
“It can be expected that the European Court on Human Rights will play 
a major role in the development of the style of proceedings in almost 
all European countries. It is therefore, not unrealistic to expect that the 
accent of the trial will be put more on direct, oral presentation, on 
challenging and evaluating of ‘first-hand evidence presented in the 
courtroom, than is presently the case in the Dutch courts.
“There is a fair chance that countries like France and the Netherlands 
will be ‘forced’ by the European Court on Human Rights in Strasbourg 
to change the practice of the trial, especially as regards the role of 
direct examination o f witnesses and other aspects ol an open, 
‘contradictoire’, oral and public style.
Nijboer envisages a trial process in which direct oral evidence plays a greater role, 
where witnesses would routinely be summoned to appear in court and presumably 
defence lawyers would play a greater role in their examination. Given that the Dutch 
Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes an oral trial, Nijboer asserts that any relorm 
will necessarily be directed at day to day practice.396 Stolwijk has claimed that the 
Cardot case marks;
“the beginning of the end of the Dutch tradition of doing justice ‘on the 
documents of the case, having heard the accused .
and that criminal trials will increasingly focus upon the oral interrogation of 
witnesses. Groenhuijsen has also claimed;
“Article 6 ECHR still has a few surprises in store. At the end ot the 
century one will wonder with amusement why so many of the 
consequences o f this key-provision were not foreseen today.
394 Nijboer, J.F, “Common Law Tradition in Evidence Scholarship Observed from a Continental 
Perspective”, (1993) 41 Am. J. Comp.L. at 311
395 ibid at 304
396 ibid , . T,
397 Stolwijk, S.A.M ., “Wachten op Cardot”, (1991) 21 Delikt en Delinkwent at 109 cited in Henket,
M., (1992), op cit at 262
398 Groenhuijsen, M.S., “Artikel 6 EVRM en de dagelijkse rechtspraktijk Inleiding en perspectief. , 
cited in Henket, M., (1992), op cit at 266
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Despite the limited impact of the Kostovski ruling so far, it would appear that a 
number o f Dutch commentators view the decision as just the beginning and that the 
Netherlands will ultimately be compelled to adopt a more adversarial model of 
criminal procedure.
3.5.5.3 The Views of Practitioners
The practitioners interviewed were asked whether they foresaw a fundamental shift in 
Dutch criminal procedure with specific regard to rape cases. All expressed the belief 
that, as a general rule, rape complainants would continue to be kept out of the 
courtroom. One examining magistrate claimed that this view was supported by the
present trend;
“Increasingly more witnesses are appearing at trials but not in rape 
cases.”
It was claimed that in rape cases, and cases involving other vulnerable complainants, 
defence lawyers would be reluctant to summon witnesses to court. One judge 
explained that defence lawyers viewed such a course to be tactically dangerous . 
Defence lawyers, it was claimed, feared that the visible distress of a rape complainant 
in court would enhance the credibility of her story and damage the defence case. The 
practitioners also claimed that there would be widespread opposition within the ranks 
of the judiciary to increased numbers of rape complainants appearing in court. 
Defendants, it is believed, would gain little from examining a complainant in court 
whereas the woman would be put through a distressing and unnecessary ordeal. 
Examination at a pre-trial hearing before an examining magistrate, the practitioners 
claimed, is a perfectly adequate substitute for courtroom examination.
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3.6. Conclusion
At this time it is impossible to foresee what eventual impact the ECHR will have on 
Dutch criminal procedure. It is however clear that some commentators in the 
Netherlands believe that a shift towards a more adversarial model is inevitable. A shift 
which will see an increased emphasis on confrontation and the presentation of oral 
evidence at trial, although interviews with Dutch practitioners suggest that lape cases 
would be treated differently for some time at least. It is submitted that to compel 
inquisitorial systems, such as the Netherlands, to adopt the evidentiary safeguards ot 
the adversarial fact-finding process would be misconceived and unfair to 
complainants.
Firstly, it is submitted, that defendants in the Netherlands would not necessarily 
benefit from such a move. A defendant should be given the opportunity to challenge 
the witnesses against him. It is however submitted, that this challenge need not take 
place in court and need not take the form of cross-examination. The inability ol the 
fact-finder to observe the demeanour of a witness where examination takes place pre­
trial, it is submitted, is inconsequential. The observation ot demeanour, confrontation, 
and the oral interrogation o f witnesses in court, are fundamental safeguards of the 
adversarial process. These safeguards are rooted in the structuie of adversarial 
proceedings and the assumptions o f adversarial theory regarding truth discovery. The 
structure o f Dutch criminal proceedings and the assumptions that infoim the Dutch 
system are very different. Alternative evidentiary safeguards protect the rights ol 
defendants. To equate fairness with the safeguards of the adversarial process signifies 
a failure to give due weight to the institutional safeguards of Dutch criminal 
procedure.
The primary objection to the alignment ot fair procedure with the evidentiary 
safeguards o f the adversarial process concerns the implications for vulnerable 
complainants were this to lead to witnesses routinely being summoned to appear in
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court. The plight o f rape complainants giving evidence in court was highlighted in 
Chapter two. Chapter two concluded that the adversarial criminal trial is an entirely 
inappropriate arena for rape complainants and identified that, for vulnerable 
complainants, a courtroom appearance often translates into a gruelling ordeal. For 
some, an ordeal more harrowing than the rape itself. The Dutch fact-finding process 
creates fewer problems for vulnerable complainants in that the majority are spared a 
courtroom appearance. In addition, the evidentiary safeguards of the Dutch fact­
finding process allow the interests o f vulnerable complainants to influence procedure. 
I f  there is a shift towards adversarial procedure it will become increasingly difficult 
and ultimately impossible, to accommodate the interests of vulnerable complainants 
within Dutch criminal proceedings.
The report of the European Commission in Cardot and recent rulings of the European 
Court contain no discussion as to the interests of complainants. The plight of 
vulnerable complainants within adversarial proceedings appears to have been entirely 
overlooked. The experience of the complainant should, it is submitted, inform any 
debate on the fairness of criminal procedure. A fair procedure must seek to reflect the 
interests o f both complainants and defendants. It is submitted, that were due 
consideration given to the competing and legitimate interests of victims, the concept 
o f a fair trial advanced by the Commission and seemingly, by the Court, would take a 
different form.
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Chapter Four- Courtroom Stories and Complainants’ Stories 
in Adversarial Criminal Proceedings
4.1. Introduction
The view that victims of crime should be allowed to communicate any concerns they 
may have, to provide information on how they have been affected by the crime 
committed against them and have that information considered at each stage ot the 
criminal justice process, is gaining ground. The United Nations Declaration o f  the 
Basic Principles o f Justice for Victims o f Crime and the Abuse o f Power states;
“6. The responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the 
needs of victims should be facilitated by:
(b) Allowing the views and concerns of the victims to be 
presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings 
where their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the 
accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal justice 
system...”399
Both Victim Support and the European Forum for Victim Services have campaigned 
for the right of victims to provide information in criminal proceedings.400 In July 
1996, the Government announced the introduction of a scheme which is aimed at 
giving victims a voice in criminal proceedings. The Victim’s Charter 1996 states that 
victims of crime can expect the chance to explain how a crime has affected them and 
have their interests taken into account.101 The introduction of this new scheme is 
discussed in this chapter.
399 Cited in Joutsen, M., The Role o f  the Victim o f Crime in European Criminal Justice Systems, 
(1987, HEUNI: Helsinki), at 179
400 Victim Support, The Rights o f  Victims o f  Crime A Policy Paper by Victim Support, (1995, 
LondomVictim Support), European Forum for Victim Services, Statement o f  Victims’ Rights in 
the Process o f  Criminal Justice, (1996, European Forum For Victim Services)
401 Home Office, The Victim’s Charter A Statement o f Service Standards for Victims o f Crime, (1996, 
London:HMSO), at 3
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Giving victims a voice in criminal proceedings in the form of victim statements 
represents an important recognition of the needs and interests of victims of crime. The 
criminal justice system ultimately relies upon the co-operation of victims. In return for 
their co-operation, this study argues, victims should be treated with dignity and 
respect. This would include granting complainants the opportunity o f describing what 
happened to them, victims’ stories would be told in court. An important issue that has 
been missing from the debate on giving victims a voice in criminal proceedings is the 
fact that victims called to give evidence in court find that once in the witness-box, 
they are denied the opportunity o f telling their stories, leaving complainants feeling 
frustrated and unheard. This chapter argues that the inability o f complainants to 
present their stories in adversarial proceedings is largely attributable to the 
presentation o f evidence in the form of conflicting stories told by advocates in court. 
The importance of storytelling in adversarial proceedings is now widely accepted. 
Following the influential work o f Bennett and Feldman40- who first analysed the 
organisation of criminal trials around storytelling, a substantial amount of research has 
been conducted into courtroom discourse.401 Much of this research has been the work 
o f linguists whose interests lie in discourse structure, discourse strategy and 
semantics. Generally, the significance of the process o f storytelling tor lay 
participants in criminal trials, defendants, complainants and witnesses, has not been 
explored. Where the experience o f lay protagonists has been considered research has 
focused to a large extent on the difficulties faced by defendants in presenting their 
version o f events in the lower courts.404 The difficulties experienced by complainants 
in telling their stories have never been adequately addressed. This chapter seeks to 
explain how the process of storytelling in adversarial trials denies complainants the 
chance to tell their stories.
402 Bennett, W.L., Feldman, M., Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom, (1981, N ew  
Brunswick:Rutgers University Press)
403 See Jackson, J.D., Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence, (1988, Liverpool: Deborah Charles), 
Matoesian, G., Reproducing Rape: Domination Through Talk in the Courtroom, (1993, Polity 
Press), Papke, D.R., Narrative and Legal Discourse:A Reader in Storytelling and Law, (1991,
Liverpool:Deborah Charles),
404 See Carlen, P., Magistrates ’ Justice, (1976, Oxford:Martin Robertson), McBarnet, D., 
Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction o f Justice, (1981, London:Macmillan)
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Firstly, this chapter examines the construction of courtroom stories in adversarial 
proceedings. It is argued that the partisanship of case construction within the 
framework o f the adversarial contest necessarily leads to a simplified and biased 
interpretation o f a complainant’s story. In addition, it is argued that the complex 
evidentiary rules that characterise the adversarial trial also represent a significant filter 
o f lay stories. It is argued that complainants are summoned to court, not to tell their 
stories, but to support the story told by the prosecuting counsel. Consequently, 
complainants are subjected to an array of preventative tactics aimed at controlling the 
narrative told in court. In addition, the rules of evidence dictate that witnesses be 
controlled to ensure inadmissible evidence is not introduced. The discursive strategies 
employed by advocates to curtail the narrative freedom o f witnesses are examined. It 
is also argued that the environment in which complainants give evidence may further 
inhibit the ability of complainants to tell their stories. Compelling rape complainants 
to appear in court means that they give evidence in a stressful and intimidating arena. 
The difficult process of recounting painful, explicit information, it is argued, is made 
more difficult.
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4.2. Case Construction and the Adversarial Process
Irrespective o f the system under examination, the process of case construction will be 
a feature. No system can hope to reproduce reality in the courtroom. Rather than 
attempting the impossible, judgments are made upon necessarily selective facts. 
Everyday events are transformed into legal cases. Events are translated into the facts 
o f the case’. However, within adversarial criminal proceedings, everyday events aie 
presented in the form of stories. Stories which are told by advocates in court within 
the framework of a contest. Consequently, ‘facts’ are subjected to a distinct filtering 
process. In any system the evidence presented in court must comply with the rules of 
evidence laid down. In England and Wales, courtroom stories are shaped by the 
complex exclusionary rules which characterise adversarial proceedings. 1 he 
relationship between the law of evidence and the process of storytelling in adversarial 
criminal proceedings is one that is never fully explored in studies of courtroom 
discourse. In adversarial proceedings courtroom stories are told by advocates, 
advocates engaged in a contest. Partisanship is therefore central to case construction in 
adversarial proceedings. The implications of these distinctive features of ease 
construction for complainants are examined below.
4.2.1. The Law of Evidence
A primary constraint on case construction is the law of evidence. The rules of 
evidence regulate the presentation of facts in court. One of the fundamental rules of 
evidence is that facts must be relevant. Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative 
or disprobative o f a fact that requires proof. The concept of relevance therefore acts as 
a filter for the myriad o f facts surrounding a given incident.
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“The concept of relevance thus allows artificial boundaries to be drawn 
around unbounded reality and the "whole truth" to be replaced by the 
“facts o f the case”.”405
The complainant's experience must be translated into legal relevances before being 
processed within the criminal justice system. It is the role of lawyers to translate every 
day events into processable legal stories. Maureen Cain identified the practice of 
translation performed by lawyers.406 Cain examined the relationship between solicitors 
and their clients. Cain identified that life experiences must be translated into a 
discourse that can be used by lawyers and the legal system. Everyday discourse must 
be transformed into legal discourse. As a result, lawyers coerce their clients’ 
experiences to fit legal definitions. According to Cain, lawyers aie primarily 
translators.
“Discursive translation is a lawyer’s defining skill.’ 407
The concept of relevance plays a significant role in the process of translation. 
Elements o f a complainant’s story that are deemed ‘irrelevant’ will not appear in the 
prosecution case. The concept of relevance acts as a filter of lay stories,
“a woman is not allowed to tell her own story of rape, only what is 
relevant in legal terms will have any influence
Adversarial proceedings are characterised by elaborate evidentiary rules, rules which 
can exclude relevant evidence. In England and Wales, the law of evidence largely 
centres on the presentation o f evidence in court. To be admissible, evidence must 
satisfy these exclusionary rules. Hearsay evidence is inadmissible in England and 
Wales, subject to numerous exceptions. Evidence which offends the heaisay uile will 
be excluded. Lay stories are filtered by a body of presentational lules. The 
simplification and modification of lay stories in adversarial proceedings is therefore, 
in part, attributable to the exclusionary character of the law of evidence.
405 McBarnet, D., (1981), op cit at 16
406 Cain, M., “The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical Conception , (1979)
7 Int. J. Soc. L. at 331
407 ibid at 339
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4.2.2. Case Construction and the Adversarial Contest
The adversarial trial is structured as a contest between two sides. Adversarial theory is 
based on the assumption that a confrontation between competing stories will some 
how lead to the emergence of the truth. It is also assumed that partisan assembly and 
presentation o f evidence unearths the greater number of facts. Investigation, it is 
assumed, should be motivated by self-interest;
“The English say that the best way of getting at the truth is to have 
each party dig for the facts that help it; between them they will bring 
all to light. Two prejudiced searchers starting from opposite ends of the 
field will between them be less likely to miss anything than the 
impartial searcher starting in the middle.’ 41
The adversarial structure of criminal trials necessitates the construction of two 
polarised versions of events. It is the role of the prosecution and the defence to 
construct two conflicting alternative stories and this necessarily leads to black and 
white interpretations of events.
“This (adversary) process takes the general form of a dramatic contest 
aimed at shaping two mutually inconsistent interpretation ol common 
data.”410
The advocate in adversarial proceedings is not engaged in a search for the truth but 
seeking to persuade the court that his or her story is the one to be believed. The lole ot 
the court is not to search out the truth but to be persuaded. It is not the duty of the 
advocate, as persuader, to furnish the court with all relevant evidence. Rather, the role 
of the advocate is to tell a story based on selected facts.
408 Smart, C., Feminism and the Power o f Law, (1989, London:Routledge), at j3
409 D evlin, P., The Judge, (1979, Oxford:Oxford University Press), at 61
4,0 Goodpaster, G., “On the Theory o f  American Adversary Criminal Trial”, (1987) 78 J. Crim.L. & 
Criminology at 120
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“The responsibility of the prosecution and defence counsel is to present 
the evidence favourable to their respective sides in the strongest 
light.”41'
Partisanship is central to the process of case construction within the adversarial 
system.
“Whilst case construction is a feature of any criminal justice system, 
the adversarial system makes case construction a particularly partisan
process.”412
The primary objective of the advocate in the adversarial trial must be to tell a good 
story. What makes a good story has been the subject of a significant body of 
research.413 According to Bennett and Feldman, story structure is all important.414 
Structural ambiguity, it is claimed, renders a story less believable. Bennett and 
Feldman claim that prosecutors are confined basically to one strategy in storytelling 
due to the burden upon the prosecution to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt. 
This is to tell a “structurally complete” and internally consistent story. The defence 
have a wider array of strategic options which the researchers categorise as challenge, 
redefinition, and reconstruction strategies.416
“All prosecution cases must attempt to construct a structurally 
complete story that contains an internally consistent interpretation for 
the defendant’s behaviour. ”417
The prosecutor must therefore be acutely aware of the danger of introducing elements 
o f uncertainty into the prosecution case. The grey areas of reality are not conducive to 
convictions within the adversarial trial, ambiguities lead to acquittals. Prosecution 
counsel will therefore seek to present a clear cut account that will avoid the aiousal of 
reasonable doubts in the minds of a jury. Counsel on both sides will strive to maintain
411 Weinreb, L.L., Denial o f Justice, (1977, London:Free Press ), at 99
412 M cConville, M„ Sanders, A., Leng, R., The Case for the Prosecution, (1991,London: 
Routledge), at 11
413 See Bennett, W.L., Feldman,M.S., (1981), op cit, Jackson, B.S., (1988), op cit
414 Bennett, W.L., Feldman, M.S., (1981), op cit
415 ibid at 94
416 See Chapter Six
417 Bennett, W.L., Feldman, M .S., (1981), op cit at 94
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a sharp distinction between the two conflicting accounts presented in court and facts 
that may lead to the blurring o f this distinction will be excluded. Rock s study of 
criminal cases within an English Crown Court led him to conclude;
“A case was a deliberate simplification that obscured some issues, 
giving luminosity only to what were called the facts at issue , the 
facts that were deemed to be causally related to the commission of the 
offence. It was so constructed that it tended to strip way volumes of 
context and history.”418
The advocate’s ultimate consideration will be the persuasiveness o f the story. The 
story told by the advocate in court is a deliberate simplification. Clearly, the stories 
told by advocates in criminal trials are largely constrained by the oppositional 
structure of adversarial proceedings. In England and Wales, the stories of witnesses 
are modified and moulded to meet the specifications of the adversarial trial.
“Victims and defendant alike may be central witnesses, but structurally 
that is all they are, witnesses not to their own experiences but to the 
professionals case shaped not by the complexities and ambiguities of 
real life but the black and white conceptions of the adversarial trial”419
“The consequences of bifurcation are not only that occasionally 
witnesses who could aid the fact-finding process are not heard. More 
generally, the testimony of a witness is shaped and packaged to meet 
the particular needs o f the side for which he testifies, according to the 
general assumption that all testimony favours one side or the other.
The more simple, direct, and -above all- unequivocal a witness s 
testimony is, the “better” it is, although just those qualities perhaps 
would ordinarily make it suspect.”4' 0
4.2.3. Summary
The adversarial trial is structured not as an investigation into the truth but as a contest. 
Rather than the court digging for facts, the court relies upon the stories told by
418 Rock, P., The Social World o f  the English Crown Court, (1993, Oxford: Clarendon Press), at 3 1
419 McBarnet, D., “Victim in the Witness Box- Confronting V ictim ology’s Stereotype”, (1983) 7 
Contemporary Crises at 295
420 Weinreb, L.L., (1977), op cit at 99
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advocates. There is no requirement that all germane evidence be presented in court. 
Courtroom stories are largely the creation of advocates and shaped by law and 
strategy. The advocate decides which questions are asked and often more 
significantly, which questions are not. The advocate decides which witnesses are 
called and which are excluded. It is the advocates who basically decide which facts 
are introduced. Trial judges have the power to call witnesses however it is a power 
that is rarely exercised;
“In criminal cases the judge technically has the right to call a witness 
but virtually never does so.’"121
Trial judges also have a right to examine witnesses and put questions overlooked or 
deliberately omitted by the advocate. Excessive judicial intervention in the 
examination o f witnesses may however lead to a conviction being overturned. In 
general, in England and Wales, a criminal court is restricted to the evidence presented 
by the parties;
“Even on points o f law however the adversary system works on the 
basis that the court is not supposed to undertake its own research and is 
not supposed to go beyond the arguments presented by the parties.
The prosecution story is a selective interpretation o f a complainant s experience. The 
process of case construction ensures that reality is subjected to a filtering process and 
is left partial and impaired;
“ ..the evidence contains only kaleidoscopic fragments o f the facts. It is 
as if  a checker o f light and dark patches were held over reality.”424
421 Zander, M„ Cases and Materials on the English Legal System, (1996, London:Butterworths), at 
285
422 See Chapter Seven
423 Zander, M„ (1996), op cit at 285
424 Egglestone, R., cited in Frank, J., Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (1963, 
AntheneunrM assachusetts), at 86
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The prosecution case will contain only “fragments" of a complainant’s story. The 
story told in court is not the complainant’s story but a story filtered by exclusionary 
rules, determinations o f legal relevance and shaped by strategic considerations. The 
rape complainant who viewed the trial as her opportunity to tell what happened to her 
is left feeling unheard, her ordeal unrecognised. The inability of rape complainants to 
tell their stories was observed by Lees;
“Each woman’s testimony, her voice, her experience, her account of 
what happened, is from the start constricted and curtailed in the court
process,”425
Lees reports;
“In one rape trial I attended where the woman was explaining how she 
felt, the defence counsel successfully intervened with the words, I 
sympathise, your honour, but I fear this is becoming a speech.”
Research conducted by Lees suggests that many complainants in rape cases feel 
frustrated and disappointed by their inability to tell their version of events, in their 
own words in court;
“The majority o f women found their experiences in court humiliating 
and distressing. A very common complaint by women was that they 
were not allowed to explain what happened to them, or how they felt 
during the rape.”427
425 Lees, S., Carnal Knowledge Rape on Trial, (1996, London:Hamish Hamilton), at 34
426 ibid
427 ibid at 31
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4.3. The Need for Control
Complainants will find themselves tightly controlled when giving evidence in court. 
This section explains why this control over witnesses is necessary in adversarial 
proceedings.
Courtroom stories are told by advocates. In an opening speech, the prosecution 
counsel will summarise the story he or she is going to tell. The opening speech in
428itself is an important stage in the persuasive process.
“Even though the story of the opening statement must be brief, the 
story weaves a core narrative that becomes the central interpretative 
framework for the entire trial.” 429
An erroneous assumption contained in much analysis of courtroom questioning is that 
the aim of the advocate in examination-in-chief is to draw out the story of the witness. 
In fact in adversarial trials, prosecution witnesses are called, not to tell their stories, 
but to support the story told by the prosecuting counsel. It is the role of the advocate 
to elicit supportive testimony from their own witnesses;
“Examination and cross-examination in court are principally designed 
to elicit from witnesses the elements of evidence that are central to the 
construction of one or other side’s story.”430
A prosecution witness who fails to cooperate with prosecuting counsel may be treated 
as a hostile witness and subjected to cross-examination by prosecuting counsel. II 
the story told by the prosecution is to be convincing the testimony of prosecution 
witnesses must fit within the story framework outlined in the opening speech. 1 he
428 Holm es Snedaker, K., “Storytelling in Opening Statements: Framing the Argumentation o f  the 
Trial”, in Papke, D.R., Narrative and Legal Discoursed Reader in Story Telling and Law, (1991, 
Liverpool: Deborah Charles), at 132
429 ibid at 134
430 Stephenson, G.M., The Psychology o f  Criminal Justice, (1992, Oxford:Blackwell), at 136
431 Criminal Procedure Act 1865 Section 3, See Newark, M., The Hostile Witness and the
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evidence introduced by prosecution witnesses must be consistent with the 
prosecution’s version of events if  a coherent, believable story is to be told. 
Prosecution witnesses, including complainants, are persons to be controlled to ensure 
that the story that unfolds in the witness-box is the story the prosecution counsel want 
told.
In addition, courtroom stories must comply with the complex, exclusionary rules ol 
evidence. Witnesses are unfamiliar with the procedural and evidential rules that 
govern the criminal trial, they are untrained in the art ot courtroom discourse. 
Witnesses are, as a result, potential ‘loose canons in a tightly regulated arena. There 
is always the danger that a witness will ‘waste the court s time with irrelevancies or 
reveal evidence that contravenes one of the many exclusionary rules. Within the 
adversarial criminal trial control over witnesses is crucial. Munkman, in a chapter 
entitled “Retaining Control”, warns barristers of the dangers of giving a witness a free 
rein;
“If the witness is allowed to give the whole of his evidence in his own 
way, he may miss out important points and stray into irrelevant 
details.”432
Similarly, Evans, advising advocates on the techniques of examining witnesses, states,
“It is the advocate’s job to control what they say and how they say it.
The lawyer who can’t control these two variables is as dangerous as a 
driver who can’t control his car, a pilot who can t control his aircraft, a 
dentist who can’t control his drill.”433
4.3.1. Summary
The revelation o f inadmissible evidence by a witness may jeopardise a trial. The 
revelation o f unsolicited, damaging information may jeopardise the prosecution case.
Adversary System” [1986] Crim. L.R. at 4 4 1
432 Munkman, J., The Techniques o f Advocacy, (1991, London :Butterworths)
433 Evans, K., The Golden Rules o f Advocacy, (1993, London:Blackstone), at 76
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In adversarial proceedings therefore, prosecution witnesses, including complainants, 
constitute a potential threat to proceedings;
“From the prosecutor's perspective the victim is a problem requiring 
careful management. Failing to limit the victim’s testimony to the 
minimum evidence required for conviction carries with it potential 
disaster for his case.”434
Consequently, it is pivotal that the advocate exerts control over witnesses. The 
discursive strategies employed by advocates to curtail the narrative freedom of 
witnesses and retain control over courtroom stories are examined below.
4.4. A dversary A dvocacy
During examination-in-chief the prosecutor will strive to exert control over the 
complainant. Jackson describes a battle between the advocate and the witness. This 
struggle between advocate and witness is clearly apparent in cross-examination 
however it also occurs throughout examination-in-chief. Jackson has argued that 
witnesses are given relative narrative freedom during examination-in-chief;
“Typically, examination-in-chief, though taking the form of 
questioning, will in fact allow the witness a fair degree o f leeway to tell 
his own story in his own words, thus adopting the “narrative testimony 
style”.”436
It is submitted that Jackson underestimates the control exerted by counsel over their 
own witnesses.
434 McBarnet, D., (1983), op cit at 299
435 Jackson, B.S., (1988), op cit
436 Jackson, B.S., “Narrative Models in Legal P roof’, in Papke, D.R., Narrative and Legal 
Discourse:A Reader in Storytelling and Law, (1991), op cit at 162
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Adversary advocacy is the mechanism which enables advocates to exert considerable 
control over witnesses and storytelling in the courtroom. It is the form of presenting 
proof within the English adversary system and is interrogatory. Evidence is elicited by 
the use o f questions and answers. A witness may only give information in response to 
questions put by the advocate. As stated above, the advocate decides which questions 
are asked. This places the advocate in a structurally powerful position. Within the 
adversarial trial the question becomes a potent manipulative tool. According to 
Marcus Stone, in examination-in-chief the advocate should employ what he terms 
“controlled questioning”;
“ ...this lets the advocate edit evidence for persuasive reasons, by 
selection, omission and subtle shaping.”437
Du Cann has similar advice for advocates;
“If the witness must not be led, he must be guided. The evidence is 
given responsively, in answer to questions, not spontaneously, and the 
advocate must keep the witness under control.”438
Aspiring advocates are advised to limit each question to a single point in order to 
maximise editorial control.439 Witnesses are taken through their evidence deliberately 
and with small steps to provide the court with a coherent and consistent account as 
well as limiting the opportunity for detrimental elaboration. Another familiar maxim 
of advocacy texts recommends that where possible advocates should not ask a 
question to which he or she does not know the answer. Prosecution counsel are also 
advised to avoid open ended questions that may give rise to a multitude o f answers, 
prosecuting counsel rely on predictability of response during examination-in-chief.
The importance of question form in achieving linguistic dominance has been 
researched in a number o f studies.440 Questions may be framed so as to limit potential
437 Stone, M., Cross-examination in Criminal Trials, (1988, London :Butterworths), at 82
438 Du Cann, R., The Art o f  the Advocate, (1993, London:Penguin), at 97
439 Stone, M., (1988), op cit
440 See Atkinson, J., Drew, P., Order in Court, (1979, London Macmillan), Matoesian, G., 
Reproducing Rape, (1993, Cambridge:Polity Press), Danet, B., Bogoch, B. “Fixed Fight or Free
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responses. By setting the parameters with a strategically worded question, counsel can 
confine the complainant to very specific responses. The party who asks the questions 
is structurally very much in control. Maley and Fahey analysed the contribution of 
question form to the construction of courtroom narratives.441 The study was based on a 
coronial enquiry which is not intended to be an adversarial arena. However, Maley 
and Fahey explain that the enquiry from which their data came was unusually 
controversial at which four counsel were present to represent the interests of the 
different parties involved. The researchers maintain that the questioning of witnesses 
in the enquiry closely resembled examination-in-chief and cross-examination.44" The 
researchers classified courtroom questions into two categories. Questions looking for 
confirmation and requiring a yes or no response and questions seeking information. 
Maley and Fahey reported a consistent preference for confirmation seeking questions;
“Counsel prefer confirmation seeking questions because they enable 
them to control the topic choice, topic focus, and to construct the 
desired reality. That is, confirmation seeking questions enable the 
counsel to assume the role o f story teller in the trial process.’ 443
Question form is only one device employed in courtroom questioning identified by 
linguists. Other strategies include the use of repetition and reformulation.444 Research 
in this area has shown that the courtroom advocate has at his disposal an extensive 
repertoire o f discursive strategies which allow him to effectively limit the narrative 
freedom of a witness.
Before testifying a rape complainant will swear to tell the ‘whole truth’ however these 
words are misleading. The complainant is not expected to furnish the court with the 
whole truth and she may be restrained from doing so if she attempts it.
for All? An Empirical Study o f  Combativeness in the Adversary System o f  Justice” (1980) 7 
British Journal o f  Law and.Society at 36
441 M aley, Y., Fahey, R., “Presenting the Evidence: Constructions o f  Reality in Court”, (1991) 1V/10 
I.J.S.L. at 3
442 ibid at 6
443 ibid at 7
444 See Goodrich, P., Languages o f  Law, (1990, London:Wiedenfeld & Nicolson), at 197
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“The oath .... is an obligation on the witness to answer the questions, 
not to volunteer all he knows about the issue.”445
The complainant is constrained to offering information in response to the questions 
put to her. If  a question is not asked on a specific point there is no opportunity for the 
complainant to bring that information to the attention o f the court. The adversarial 
system requires prosecution counsel to engage in the strategic manipulation ol 
prosecution witnesses. The prosecuting advocate will actively endeavour to thwart 
any attempt made by the rape complainant to give information which deviates from 
the prosecution story. The rape complainant who erroneously assumes that the role of 
prosecution counsel is to present the court with her story will be quickly disabused;
“Instead o f finding their lawyer helpful they often found that he or she 
prevented the story they had come to tell coming out.
The complainant may be cut off in full flow or interrupted abruptly if she strays 
beyond the parameters set down by the examiner;
“Anyone who has listened to a layman’s account of a court case will 
almost inevitably have heard the complaint that there were vital facts 
that he would have liked to communicate to the court, but which he 
was forbidden to mention.”447
The rape complainant who insists on offering elaboration may be treated quite 
severely by the prosecutor. As McBarnet states;
“ ...the degradation of witnesses in court is not just something meted 
out by their adversaries. Victim, or witnesses more generally, can find 
themselves treated just as abruptly and unpleasantly by their own
side”.”448
“The hazards involved in allowing the victim free rein thus lead to the 
employment of preventative techniques to manipulate the information
445 Stone, M., (1988) op cit at 50
446 Jackson, J.D., “Law ‘s Truth, Lay Truth and Lawyers’ Truth: the Representation o f  Evidence in 
Adversary Trials” (1 9 9 2 )3  Law and Critique, at 4 1
447 Egglestone, R., “What is Wrong with the Adversary System?” (19 7 5 )4 9  Austrl. L.J. at 434
448 McBarnet, D„ (1983), op cit at 295
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presented. But these preventative techniques are abrupt, frustrating and 
degrading to the victim.” 449
4.4.1. Summary
The form o f presenting proof in adversarial criminal proceedings, adversary advocacy, 
enables advocates to exert control over witnesses. Discursive strategies are employed 
by prosecution counsel to ensure that the narrative freedom of complainants is 
restricted and that the story told in court is that o f the prosecutor and not o f the 
complainant. The complainant does not tell her story in court but rather serves as a 
witness to the prosecutor’s version o f events.
“In a legal system based on adversary advocacy a case is not the whole 
truth but a partial account limited to the facts o f the case as defined by 
law and strategy rather than the victim's perceptions of his or her 
experience.”450
449 ibid at 299
450 ibid
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4.5. The Courtroom  Environm ent and Storytelling
The extent to which the environment in which a complainant gives evidence in 
adversarial proceedings constitutes a further obstacle to the presentation of her version 
o f events is a matter that has not been adequately addressed. It is submitted that a 
number of features specific to adversarial proceedings may have such an effect.
Firstly, the process o f storytelling within the adversarial criminal trial is far removed 
from story telling in everyday life where the storyteller will have relative narrative 
freedom. The interrogatory method of examination, eliciting evidence by the use o f 
question and answer, will be unfamiliar to the witness. The witness in a trial is 
compelled to furnish information in a unnatural and artificial manner to which he or 
she is unaccustomed.
“In general, witnesses, whether for the prosecution or for the defence, 
will not be able to tell their own story in the way they would tell it in 
their everyday lives. Courtroom discourse is a specialised art.”451
Secondly, within the adversarial contest, a complainant is cast as the ally of the 
prosecution and the enemy o f the defence. A complainant may consequently feel 
obliged to censor information which may be detrimental to the prosecution and 
potentially advantageous to the defence. Alternatively, a complainant may feel 
reluctant to challenge the manipulative tactics of her ‘representative’.
“Indeed, the whole system of eliciting evidence by question and 
answer is calculated to persuade the witness that he must only tell the 
favourable parts o f his evidence in examination-in-chief and leave it to 
the cross examiner to extract the unfavourable parts.”452
451 Shapland, J., Willmore, J., Duff, P., Victims and the Criminal Justice System, (1985, 
Aldershot:Gower), at 66
452 Egglestone, R., (1975), op cit at 432
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Thirdly, rape complainants, in England and Wales, are compelled to give evidence in 
court. The complainant gives her evidence from the isolation of the witness-box in the 
imposing, intimidating surroundings of the Crown Court. She is required to recount 
intimate, sexually explicit details to a courtroom full of strangers. Her audience may 
include supporters of the defendant and members of the press. A complainant is 
further compelled to describe events in a loud voice and at a speed which allows 
verbatim transcription. In addition, she must endure the gaze o f her alleged attacker 
throughout her testimony. For a complainant in a rape case, giving evidence is 
inevitably a painful experience. She relives an traumatic ordeal. Defining features of 
adversarial proceedings however ensure that the fragmentary story that a complainant 
is allowed to tell is told in a manner and environment which undoubtedly makes a 
painful task more difficult.
“ ..it is misleading to think that present procedures take much account 
o f lay truth as they seem to manage to make lay persons of all kinds, 
witnesses, defendants and jurors, inarticulate and extremely 
uncomfortable, if  not speechless.” 453
4.5.1. Summary
In Chapter two it was argued that a courtroom appearance is a source of considerable 
stress for rape complainants. It was also stated that psychological research has shown 
that stress has an adverse effect on an individual’s ability to recall and relay facts.
“The law, it seems, turns the most elementary rules of psychology on 
their head. By insisting that only courtroom testimony is acceptable it 
assumes that memory is improved with time, and secondly, that stress 
improves the process of recall.” 454
453 Jackson, J.D., (1992), op cit at 49
454 Spencer, J.R., Jacksons Machinery o f  Justice (1989, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press), at 
267
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It is submitted that the environment in which rape complainants are compelled to give 
evidence is not conducive to the elicitation of full and frank testimony. Not only does 
this have implications for individual complainants but also clearly raises questions 
relating to truth-discovery in adversarial proceedings.
168
4.6. G iving V ictim s a Voice
The complainant is not heard in a criminal trial other than during examination by 
prosecution and defence counsel. Traditionally, the impact of a criminal offence upon 
the victim or a victim’s concerns have not been formally addressed in court. At no 
stage in the proceedings is the rape complainant given an opportunity to tell the court 
how she has suffered and the effect the rape has had upon her life. Lees’ research has 
revealed the devastating and long term affects o f rape on women.455 Questionnaires 
distributed by Lees provided many harrowing examples o f the aftermath of rape;
“I think torture is the only thing you can equate with it. If you’ve been 
tortured you come out very shaky and unsure of your personality and 
you’ve had something subjected on you against your will and it takes a 
lot to reconstruct your strength and your confidence.”456
“I wanted to die. I could not stop crying. I thought everybody was 
looking at me and could see what I was feeling inside. I felt dirty, 
bathing all the time as I needed to be clean. I couldn’t sleep couldn’t 
eat, I had nightmares. I was frightened to go out. I was scared o f being 
left alone. I could smell him all the time. I kept scratching myself to 
get him out of my body. I smashed all the mirrors in my bedroom and 
cut up the clothes I had been wearing.”457
Lees reports that many women became less trusting o f men, several suffered severe 
depression, several felt suicidal. Lees also reports that following rape women felt 
unable to live in their homes, to go to work, to continue relationships.
“I lost my job shortly afterwards. I lost my boyfriend. He once in an 
argument said I was ‘soiled goods’, which was cruel. We split up. I 
started reacting to stress by slashing my wrists. I took many overdoses, 
requiring immediate hospitalisation and treatment. They placed me in a
4,5 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 16
456 ibid
457 ibid at 19
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mental health institution twice. I have to this day become very 
anxious.”458
Interviews with rape victims conducted by Victim Support yielded similar stories. 
One woman who had been raped two years earlier stated;
“My nerves have gone. It has completely changed my life. I feel great 
for a couple of months and then I start to have nightmares. Its 
terrible.”459
The aftermath o f rape is however rarely heard in rape trials. Commenting on the 
experience o f rape complainants within the Scottish criminal justice system, Brown et 
al report;
“The trial itself is not an occasion for her to tell her own story in her 
own way, rather she can only answer the questions she is asked. She is 
simply one of the prosecution witnesses, positioned almost as an 
outside observer, a bystander of what she in fact as suffered; her 
suffering itself merely regarded as evidence, her anger unrepresented 
and inappropriate.”460
This is the position for all victims of crime. As discussed in Chapter one, within the 
English adversarial trial the complainant is simply a witness; a source o f evidence. 
The complainant plays a purely passive role in criminal proceedings. On entering the 
criminal justice system the complainant effectively surrenders definitional control 
over her own experience to the State. She no longer “owns” her own experience. Nils 
Christie states that when a victim o f crime seeks redress in a court of law the victim’s 
experience becomes the ‘property’ of lawyers and the legal process.461 This view is 
supported by McBarnet;
“By the stage of the trial the layman’s experience has become the 
professional’s property, and it has become a case.”462
458 ib id a t\1 6
459 Victim Support, Women, Rape and the Criminal Justice System, (1996, London: Victim Support), 
at 33
460 Brown, B„ Burman, M., Jamieson, L., Sex Crimes on Trial, (1993, Edinburgh:Edinburgh 
University Press), at 17
461 Christie, N ils., “Conflicts as Property”, (1977), 17 Brit. J. Criminol. 1
462 McBarnet, D„ (1983), op cit at 295
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The prosecutor’s case will only contain that information, those elements of a 
complainant’s story, which will assist the prosecutor in proving the guilt o f the 
defendant. The parts o f a complainant’s story which do not meet this criterion are 
disregarded, excluded. The complainant’s suffering, her pain, is not voiced. It is 
submitted that all complainants in criminal proceedings should be given the 
opportunity to describe the impact of an offence upon their lives. This view has 
recently gained support, notably from the UK Government.46 Whether this should 
take the form of a victim statement is discussed below.
4.6.1. Victim Statements
In June 1996 the Government announced the introduction of a new scheme which is 
aimed at giving victims a voice in criminal trials. Detailed impact statements will 
give complainants the opportunity to explain the effects of the crimes committed 
against them. Year long pilot schemes were launched in six police force areas in 
August 1996- Metropolitan, Merseyside, Lancashire, Hants, Suffolk, Beds. A 
number o f commentators have questioned the potential value of victim statements. 
Ashworth is among those to express doubts;
“The right to submit a VIS may be high in profile but low in improving 
genuine respect for victims.”465
Mawby and Walklate have argued against the introduction of such statements 
claiming that were they to influence sentencing “further inequity is introduced into the 
system;”466 and if they were not, then “asking victims’ opinions and not acting on 
them increases victims’ feeling of frustration and impotence. 4 7 Morgan et al express 
similar concerns about victim statements influencing sentencing;
463 Home Office, (1996), op cit at 5
454 The Daily Telegraph, 19 June 1996
465 Ashworth, A., “Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing”, [1993] Crim.L.R. at 509
466 Mawby, R.I., Walklate, S., Critical Victimology, (1994, London:Sage), at 192
467 ibid
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“Most victims will lack knowledge of either the options available to 
the court or the wider policy considerations which must be considered 
in sentencing, which is supposed to reflect the moral wrong suffered by 
violation o f societal rules and the personal responsibility and moral 
guilt of the offender. Any large increase in victims’ rights in sentencing 
might destroy this relationship; interfere with the objective decision of 
sentencers; and blur the difference between civil wrong and crime, 
such far-reaching consequences would require a complete 
reconsideration of the whole area of criminal law, sanctions, and the 
moral right to enforce them. This may be excessive since the American 
experience indicates that few victims use the right to make a 
statement.”468
Victim Support supports the introduction of victim statements and have expressed 
strong views on the appropriate form and purpose o f victim statements. According to 
Victim Support, the purpose o f the statement should be;
“i) to ensure that the victim has a right to be heard,
ii) to provide information needed for any award of financial 
compensation;
iii) to alert the authorities to any continuing risk to the victim 
which could affect the defendant’s release from custody, or the
conditions on which he/she is released;
iv) to enable the professional parties involved to take the victim s 
interests into account in decisions which have to be made,
v) to inform the prosecutor of wider circumstances of the case to 
be taken into account during the management of the case in 
court;
vi) to provide the prosecutor with information which could be used 
to refute the misleading statements made by the defence in 
mitigation;
vii) to enable the prosecutor to provide additional relevant 
information to the court, for example, prior to sentence.”469
As to the contents o f the statement, Victim Support states,
“We propose., that victims be given the opportunity to provide a 
statement to the police. It could describe the crime and the
468 Morgan, J„ Willem Winkel, F., Williams, K.S., “Protection o f  and Compensation for Victims of 
Crirne” in (eds) Harding, C., Fennell, P, Jorg, N ., Swart, B„ Criminal Justice in Europe A 
Comparative Study, (1995, Oxford:Oxford University Press), at 315
469 Victim Support, (1995), op cit at 16
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circumstances surrounding it in their own words. It might mention for 
example whether the victim had any previous knowledge of or contact 
with the offender; whether he or she had any continuing fears or had 
received threats; the extent of any losses or injuries, and the emotional 
impact of the crime; and any other aspect ol the crime which they 
would like the authorities to know. This should be passed by the police 
with the other case papers to the Crown Prosecution Service; there 
should be an opportunity to update it before the trial.
Victim Support argues that while victims should be permitted to provide information, 
to describe the effect a crime has had on their lives, they should not assume the 
burden of decisions relating to the offender;
“The state is responsible for dealing with the offender and no attempt 
should be made to return the burden of this responsibility to the 
victim.” 471
Victim Support consequently advocates caution concerning the introduction of victim 
statements prepared for the purposes of sentencing. According to Victim Support, 
the sentencing of offenders should remain the responsibility ol the State. It is 
submitted that this is the correct view. There is no evidence that complainants in lape 
cases, or in other cases, wish to play a more active role in criminal proceedings 01 
wish to influence sentencing.
4.6.2. Summary
Whether the introduction of victim statements will ultimately benefit complainants 
awaits to be seen. While in favour of victim statements, Victim Support has raised a 
number of concerns. These include the possibility that defence lawyers might attempt 
to delay a case so that “a more ‘recovered’ victim could be presented to the court . 
Alternatively, that prosecutors may “oppose a victim receiving counselling or support 
in case they are too recovered by the time of the trial. It also awaits to be seen 
whether complainants will be subjected to cross-examination by the defence regarding
470 ibid at 12
471 ibid at \ 5
472 ibid at 12
173
the claims made in victim statements. While the introduction of the scheme is broadly 
welcomed, the need for careful monitoring o f the scheme and its implications for the 
treatment o f complainants in court is clear.
',73 ibid at 12
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4.7. C onclusion
This chapter has argued that complainants in criminal proceedings should be heard, 
that their stories should be told. This chapter had sought to demonstrate that the 
presentation of evidence in the adversarial trial process in the form o f conflicting 
stories told by advocates in court effectively denies complainants the opportunity to 
tell their stories. The process of case construction is constrained by the oppositional 
structure o f the adversarial trial and the exclusionary character o f the law of evidence. 
The reconstruction of evidence into courtroom stories ensures that the court is 
presented with a selective interpretation of a complainant’s story. A complainant does 
not tell her own story but serves as a witness to the prosecutor’s version o f events. In 
court, complainants find themselves prevented from presenting their stories by their 
‘own’ side, constrained to answering the specific questions o f prosecution counsel. 
Questions which are strategically framed to limit the narrative freedom of the 
complainant. In addition, rape complainants are compelled to give evidence in an 
environment which may reasonably be assumed to make a necessarily painful process 
more difficult.
The fact that until now, victims have not been given a voice in criminal proceedings, 
(and it is by no means certain that victim statement scheme will be implemented 
nationwide), may also be attributed to the historical exclusion of the victim from the 
criminal justice process. There is a strong tradition of not listening to victims of 
crime. Complainants have been historically marginalised and so too have the stories 
they have to tell. The increased focus on the needs and interests o f victims of crime in 
recent years, it appears, may finally give complainants a voice in criminal 
proceedings. The success o f the victim statement scheme awaits to be seen.
If complainants’ stories are to be told however it is clear that reform must extend 
beyond the introduction of new procedural rights. The very structure o f adversarial
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proceedings which relies on stories told by partisan advocates in court would require 
re-examination. Until such a re-evaluation takes place it is submitted, complainants 
and their stories, will continue to be manipulated, and complainants left feeling 
frustrated and unheard by a criminal justice system that ultimately relies upon their 
co-operation.
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Chapter Five - Victims’ Stories and Dutch Criminal Procedure
5.1. Introduction
In Chapter four it was argued that the rape complainant who gives evidence in an 
English criminal trial is denied the opportunity to fully present her version o f events. 
The inability o f complainants to tell their stories was attributed largely to the form in 
which evidence is presented in adversarial criminal proceedings namely, as conflicting 
stories told by advocates in court. This chapter explores whether victims’ stories are 
told within Dutch criminal proceedings.
Firstly, this chapter examines the process of case construction in Dutch criminal 
proceedings. In the Netherlands, evidence is presented in the form of written evidence 
contained in the dossier. It is the dossier that tells the story rather than partisan 
advocates whose task is to persuade the fact-finder. In addition, the law of evidence in 
the Netherlands largely takes the form of decision-making rules rather than 
presentational rules governing admissibility. Consequently, the process o f case 
construction is very different to that described in Chapter four. The implications of 
these differences for complainants in Dutch criminal proceedings are explored in this 
chapter.
Secondly, this chapter argues that the exertion of tight control over witnesses, crucial 
in adversarial proceedings, is rendered largely unnecessary in Dutch criminal 
proceedings and consequently, so too are the preventative techniques identified and 
examined in Chapter four.
This chapter also reports interviews conducted with two groups of Dutch 
practitioners; examining magistrates and lawyers with experience of representing rape 
complainants in criminal proceedings. The aim of these interviews was to provide 
supportive testimony for claims made in the limited Dutch literature that rape
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complainants are denied the opportunity of telling their stories in Dutch criminal 
proceedings.
The environment in which rape complainants in the Netherlands generally give 
evidence is also examined. It is argued that, compared to the English courtroom, the 
Dutch pre-trial hearing provides a more appropriate environment for victims o f sexual 
offences to tell their stories.
Finally, this chapter examines whether the use o f the adhesion procedure, whereby a 
complainant joins a civil claim to criminal proceedings, affords complainants in the 
Netherlands the opportunity to inform the court of the impact of a criminal offence 
upon their lives.
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5.2. Case Construction
In Dutch criminal proceedings, the term case construction refers to the compilation of 
the dossier. Dutch criminal procedure is structured to ensure that the dossier contains 
all relevant evidence and is a legally competent basis for judgment at trial. As 
discussed in Chapter one, the dossier will include the police file; statements o f an 
accused, the complainant and witnesses. The dossier also contains expert evidence, 
social and psychiatric reports. The statements o f the accused and witnesses taken at a 
pre-trial hearing before an examining magistrate are also included.474 The process of 
case construction in the Netherlands varies greatly from the process described in 
Chapter four. The major differences are explored in this section.
5.2.1. A Collaborative Enterprise
Case construction in England and Wales is a process dominated by the parties. The 
adversarial trial is structured as a contest. A contest in which evidence is presented in 
the form of competing stories told by advocates. It is the advocates who construct 
these stories; they are the storytellers. It is the advocates who decide which facts are 
introduced. The court is largely dependant upon the evidence presented by the parties. 
There is no requirement that either party present all relevant evidence in court. Rather, 
the evidence presented by the advocates is shaped by tactical considerations. In 
England and Wales, case construction is a highly partisan process. In contrast, case 
construction in the Netherlands is a process characterised by co-operation. The Dutch 
trial process is structured as an inquiry and not as a contest. In Dutch criminal 
proceedings the public prosecutor, the examining magistrate, the defence and trial 
judges all have a role to play in the construction of the dossier which forms the basis
474 See Chapter One 1.3
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for judgment at trial. Case construction is a collaborative enterprise. All are charged 
with ensuring that the dossier contains all the relevant evidence.
As discussed in Chapter one, in England and Wales, prosecutors are commonly 
described as ‘ministers of justice’, a title which denotes impartiality. However, the 
role o f  the prosecutor in adversarial proceedings is to present a partisan version of 
events. A version which presents the evidence in the best light for the prosecution. 
The role of the prosecutor does not extend to seeking out exculpatory evidence. In the 
Netherlands, the public prosecutor truly is a judicial and impartial figure. The 
prosecutor is regarded not as a contending party but as a representative of the public 
interest. As director of the investigation, the public prosecutor is under a duty to seek 
out both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. As discussed in Chapter one, built into 
the Dutch investigative process are institutional incentives which put public 
prosecutors under pressure to ensure that an investigation is thorough and that the 
dossier constitutes a legally competent basis for judgment at trial.47'’ The public 
prosecutor who does not conduct a thorough investigation risks being stigmatised as 
inefficient and deemed to be not impartial.476 The public prosecutor is, for example, 
under pressure to respect requests made by defence lawyers for further investigation.
“Dutch prosecutors are under pressure to use their power within the 
system to ensure that the dossier is thorough and complete as a 
statement of germane evidence pointing to both conviction and 
acquittal. If  they do not do so, they run the risk o f being discomforted 
at trial.”477
The examining-magistrate, Rechter-Commissaris, is also a judicial, independent 
figure in Dutch criminal proceedings. The role of the examining magistrate is to 
conduct an impartial investigation into the truth and to collect relevant evidence. The 
examining magistrate is under a duty to ensure that the dossier is a complete and 
thorough statement of the evidence.
475 See Chapter One 1.3.1.1
476 See Field, S., Alldridge, P., Jorg, N ., “Prosecutors, Examining Judges, and Control o f  Police 
Investigations”, in (eds) Harding, C., Fennel, P., Jorg, N ., Swart, B., Criminal Justice in Europe: 
A Comparative Study, (1995, Oxford:Oxford University Press), at 237
477 ibid at 235
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“The RC, like the prosecutor, is under significant institutional pressure 
to investigate defence claims and to pursue relevant exculpatory 
evidence. If he rejects a defence suggestion that evidence be sought, 
the defence may raise the issue again at trial and, if  the trial judges 
consider that the investigation might have yielded germane evidence, 
the case will be sent to the RC to conduct the investigation.”478
The defence lawyer also plays an important role in the construction o f the 
investigative file. As discussed in Chapter one, the role of the defence lawyer is to 
identify evidentiary weaknesses, deficiencies and ambiguities in the dossier. It is open 
to the defence lawyer to request further investigation.479 Such requests may be directed 
at the public prosecutor, the examining magistrate and the trial judge. In the 
Netherlands the defence lawyer safeguards the impartiality and thoroughness o f the 
investigation and the evidentiary quality of the dossier.
In England and Wales, the court is largely confined to the evidence presented by the 
parties. The Dutch criminal court is not so confined. In the Netherlands, the court 
actively seeks out the truth. The Dutch trial judge may move on his or her own 
initiative to explore the thoroughness o f the dossier. If considered necessary, the trial 
judge may order further investigation postponing the trial.48"
In the Netherlands the process of case construction is geared towards ensuring that the 
dossier constitutes a thorough and complete statement of the evidence and is a legally 
competent basis for judgment at trial. Key criminal justice professionals work together 
to ensure that the court is presented with all germane evidence. This process reflects 
the underlying assumption o f Dutch criminal procedure that the truth is most likely to 
emerge through an independent investigation motivated by public interest as opposed 
to a party contest. In contrast, the process o f case construction in England and Wales 
reflects adversarial theory’s central assumption that the truth will emerge through 
confrontation, when evidence is assembled and presented by partisan advocates.
The significance that the process o f case construction in Dutch criminal proceedings 
holds for complainants is examined below.
478 ibid at 242
479 See Chapter One 1.3.3.
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5.2.2. Contest vs. Inquiry
In England and Wales, the process of case construction is constrained by the 
oppositional structure o f adversarial proceedings. Evidence is reconstructed into two 
mutually inconsistent stories. Evidence is presented by advocates whose role is to 
persuade. As stated above, the advocates are not under a duty to present all the 
relevant evidence. The process of case construction is dominated by considerations of 
what will make a good story. Structural coherence, consistency and clarity will be 
among the prosecutor’s objectives. The adversarial process requires black and white 
interpretations o f events, clear cut, conflicting accounts. Accounts stripped of 
ambiguity, shades of grey. This has important implications for complainants in 
criminal proceedings. Lay stories are simplified, modified. The prosecution case is a 
selective interpretation of a complainant’s story shaped by strategy.
In the Netherlands, the process of case construction is not subject to such structural 
constraints. Evidence is not moulded into two conflicting accounts. The bi­
polarisation o f evidence in adversarial proceedings which results in the filtering and 
distortion o f lay stories is not a feature of Dutch criminal proceedings. Rather than the 
court deciding between two conflicting versions o f events, the Dutch criminal court 
pieces together a story from all the evidence contained in the dossier. Rather than 
seeking to magnify conflict and emphasise incongruity, in Dutch pre-trial 
proceedings, the public prosecutor, examining magistrate and defence lawyer all 
endeavour to limit areas o f ambiguity in the dossier. They seek to reach, where 
possible, resolution of disputed matters before a case comes to court.
Evidence in Dutch criminal proceedings is not presented in the form o f a story. 
Consequently, considerations of effective storytelling are not a feature o f case 
construction. Elements of a complainant’s story will not be excluded on the grounds 
that their inclusion may introduce ambiguity and inconsistency.
In England and Wales the reconstruction of evidence into conflicting courtroom 
stories leads to the simplification and the fragmentation of lay stories. The story told
480 Field, S., et al, (1995), op cit at 236
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in court by the prosecution is not the complainant’s story but a story shaped by 
strategy. In the Netherlands this reconstruction of evidence, o f lay stories, does not 
occur. Complainants’ stories are not therefore subject to the attendant fdtering 
process.
5.2.3. Law of Evidence
A fundamental distinction between the process of case construction in the Netherlands 
and in England and Wales centres on the law of evidence. In England and Wales, the 
process o f case construction is constrained by the body of complex exclusionary rules 
that characterise adversarial proceedings. In adversarial proceedings, lay stories are 
subject to a distinct fdtering process. Elements o f a complainant’s story which 
constitute inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay evidence, are excluded and will not 
be heard in court. In the Netherlands, the law of evidence is conceived, not as a set of 
presentational rules, but as decision making rules. Dutch criminal procedure is not 
concerned with questions o f admissibility. In the Netherlands, the jury is replaced by a 
career judge and as discussed in Chapter three, great faith is placed in the ability o f 
trial judges to evaluate evidence.481 It is assumed that trial judges are capable o f 
identifying weaknesses in evidence and according such evidence appropriate 
probative force. Consequently, hearsay evidence is generally accepted in Dutch 
criminal proceedings. In the Dutch inquisitorial process lay stories are not fdtered or 
strained by a body o f exclusionary presentational rules. Elements of a complainant’s 
story are unlikely to be excluded on the grounds o f inadmissibility.
5.2.4. Relevance
481 See Chapter One 1.4.2
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In any legal system the concept o f relevance plays a central role in the process of case 
construction. Everyday events are coerced to fit legal definitions. Lay stories are 
translated into legal relevances, legal discourse. In both adversarial and inquisitorial 
systems lay stories are filtered by the concept of relevance. In the Netherlands, the 
translation o f lay stories into legal relevances is apparent when a complainant reports 
an offence to the police. When a complainant reports an offence she is interviewed by 
a police officer. A summarised version of the complainant’s account is then compiled 
and this becomes part o f the police file which in turn, becomes part o f the dossier. As 
a summarised version, certain details o f a complainant’s story are inevitably omitted 
from the police statement, details which are deemed irrelevant by the police officer.
5.2.5. Summary
This section has identified the major differences between the process of case 
construction in the Netherlands and in England and Wales. Case construction in 
adversarial proceedings refers to the transformation of evidence into the distinct form 
o f a courtroom story. A term which refers to the moulding o f evidence into 
competing, highly stylised, versions of events by partisan lawyers. The ultimate aim 
of the advocate is to present the fact-finder with a persuasive interpretation of the 
evidence. In the Netherlands, the term case construction refers to the compilation o f 
the dossier; the record of a thorough and impartial investigation. It is a process in 
which all key criminal justice professionals are involved. The ultimate aim o f which is 
to present the fact-finder with all the germane evidence. In adversarial proceedings the 
concept o f relevance, the exclusionary rules o f evidence and the presentation of 
evidence in the form of conflicting stories all act as significant filters of lay stories. In 
the Netherlands, the primary constraint on the process of case construction is the 
concept o f relevance and this would appear to be the only significant filter o f lay 
stories.
184
5.3. Controlled Questioning?
In Chapter four it was argued that witnesses in adversarial proceedings are persons to 
be controlled and that advocates exert this control through the deployment o f an array 
o f discursive strategies. The preventative techniques employed by advocates to limit 
the narrative freedom of witnesses in court have been the subject o f numerable 
studies.482 Research into courtroom questioning has not however been replicated 
within inquisitorial jurisdictions. The style of questioning employed in Dutch criminal 
proceedings and its bearing upon the ability of complainants to tell their stories has 
not been investigated. Despite this lack of empirical research, this section seeks to 
demonstrate that the control of witnesses is rendered largely unnecessary in the 
context o f the Dutch criminal trial process, that linguistic dominance is not a primary 
objective o f those who examine witnesses in the Netherlands. This section focuses 
upon the questioning of complainants at pre-trial hearings before examining 
magistrates. It is argued that to restrict the narrative freedom of witnesses in the 
manner practised in adversarial proceedings, would be inconsistent with the role o f 
the examiner to conduct a thorough investigation; to search for the truth.
5.3.1. Not seeking control
In England and Wales, complainants are examined by advocates. The role o f the 
advocate in adversarial proceedings is to persuade. As stated in Chapter four, if  a story 
is to be convincing, the information provided by a prosecution witnesses must fit 
within the story framework of the prosecution case. The complainant allowed to offer 
explanation or clarification may introduce irrelevancies and inconsistencies or she 
may tell a story that conflicts with the version of events the prosecutor is attempting to
482 See Chapter Four 4.4.
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present. In other words, granting a complainant narrative lee-way may jeopardise the 
prosecution case. Consequently, tight control of questioning is crucial in adversarial 
proceedings.
At pre-trial hearings in the Netherlands a complainant is questioned primarily by an 
impartial inquisitor, the examining-magistrate. The examining magistrate has no story 
to tell. The role of the examining magistrate is not to persuade but to conduct an 
investigation into the truth. A complainant is summoned, not to support a story told by 
the prosecutor, but in order that the examining-magistrate can be satisfied that the 
dossier contains all germane evidence. The examining magistrate is an impartial 
figure whose task is to dig for the truth irrespective of its potential value or otherwise 
to the parties. As a result, controlling witnesses through preventative techniques, it is 
submitted, is not a primary objective of the examining magistrate.
In England and Wales, advocates’ attempts to exert control over witnesses are also 
attributable to the exclusionary nature of the law o f evidence. In adversarial 
proceedings the examiner must ensure that inadmissible evidence is not introduced 
before the fact-finder. The introduction of such evidence may jeopardise the trial. In 
the Netherlands, witnesses are not generally questioned before the fact-finder but at a 
preliminary hearing. In addition, the Dutch law of evidence contains few 
presentational rules. The examining magistrate need not therefore, be concerned with 
questions o f admissibility. The law of evidence in the Netherlands does not 
necessitate the rigorous control of witnesses at pre-trial hearings.
In both countries a witness, including a complainant, is a source of evidence. Within 
the structural framework of the adversarial trial the witness becomes a source o f 
evidence which, if  not carefully managed, may jeopardise proceedings. In the 
Netherlands, a witness does not constitute such a threat and therefore, it is submitted, 
control over witnesses is rendered largely unnecessary.
5.3.2. Style of Questioning
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Despite the absence of empirical research into the style of questioning employed at 
pre-trial hearings in the Netherlands, it is argued in this section that the fact that 
control over witnesses is rendered largely unnecessary in Dutch proceedings also 
renders the discursive strategies employed in adversarial proceedings unnecessary. It 
is argued that the use o f the discursive strategies identified in Chapter four, may be 
attributed to the structural constraints o f the adversarial process. Constraints which are 
largely absent in Dutch criminal proceedings. To allow witnesses greater narrative 
freedom to present their version of events, to offer explanation and clarification, it is 
argued, is more fitting with the Dutch inquisitorial process than to curtail and control 
witnesses through strategic questioning.
5.3.3. Omission of Relevant Evidence
Both the complainant in court in England and Wales and the complainant at a pre-trial 
hearing in the Netherlands give evidence responsively to the questions put by their 
examiner. As discussed in Chapter four, the advocate in the adversarial trial may 
deliberately seek to omit relevant evidence. The advocate may decide not to question 
a witness about certain matters or he or she may decide not to call a witness 
altogether. The decision whether to ask a specific question or not is governed by a 
number of considerations in adversarial trial proceedings. The advocate must consider 
for example, whether a question will elicit evidence that is admissible or whether the 
response o f a witness will support the story the advocate is trying to tell. An effective 
advocate must be equally capable o f identifying questions that should be avoided as 
well as those that should be raised. In the Netherlands the examining magistrate is not 
constrained by such considerations. The examining magistrate is not telling a story, he 
or she is not seeking to persuade the fact-finder. Rather the examining magistrate is 
engaged in a search for the truth, gathering all relevant evidence. To fail to question a 
witness on matters which the examining magistrate believes would furnish relevant 
information and assist the court in determining the facts, it is submitted, would be 
inconsistent with the duty of the examining magistrate to conduct a thorough enquiry. 
The same would apply to the failure to call a witness.
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5.3.4. Question Form
In Chapter four, question form was identified as an important discursive strategy 
employed by advocates to achieve linguistic dominance and restrict the narrative 
freedom of witnesses. In England and Wales witnesses are confined to answering the 
specific questions put by advocates. Questions which may be strategically framed to 
limit the potential response of the witness to ensure that the witness offers only 
supportive testimony. As discussed in Chapter four, open ended questions which 
allow those under examination a greater degree of latitude in their response are 
tactically avoided. In the Netherlands, the examining magistrate is not seeking to elicit 
supportive testimony. The examining magistrate is concerned with gathering relevant 
evidence. It is submitted that to restrict the potential response of a complainant with 
strategically framed questions would be inconsistent with the role o f the examining 
magistrate to investigate the truth. It is submitted that the use o f open ended questions 
which grant witnesses a degree of narrative lee-way would be more consistent with 
the role o f the examiner as inquisitor, questions which allow witnesses to provide 
explanation, clarification and present their version of events. Danet makes the same 
assumption;
“Whereas the modern inquisitorial model combines questioning by the 
judge with relative freedom for witnesses to tell their stories in open- 
ended narrative style, the adversary model requires tight control of 
questioning so that claims are generally expressed as answers to very 
specific questions.”483
5.3.5. Interrupting Witnesses
In an English criminal trial attempts by a witness to communicate unsolicited 
information are commonly met with abrupt interruptions from counsel and the trial
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judge. As discussed in Chapter four, a witness will be informed that she is to confine 
her testimony to the specific question put by her examiner. Interruption and insistence 
upon precise answers are preventative techniques employed by advocates in 
adversarial proceedings. The witness who seeks to offer explanation, ‘irrelevant’ 
details, or unknowingly adverts to inadmissible evidence will be effectively silenced. 
In the Netherlands, the need to control a witness through such preventative techniques 
is reduced. It is submitted once again that to seek to exert control over a complainant 
through frequent interruption or to confine a complainant to a very limited response 
during questioning would be inconsistent with the examining magistrate’s duty to 
conduct a thorough investigation.
5.3.6. Summary
The tight control of witnesses, crucial in adversarial proceedings, is to a large extent, 
unnecessary in Dutch criminal proceedings. The witness in Dutch criminal 
proceedings is questioned primarily by an impartial inquisitor investigating the truth. 
Examination takes place in the context of a public enquiry. This section has argued 
that in the absence of the structural constraints which necessitate the tight control of 
witnesses in adversarial criminal proceedings, the discursive strategies employed by 
advocates in England and Wales are rendered largely unnecessary in the Netherlands. 
In the absence of empirical research into the questioning of witnesses in the 
Netherlands, it is submitted that there is a strong case for assuming that attempts to 
limit the narrative freedom of complainants through the use of preventative techniques 
are less evident in Dutch pre-trial hearings than in the English courtroom.
The fact that specific discursive strategies are rendered unnecessary in the context of 
Dutch criminal proceedings does not automatically mean however that complainants 
in the Netherlands are free to tell their stories. The ability o f complainants to present 
their version o f events at pre-trial hearings is discussed below.
483 Danet, B., “Language in the Legal Process” (1980) 14 Law and Society Review at 514
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5.4. Views of Dutch Practitioners
Confronted with limited research into the ability of complainants to tell their stories in 
Dutch criminal proceedings, semi-structured interviews were conducted with two 
groups o f Dutch legal practitioners; examining magistrates and lawyers belonging to 
all women law firms based in Amsterdam. These were lawyers who had represented 
victims of rape and attended pre-trial hearings. The aim of these interviews was to 
corroborate limited literature in which it is argued that rape complainants in the 
Netherlands are denied the opportunity to tell their stories in criminal proceedings.
5.4.1. Interviews with Dutch Lawyers
Van Driem claims that rape complainants are denied a voice in Dutch criminal 
proceedings and attributes this largely to the passive role played by the victim in 
criminal proceedings.484 Stuart has also argued that rape complainants in Dutch 
criminal proceedings are denied the opportunity o f describing what happened to them 
in their own words.485 Interviews conducted with Dutch lawyers sought to establish 
the basis o f this criticism, to establish how complainants in criminal proceedings are 
denied this opportunity.
All the lawyers interviewed expressed concern about the limitations placed upon the 
narrative freedom of complainants at pre-trial hearings. The practitioners interviewed 
strongly opposed the practice o f summarising police interviews. It was argued that the 
police file should include a verbatim record of an interview with a complainant. This 
translation o f a woman’s account it was argued, clearly denied a complainant the
484 Van Driem, G., “ Waarom Slachtoffers van Seksueel Geweld het Strafproces Moeten Mijden”, in 
(ed) Soetenhorst-de Savorin Lohman, J., Slachtoffers van misdrijven ontwikkelingen in 
hulperverlening recht en beleid (1989, Arnhem:Gouda Quint)
IS5 Stuart, Heikelien Verrijn, “Towards a Civilised Law Against Sexual V iolence”(1990, unpublished 
paper)
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opportunity to tell her story in her own words. Criticism was also directed at 
examining magistrates and their unwillingness to hear the stories o f complainants. 
The practitioners explained that the extent to which a complainant was allowed to tell 
her story can vary dramatically. At a pre-trial hearing, it was claimed, a complainant 
may be asked to repeat her version o f events in her own words. In such circumstances 
a complainant is clearly given the opportunity to tell her story. Alternatively, it was 
claimed, an examining magistrate may put to a complainant a limited number o f 
questions relating only to specific matters on which the examining magistrate is 
seeking clarification. The ability of a complainant to tell her story, where this is the 
case, is obviously impaired. More significantly, the practitioners claimed, that an 
examining magistrate may simply ask a complainant to verify her police statement 
and ask no further questions. Given that the police statement is a summarised version 
o f a complainant’s account, this was presented as a severe restriction upon the ability 
o f complainants to tell their stories. The practitioners were unable to state how often 
complainants in rape cases were restricted to mere verification of their police 
statement but maintained that it was not a rare occurrence.
Interviews with Dutch lawyers provided support for the claims made by Van Driem 
and Stuart and provided an insight into how complainants may be denied the 
opportunity of presenting their version of events at pre-trial hearings. Primarily, 
through restricting complainants to a mere verification of their police statement. These 
interviews also confirm that within the framework of Dutch criminal procedure, 
victim s’ stories could be told. In stating that complainants are sometimes requested to 
give their version of events in their own words, the interviewees confirmed that lay 
stories can be accommodated within Dutch criminal proceedings. The interviewees 
attributed the inability o f some women to tell their stories not to structural constraints, 
but largely to the unwillingness o f examining magistrates to listen to complainants. 
The validity o f this criticism was explored in interviews with examining magistrates.
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5.4.2. An Inappropriate Forum?
At a pre-trial hearing the role o f the examining magistrate is to gather relevant 
evidence. The extent to which a complainant’s story is told will depend on how much 
information the examining magistrate deems necessary and relevant. In semi­
structured interviews, examining magistrates were asked whether they felt it was 
important that complainants be given the opportunity to tell their stories at pre-trial 
hearings. The aim o f these interviews was to establish whether there was support for 
the argument advanced by the Dutch lawyers interviewed, that examining magistrates 
are unwilling to listen to the stories complainants have to tell.
All the examining magistrates interviewed expressed the opinion that the pre-trial 
hearing was not an arena for complainants to tell all they had to tell. It was claimed 
that time constraints demanded that the freedom of complainants to present their 
version o f events be restricted. One examining magistrate explained that complainants 
cannot be given complete freedom to tell their own stories in their own manner as 
there simply was not the time to listen to “such outpourings”. The examining 
magistrates explained that they would interrupt or seek to contain a witness who 
offered ‘irrelevant’ information. The examining magistrates interviewed clearly did 
not view the pre-trial hearing as an appropriate forum for complainants to tell their 
stories. As complainants in the Netherlands rarely appear in court and the police 
statement and statement of examining magistrate are often the only channel through 
which a complainant may tell her story, the pre-trial hearing would however appear to 
be the only available forum.
Interviews with examining magistrates would suggest that at least some examining 
magistrates are unwilling to allow complainants free rein to fully describe what 
happened to them at pre-trial hearings. This unwillingness would appear to be 
attributable, in part, to structural constraints, namely time considerations. However, 
interviews with examining magistrates also reveal that the obstacles faced by 
complainants are also attitudinal. The examining magistrates interviewed clearly did
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not regard the pre-trial hearing as an appropriate setting for complainants to tell their 
stories.
In the Netherlands, as in England and Wales, the complainant has been traditionally 
marginalised in the criminal trial process. The victim of crime is simply treated as any 
other witness and plays a very passive role in Dutch criminal proceedings. It is 
submitted that as a result little importance has traditionally attached to listening to 
victim ’s stories in the Netherlands. As complainants have been marginalised so too 
have their stories. It is submitted that the attitudes expressed by the examining 
magistrates interviewed may, in part, be attributed to the historical exclusion o f the 
victim in Dutch criminal proceedings.
5.4.3. Summary
In the Netherlands a complainant’s story is told in the dossier through her police 
statement and the statement from the pre-trial hearing. Where the complainant’s pre­
trial hearing statement represents little more than a verification o f her police statement 
then it is unlikely that the complainant’s story is told. Where a complainant is asked to 
recount events in her own words at a pre-trial hearing the dossier is more likely to 
accurately reflect her experience. In Chapter four it was argued that the structural 
constraints o f the adversarial trial process effectively deny complainants the 
opportunity to present their version of events in their own words. Victims’ stories 
could be told at pre-trial hearings in the Netherlands. Lay stories are not filtered, 
moulded and fragmented in the manner prescribed by the adversarial trial process. 
Were it to be decided that the dossier should contain a full account of a complainant’s 
version o f events this could be achieved without structural reform. The task of 
ensuring that the victim’s story is told in the dossier could be ascribed to examining 
magistrates and carried out with minimal disruption to the Dutch criminal process, 
only attitudes would need to be challenged.
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5.5. Environm ent and Storytelling
In Chapter four it was argued that the environment in which rape complainants are 
compelled to give evidence in England and Wales may have a negative impact on the 
ability o f complainants to tell their stories. It was argued that the painful process of 
describing what took place is made infinitely more difficult for example, by the 
presence o f the defendant, the public, and the need to speak unnaturally slowly and 
loudly in court. In the Netherlands, rather than giving evidence in court, the 
complainant in a rape case will usually attend a pre-trial hearing held in the office of 
the examining magistrate. The complainant gives her evidence only in the presence of 
the examining magistrate, the defence lawyer and the clerk. As a general rule, a rape 
complainant will not be examined in the presence of the defendant. The complainant 
is also spared the ordeal of rendering painful and sexually explicit information in 
public. Rather than giving evidence from the isolation o f the witness-box, the rape 
complainant is seated at an ordinary desk and is therefore, not obliged to speak 
unnaturally loudly although she will be required to speak at a pace which allows 
transcription.
5.5.1. Summary
While complainants in rape cases will inevitably find giving evidence a painful 
experience the attendant tribulations of giving evidence in adversarial proceedings are 
largely absent in the Netherlands. Dutch criminal procedure, it is submitted, provides 
a more appropriate environment for complainants of sexual offences to tell their 
stories. The pre-trial hearing, it is submitted, provides an environment more conducive 
to full and frank testimony.
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5.6. A Voice for Victims in Court
As in England and Wales, there is no procedure in place in the Netherlands which 
gives victims an opportunity to describe the impact of a criminal offence upon their 
lives.486 Traditionally, the impact o f crime has not been explored in Dutch criminal 
proceedings. According to Van Driem, the victim of rape is denied the opportunity to 
inform the court of her suffering. The court never hears for example, o f the sleepless 
nights and the effect the attack has had upon her relationships.487
As discussed in Chapter one, complainants in the Netherlands have the possibility of 
joining a civil claim to criminal proceedings. The extent to which the adhesion 
procedure allows complainants to describe the impact o f an offence upon their private 
lives is examined below.
5.6.1. Adhesion Procedure
In the Netherlands victims of crime may claim financial compensation for both 
material and non-material damages by joining as an injured party in criminal 
proceedings. A complainant may join proceedings either before or during the court 
session.488 If joining before the trial a complainant must complete a “joining form” 
available from the Office o f the Public Prosecutor. The form itself provides little 
space to provide details of damage. If  joining in this manner a complainant need not 
attend court. A complainant joins proceedings during a court session either in writing 
or orally.
b Van Driem, G., (1989), op cit at 60
487 ibid
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Nijboer suggests that a complainant’s opportunity to the describe the impact of an 
offence afforded by the adhesion procedure is restricted.
“During the trial the victim can introduce a claim for the compensation 
o f damage. Such a claim can be accepted by the court. The trial, 
however, as it concerns the discussion about such a claim is very 
brief.”489
This claim was supported by the Dutch practitioners interviewed who explained that 
joining a civil claim to criminal proceedings does not enable complainants to present 
the court with much information. The practitioners explained that the complainant 
may not call witnesses or refer to any matter other than the damage she has suffered.
In addition, to be considered at a criminal trial, a civil claim must be simple. I f  a claim 
would take too much time to judge the court may decide not to consider the claim at 
all or to split the claim. The complex part of the claim will then be considered 
separately in the civil courts.490
“The case must remain simple and clear cut. Simple means that the 
victim may not bring witnesses or experts to the trial to support his/her 
claim. The claim must stand on its own and therefore only 
straightforward cases will be considered within the criminal trial.”491
The practitioners interviewed explained that claims in rape cases would often be 
complex and as a result they believed that a separate civil action would always be 
preferable.
The complainant joining criminal proceedings in the Netherlands does not enjoy the 
same role as that o f the partie civile in France. In France the partie civile may call
Ministry of Justice, Joining in Criminal Proceedings, (1995), (leaflet produced by Ministry o f  
Ju stice)
Nijboer, J.F., “Protection o f  Victims in Rape and Sexual Abuse Cases in the Netherlands”, in
49o Nijboer, J.F., Proof and Criminal Justice Systems, (1995), Frankfurt: Peter Lang), at 98 
,0 Ministry o f  Justice, (1995), op cit
Wemmers, Jo-Anne., Victims in the Criminal Justice System, (1996, Amsterdam:Kugler 
Publications), at 45
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witnesses who may testify to the character of the accused and refer to matters beyond 
the specific claim;492
“Moreover, the partie civile or his lawyer, in his address to the court, 
does not have to confine himself to the issue of damages. For example, 
he may address the court on the question whether the accused in guilty 
or not, and on the heinousness of the offence charged.”493
The complainant in the Netherlands plays a relatively passive role. Joutsen’s study of 
the procedural role of victims within European criminal justice systems revealed that 
the adhesion procedure was not commonly used in the Netherlands. Joutsen concluded 
that this was due to “built-in difficulties” .494 These difficulties have, to a large extent, 
been removed since April 1995.495 There is for example, no longer a limit on 
compensation and complainants are no longer compelled to appear in court. These 
reforms may well lead to more widespread use o f the adhesion procedure however, 
any increase will remain restricted to simple cases.
Dissatisfaction with the adhesion procedure led a number of the Dutch lawyers 
interviewed to advocate a separate civil action in rape cases. The practitioners were 
very critical o f the passive role of complainants within criminal proceedings. It was 
claimed that complainants are able to tell their stories freely in civil proceedings in 
which they play a more active role. It was argued that victims o f rape should be 
encouraged to transfer their energies into civil proceedings. Stuart argues that in civil 
proceedings, complainants are granted “maximum narrative amplitude”.496
“The witness’s statements are not filtered by the police and judicial 
terminology, nor moulded into legal terms. No, the witness or her 
lawyer present her story exactly as she herself wants to or finds it 
useful.”497
492 Jones, R.L., “Victims o f  Crime in France”, (1994) 158 J.P. at 795
493 ibid
4,4 Joutsen, M., The Role o f the Victim o f  Crime in European Criminal Justice Systems, (1987, 
Helsinki:HEUNI), at 196
495 Wemmers, Jo-Anne., (1996), op cit at 45
496 Stuart, H., (1990) op cit at 9
497 ibid at 7
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It would appear that the Dutch adhesion procedure does not represent an effective 
channel through which rape complainants may convey the impact o f crime upon their 
lives. The procedure is only open to those with simple claims and where available, the 
procedure does not allow complainants free rein in providing information.
5.6.2. Summary
Van Driem advocates the introduction o f victim impact statements in line with 
developments in the United States.498 The introduction of victim statements, detailing 
the extent o f a victim’s losses, injuries and the emotional impact of the crime upon the 
victim and forming an integral part o f the investigative fde, would go some way to 
meeting the criticisms and concerns o f the Dutch lawyers interviewed. The statement 
would give complainants a voice that is currently denied. However, there appear to be 
no plans to introduce victims statements in the Netherlands.
498 ibid at 66
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5.7. Conclusion
In Chapter four it was argued that in a fair trial process complainants in criminal 
proceedings would be given the opportunity to present their version of events in their 
own words and to describe the impact of an offence upon their private lives. It was 
argued that the presentation of evidence in adversarial proceedings in the form of 
conflicting stories told by advocates in court results in the simplification and 
fragmentation o f lay stories and the strategic manipulation of complainants through 
the use o f preventative techniques designed to limit their narrative freedom. This 
chapter has sought to demonstrate that in the Netherlands, lay stories are not subject to 
the distinct filtering process described in Chapter four. The concept of relevance is 
identified as the only significant constraint on the process o f case construction in 
Dutch criminal proceedings. This chapter has also argued that the need to control 
witnesses through the use o f preventative techniques is greatly reduced within the 
context o f Dutch criminal proceedings. Victims’ stories could be told within the 
Dutch trial process and indeed, are sometimes told according to the Dutch 
practitioners interviewed. The fact that they are not always told may be attributed to 
the traditionally marginalised role played by complainants in Dutch criminal 
proceedings. Were due consideration to be given to the needs of victims to tell their 
stories, complainants in the Netherlands could be accorded this opportunity without 
structural reform. The only apparent obstacle to providing complainants with this 
opportunity is the unwillingness o f examining magistrates to grant complainants the 
freedom to give their version of events at pre-trial hearings. Were this obstacle to be 
removed, the result would be a fairer process from the perspective o f the victim.
With regard to providing complainants with the opportunity to describe the impact of 
crime upon their lives, complainants in the Netherlands are in a similar position to 
complainants in England and Wales. In both countries the impact of crime upon 
complainants has traditionally not been addressed in court. While a victim statement
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scheme has been introduced in England and Wales, similar developments have not 
taken place in the Netherlands.
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Chapter six- Cross-Examination, the Adversarial Trial and the 
Rape Complainant
6.1. Introduction
This chapter argues that cross-examination is an inappropriate mechanism for testing 
the veracity o f rape complainants. It is argued that the humiliation and degradation of 
rape complainants is in part, directly attributable to the role and nature o f cross- 
examination in the English adversarial fact-finding process and that there is an 
irreconcilable conflict between cross-examination as a device for testing evidence and 
the decent treatment o f complainants.
This chapter examines how during cross-examination, the character and lifestyle of 
complainants are effectively put on trial. How rape complainants are humiliated and 
shamed through defence advocates’ attempts to discredit their testimony in the stories 
they tell. This chapter also explores how the mechanics of the adversarial fact-finding 
process compel advocates to exploit prevailing prejudices during cross-examination. 
The relationship between the nature o f cross-examination within the adversarial fact­
finding process and the hostile treatment of rape complainants by defence counsel is 
examined. It is argued that the rough and insensitive handling of rape complainants is 
a structural consequence o f the adversarial process. It is also argued that cross- 
examination is a device that is used by advocates to humiliate, intimidate and 
antagonise witnesses in order to undermine their oral performance in court.
Finally, the great degree of latitude afforded defence counsel during cross- 
examination and the ineffectiveness o f the limits placed upon cross-examination are 
discussed.
This chapter begins however, by describing the experiences o f rape complainants 
during cross-examination as documented by researchers of the conduct o f rape trials.
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6.2. The Experience of Rape Complainants during Cross- 
examination
As discussed in Chapter two, research has shown that cross-examination is a gruelling 
ordeal for many women.499 Research has revealed that during cross-examination, rape 
complainants are subjected to an aggressive verbal interrogation during which their 
lifestyles are scrutinised and their characters attacked. Lees has summed up the 
experience o f the rape complainant in the English adversarial criminal trial stating;
“She is subjected to a ruthless character assassination, a humiliating 
trial, indeed a form o f judicial rape.”500
Interviews conducted with rape victims by Victim Support yielded the following 
descriptions o f cross-examination; v
“it was awful. They made you feel that it’s all your fault. They twist 
and turn your words.”501
“I was on trial, not him, without doubt.”'’02 
Chambers and Millar report similar findings;
“The actual experience of the trial for the majority o f women 
confirmed their worst expectations principally because defence cross­
4W Lees, S., “Judicial Rape”, (1993), 16, Womens Studies International Forum, 11, Lees, S., Carnal 
Knowledge, (1996, London:Hamish Hamilton), Victim Support, Women, Rape and the Criminal 
Justice System, (1996, London:Victim Support)
500 Lees, Sue., (1993), op cit at 14
501 Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 45
s"2 ibid at 38
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examination made the complainer feel that her own character and 
behaviour was on trial.”503
This section addresses how rape complainants are treated during cross-examination, 
the questions put to them by defence barristers and the manner o f questioning. In 
seeking to describe the victimisation o f rape complainants during cross-examination, 
the concept of the ‘ideal rape’ provides a focus for analysis, as the concept is at the 
heart o f every rape trial. The ideal rape is defined by Adler;
“The ‘ideal’ rape, most approximating to the stereotype, is one where 
the victim is sexually inexperienced and has a ‘respectable’ lifestyle, 
whose assailant was a stranger and whose company she had not 
willingly found herself in. She will have fought back, been physically 
hurt and, afterwards, promptly reported the offence.”504
A central element o f the ideal rape is the ideal rape complainant. ‘Ideal’ translates as 
‘respectable’.
“The complainant in a rape case is required to be the ideal victim, 
sexually inexperienced or at least respectable.”505
6.2.1. The Ideal Rape Victim
Researchers have reported how, during cross-examination, rape complainants are 
asked a barrage o f questions that relate, not to the actual rape, but to the complainant’s 
lifestyle. Questions which are designed to portray complainants as disreputable. A 
woman’s reputation has been traditionally judged with reference to her sexual 
character and conduct and consequently, a rape complainant’s sexual reputation will 
be the focus o f defence questioning. Such questions do not simply relate to her sexual 
history but to any aspect o f her lifestyle from which her ‘sexual morality’ may be
Chambers, G., Millar, A., “Proving sexual Assault:Prosecuting the Offender or Persecuting the 
Victim?”; in (eds) Carlen, P., Worral, A ., Gender, Crime and Justice, (1987, Milton KeynesiOpen 
University Press), at 64
504 Adler, Z., Rape on Trial, (1987, London:Routledge & Kegan Paul), at 119
Kennedy, H., Eve was Framed, (1992, London:Chatto & Windus), at 114
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inferred. The range of questions put to rape complainants that purport to sexual 
reputation is reported by Lees;
“Questions addressed to the women in the trials I monitored included 
whether she has had previous sex with men other than the defendant; 
whether she was a single mother; whether she was living with the 
lather o f her children; the colour of past and present boyfriends(where 
the woman was white); who looked after her children while she was at 
work; whether she was in the habit of going to night-clubs on her own 
late at night; whether she smoked cannabis and drank alcohol(when 
there was no evidence of this); what underwear she had on; whether 
she wore false eyelashes and red lipstick; whether the defendant “had 
used her previously”(rather than raped her); details of her menstrual 
flow; and on one occasion whether she had a vibrator in her drawer 
wrapped in a purple sock.”506
Women are asked about their marital status. As Lees notes; “being single, divorced or 
a single mother also carry the implication o f promiscuity or lack o f respectability.”507
“DC: Being a single mother must be hard?
C: Not really.
DC: Were you keen to have a relationship?
C: Not really.
DC: Were you keen to have a man around?
C: Not really.”508
Complainants are also asked about their appearance. It has been argued that such 
questions are designed to suggest that the complainant in some way provoked the 
attack or was ‘asking for it’;
“A common defence technique is to comment on the victim’s clothes 
and culpability.”509
Only in sexual offences is the clothing o f complainants the subject o f courtroom 
examination. Rape complainants are routinely asked to describe their underwear in 
court. Defence counsel will ask a complainant if  she was wearing tights or stockings.
06 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 134
507 ibid  at 133
508 Lees, S., (1993), op cit at 21
509 Adler, Z., (1987), op cit at 107
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Items oi clothing including underwear also appear as exhibits at the trial and are held 
up for inspection. The defence counsel in one case observed by Lees clearly thought 
the amount o f make-up worn by a complainant was a matter to be explored in depth;
“Defence Counsel: Forgive me for asking. I needn’t put it to you again.
Did you have make-up on in court yesterday?
Stephenie: Yes. Yes. Do you want to know why?
Judge: Well, I think he’s more interested in whether yesterday’s make­
up would be termed your normal make-up.
S: It’s my normal make-up.
DC: Foundation cream?
S: Yeah.
DC: Eyeshadow, bright red lipstick?
S: Did I have bright red lipstick on yesterday?
DC: Bright red lipstick.
S: I can’t remember what lipstick I had on.
DC: Eye pencil.
S: Don’t wear eyepencil.
DC: Never?
S: I used to.
DC: At time o f this incident?
S: Probably.
DC: Mascara?
S: Yeah.
DC: Hair done prettily?
S: If you could call it pretty. No more than what I normally only do
everyday.”510
Such questioning is clearly based upon the sexist assumption that a woman’s sexual 
character may be inferred from her appearance. That a woman’s sexual ‘availability’ 
may be ascertained from the length o f her skirt, the colour of her lipstick and her use 
o f eye-liner. The reasoning o f defence counsel is never explicit but the implicit 
insinuation in such questions is that this woman is a ‘slut’, a ‘loose woman’ and she 
invited the sexual advances o f the defendant by her appearance. The questions contain 
a series o f moral judgements which are based upon sexist perceptions of ‘appropriate’ 
female behaviour. The normal behaviour o f women is presented as inappropriate and 
improper.
Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 140
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“Women are asked questions which are never put to men about why 
they were out alone in the street or in a pub or disco. They are asked 
about their clothing; the tightness o f the fit, the absence of a bra. They 
are asked about their use of contraception.”511
6.2.2. Sexual History Evidence
In 1975 the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape; the Heilbron Committee was 
established to examine rape legislation following a public outcry regarding the 
conduct ot rape trials. The Heilbron Committee reported that the introduction o f 
evidence o f a rape complainant’s previous sexual history during cross-examination 
was often unnecessary and invariably caused the complainant considerable distress.
“We have come to the conclusion that unless there are some 
restrictions, questioning can take place which does not advance the 
cause o f justice but in effect puts the woman on trial.” 512
The Committee’s report led to the enactment of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act 
1976 section 2. Section 2 states;
“(1) If at trial any person for the time being charged with a rape 
offence to which he pleads not guilty, then except with the leave o f the 
judge no evidence and no question in cross examination shall be 
adduced or asked at trial by or on behalf of any defendant at the trial 
about any sexual experience o f a complainant with a person other than 
the defendant
(2) The judge shall not give leave in pursuance o f the preceding 
subsection for any evidence or question except on an application made 
to him in the absence o f the jury by or on behalf o f the defendant ; and 
on such an application the judge shall grant leave if and only if  he is 
satisfied that it would be uni'air to the defendant to refuse to allow the 
evidence to be adduced or the question to be asked.”
511 Kennedy, H., (1992), op cit at 114
Home Office, Report on the Advisory Group on the Law o f Rape (London:HMSO) Cmnd 6352 at
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The section was designed to alleviate the ordeal of rape complainants in court 
however, subsequent research has revealed that the cross-examination o f rape 
complainants remains largely unchanged. In 1982, Adler carried out research into the 
implementation o f section 2 in a number o f Old Bailey cases. Adler found that section 
2 had had a minimal impact upon the introduction of sexual history evidence during 
cross-examination.113 Adler found that questions regarding a rape complainant’s 
sexual history were still being asked. Adler also found that evidence that came within 
the ambit o f the legislation was being introduced by defence counsel without an 
application having been made.514 When this did in fact occur, trial judges routinely 
failed to intervene.51" Indeed, Adler observed trial judges themselves asking the 
damaging questions the section was designed to prevent.516 Lees’ more recent 
observations o f rape trials revealed that sexual history evidence is still routinely 
introduced in rape trials.
“Irrelevant past sexual history evidence is still brought up again and
again.”517
Questions are asked about a complainant’s sexual history which attempt to portray the 
complainant as promiscuous and suggest that the complainant is indiscriminate in her 
choice o f sexual partners. Women are asked about their previous sexual relationships 
with other men and about the nature of sexual activity they have previously engaged 
in. Women are also questioned about past abortions and asked if they have ever had a 
sexually transmitted disease. Even where the complainant appears to fit the stereotype 
o f the ideal victim, i.e. sexually inexperienced, she will not necessarily escape such 
questioning. The sexually inactive woman is asked whether she was sexually 
frustrated. The married woman is asked whether she is bored with her sex life and 
single older women are portrayed as embittered towards men.
513 See Adler, Z., “Rape- the Intention o f  Parliament and the Practice o f  the Courts” (1982) 45 
M.L.R. 664, Adler, Z„ (1987), op cit
514 Adler, Z., (1982), op cit at 674
515 ibid at 673
516 ibid
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Rape complainants are also questioned about other aspects of their lifestyles including 
their financial circumstances. Both Adler518 and Lees observed that if  a complainant is 
unemployed or without permanent accommodation it will be used in cross- 
examination;
“Being homeless and on Social Security came up in one case and was 
used to imply that the complainant had ‘asked for it’.”519
Such questioning also suggests the possibility that the complainant’s need for money 
may have led her into prostitution. Complainants are also questioned about any past 
misconduct or criminal convictions;
“A victim with a criminal record is a real bonus for the defence.”520
Women are also asked questions that suggest emotional or mental instability. 
Complainants will be questioned about any medication they have been prescribed and 
any psychiatric problems they have experienced. Adler reported how evidence o f a 
suicide attempt by a complainant which preceded the alleged rape by two years was 
introduced by defence counsel in one case.521
“When the defence have something more tangible and concrete to 
hand, such as evidence of suicide attempts, periods o f hospitalisation in 
psychiatric institutions or outpatient psychiatric treatment, no matter 
how long before the rape incident, these are certain to be explored in 
great detail during the trial.”522
The complainant’s use o f drugs and alcohol will also be explored in cross- 
examination. Lees identifies the sexist stereotypical assumptions about women and 
female sexuality that lie behind such questions;
517 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 134
Ms Adler, Z., (1987), op cit at 92
519 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 135
520 Adler, Z., (1987), op cit at 104
521 ibid at 105
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“Drinking and drug use were introduced to discredit the complainant in 
two ways. The first was to suggest that their consumption would lower 
the woman’s inhibitions and unleash her sexuality. Thus she would 
have been likely to consent to something which she would regret later.
The second was to suggest that a woman under the influence of alcohol 
would be more likely to act irrationally or vindictively and make a 
false complaint. Often the only evidence for the complainant’s use of 
drugs was the defendant’s allegation.”523
6.2.3. The Ideal Rape
The concept of the ideal rape prescribes the appropriate behaviour o f a woman who is 
raped. This behaviour includes strenuous resistance by the complainant, a prompt 
report to the police and the complainant not being viewed to have put herself at risk. 
During cross-examination the defence lawyer will exploit any divergences between 
the alleged incident and the ideal rape. The fact that this stereotype, far from reflecting 
the common experience of rape complainants is a misleading representation of rape, 
makes the task o f the defence advocate all the more easy.
6.2.3.1. Resistance
In the ‘ideal rape’, the woman will have vigorously resisted her attacker and will have 
the physical injuries to prove it. A complainant may be asked questions about her 
attempts to repel her alleged attacker which contain the implicit insinuation that she 
failed to resist with sufficient force or resolve. Where there is little or no evidence of 
physical injury it will be put to the complainant that this is indicative of consent. Lees 
argues that such questioning fails to acknowledge that many women who are raped 
fear for their lives and as a result feel unable to fight back.
523 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 146
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“Women often use various tactics to survive, such as humouring the 
rapist or not running away, if  frozen in fright this is often held against 
them in trials.”524
McColgan also challenges the traditional focus on resistance in rape trials;
“Surely it is time to recognise that women should not be expected to 
resist rape any more than we are expected to resist mugging, burglary 
or assault.”525
As well as identifying divergences, McColgan argues that the defence advocate must 
also defuse any similarities between the ‘ideal’ rape and the events in question.526 The 
defence lawyer must normalise the alleged rape into sex.527 Any evidence o f resistance 
on the part o f the complainant will be redefined as ‘playing hard to get’, token 
resistance. The defence advocate draws upon a coercive model of sexuality in which 
the predatory male may legitimately disregard a level of resistance. In a rape trial, to 
press a woman until she submits to intercourse is presented as ‘normal’.528 It is a 
model o f sexuality in which the onus is upon the woman to demonstrate her refusal 
rather than the man to actively inquire into consent.'’29 Lees argues that defence 
advocates invoke an old-fashioned model of sexuality;
“The idea that some resistance is part of the normal sequence of events 
in sexual encounters is taken for granted. This depiction o f sex used in 
courts is out o f date, being based on a model of sexuality where women 
were expected to resist men’s advances.”530
Even if the complainant has suffered significant physical injuries, she will not 
necessarily escape the challenges of an inventive defence counsel, especially a 
defence lawyer with a working knowledge of Freudian psychoanalysis. Evidence of 
physical injuries, presented by the prosecution as evidence of lack of consent, will be
524 ibid at 113
525 M cColgan, A., The Case for taking the Date out o f Rape, (1996a, London: Pandora), at 86
526 McColgan, A., “Common Law -R elevance o f  Sexual History Evidence” (1996b) 16 O.J.L.S. at 
300
527 ibid
528 See Smart, C., Feminism and the Power o f  Law, (1989, London:Routledge), at 42
529 See Lees, S., (1996), op cit at xviii
530 ibid
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redefined by the defence advocate as evidence of ‘enthusiastic’ sex. Women who 
claim to have been punched and kicked by their assailant are asked whether they 
enjoy ‘rough sex’.
It is by no means uncommon for a complainant in a rape case to be asked if she 
enjoyed it. A complainant may be asked if  she was sexually aroused and whether her 
vagina was lubricated at the time o f the attack. Kennedy confirms the use o f this 
argument by defence lawyers;
“Crude populist psychology is used in courtrooms to suggest 
subconscious desires that are not even acknowledged by the woman 
herself. A woman is asked whether her vagina naturally lubricated to 
enable penetration thereby encouraging the jury to infer that sexual 
gratification was being found in the sexual contact.”531
Lees challenges such questioning on the grounds that lubrication is not necessarily 
evidence o f sexual excitement but could be due to a number o f factors including fear. 
Lees views such questions as particularly pernicious;
“It reduces the whole issue o f consent to an absurdity, in which the 
woman is denied any subjectivity or knowledge o f her own desire.”532
6.2 3 .2. Promptly Reported
If there was a delay between the rape and a subsequent report to the police the rape 
complainant will be required to account for this in cross-examination. It will be 
implied by defence counsel that the lapse in time is indicative o f fabrication. It will be 
suggested to the complainant by defence counsel that a genuine victim o f rape will 
have reported it immediately. However, women may delay reporting rape for many 
understandable reasons. These include fear of an unsympathetic response by the 
police or the courts, o f retaliation by her assailant, o f the reaction o f friends and 
relatives, embarrassment, self-blame, or an unwillingness to relive the ordeal in court.
Kennedy, H., (1992), op cit at 115 
Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 118
211
Defence barristers directly accuse rape complainants of lying during cross- 
examination. Defence counsel accuse women o f fabricating rape allegations for a 
variety o f reasons. Possible motivations for making a false allegation of rape that are 
commonly suggested by defence counsel include fear o f parental disapproval and fear 
ot a husband or boyfriend discovering infidelity. Alternatively, defence counsel may 
seek to portray the complainant as a spiteful, malicious woman out for revenge. It may 
be suggested that the complainant had a particular grudge against the defendant or 
simply that the complainant dislikes men in general.
6.2.3.3. Assuming Risk
During cross-examination rape complainants are asked questions that imply that they 
in some way precipitated their attacks or were ‘asking for it’. Questioning in this 
category includes asking the complainant why she was out alone late at night and why 
she accepted a lift from a man who she hardly knew. The complainant’s behaviour 
leading up to the alleged rape will be scrutinised for culpability. When the defendant 
is an acquaintance of the complainant she will be quizzed about her behaviour towards 
him. Did she find him attractive, had she flirted with him, had she kissed him? Had 
she consumed alcohol or drugs? Such questioning clearly implies that women who 
incite the uncontrollable sexual urges of men deserve their fate and that women who 
enter ‘risky’ situations ‘ask for it’. In rape trials the normal behaviour o f women is 
portrayed as inappropriate and imprudent.
6.2.4. Summary
Research o f the conduct of rape trials in England and Wales has revealed that cross- 
examination is an undeniably traumatic, degrading and humiliating experience for 
many rape complainants. Complainants are subjected to a ruthless character
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assassination. During cross-examination women are portrayed as ‘sluts’ and whores, 
as vindictive harridans, as villainous liars. Their private lives are exposed to public 
scrutiny and they are treated aggressively by defence barristers. Cross-examination is 
unquestionably a gruelling ordeal for many women.
Having described how rape complainants are degraded and humiliated in court, the 
rest o f this chapter is devoted to explaining why complainants are treated this way 
during cross-examination.
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6.3. The Role Cross-Examination Within the Adversarial Criminal 
Trial
In this section the relationship between the ordeal of rape complainants in court and 
the role o f cross-examination in adversarial proceedings is explored. It is argued that 
to lay blame solely on defence advocates for the treatment of rape complainants 
during cross-examination is misleading. Criticism should, it is argued, also be directed 
at the system which compels advocates to engage in the ritual vilification o f 
complainants.
6.3.1. An Alternative Version of Events
The role o f the advocate in adversarial criminal proceedings is that o f storyteller. The 
role o f the defence lawyer is to present an alternative version of events to that 
presented by the prosecution;
“The lawyer’s job is to establish the truth of his client’s story and 
destroy the credibility o f the other side’s story.”533
“It was the job o f defence counsel to supply a rival way of explaining 
what had occurred, what might be called the antithesis, although that 
term was not used in the courts.”534
In Chapter four, Bennett and Feldman’s claim that prosecuting barristers have a clear 
strategic mandate; to tell a structurally complete, internally consistent story, was 
discussed. According to Bennett and Feldman, the defence lawyer has an array of
Stephenson, G., The Psychology o f  Criminal Justice, (1992, Oxford:Blackwell), at 143 
Rock, P., The Social World o f  an English Crown Court, (1993, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 33
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storytelling strategies at his disposal.'35 A defence lawyer may employ ‘challenge’ 
strategy; identifying weakness, inconsistencies in the prosecution story.536 Defence 
counsel may choose to redefine a central element of the prosecution story; 
‘redefinition’ strategy."’7 Alternatively, he may present an entirely new story; 
‘reconstruction strategy’.538 Using these strategies the defence lawyer is able to present 
a rival interpretation o f events.
6.3.2. Testing Credibility
The role o f the advocate is however not simply confined to storytelling. The advocate 
must also ‘test’ the evidence presented by his opponent. The mechanism employed by 
advocates to test evidence is cross-examination.
“Mere competition between contradictory assertions would not be 
enough. Sound judgment is helped by contentious advocacy, which 
directly tests the evidence for accuracy, and exposes errors and lies.
The opposing points o f view must actually meet head-on in 
confrontation, as occurs in cross-examination.”539
As discussed in Chapter one, in adversarial proceedings great faith is placed in cross- 
examination to expose inconsistency and contradiction in witness testimony. Cross- 
examination is however a device employed to test not only the evidence, but is also a 
tool for testing the credibility of witnesses. The adversarial trial is structured as an 
oral contest in which the credibility and reputations o f witnesses are pitted against 
each other. Not only must the evidence withstand the testing process in adversarial 
proceedings but so too must the source of the evidence; the witness.
“The defence lawyer’s role is to ‘test’ the version o f reality offered by 
the victim. It is his or her role to discredit, or at least undermine, the
1,1 Bennett, W.L., Feldman, M., Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom, (1981, New  
Brunswick:Rutgers University Press), at 98
536 ibid
537 ibid at 102
5,8 ibid at 104
539 Stone, M., Cross-examination in Criminal Trials, (1988, London :Butterworths), at 3
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reliability and credibility o f the victim’s testimony, even if the lawyer 
believes the witness is being truthful.”540
A fundamental safeguard o f the adversarial fact-finding process is the testing of 
witness credibility in open court. Testing of witness veracity is not confined to the 
events in question but extends to the truthfulness, the integrity, o f the witness per se. 
It is the role of defence counsel to investigate the moral credibility of prosecution 
witnesses to determine whether they can be believed.
“Witnesses were people whose very moral status were in 
contention.”541
The moral credibility of witnesses is an important consideration in adversarial 
criminal proceedings.
“When a cross-examiner attacks the moral standing o f a witness he 
often does so not only with a view to showing that the witness’s word 
carries less truth-value but also to suggest that the morality and 
humanity o f the witness is so inferior that no verdict can be based on 
his testimony.”542
It is an assumption of the adversarial process that the honest witness, the genuine 
complainant, will withstand such an assault upon his or her character and integrity.
“The contribution to justice made by unsuccessful cross-examination 
should be noted. Able cross-examination, instead o f destroying 
evidence, may actually strengthen it. Many innocent persons owe their 
acquittals to the way in which they withstand forceful cross- 
examination by the Crown.”543
The personal affairs of complainants are a legitimate area of scrutiny during cross- 
examination. Commenting on the experiences o f prosecution witnesses in criminal 
proceedings, Rock states;
540 Yaroshefsky, E., “Balancing Victims Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for the Defendant”, [ 1989] 
1 Ann. Snrv. Am. L. 135, at 137
541 Rock, P., (1993), op cit at 86
Zuckerman, A .A.S., Principles o f Criminal Evidence (1989, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 248
543 Stone, M., (1988), op cit at 5
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“They could be vilified and shamed as they defended in public and 
perhaps for the first time, testimony about matters that were painful, 
embarrassing and once personal.”544
In seeking to discredit a witness, the evidence introduced need not directly relate to 
the actual proceedings but may include private, embarrassing events from the 
witness’s past. This is confirmed by Du Cann;
“It is important to remember that in order to serve the interests of his 
client to the best o f his ability he [defence counsel] is entitled to range 
at will over the life history of any or all the witnesses he has to 
examine.”545
The court may be presented with any evidence o f discreditable conduct or previous 
criminal convictions.546 Complainants may be confronted with previous inconsistent 
statements,517 and asked questions designed to reveal bias,548 prejudice and 
unreliability as a result of any physical or mental disability. Rock reports;
“Witnesses unknowingly come to be assailed in court, and to be seen 
and heard closely as they are assailed. They are confronted with a form 
of trial by ordeal in which their claims to knowledge and veracity were 
subjected to organised and sustained attack by professional 
adversaries.”549
Complainants in rape cases are also the targets of such assaults. The moral standing, 
the integrity, of the rape complainant will be tested during cross-examination. Her 
lifestyle, her character, will be scrutinised in open court. It is unsurprising that women 
complain o f feeling as though they themselves were on trial. In the adversarial trial, 
the characters and conduct of witnesses are on trial.
544 Rock, P., (1993), op cit at 34
545 Du Cann, R., The Art o f  the Advocate, (1993, London:Penguin), at 121
546 Criminal Procedure Act 1865 section 6
'47 Criminal Procedure Act 1865 sections 4 and 5.
548 R v Mendy (1976), 64 Cr App Rep 4
Rock, P., (1993), op cit at 86
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6.3.3. Defence Stories
Adversarial proceedings are structured as a contest between competing stories. The 
role o f advocates is to present the court with mutually inconsistent versions o f events. 
It is assumed that a confrontation between conflicting stories will lead to the 
emergence o f the truth. Cross-examination plays an important role in courtroom 
storytelling. Through cross-examination, the advocate may present an alternative 
version o f events, as well as discredit the version told by his opponent. The advocate 
may redefine or reconstruct events to cast doubt upon or destroy the prosecution story. 
The role o f the defence barrister is to provide a rival interpretation of events to that 
presented by the prosecution. This has important implications for complainants in 
criminal proceedings.
6.3.3.1. Alternative Portrayal of the Victim
The task o f the defence lawyer is to provide a rival interpretation o f events. This will 
necessarily involve an alternative portrayal of the victim, the complainant. It is the 
role o f the advocate to portray the complainant as at best, mistaken and at worst, a 
liar. In defence stories, the complainant is transformed into the villain. It is the role of 
the defence advocate is to paint as black a picture of the complainant as possible, to 
denigrate the complainant. During his research of proceedings at an English Crown 
Court, Rock observed;
“Defence lawyers would routinely try to turn matters on their head, 
transforming victims and their supporting witnesses into villains and
fools.”550
Defence advocates routinely portray complainants as spiteful, vindictive, disreputable 
and consequently incredible. Rock reports;
5'0 ibid at 72
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“Almost as a matter o f course, counsel would as one judge put it, so 
‘blackguard’ the witnesses that they were no longer believable.”551
The defence advocate presents a one-sided, distorted picture of the complainant. As 
stated above, in constructing the defence story the defence advocate may delve into 
the private life of a complainant in court and use any aspect of their lifestyle and 
reputation to lend credence to the defence’s depiction o f the complainant. Frequently, 
complainants are confronted with painful and sensitive incidents from their past.
6.3.3.2. Portrayal of the Victim in a Rape Case
The rape complainant will also be subjected to this alternative portrayal. The role of 
the defence advocate in a rape case, as in other cases, is to discredit and vilify the 
complainant. As in other cases, the defence advocate may explore her private life and 
bring sensitive and embarrassing incidents in her past to the attention of the court. In 
his portrayal of the complainant in a rape case the defence lawyer will draw upon the 
concept o f the ideal rape victim. The defence advocate in a rape case will seek to paint 
a picture o f a woman who is far removed from that of the ‘genuine’ victim stereotype 
o f the popular imagination. The defence advocate will seek to present the court for 
example, with a woman who is sexually experienced, indiscriminate in her choice of 
sexual partner, a woman who leads an ‘unrespectable’ lifestyle, who is emotionally 
unstable.
The adversarial trial is structured as a contest between competing stories told by 
advocates. Complainants are frequently the losers in this storytelling contest. 
Character assassination, the vilification o f complainants, is not confined to rape cases 
but is a structural consequence of the adversarial process. Criticism should be directed 
not simply at defence advocates for their disparaging portrayals o f rape complainants, 
but at the system which fashions the stories told in court.
ibid at 34
6.3.3.3. A Rival Interpretation of Events
The role o f the defence lawyer is to supply an alternative interpretation o f events, the 
antithesis to the prosecution case. Invariably, this reconstruction of events will 
necessarily involve the defence advocate accusing the complainant and other 
prosecution witnesses of lying. At least, it will involve the imputation that the 
complainant is mistaken, confused and unreliable. If an allegation of dishonesty is to 
be credible, the defence advocate must supply a motive. Hence, complainants are 
routinely portrayed as greedy, spiteful, malicious and jealous. Accusations of 
mendacity are not reserved for complainants in rape trials. All complainants are 
potential targets.
Invariably, the reconstruction provided by the defence will cast imputations on the 
conduct o f the victim. In the defence’s alternative portrayal, responsibility for what 
took place is commonly attributed to the complainant and the defendant is cast as the 
true victim. As stated above, rape complainants are blamed for not resisting their 
alleged assailant vigorously enough, for inviting his advances by her appearance, for 
provoking the alleged rape. The complainant finds her conduct before, during and 
after the alleged rape criticised and challenged. Victim-blaming is not confined to rape 
cases but rather an inherent feature of adversarial proceedings. In all criminal trials the 
‘culpability’ of the victim forms an important component of defence stories.
6.3.3.4. Standard Stories
Research into the conduct o f rape trials suggests that rape complainants are subjected 
to routine, standard assaults upon their credibility. Defence advocates present juries 
with tired, cliched, portrayals o f rape complainants. Women o f different ages, 
backgrounds, are subjected to uniform attacks upon their character. Defence advocates 
appear to tell the same stories again and again. Observation of criminal trials led Rock
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to conclude that the stories told in criminal trials are formulaic.552 Lawyers, Rock 
maintains, do not develop original themes and theories in the stories they tell, but rely 
upon a standard repertoire of storylines. Rock argues that prosecution witnesses are 
the targets o f formulaic defence attacks.553
“Witnesses are translated into routine categories and then subjected to 
the routine attacks that those categories warrant.”554
6.3.4. Non-Rape Cases
Analysis o f rape trials often fails to acknowledge that complainants in non-rape cases 
can also suffer during cross-examination. In fact, all prosecution witnesses are liable 
to an offensive and humiliating portrayal by defence advocates. The fact that cross- 
examination can be highly stressful and demeaning for all classes o f complainant and 
not only rape victims is clear. Research undertaken by Rock has revealed that other 
crime victims, and prosecution witnesses in general, often feel humiliated, degraded, 
and frustrated by the process of cross-examination. Following interviews with 
prosecution witnesses, Rock reports;
“Many witnesses detested cross-examination so much that they reacted 
viscerally.”555
“Witnesses frequently leave the box angrily and in tears.”556
Prosecution witnesses described their treatment under cross-examination as being 
‘bullied’, ‘traduced’ and ‘on trial’.557 The plight of non-rape complainants during 
cross-examination is also recognised by McBarnet;
’52 ibid at 78
553 ibid at 83
554 ibid at 88
555 ibid at 176
556 Rock, P., “Witnesses and Space in a Crown Court”, (1991) 31 Brit. J. Criminol. at 267
557 Rock, P., (1993), op cit at 176
221
“Discrediting techniques are not something specially reserved for rape 
victims in particular or even victims in general. Everyone who enters 
the witness box is a ‘victim’ of the court in this sense. Crimes against 
the person merely exacerbate this vulnerability to discrediting cross- 
examination. Since both victim and offender are directly and 
personally involved, there is a wide scope for not just generally 
discrediting but for specifically blaming the victim. This is not 
confined to the offences of rape.”558
Brown et al also identify the similarity between the treatment o f male complainants of 
sexual assault and female rape complainants;
“Male complainers who were homosexual were liable to be subject to 
similar sorts o f stories and stereotypes as female complainants, they 
were presented as seeking sex, promiscuous, immoral and 
vindictive.”559
Research suggests however that rape complainants are particularly vulnerable during 
cross-examination. The reasons for the heightened vulnerability o f rape complainants 
are examined below.
6.4. Heightened Vulnerability of Rape Complainants
6.4.1. Nature o f the Offence
One reason for the heightened vulnerability of rape complainants is undoubtedly the 
nature o f the offence. The ordeal o f the rape complainant during cross-examination is 
exacerbated by the frequent lack o f evidence associated with a rape allegation. The 
nature o f the crime ensures few, if any, witnesses. The court will be confronted with
McBarnet, D., “Victim in the Witness Box- Confronting V ictim ology’s Stereotype” (1983) 7 
Contemporary Crisis at 294
Brown, B., Burman, M., Jamieson, L., Sex Crimes on Trial :The Use o f  Sexual Evidence in 
Scottish Courts, (1993, Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press), at 208
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two conflicting versions of events provided by the defendant and the complainant. 
The credibility o f the rape complainant is therefore pivotal.
“Evidence is often effectively limited to that of the parties and much is 
likely to depend upon the balance of credibility between them.”560
As a result, rape trials in England and Wales are largely reduced to credibility fights 
between the defendant and the complainant.
“If the only issue is consent and the only witness is the complainant the 
conclusion that the complainant is not worthy of credit must be 
decisive of the issue.”561
It is the decisiveness o f the credibility of the complainant that ensures that all the 
strategies employed by defence counsel during a routine cross-examination are 
intensified in a rape trial. Defence counsel will pull out all the stops to undermine the 
evidence o f the complainant and the attack upon the complainant’s character will be 
particularly ruthless.
“In sexual offence cases, there may be specific difficulties in proving 
the offence, due to the typical lack of eye-witnesses, which justify 
particularly vigorous testing o f complainers. Hence it can be expected 
that the ordeal o f the complainer in a sexual offence case is even 
greater.”562
The lack o f evidence in rape cases also means that defence lawyers resort to the 
introduction o f what Chambers and Millar term ‘quasi-extra legal’ information.563 
This includes the character o f the complainant and her lifestyle. This happens to a 
degree in all cases but the frequent lack of evidence in rape cases means a greater 
proportion o f the defence case will focus on quasi-legal matters. Hence the lifestyle of 
the complainant and her sexual character become the focus of the defence case.
Tapper, C., Cross and Tapper on Evidence, (1995, London:Butterworths), at 341
561 ibid
562 Brown, B., et al, (1993), op cit at 26
563 Chambers, G., Millar, A., (1987), op cit at 65
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"Questioning on lifestyle was clearly extraneous to the crime itself and 
provided the court with highly selective items of information about a 
woman, often with strong moral overtones designed both to discredit 
her personally and reduce the credibility of her story.”564
The vulnerability o f rape complainants during cross-examination is also attributable to 
the exploitation of sexist stereotypes and rape myths by defence advocates. Counsel 
for the defence will attack the credibility of the rape complainant as he or she will any 
prosecution witness but in the case of rape the sexist assumptions and myths 
surrounding rape are there to aid the defence counsel in his assault.
6.4.2. Rape Myths
“ ‘True’ rape in the popular imagination involves the use of weapons, 
the infliction of serious injury and occurs in a lonely place late at night.
The ‘true rapist’ is over-sexed, sexually frustrated or mentally ill, and 
is a stranger. The ‘true rape victim’ is a virgin (or has had no extra­
marital affairs), was not voluntarily in the place where the act took 
place, fought to the end and has the bruises to show for it!”565
The myths surrounding rape are well catalogued in feminist literature on rape.566 These 
myths are used by defence lawyers in the stories they tell in rape trials. This section 
explores a number o f these myths
6.4.2.1. Women Lie About Rape
The pervasive myth that women lie about rape has effectively turned men into the real 
rape victims; “victims of Eve”567. The plight of innocent men was a great concern of
564 ibid at 70
'l'5 Morris, A ., Women, Crime and Criminal Justice (1987, Oxford:Blackwell) at 165
See Adler, Z., Rape on Trial, (1987, London:Routledge & Kegan Paul), Estrich, S., Real Rape,
(1987, London:Harvard University Press), Lees, S, Carnal Knowledge, (1996, London:Hamish 
Hamilton), McColgan, A., The Case for taking the Date out o f Rape, (1996a, London: Pandora)
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Wigmore, a figure who undoubtedly had a significant influence on common 
perceptions about rape;
“The unchaste mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the 
narration o f imaginary sex-incidents of which the narrator is the 
heroine or victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and 
convincing. The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the 
innocent man.”568
The well-cited pronouncement o f Hale is also frequently identified as having a 
profound effect on the jurisprudence o f rape;
“ an accusation easy to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to 
be defended by the party accused, tho’ never so innocent.”569
Edwards has charted the history of the fear of false allegations in rape cases and 
documented the influence of a number of disciplines in the establishment and 
perpetuation of the myth that women lie about rape;
“From the mid-nineteenth century the belief in the false allegation 
hypothesis gathered increasing momentum, supported in all the 
disciplines o f medicine, psychology, law and medical 
jurisprudence.”570
There is no lack of modern day pronouncements on the mendacity o f women. 
Commonly cited are examples of judicial advice to juries in rape cases. For example 
the advice given by Sutcliffe, J;
“ ..it is well known that women in particular and small boys are liable to 
be untruthful and invent stories.”571
M>7 Weisstub, D., “Victims o f  Crime in the Criminal Justice System”,in (ed) Fattah, E.A., From 
Crime Policy to Victim Policy, (1986, London:Macmillan), at 201
568 W igmore, J.H., A Treatise on the Anglo-American System o f Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
(1940, Boston:Little Brown) vol. 7 at sec. 2061
s<<’ Hale, Sir Matthew., The History o f  the Pleas o f the Crown, (1736) 634, cited in Geis, G., “Lord 
Hale, Witches and Rape” (1978) 5 British Journal o f  Law and Society at 26
570 Edwards, S., Female Sexuality and the Law, (1981, Oxford:Martin Robertson), at 126
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Fear o f feminine duplicity has prompted warnings to trial advocates to exercise all 
their skill when examining women;
“The man that cross-examines a woman faces, indeed a delicate task.
They are quicker-witted than men and some of them seem to know 
intuitively what your next question is going to be and have the answer 
ready before you ask the question. Then too, they use every weapon in 
their armoury, smiles, coquetry, shrugs, sauciness, and if you press 
them too closely, they will resort to tears; then too they always have as 
last resort, the ability to faint at a convenient and dramatic time.”572
In 1993, Du Cann described the difficulties o f examining a female witness;
“Some become blatantly flirtatious, others unnecessarily shy, all are 
unnatural to a greater or lesser extent because they are suspicious.”573
The supposed reasons women have for lying about rape are wide-ranging and 
frequently outlandish;
“Some supposed motivations for false allegations o f rape are so 
preposterous that they would be funny if it weren’t for the fact that 
people actually believe them.”574
Glanville Williams includes “sexual neurosis, phantasy, jealousy, spite, or simply a 
refusal o f a girl to admit that she consented to an act o f which she is now ashamed” 
among possible motivations."’75 Elliott cites the following as causes of lying in rape 
cases;
“Extrication from difficulties caused by arriving home late, becoming 
pregnant, contracting V.D., or being caught in the act of intercourse; 
feelings o f guilt about what was done in two minds and is now
71 Sutcliffe, Judge, 1976 cited in Kennedy, H., (1992), op cit at 117, See Pattullo, P., Judging 
Women, (1983, London:NCCL)
S1~ Linton, N ., “The Witness and Cross-examination”, (1965) vol. x Berkeley J. Soc. at 7
573 Du Cann, R., (1993), op cit at 108
74 McColgan, A., (1996a), op cit at 58
'7' Williams, G., Proof o f  Guilt, (1958, London:Hamlyn Trust), at 159
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repented... getting one’s own back on the unfaithful, or contemptuous, 
lover; blackmail; confusion of fantasies with reality.”576
Fear o f false allegations has also been attributed to deep rooted assumptions regarding 
female sexuality. Female sexuality, Smart argues, has been pathologized in a 
phallocentric culture577;
“From the judge to the convicted rapist there is a common 
understanding that female sexuality is problematic and that women’s’ 
sexual responsiveness is whimsical or capricious.”578
In recent years a new fear has emerged, fed by a number of high profile rape cases 
such as the Tyson, Kennedy, Donnellani19, Kyddm cases, that women have redefined 
rape to include bad sex. Women who regret consensual sexual intercourse, it is 
claimed, are crying rape.581
“Men, rather than women, are now the victims of rape. Men are being 
victimised by a flood o f false allegations of rape, by the redefinition as 
rape o f bad sex, of drunken sex, of any sex which is less than orgasmic 
and stone-cold sober. Innocent men, we are told, are suffering. And 
women are to blame.”582
As well as confusing bad sex and rape it is also assumed that women can not be 
trusted to distinguish rape from sexual fantasy.
“The evidence o f Lady Wishfor complaining of rape may be dangerous 
because she may be indulging in undiluted sexual fantasy.”583
576 Elliott, D.W ., “Rape Complainants’ Sexual Experience with Third Parties”, [1984] Crim.L.R. at 
13
577 Smart, C., (1989), op cit at 28
;'7S ibid at 31
570 See Lees, S., (1996) op cit at 79
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81 Roiphe, K., The Morning After, (1993, N ew  York:Little Brown)
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The assumption that women desire rape is largely a product o f Freudian 
psychoanalysis in which female sexuality is defined as ultimately masochistic.584
“Men have always raped women, but it wasn’t until the advent of 
Sigmund Freud and his followers that the male ideology o f rape began 
to rely on the tenet that rape was something that women desired.”585
Defence lawyers draw upon this masochistic model of female sexuality when they ask 
complainants in rape cases whether evidence o f physical injuries is not really 
attributable to ‘rough sex’. Whereas theories of female sexuality are routinely 
expounded in rape cases, Edwards notes that male sexuality remains invariably 
unexplored;
“Male sadism, dominance and aggression are not invoked in an attempt 
to make sense o f his behaviour, in the way that masochism and fantasy 
are introduced to make sense of hers.”586
The myth that women lie about rape has translated into evidentiary safeguards in rape 
trials in order to offer innocent men necessary protection.587 The corroboration 
warning is one such safeguard. Until 1995 trial judges were required to warn juries of 
the dangers o f convicting a defendant on the uncorroborated testimony o f a woman in 
a rape case. McColgan cites a typical warning given by trial judges in a rape case;
“This is a sex case. Experience has shown that women can and do tell
lies for some reason, some for no reason at all.”588
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 removed the requirement for the 
warning. However, a number o f commentators have expressed doubts as to the likely 
impact o f this legislation. Lees states;
'S4 See also Deutsch, H., The Psychology o f Women, (1944), cited in Brownmiller, S., Against our 
Will, (1975, Harmondsworth:Penguin), at 315
Brownmiller, S., (1975), op cit at 315
S86 Edwards, S., (1981), op cit at 107
5S7 See Mack, K., “Continuing Barriers to W omen’s Credibility:A Feminist Perspective on the Proof 
Process”, [1993] 2 Crim.L.F. 327
5!>s McColgan, A., (1996a), op cit at 80
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“It is doubtful whether the abolition of the mandatory corroboration 
ruling introduced by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994) 
will prevent the introduction of such comments by some judges.”589
McColgan shares Lees’ scepticism stating that when the mandatory warning was 
abolished in Canada in 1976 so many judges continued to issue the warning that it had 
to be banned in 1982. McColgan reports a similar response in Australia.590
There is no evidence that there are more false allegations o f rape than any other crime.
“There is absolutely no evidence that bogus complainants are any more 
common for rape than for any other criminal offence.”591
“All the evidence shows that false claims of rape are very uncommon, 
and that claims against particular men (as opposed to vague stories 
about assault by unidentified strangers) are even more unusual.”592
In fact, all the available evidence points to the opposite, that the majority o f rapes go 
unreported.''93 According to Lees, despite the fact that the number o f women reporting 
rape has doubled over the past decade, all the evidence suggests that reported rapes 
represent only the tip o f the ice-berg.594 Lees cites a student union study at Cambridge 
University where it was found that only one in fifty students who had been victims of 
rape or attempted rape had told the police and a similar study at Oxford Brookes 
University where only 6 percent of victims of rape reported it to the police.595
“The real lies that are told about rape are told by women who pretend 
that they have not been raped when, in fact, they have.”596
‘ Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 110
590 McColgan, A., (1996a), op cit at 79
591 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at ix
592 McColgan, A., (1996a), op cit at 103
593 See Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 215
594 ibid at 23
595 ibid at 215
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The reasons women have for not reporting rape are now well known. They include a 
lack of confidence in the criminal justice system, fear o f not being believed, fear o f 
reprisals by an assailant or his family, embarrassment, not wishing to testify in court, 
feeling that they were somehow responsible.597 Kennedy also points out that many of 
the supposed motivations for false allegations are now outdated;
“There are a few misguided or malicious women who make false 
allegations o f rape, and it is essential that the strong protections for 
defendants which exist within our system our jealously maintained. 
However, the change in social mores means few women now cover up 
their own indiscretions or pregnancies by laying a false allegation at 
the door o f some innocent lover. The days of tyrannical fathers raging 
at the deflowering o f their daughters have happily receded, and women 
do not feel under so much pressure to deny their willing participation 
in sexual acts. The premium on virginity has largely disappeared and 
women feel freer to include sexual activity in their lives, but they want 
their sexual relationships to be based on mutuality and equality. The 
emphasis is on choice, and women are rightly indignant that they are 
viewed and tested according to outmoded assumptions.”598
6.4.2.2. Women are Responsible for Rape
The myth that women are responsible for rape is based on the assumptions that 
women provoke men to rape and that it is for women to avoid rape.
The defence advocate who seeks to portray a complainant in a rape case as a 
temptress, a seductress, who ‘led on’ the defendant, exploits the myth that women 
provoke rape.599 A myth based on the erroneous assumption that men are unable to 
control their sexual urges once aroused.600 Women are questioned about their 
appearance, clothes and make-up worn and asked whether they flirted with the 
defendant. Women’s behaviour is depicted as inappropriate and improper. 
Conversely, the behaviour of men is regarded as ‘normal’ and goes unchallenged;
ibid at 24
598 Kennedy, H., (1992), op cit at 118
599 See Edwards, S., (1981), op cit at 50
600 See Adler, Z., (1987), op cit at 9
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“Embedded in the idea o f male sexuality as natural and therefore 
uncontrollable is the idea that women are responsible for tempting men 
and, by the way they dress or behave, leading them on into rages of 
violence and rape.”601
“ in the rape trial male sexuality and its satisfaction is always its own 
excuse or justification.602
A woman may also be blamed for creating the opportunities for a man to rape her or 
failing to take evasive action.603
“She can be blamed for having let a situation get out of hand, for 
having failed to take steps to avert the sexual contact she should have 
anticipated.”604
Her behaviour is scrutinised and judged while his behaviour is accepted as normal.
“They are assuming that men are women’s natural enemies, that all 
men are potential predators upon women, and that women know this 
and must protect themselves. If they do not, they are asking for what 
they get. M ens’ behaviour is taken for granted, not judged.”605
The assumption that women should avoid rape effectively shifts responsibility for 
rape from men to women. According to Brownmiller, rapists use such rationalisations 
to justify their actions;
“ “She was asking for it” is the classic way a rapist shifts the burden of 
blame from himself to his victim. The popularity o f the belief that a 
woman seduces or “cock-teases” a man into rape, or precipitates a rape 
by incautious behaviour, is part of the smoke-screen that men throw up 
to obscure their actions. The insecurity of women runs so deep that 
many, possibly most, rape victims agonise afterward in an effort to
1 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at xix
6(12 Smart, C., (1989), op cit at 42
603 McColgan, A., (1996b), op cit at 305
604 ibid at 306
f’05 French, M., The War Against Women, (1992, London:Hamilton), at 197
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uncover what it was in their behaviour, their manner, their dress, that 
triggered this awful act against them.” 606
In a rape trial the woman’s behaviour becomes the focus of attention. Did she engage 
in "risky’ behaviour, did she put herself in a ‘perilous’ situation, was she ‘asking for 
it’?607 Defence lawyers invite juries to drew conclusions as to why a complainant 
ventured out alone at night, why she invited a mere acquaintance into her home, in 
fact, why she engaged in perfectly usual behaviour. It is unsurprising that women 
complain o f feeling as though they themselves were the ones on trial in rape cases. In 
a rape trial a complainant’s culpability will be under investigation.
“The trial turns on her “innocence of experience” or freedom from 
guilt.”608
Soothill and Soothill have claimed that prosecution counsel frequently collude with 
defence barristers in making judgements about ‘appropriate’ female behaviour;
“Equally damaging for the victim may be the spoken or unspoken 
shared assumptions o f defence and prosecuting counsel which most 
commentators seem to overlook.”609
Comments made by prosecuting counsel reported by the researchers include;
“it would have been much better if  these girls had been tucked up in 
bed”
“Perhaps unwisely she accepted a lift.”610
The myth that women are to blame for rape often plays a central role in the stories 
told by defence lawyers in court. The myth is used to undermine a complainant’s 
credibility and the plausibility of her story.
606 Brownmiller, S., (1975), op cit at 312
607 See Jeffreys, S., Radford, J., “Contributory Negligence or being a Woman?:The Car Rapist”, in 
(eds) Scraton, P., Gordon, P., Causes for Concern, (1984, London:Penguin)
608 Bumiller, K., “Fallen Angels: The Representation o f  Violence Against Women in Legal Culture”, 
(1990) 18 Int.J.Soc.L at 127
509 Soothill, K., Soothill, D., “Prosecuting the Victim? A Study o f  the Reporting o f  Barristers’ 
Comments in Rape Cases”, (1993) 32 Howard Journal, at 12
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6.4.2.3. The Monster in the Bushes
The myth that ‘real’ rape involves the abnormal, psychologically disturbed rapist who 
pounces on his victim in the street also appears in defence stories. Defence lawyers 
will seize upon any divergence between the alleged rape and the stereotypical rape to 
discredit a complainant’s version of events. However, research has shown that the 
‘monster in the bushes’ is a wholly inaccurate characterisation o f rape. In fact, most 
women are raped by men they know. McColgan cites Women Against Rape’s 1985 
London survey which found that 30 per cent of the women who reported rape to 
W.A.R. had been raped by their husbands and 54 per cent of women knew their 
attackers.611
“Some women are raped by strangers who jump on them from behind 
dark bushes at night. Some women are raped by strangers who break 
into their home. Many more are raped by men who are not strangers to 
them. Women are raped by their husbands, they are raped by their 
boyfriends, they are raped by their ex-partners and family friends. They 
are raped in the sanctity o f their marriage bed, in the flats that they 
share with their lovers, in the homes o f their friends.” 612
Research also suggests that the typical rapist is not a psychopath but is in fact, fairly 
indistinguishable from other men613;
“The majority are perfectly normal men, married and unmarried, with 
and without girlfriends.”614
Despite the inaccuracy of the stereotype, it continues to inform defence stories in 
cases o f non-stranger rape. ‘Typical’ rapes are portrayed by defence barristers as 
abnormal and consequently improbable.
610 ibid at 21
611 McColgan, A., (1996a), op cit at 99
612 McColgan, A., (1996a) op cit at 108, See Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 223
613 See Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 210-236
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6.4.3. Summary
In adversarial criminal proceedings complainants are effectively put on trial as 
their character and reputations are tested. Defence lawyers are free to delve into the 
private lives o f complainants and expose all to public scrutiny and condemnation. 
Complainants are routinely vilified and demeaned. Complainants in rape cases are 
uniquely vulnerable during cross-examination as defence counsel are aided in their 
attacks upon the credibility o f rape complainants by a multitude o f sexist and 
erroneous assumptions about rape, women and female sexuality. Whether the 
defence lawyer ascribes to the sexist assumptions he espouses is not really 
significant. Within the framework o f the adversarial trial it would be unrealistic to 
expect counsel not to take advantage of cultural biases when seeking to undermine 
the credibility o f rape complainants. Fair treatment o f the complainant is not an 
objective o f the defence advocate. It is the role o f the defence advocate to 
vigorously defend his client and provide a rival interpretation of events. Defence 
lawyers are compelled to exploit prejudices in their attempts undermine the 
prosecution case. This study questions whether victims of rape are appropriate 
targets for the brutal character assassination that attends cross-examination;
“There is little incentive for rape victims to come forward when the 
system which is supposed to protect the public from crime serves them 
up in court like laboratory specimens on a microscope slide.” 615
('15 McEwan, J., “Documentary Hearsay Evidence-Refuge for the Vulnerable Witness?”, [1989] 
Crim.L.R. at 642
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6.5. The Jury
In adversarial proceedings the ultimate aim of the advocate is to tell a persuasive 
story. If a story is to be believed, the story teller must appeal to the values and 
assumptions o f the audience; the jury.
“Telling a good story depends as much on the expectations o f the 
listeners as on the skills of the story-teller.”616
Defence advocates will use arguments that they believe will impress jurors.
“Jurors decide verdicts by reflecting upon the competing stories o f the 
defence and the prosecution and by choosing the narrative that they 
believe gives the most reasonable account o f the action. For them, 
reasonable means the narrative o f the case which presents a probable 
explanation that fits within the juror’s knowledge and experience o f 
human behaviour.”617
Research into the decision making of juries in England and Wales is prohibited by the 
Contempt o f Court Act 1981, section 8. Consequently, very little is known about jury 
deliberations in rape cases. Studies conducted in the United States suggest that jurors 
are greatly influenced by the character of complainants in rape cases;618
“Perhaps no single variable is thought to produce more discriminatory 
effects in rape trials as the introduction of the victim’s sexual 
reputation or moral character as evidence.”619
Commenting on jury studies McColgan states;
616 Stephenson, G., The Psychology o f Criminal Justice, (1992, Oxford:Blackwell) at 147
Snedaker, K.H., “Storytelling in O pening Statements: Framing the A rgum entation o f  the Trial” , 
in Papke, D.R. Narrative and the Legal Discourse a Reader in Storytelling and the Law, 
(1991,L iverpool:D eborah Charles)
See Kalven, H., Zeisel, H., The American Jury, (1966, Boston), La Free, G., Reskin, B.F.,Vischer, 
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(1985) 32 Social Problems, cited in Ward, C.A., Attitudes Towards Rape, (1995,L ondonSage) 
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It seems that jurors male and female, share the assumption that 
women who are sexually active lie about rape, that they consent 
indiscriminately and/or that their lack of consent to any particular 
sexual contact is not the lack o f consent which may result in 
punishment for a man who chooses to ignore it.”620
In the absence o f empirical research juries are assumed to use their common sense.
“For pragmatic reasons, and perhaps for want of anything better, the 
jury were thought to employ common sense in their reasoning.”621
In fact, following his observations of criminal trials in a Crown Court, Rock reports;
“Jurors were told to use common sense in judging the facts.”622
It may be assumed that in employing common sense in rape trials jurors draw upon 
prevalent myths and stereotypes about rape and women.
“Their influence is not limited to men who would accept the use of 
force as an appropriate method o f overcoming resistance to sex. They 
have, rather, become part o f the dominant culture, a culture historically 
dependent, for its existence, upon the control o f women’s sexuality.
Women as well as men jurors are the product of this culture.”623
In their portrayal o f complainants defence barristers exploit this fact;
“Such sexist attitudes are manipulated successfully because they 
remain in our society as well as in our courts and hence impress 
jurors.”624
Kit Kinport accepts this explanation o f defence counsels’ use o f sexist stereotypes;
McColgan, A., (1996b), op cit at 287
621 Rock, P., (1993) op cit at 76
622 ibid
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“They may feed on the jury’s tendency to view women as less credible
than men.... by taking advantage o f inaccurate stereotypes about rape
victims.”625
Brown et al conducted interviews with defence barristers together with other legal 
practitioners within the Scottish legal system regarding the introduction of sexual 
history evidence in rape trials. These interviews provide confirmation of the 
exploitation of rape myths and prejudice by defence barristers;
“A number of defence interviewees freely admitted that they would do 
what they could to suggest that a woman was of ‘easy virtue’ precisely 
because they believed that juries were swayed by it.”626
One defence advocate interviewed by the researchers explained;
“I think a lot of males think a woman of ‘easy virtue’ is more likely 
give to her consent than a 15 year old virgin. I think it is a male attitude 
and these male attitudes manifest themselves in cross-examination. But 
you can’t get away from the fact that advocates are in court to win.
Now they are there to present the case as best they can on behalf of an 
accused person. If an accused person says that this lady is o f easy 
virtue and if you know that it can be established that she is of easy 
virtue, you know that the people in the jury will take that into 
consideration. It would be foolish to say that they will not. The 
common-sense o f the situation demands that they will.”627
The complainant’s sexual character is so often the focus of rape trials because defence 
lawyers believe that if  they manage to portray the complainant as o f ‘easy virtue’ the 
jury are less likely to believe her story. The same is true o f other aspects o f the 
complainant’s lifestyle. If  the complainant is portrayed as disreputable it is assumed 
that the chances of an acquittal increase. Any detail of the complainant’s private life 
that the defence believes will influence jury decision-making is likely to be included 
in the cross-examination of the rape complainant. For example, Kennedy recognises 
the potency o f psychiatric evidence in rape trials;
Kinport, K.., ‘Evidence Engendered’ [1991] 2 U.ILL.L.Rev. at 427
626 Brown, B., et al, (1993), op cit at 206
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The slightest hint o f anything which might affect the mind, 
particularly o f a female witness, can jeopardise a case.”628
1 emkin advances the proposition that defence lawyers do not simply exploit 
cultural myths that prevail in wider society but in fact, appeal to the prejudiced 
assumptions o f the past.
“Within the enclosed and cut-off realm o f the courtroom, a jury may 
accept an account o f the world as set out by the defence which in no 
way corresponds to the actual sexual mores o f today’s society but 
exemplifies the double standard of sexual morality in its most virulent 
form.”629
6.5.1. Summary
The stories told by defence advocates in rape trials are clearly designed to influence 
jurors. With no empirical evidence upon which to draw, barristers assume that jurors 
use their common sense and are swayed by sexist stereotypes and arguments grounded 
in rape mythology. In the absence of research into jury decision-making in rape cases 
it is impossible to draw firm conclusions as to the role played by the jury system in 
the treatment o f rape complainants in court. There is no evidence that the stories told 
by defence advocates would contain less denigrating, less offensive portrayals of rape 
complainants if  the jury were to be replaced by a trial judge. The research conducted 
by Jackson and Doran into Diplock trials suggests that the removal of the jury would 
not necessarily lead to marked differences in the ways the parties decide to present 
their evidence.630
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6.6. The Nature o f Cross-examination
This section examines the relationship between the nature o f cross-examination and 
the hostile treatment of rape complainants by defence counsel. It is argued that within 
the adversarial trial advocates are compelled to be hostile and insensitive in their 
handling o f rape complainants.
6.6.1. The Combativeness of Cross-examination
As discussed in a Chapter one, the adversarial trial is a combative arena. The 
adversarial system is based upon the assumption that vigorous advocacy is the most 
effective mechanism for testing evidence.
“Confrontation is at the heart of the system since it is thought that the 
best result is obtained through this “constrained battle procedure.”631
The adversarial process dictates that advocates are robust in their encounters with 
witnesses. The adversarial trial is structured as a conflict and it is the advocate and 
witnesses who are in combat.
“Defence counsel were required to be hostile to prosecution witnesses 
inside the courtroom. They were belligerents whose job was to serve 
their clients by attacking the standing, credibility and evidence o f those 
who testified against them.”632
The combative nature o f adversary advocacy is embodied in the following extract;
Yaroshefsky, E„ (1989), op cit at 137
632 Rock, P., (1993), op cit 168
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the trial lawyer must possess a combativeness, a bellicosity which 
responds to the challenge of impending conflict by some unconscious 
remembrance he is linked to the first stand in trial combatant and as his 
heir it is he who now grasps the cudgel to swing on behalf o f his client, 
he must relish the thwack of a well landed left hook tingle with the 
thump o f a rushing block. The physical crudities will not be there but 
the verbal jousting, the tactical thrusts, the legal clouts will be.”633
In adversarial proceedings cross-examination is wielded by defence counsel as a 
weapon. The ‘potency’ o f cross-examination is, in part, accredited to its brutality. It is 
assumed that a dishonest or mistaken witness will be exposed during a hostile and 
aggressive verbal attack. Advocates speak of ‘breaking’ and ‘destroying’ a witness. 
Conversely, honest witnesses are assumed capable of withstanding such an assault. 
The implications for complainants are clear;
“By its nature a criminal trial is likely to be a testing experience for the 
key witness in which the ability to withstand gruelling questioning is 
seen as an appropriate mark of the truth.”634
Cross-examination is often likened to a physical fight between advocate and witness;
quite often the most devastating cross-examination can be a fairly 
short build up rather like in boxing with one blow to the body followed 
by a quick blow to the chin.”635
Evans in offering advocates advice on conducting cross-examination uses the term 
“butchering” the witness.636 Devlin refers to “verbal pugilism” as a defining feature of 
adversarial proceedings. The nature of cross-examination has led commentators to cite 
the adversarial trial as the modern day successor to mediaeval trial by ordeal;
“That battle, that ordeal, is today made manifest in the ritual combat o f 
counsel and witnesses - for many, no less terrifying an experience.”637
See Danet, B., Bogoch, B., “Fixed Fight or Free For All? An Empirical Study o f  Combativeness 
in the Adversary System o f Justice”, (1980) 7 British Journal o f  Law and Society at 42
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Research o f rape trials has revealed that vigorous advocacy easily descends into 
bullying and browbeating.*”s It is by no means unusual for a complainant to be 
brought to tears by defence counsel;
Trials could be cruel, and it was counsel who were the perpetrators of 
that cruelty.”639
The brutal treatment o f rape complainants may not simply be attributed to the 
malevolence o f individual barristers but to the nature of cross-examination as a 
process. An effective advocate within the adversarial system must be indifferent to the 
distress and hurt of those he or she cross-examines.
“Those who dwelt too much on the pain o f the lay witness would not 
last long as effective advocates.”640
6.6.2. The Competitiveness of Cross-examination
The competitiveness o f adversarial proceedings also helps explain the treatment of 
complainants during cross-examination. The adversarial criminal trial is a contest 
between the two sides. In any contest there is a winner and a loser and both sides 
naturally want to win. The adversarial structure instils competitiveness into its 
advocates. The criminal trial is a competitive arena, an environment in which 
advocates will attempt to push the boundaries and to do all they can ‘get away’ with. 
Within the adversarial system the success o f counsel is to a degree measured by his or 
her performance in court. The competitiveness of adversarial proceedings 
undoubtedly adds to the zealousness o f advocates during cross-examination;
“A courtroom is a laboratory o f life, and the trial is to a great extent a 
battle that each o f the lawyers wants to win. Although we may speak of 
truth and justice as the goals o f the system, once in the courtroom
638 See Chambers, G., Millar, A., (1987), op cit
639 Rock, P., (1993), op cit at 174
640 ibid
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arena, each lawyer’s wish to win may lead to him or her to exploit 
prevailing cultural biases.”641
Brown et al’s interviews with defence advocates identified the pressure upon 
advocates to push the boundaries. One advocate interviewed confessed;
You try and get away with anything which you think that the jury will 
use in assessing the credibility o f the complainer or the credibility of 
your client.”642
6.6.3. Summary
Within the adversarial fact-finding process the ability o f a witness to withstand a 
taxing cross-examination is seen as a mark o f veracity. Defence advocates are 
compelled to be aggressive and hostile towards complainants. Within the combative 
and competitive arena o f the adversarial criminal trial vigorous advocacy 
imperceptibly descends into intimidation and harassment. The faith placed in 
confrontation within the adversarial fact-finding process dictates that no concessions 
may be made for rape complainants and other vulnerable complainants. Vulnerable 
complainants may not be treated less robustly during cross-examination, they are 
simply expected to withstand the same gruelling testing process. Again, this study 
questions the appropriateness of subjecting women who have been raped and other 
victims of horrific crimes to such treatment.
“The defence counsel’s task is to try to prove the complainant to be a 
liar which can often result in bullying and aggressive questioning, quite 
inappropriate for a woman who has been traumatised by rape.”643
Cross-examination is extolled within common law jurisdictions as the most effective 
mechanism for exposing inconsistency, contradiction and inaccuracy in testimony. 
Great faith is placed in the ability o f the skilful cross-examiner to expose the
Yaroshefsky, E., (1989), op cit at 152
Brown, B.,et al, (1993), op cit at 108
Lees, S., (1993), op cit at 22
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unreliable and dishonest witness. The experiences of rape complainants during cross- 
examination raise important questions regarding the effectiveness o f cross- 
examination, especially in cases involving vulnerable complainants. Primarily, the 
extent to which the process o f truth-discovery is aided by the ‘butchering’ or bullying 
o f complainants and how the secondary victimisation of vulnerable complainants in 
this manner can be justified.
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6.7. Cross-examination and Witness Performance
In this section the tactics employed by defence counsel in undermining the oral 
performance o f complainants in court are examined. It is argued that defence 
advocates deliberately set out to humiliate, intimidate and antagonise complainants in 
order to diminish their credibility.
6.7.1. A Theatrical Spectacle
The adversarial criminal trial is often referred to as a theatrical spectacle;
“A court o f law is a theatre.”644
The wigs and gowns worn by the judges and advocates make distinctive costumes. 
The oral contest offers drama and suspense. The entertainment value of court 
proceedings is evidenced by the popularity of courtroom scenes in films, books and 
other media. If the courtroom is the stage then the jury is the audience and the 
advocates and the witnesses the central protagonists. The courtroom is a theatre in the 
sense that the participants are required to perform. The jury will be judging both the 
advocates and the witnesses on their oral performance in court. A good performance 
can be decisive. Advocates are well aware o f the need to perform well in court and to 
be constantly aware o f the impression they are conveying to the jury. Evans advises 
advocates to study their body language in front o f a mirror,645 to learn to control their 
facial expressions so as not to inadvertently betray disappointment or surprise and to 
make frequent eye contact with the jury.646 Evan also advises advocates to try and
Evans, K., (1993), op cit at 33
645 ibid at 10
646 ibid at 13
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build a rapport with the jury, to be likeable.647 According to Evans, all aspiring 
advocates should have a degree o f acting ability and be at least a little stage-struck.
I o be a real advocate you have got to be an actor and you have got to 
be a brave one.”648
Advocates are also aware of the need to entertain their captive audience. The advocate 
is advised to vary pace and tone of delivery to promote attentiveness,649 to appreciate 
the importance o f timing and the power of the pause. Evans even suggests bringing 
props into the courtroom to arouse interest.650
6.7.2. Witness Performance
The oral performance of witnesses is o f crucial importance within the adversarial 
criminal trial. The jury will be trying to assess the credibility o f the witness and his or 
hei performance in the witness-box may be decisive. The importance attached to 
witness demeanour was examined in Chapter two. The advocate is only too aware of 
the pivotal importance of witness performance. A flustered, disconcerted witness may 
well be a less credible witness. During cross-examination the defence counsel will 
engage in tactics designed to undermine witness performance.
The adversarial nature o f the litigation process encourages lawyers to 
use tactics to intimidate opposing counsel and her witnesses hoping it 
rattle them so that they will be unable to effectively present their 
evidence, or will at least appear less credible in the jury's eyes.”651
Although not apparent in advocacy texts, research suggests that such tactics are 
common place in criminal trials. Chambers and Millar, in their research into the 
prosecution o f sex offences within the Scottish criminal justice system, identified the
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employment of tactics by the defence to undermine the oral performance o f 
complainants.
..in attempting to understand the complainer’s experience at trial, 
attention should be focused on how the defence use certain tactics to 
discredit a woman’s evidence, and unsettle her performance in the 
witness box.”652
According to Chambers and Millar, these tactics included insensitive questioning, 
persistent questioning, and intimidation.653 The researchers describe how defence 
counsel used questions to unsettle and disconcert complainants. Chambers and Millar 
report that defence counsel asked questions that were simply designed to embarrass 
and humiliate complainants. Another tactic was to repeatedly demand precise 
recollection o f seemingly obscure facts, continuing a line o f questioning despite its 
rejection by the complainant and continual references to the seriousness o f the 
allegation in an attempt to intimidate the complainant. Research o f rape trials led 
Chambers and Millar to conclude that;
“much o f the distress and anxiety suffered by women at trial is due to 
pernicious and prurient lines o f questioning which make no attempt to 
introduce factual evidence but would appear to be mainly attempts to 
humiliate or degrade the complainer with a view to spoiling the 
prosecution case.”654
Weinreb identifies further tactics employed by advocates;
“So far as he can, counsel ‘shakes’ an opposing witness’s testimony by 
revealing if not indeed creating minor inconsistencies, insisting on 
precision about trivia and then either lamenting the imprecision or 
pouncing on another inconsistency, and making the witness behave 
nervously and otherwise look unreliable.”655
The use o f such techniques in the cross-examination o f rape complainants is 
confirmed by McEwan;
652 Chambers, G., Millar, A., (1987), op cit at 71
653 ibid
654 ibid at 79
Weinreb, L.L., The Denial o f Justice (1977, London:Free Press), at 102
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...cross-examination o f rape complainants is often used simply to 
humiliate them and therefore undermine the confidence with which 
they describe alleged events.”656
Further evidence ol the harassment o f rape complainants during cross-examination is 
provided by Brown et al;
Cross examination in rape trials and other sexual offences continues 
to pioduce examples o f the art o f the advocate which involves the 
harassment and vilification o f witnesses.”657
The use o f tactics to fluster and unsettle a witness in order to diminish the impact o f 
testimony is not reserved for rape complainants but is in fact routine in the cross- 
examination o f prosecution witnesses. An emotional outburst, whether it be tears or 
anger, from any key witness may cause the jury to question the reliability o f his or her 
testimony. Wherever the defence perceives that strategic capital may be made from 
antagonising or distressing a witness he or she will devise questions to achieve this 
result. Rock reports;
“Almost every cross-examination will contain a passage in which 
counsel puts on a mocking or stern face and presses the witness hard as 
if  trying to drive him or her to anger.”658
6.7.3. Summary
Research suggests that cross-examination is a tool employed to harass, confuse and 
antagonise witnesses. However, given the role and nature of cross-examination and 
the importance o f demeanour in adversarial proceedings, this is unsurprising. In fact, 
it would be more surprising if advocates did not resort to such tactics within the 
adversarial arena. To blame defence advocates for the treatment of complainants in
657 McEwan, J., Evidence and the Adversarial Process (1992, Oxford:Blackwell), at 16 
Brown, B., et al, (1993), op cit at 201
Rock, P., (1991), op cit at 268
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court is short-sighted. The adversarial fact-finding process expects advocates to 
display a high degree of inventiveness and ingenuity in presenting their cases;
“ if  there is criticism it should be directed at the system that virtually 
compels there use, a system that treats a law-suit as a battle o f wits and 
wiles.”659
“ the assumptions of the adversary system permit, nay rather demand, 
that the defendant’s advocate use every skill he has in cross-examining 
the State’s witnesses to test the accuracy of their testimonial 
evidence.”660
The fact that advocates are compelled to engage in such tactics during cross- 
examination raises important questions regarding truth-discovery in adversarial 
criminal proceedings. As discussed in Chapter two, can it be said that a distressed, 
intimidated and confused witness is the best source o f evidence. Does too much 
defence advocacy, as McEwan claims, consist o f “theatricality or the planting of 
improbable doubts for the benefit of the jury”661, and can the resulting ordeal o f rape 
complainants be justified?
Frank, J., Courts on Trial.Myth and Reality in American Justice, (1963, Antheneum: 
M assachusetts), at 85
660 Barrett, E., “The Adversary System and the Ethics o f  Advocacy”, (1962) 37 Notre Dame Lawver
at 487
McEwan, J., “Child Evidence:More Proposals for Reform”, [1988] Crim. L.R. at 820
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6.8. A Vulnerable Target?
Complainants are powerless to contest the insulting and demeaning remarks made by 
defence advocates during cross-examination. This is undoubtedly a source o f 
frustration and distress for complainants. A rape victim interviewed by Victim 
Support expressed her frustration stating;
“I felt as if  he wouldn’t let me say my piece.”662
This section addresses how the method of interrogation employed in cross- 
examination denies complainants the opportunity to challenge their disparaging 
portrayal in court.
6.8.1. The Need for Control
As discussed in Chapter four, in adversarial proceedings control over witnesses is 
crucial. The exclusionary character of the law of evidence means that advocates must 
ensure that witnesses do not introduce inadmissible evidence in court. Defence 
counsel must also exert control to prevent a complainant from revealing facts 
prejudicial to the defence or reiterating the case for the prosecution.
“If the witness is allowed any freedom, he may give evidence which is 
harmful to the cross-examiner’s case.”663
“For the lawyer to win he must, then, control and thwart the self- 
presenting activity o f the witness.”664
662 Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 33
w” Stone, M., op cit at 309
664 Linton, N ., (1965), op cit at 4
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The adversarial trial is structured as a contest between competing stories. It is in the 
interests o f the advocate to deny opposing witnesses the opportunity to challenge his 
version of events. The ultimate success of the defence may depend on the ability o f 
the defence advocate to check the attempts o f a complainant to refute his or her 
demeaning and offensive portrayal in court. In a rape trial, where proceedings are 
olten reduced to a credibility fight between the defendant and the complainant, the 
ability o f the defence to present a negative portrayal o f the complainant can be 
decisive. Restricting the narrative freedom of the rape complainant during cross- 
examination will therefore be a primary objective of the defence advocate.
6.8.2. Discursive Strategies Employed
Complainants are unpractised in the art of interrogation, unfamiliar with legal 
terminology and unversed in the rules that govern the adversarial contest. The 
advocate and the complainant are unevenly matched opponents. This is likely to be 
the case in any legal system. A lawyer will always have a number o f advantages over 
a witness. However, the vulnerability and powerlessness of the complainant is 
heightened within an adversarial system. This is due to the method of examination 
employed within adversarial criminal trials; adversary advocacy. In Chapter four, the 
discursive strategies employed by advocates to exert control over witnesses were 
examined. It was stated that advocacy manuals advise advocates for example, to avoid 
open ended questions, to avoid asking questions to which the advocate does not know 
the answer, and guide witnesses firmly through their evidence. The control exercised 
in examination-in-chief is magnified during cross-examination.
In the art o f witness manipulation, the cross-examiner has the aid o f the leading 
question. A leading question is a question that asserts more than it asks. In cross- 
examination questions may be so tightly framed that the witness is frequently 
restricted to mere agreement or denial; a yes or no response. A witness may only give 
evidence responsively, she may not volunteer information;
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“Witnesses are not entitled to add to their account material that has not 
been asked for and so counsel can manipulate them to obtain the least 
damaging version of the facts.”665
Evans offers the following advice to aspiring advocates;
“Know what you want them to say and then make them say it.”666
According to Evans, during cross-examination advocates should never ask ‘why’ and 
never ask ‘how’;
“Almost anything is responsive to a question that asks How? or Why?
Those words are to be avoided like the plague in cross-examination.”667
In this way the complainant is denied the possibility o f effectively challenging the 
assertions o f defence counsel. If the complainant’s response is in danger o f exceeding 
the narrowly constructed bounds posited by the cross-examiner it will be met with 
vigorous objection. The complainant who raises objections, who volunteers 
information, will be effectively silenced.
“Any deviation from the point of the question or evasiveness may be 
countered by warnings, reminders, repetition o f questions and the 
insistence o f proper answers.”668
When confronted with a barrage of insulting and distressing questions complainants 
are not in a position to protest. If  complainants feel that their evidence has been 
distorted and that they have been unfairly treated they are unable to object;
“Rarely are witnesses permitted to fight back, or, of course, ever to ask 
a question.”669
665 McEwan, J., (1992), op cit at 13
666 Evans, K., (1993), op cit at 76
667 ibid at 108
668 Stone, M., (1988), op cit at 107
669 Stephenson, G., (1992), op cit at 136
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The defence counsel has a further advantage over rape complainants. Women 
traumatised by rape may well not be willing, or able, to engage in a war of words with 
defence advocates. Vulnerable complainants are potentially easy prey for defence 
counsel during cross-examination.
6.8.3. Summary
It is submitted that rape complainants whose characters have been maligned by 
defence counsel should have the right to challenge the damning picture that has been 
painted in court.
“Can it be right to deprive a person o f the right to negotiate his or her 
identity through free-flowing talk just when it matters most.”670
Ideally, complainants should be able to refute defence accusations as they occur, not 
at a point later in the trial when the damage may be said to be already done. This 
section has sought to demonstrate that while cross-examination is retained as the 
method o f witness interrogation, complainants will be denied this right.
Danet, B., “Language and the Legal Process”, (1989) 14 Law & Society Review at 539
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6.9. The Ineffectiveness o f Limitations
In this section the ineffectiveness of the limitations placed upon cross-examination by 
defence advocates is examined. These limitations include; the Code o f Conduct o f the 
Bar o f  England and Wales, the duty o f trial judges to protect witnesses from improper 
questioning, the Sexual Offences Act 1976 and the Criminal Evidence Act 1898.
6.9.1. The Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales
The Code o f  Conduct o f  the Bar o f England and Wales lays down rules for the 
conduct of cross-examination. These include;
“A barrister must guard against being made the channel for questions 
or statements which are only intended to insult or annoy either the 
witness or some other person.671
A barrister may only suggest that a witness is guilty of fraud, 
misconduct or crime if allegations go to a matter in issue which is 
material to a client’s case. Where the only such matter is the credibility 
o f the witness the barrister must be satisfied as to the reasons for such 
allegations being made and that they are supported by reasonable 
grounds.”672
The Code basically seeks to prevent counsel making unnecessary allegations and to 
discourage unnecessarily lengthy cross-examination and cross-examination conducted 
with a view to browbeating a witness. Research has revealed that defence advocates 
routinely ask questions that are designed to insult and distress rape complainants 
without incurring any penalty from the court or any other quarter. Lees reports that in 
the rape cases she monitored the Code was routinely breached by defence counsel and
General Council o f  the Bar o f  England and Wales, Code o f Conduct o f  the Bar o f England and
Wales, (1991, London:Bar Council) para. 22.4.2 cited in Archbold, Pleadings, Evidence and 
Practice in Criminal Cases (1995, London:Sweet & Maxwell) at para. 4-317 and Appendix C 
('72 ibid at para. 22.8.1
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there was no intervention by either prosecution counsel or the trial judge on these 
occasions. Edwards also doubts the impact o f the Code on the conduct o f barristers;
“The Bar, like any other professional body, is bound by its own rules 
or Code o f conduct. But these rules are frequently breached or 
stretched to say the least, particularly with regard to the way in which 
victims o f sexual offences are cross-examined.”674
Clearly, the Code o f  Conduct o f the Bar o f  England and Wales does not act as an 
effective limit upon cross-examination. Du Cann identifies the limitations o f the 
Code;
“They do no more than state the broad principles which should guide 
him, for the substance and form of the questions which may be put by 
the advocate must be a matter o f his own choice.”675
6.9.2. Duty of the Trial Judge
Trial judges have a duty to prevent questioning of an unduly offensive, vexatious 
improper and oppressive nature; Mechanical and General Inventions Co. Ltd and 
Lehwess v Austin and Austin Motor Co. Ltd.blb In this case Lord Sankey stated;
“Cross examination is a powerful weapon entrusted to counsel and 
should be conducted with restraint and a measure o f courtesy and 
consideration which a witness is entitled to expect in a court o f law.”
The trial judge should exercise this discretion if questioning relates to matters so 
remote as to have negligible impact on the credibility o f the witness or if  there is a
Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 249
Edwards, S., “Evidential Matters in Rape Prosecutions from “First Opportunity to Complain” to 
Corroboration.”, (1986) 136(i) N.L.J. at 292
675 Du Cann, R., (1993), op cit at 122
676 [1935] AC 346
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disproportion between the importance of the imputation and the importance o f the 
evidence.677
As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, cross-examination is being conducted with 
neither restraint nor courtesy by defence counsel in rape cases. Trial judges have a 
discretion to prevent offensive questioning and to rebuke counsel for haranguing 
witnesses but clearly, this discretion is not being exercised in rape cases. Defence 
counsel are granted a great deal o f latitude in their cross-examination o f rape 
complainants. The reasons for the lack of protection afforded rape complainants 
during cross-examination by trial judges are examined in Chapter seven. Chapter 
seven makes it clear that judicial discretion is an ineffective limit upon the 
interrogation o f witnesses in the adversarial criminal trial.
6.9.3. Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1976 section 2
I he lesearch ol Adler and Lees has shown that the legislation designed to restrict the 
use o f sexual history evidence has had a limited impact on the cross-examination of 
complainants in rape trials.678 The decision of a trial judge to grant leave is not a 
matter o f judicial discretion but a judgment as to the relevance o f the evidence in 
question. The central role played by the concept of relevance in the implementation of 
section 2 has been examined by a number o f commentators.679
6.9.3.1. The concept of relevance
Hobbs v Tinling, [1929] 2 KB 1 cited in Keane, A., The Modern Law o f Evidence, (1996, 
London :Butterworths), at 152
See Adler, Z., Rape on Trial, (1987, London:Routledge & Kegan Paul), Lees, S., Carnal 
Knowledge, (1996, London:Hamish Hamilton)
See Adler, Z., “The Relevance o f  Sexual History Evidence in Rape:Problems o f  Subjective 
Interpretation”, [1985] Crim.L.R. 769, McColgan, A., “Common Law and the Relevance o f  
Sexual History Evidence”, (1996b), 16, O.J.L.S. at 275, Temkin, J., “Sexual History Evidence- 
The Ravishment o f  Section 2”, [1993] Crim.L.R. 3
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The classic definition o f relevance is contained in Article 1 of Stephen's Digest o f  the 
Law o f  Evidence:
“..any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other that 
according to the common-sense course of events one either taken by 
itself or in connection with other facts proves or renders probable the 
past, present, or future existence or non existence of the other.”680
Evidence is therefore relevant if  it is logically probative or disprobative o f a fact that 
requires proof. The evidence must be found suitable for rational inference. There is no 
legal test o f relevancy. It is forjudges to decide the probative force, and therefore the 
relevance, of evidence.
“The law furnishes no test o f relevancy. For this it tacitly refers to logic 
and general experience, assuming that the principles o f reasoning are 
well known to it's judges and ministers.”681
Relevance is presented by the courts as an objective concept, a matter o f common- 
sense. Whether the trial judge considers evidence probative or disprobative will 
largely depend on the life experiences, assumptions and values that inform that 
decision making process. The beliefs and standpoint of the trial judge are therefore 
central.
“Given absolute discretion in this area, judges must ultimately rely on 
personal experiences and individual perceptions o f what constitutes 
“relevance” or “unfairness.”682
Relevance is therefore not the objective, neutral concept it is presented to be but a 
highly subjective concept.
“ ..though seemingly neutral and impartial relevance is in fact in the eye 
o f the beholder.”683
680 Stephen, Sir James, Digest o f  the Law o f Evidence, (1979), cited in Adler, Z., (1985), op cit at 772 
Thayer, J.B., A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence on Evidence at Common Law 1898 (1969,
South Hackensack) cited in Zuckerman, A. A.S., The Principles o f Criminal Evidence, (1989, 
Oxford:Clarendon Press)
682 Adler, Z., “Rape- The Intention o f  Parliament and the Practice o f  the Courts” (1982) 45 M.L R
at 675
256
Feminist analysis o f the legal concept of relevance has exposed the bias inherent in 
relevance determinations. Adler argues that the subjective nature o f the legal concept 
of relevance allows the sexist assumptions of individual judges to inform the decision 
making process;
“It is a matter of considerable concern that the question of sexual 
history evidence, prone to biased interpretations, is at present left 
entirely in the hands of judges whose tendency to prejudice against 
women has been clearly documented at all levels o f the jurisdiction.”684
According to Kinports, leaving relevance determinations to trial judges necessarily 
solidifies a white male perspective.685 The trial judge will base his decision on his 
understanding o f human behaviour. As discussed in Chapter one, the majority of 
judges in England and Wales are male. The rape complainant’s experience is 
translated using values, assumptions and norms shared by men. Relevant evidence is 
evidence deemed logically probative from a male perspective. In a rape trial a 
decision as to the relevance of evidence will be based, in part, on the judge’s 
understanding of the nature o f rape, women and female sexuality. Lees also argues 
that far from being objective the legal concept of relevance embodies a male 
perspective;
“British judges are overwhelmingly old, upper class, white, highly 
privileged, and male. They hold themselves ostentatiously aloof from 
everyday life and their courts are prescribed as neutral islands of 
rationality, sealed off from imperfect society.”686
“The very concepts o f “neutrality” and “rationality” to which the courts 
adhere are infused with male ideologies. No where is this more 
apparent than in rape trials. Masculinity stands revealed in their 
procedures and judgment.”687
6Rj Kinports, K., (1991), op cit at 431
684 Adler, Z„ (1985), op cit at 770
685 Kinports, K., (1991), op cit at 431
686 Lees, S., (1993), op cit at 32
687 ibid at 33
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According to Adler’s research, the majority of applications made under section 2 are 
argued on the grounds of relevance to consent.688 Adler’s observations of rape trials 
reveal that an inventive advocate can introduce far ranging evidence of a 
complainant’s previous sexual history using this argument. Defence counsel argue for 
example, that evidence o f the complainant’s sexual history should be admitted to
show that the complainant has previously had sexual intercourse with a man that......... .... -.......... - -... ...— — i i
shared certain characteristics with the defendant.689 Where the complainant is white 
and the defendant is black, the defence counsel may seek to ask questions about 
previous black sexual partners upon the premise that this shows that the complainant 
has no aversion to sex with black men. If the defendant is an old man or a particularly 
young man or judged to be middle-class or working class the defence will apply the 
same flawed logic. If  it was part o f the prosecution case that the complainant claims 
that she would never entertain the idea of having sexual intercourse with a black man, 
then naturally, previous sexual relationships with black men become relevant. 
However, where used to illustrate “no aversion”, where no aversion has been claimed 
by the prosecution, this represents nothing more than manipulation of the statute to 
introduce the type of evidence the section was designed to prevent.
Defence counsel also argue that evidence o f a complainant’s sexual history should be 
admitted on the grounds that it shows that the complainant had previously consented 
to sexual intercourse o f the same nature as the alleged rape. If  the complainant was 
anally penetrated, for example, defence counsel will attempt to introduce evidence 
that the complainant has previously engaged in consensual anal intercourse. Again, if 
the complainant asserts that she would never consent to anal intercourse, such defence 
questioning would be appropriate. In the absence of such an assertion the defence’s 
argument is spurious.
According to Adler’s research, defence counsel also argue that evidence that a 
complainant has consented to sexual intercourse indiscriminately in the past also goes 
to the issue o f consent. Evidence o f consensual sexual intercourse on a number of 
occasions in the past, it is argued, shows that a complainant was more likely to 
consent to the defendant.
" Adler, Z., (1982), op cit at 669
Adler, Z., (1985) Crim. L.R. op cit at 772
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“It remains an important defence strategy to portray the alleged victim 
of rape as “bad”, and to appeal to the widely shared attitudes 
undoubtedly present among the jury that women with a normal sexual 
past are more likely to consent to sexual intercourse than those 
without.”690
The concept o f relevance, far from protecting rape complainants from distressing and 
unnecessary questioning, allows defence counsel to delve into the personal and 
intimate details o f a complainant’s life. The concept opens the door to prejudiced 
assumptions about rape, women and female sexuality;
“Thus, in many cases, far from being relevant, such evidence is 
introduced to play on the jury’s prejudices and widely believed myths 
regarding the role of the alleged victim in sexual assaults.”691
The concept allows defence counsel to ask questions designed to humiliate and 
distress a complainant and thereby undermine her performance in court.
“For the victim ‘relevant’ testimony is perceived as character 
assassination.”692
McEwan, identifies a further reason for the failure of section 2 to significantly alter 
the questioning o f rape complainants during cross-examination.693 McEwan argues 
that the distinction between evidence that goes to credit and evidence that goes to an 
issue in the trial is often arbitrary and a distinction that lawyers find difficult to 
appreciate. According to McEwan, where reform is not understood it does not achieve 
anything.694
690 ibid at 779
691 ibid
692 Yaroshefsky, E., (1989), op cit at 154
McEwan, J., (1992), op cit at 103
694 ibid
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6.9.4. The Criminal Evidence Act 1898: section 1 (f)
It has been argued that the rules that govern cross-examination operate discriminately 
between the defendant and the complainant;.
“In some ways the victim is particularly vulnerable in court. There are 
legal rules limiting the discussion o f a defendant’s previous 
convictions or bad character in court; the victim’s history and character 
are less sacrosanct.”695
The defendant may o f course elect not to give evidence at all and therefore may 
escape cross-examination completely. If the defendant does give evidence there are 
certain restrictions governing the cross-examination of the defendant in a criminal 
trial. The Criminal Evidence Act 1898 section 1(f) states;
“A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance o f this Act 
shall not be asked and if asked shall not be required to answer any 
question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of 
such other offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is 
o f bad character unless -;”
The section proceeds to list three exceptions upon the satisfaction o f which 
questioning relating to the bad character of the defendant and evidence o f previous 
convictions becomes permissible. Section 1 (f) effectively provides the defendant with 
a shield that protects him from cross-examination about his character. The defendant 
may however ‘throw his shield away’ and therefore lose this protection if  he has made 
his character a relevant issue. Section l(f)ii states;
“- he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the 
witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establishing his own good 
character, or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve 
imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the 
prosecution.”
695 McBarnet, D., (1983), op cit 294
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Once the defendant has thrown his shield away he is liable to be cross-examined like 
any other witness. Under section l(f)(ii), the defendant waives the protection afforded 
by section 1(f) if  for example, he or she asserts his or her own good character by 
personally giving evidence or through his or her advocate asking questions of 
prosecution witnesses aimed at establishing the defendant’s good character. In this 
situation, counsel for the prosecution may cross-examine the defendant on his or her 
bad character and previous convictions. The defendant may also lose his or her shield 
by attacking the character o f prosecution witnesses. The defendant is allowed a certain 
latitude to assert his or her innocence without losing the shield. An emphatic denial of 
guilt is not regarded as ‘casting imputations’ and the shield remains in force. If 
however the defendant accuses the prosecutor or prosecution witnesses of deliberate 
fabrication the shield will be lost.696
The trial judge also has a discretion under section 1 (f) ii to prevent the prosecution 
from cross-examining about certain previous convictions even if  the shield is lost. It 
was held in Selvey v DPP 697 that this judicial discretion should be exercised where it 
would be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant to allow evidence of his or her previous 
convictions. Even if  the defendant has attacked the credibility o f prosecution 
witnesses and or asserted his or her good character the defendant’s previous 
convictions may therefore never become evidence before the court.
6.9.4.1. Section 1 (f) (ii) and the Rape Complainant
II the conduct o f the defence necessarily involves casting imputations on the 
prosecutor or prosecution witnesses the accused may still lose his shield. The only 
exception to this rule is where an accused relies on the defence of consent in a rape 
case. The defendant’s assertion that the rape complainant consented to sexual 
intercourse was held not to cast an imputation upon the rape complainant’s character
696 See Tapper, C., Cross and Tapper on Evidence, (1996), Chapter Ten
697 [1970] AC 304
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for the purposes o f section 1 (f) (ii) in R v Turner.™ The court also held in that case 
that allegations that a rape complainant was guilty of gross indecency as a preliminary 
did not amount to an imputation under the Act. This view was upheld in Selvev v 
DPP.699
There seem to be no reasons for making rape a special case. According to Iller, the 
‘mud-slinging' that routinely takes place in rape cases could be constrained if  the 
defendant risked a similar attack upon his character.700 According to Duncan, the rule 
leaves complainants in rape cases uniquely vulnerable during cross-examination;
“In any other offence, an attack on the character o f the complainant 
leaves the defendant open to having his previous convictions put in 
evidence. In the rape trial alone, the complainant can be constructed as 
whore, as temptress, as liar, with impunity.”701
6.9.5. Summary
Research into the conduct o f rape trials has revealed that the rules governing the 
cross-examination of witnesses are grossly inadequate. Defence barristers are free to 
besmirch and denigrate complainants without fear o f rebuke. Such is the 
ineffectiveness o f these rules that Rock concludes;
“There are rules of evidence and cross-examination, but these are not 
designed to protect the feelings o f those who are interrogated.”702
This chapter has sought to show that the ordeal o f rape complainants during cross- 
examination is largely attributable to the adversarial structure o f criminal trials. It is 
submitted that while the adversarial framework remains in place, no ethical code will 
be able to offer rape complainants protection from the attacks mounted by defence
698 [1944] KB 463
699 [1970] AC 304
™° Iller, M., “A Fair Trial for Rape Complainants”, (1 9 9 2 )4  March, L.S.G. at 2
Duncan, S., “The Mirror Tells its Tale: Constructions o f  Gender in Criminal Law”, in (ed) 
Bottomley, A., Feminist Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects o f  Law, (1996, London:
Cavendish), at 179 
Rock, P., (1991), op cit at 269
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counsel and neither will judicial discretion prove a refuge for vulnerable 
complainants, as discussed in Chapter seven.
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6.10. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to illustrate that cross-examination is an inappropriate 
mechanism for testing the veracity o f rape complainants. Complainants are humiliated 
and degraded as their personal lives and characters are publicly scrutinised and 
etfectively put on trial. Given the nature o f the offence and the wealth o f myths and 
prejudice surrounding rape and female sexuality rape complainants are uniquely 
vulnerable during cross-examination. A woman’s sexual reputation becomes the focus 
ot questioning. Being forced to reveal very intimate details o f her sexual experience in 
court is a humiliating and painful experience for a woman who has been raped. Rape 
is a crime o f sexual violation, the scrutiny o f her sexual history in a courtroom of 
strangers represents a further violation of her sexual integrity.
Women traumatised by rape are inappropriate targets for a brutal verbal interrogation. 
Complainants are treated harshly and crudely by an advocate necessarily indifferent to 
the psychological harm he or she inflicts. The adversarial system demands that 
women seeking justice subject themselves to a gruelling and demeaning ordeal. This 
study arges that it is time that this was seen for the injustice that it undeniably is and 
tor other methods o f testing the evidence o f rape complainants and other vulnerable 
complainants to be investigated.
“There is a consensus today that physical torture is a bad means to 
elicit evidence, not only because such testimony may be unreliable but 
also because torture is abhorrent. It was not so many centuries ago that 
torture was considered a perfectly appropriate method o f eliciting 
testimony and not a punishment at all. Can we change our thinking 
about cross-examination too?”703
Danet, B., (1989), op cit at 539
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Chapter Seven - Protection of Rape Complainants in Court in 
England and Wales
7.1. Introduction
This chapter addresses the failure o f the adversarial process to offer vulnerable 
complainants protection during cross-examination. As discussed in Chapter six, the 
trial judge in England and Wales has a duty to prevent questioning of an unduly 
offensive, vexatious, improper and oppressive nature.704 Judicial indifference to the 
plight of rape complainants is often cited as the reason trial judges fail to intervene on 
the part o f complainants during cross-examination. Consequently, there have been 
calls for the reform o f the judiciary. Lees for example, has recommended special 
training for judges as to the effects o f rape and the appointment o f more female 
judges.705 While individual trial judges are criticised for not adopting a firmer stance, 
the relationship between judicial non-intervention in rape trials and the adversarial 
trial process has remained largely unexplored. This chapter argues that the lack of 
intervention by trial judges on behalf o f rape complainants is, in part, attributable to 
the adversarial structure of criminal trials and the prescribed role of the judge within 
adversarial theory. It is argued that there is a conflict between the trial judge’s duty to 
protect witnesses from improper questioning and the umpireal function o f the trial 
judge within adversarial criminal proceedings. The result of this conflict is that rape 
complainants are afforded inadequate protection during cross-examination.
This chapter also examines why the offensive and brutal attacks upon rape 
complainants are not met with objections from prosecution counsel. The failure o f 
prosecution barristers to intervene on behalf o f rape complainants or to mount an
7(M See Chapter Six at 6.9.2.
705 Lees, S., Carnal Knowledge:Rape on Trial, (1996, London:Hamish Hamilton), at 250
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effective counter-attack on the defence is again, often attributed to a lack o f sympathy 
and empathy for victims of rape. The criminal trial process itself has again escaped 
examination and criticism. This chapter argues that the perceived passivity of 
prosecution barristers is linked to the adversarial structure of criminal proceedings and 
the role o f prosecution counsel within the English adversarial trial. The vulnerability 
o f the complainant during cross-examination it is argued, is largely a structural 
consequence o f the adversarial process.
The vulnerability of rape complainants in court has led a number o f commentators to 
advocate legal representation for rape victims. In this chapter the arguments for and 
against the introduction of ‘victim advocates’ in rape cases are discussed. It is argued 
that within the existing framework of the adversarial criminal trial a victim advocate 
would ultimately have little impact upon the treatment of rape complainants in court.
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7.2. Cross-examination and Judicial Intervention in Rape Trials
7.2.1. Criticism of Trial Judges
Researchers concerned with the conduct of rape trials have often criticised trial judges 
for failing to take a more active role in protecting rape complainants during cross- 
examination.700 Trial judges, for example, have been blamed for the continued 
introduction o f sexual history evidence following the implementation of the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 section 2.
“The role o f the judge in a rape trial is crucial, and this has not been 
affected by the provisions of the 1976 Act. Most judges remain 
creatures o f their time and circumstances, their social opinions largely 
shaped by education, class and occupation. Their view of the proper 
sexual roles of men and women, and the social status and situation of 
women reflect, by acceptance or sometimes by rejection, the values of 
the generation to which they belong. These are bound to affect their 
decisions under section 2 of the Act.”707
Criticism has not been confined to feminist researchers. Lord Hailsham has argued 
that there would be fewer calls for reform in the area of the cross-examination of rape 
complainants if  trial judges exercised greater control or “a tighter rein” over defending 
counsel.708 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report (1993) also 
recommended that trial judges adopt a firmer stance in protecting witnesses from the 
excesses o f counsel;
“Judges should act firmly to control bullying and intimidatory tactics 
on the part of counsel.709
70<’ See Adler, Z., Rape on Trial, (1987, London:Routledge & Kegan Paul), Lees, S., (1996), op cit 
Adler, Z., ‘The Relevance o f  Sexual History Evidence in Rape:Problems o f  Subjective 
Interpretation’ [1985] Crim.L.R. 779
708 Lord Hailsham, HL Deb. vol. 375 col. 1773, 22 Oct. (1976)
Home Office, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report, (1993, London:HMSO) at para 
182
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Judges should be particularly vigilant to check unfair and intimidatory 
cross-examination o f witnesses who are likely to be distressed or 
vulnerable.”710
Following the Mason case, where a rape complainant was subjected to a cross- 
examination that lasted 30 hours, the trial judge is the case, Judge Ann Goddard, QC, 
was criticised by a number o f commentators.7" Sir Frederick Lawson, a retired Lord 
Justice of Appeal was reported as stating;
“I cannot conceive how it lasted that long or how some of those 
questions could be relevant. The judge can stop irrelevant questions 
and what is more, a judge has a duty to do so.”712
It is submitted that those who have recommended that trial judges adopt a firmer 
stance or exercise greater vigilance during the cross-examination of vulnerable 
complainants have failed to consider the deeper structural issues at play in judicial 
non-intervention during the examination of witnesses. These issues are identified and 
examined below.
7.2.2. The Umpireal Judge of Adversarial Theory
As discussed in Chapter one, the umpireal judge is a defining characteristic of the 
adversarial trial.
“The passive, disinterested judge in the trial process is a sine qua non 
o f the adversarial theory.”713
710 ibid at para. 201
711 The Daily Telegraph 23 August, 1996
712 ibid
713 McEwan, J., Evidence and the Adversarial Process, (1992, Oxford:Blackwell), at 14
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The trial judge o f adversarial theory is a scrupulously impartial, largely passive figure. 
In the contest between the two contending parties the trial judge acts an neutral 
umpire. In adversarial theory the trial judge must be, and be seen to be, unbiased.
“ ..one o f the basic requirements of the adversary system is for the 
judge to be impartial.”714
The English trial judge may, however, be distinguished from the model judge of 
adversarial theory. It is the role o f the English judge to ensure a fair trial. To this end, 
in English law, the trial judge may depart from a strictly umpireal role and may call 
witnesses that both parties neglect to call and engage in the examination and cross- 
examination o f witnesses if the trial judge deems this necessary in the interests of 
justice. As a result, intervention from the bench is common place in criminal trials. 
McEwan argues that the English trial judge barely resembles the judge of adversarial 
theory;
“The passive umpire is a creature of theory rather than practice,..In the 
average criminal trial you will be interrupted far more by the judge 
than by your opponent.”715
The increasingly active role played by the English trial judge in criminal trials is 
identified by Evans;
“It has become the rule, now, for the English judge to come down into 
the arena and to take part to quite a surprising degree.”716
The English trial judge may be far removed from the ideal of adversarial theory but 
there are still significant limitations upon judicial intervention in criminal trials.
714 Danet, B., Bogoch, B., “Fixed Fight or Free-For-All? An Empircal Study o f  Combativeness in the 
Adversary System o f  Justice”, (1980) 7 British Journal o f  Law and Society at 45
715 McEwan, J., (1992), op cit at 14
716 Evans, K., Advocacy at the Bar, (1983, London:Financial Training Publications), at 91
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7.2.3. Limits Upon Judicial Intervention
7.2.3.1. Upsetting the Balance
In Cain, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated;
“There is no reason why the judge should not from time to time 
interpose such questions as seem to him fair and proper.”717
The trial judge may intervene at any time during the trial and ask questions o f the 
accused or other witnesses if he or she believes it necessary in the interests o f justice 
to do so. However, in the case of Hamilton the Court o f Appeal provided guidelines as 
to when a trial judge's intervention may lead to a conviction being overturned;
“(a) interventions which invite the jury to disbelieve the evidence for 
the defence in such strong terms that they cannot be cured by the 
common formula that the facts are for the jury alone to decide;
(b) those that make it impossible for counsel for the defence to carry 
out his duty in properly presenting the defence;
(c) where the defendant himself has been prevented from doing himself 
justice and telling his story in his own way.”718
In adversarial proceedings the parties are charged with the presentation of evidence. 
Advocates are storytellers who must be allowed to present their version o f events. 
Interventions from the trial judge must not compromise the ability o f counsel to tell 
their stories.7I<) It is not the role o f the trial judge to investigate the truth. It is a 
fundamental assumption o f adversarial theory that the court relies on the evidence 
presented by the advocates. The role of the judge is that of referee in the party contest. 
The trial judge may intervene, but if  that intervention is deemed excessive, as having 
upset the balance o f proceedings, a conviction may be overturned. In Gunning the 
Court o f Appeal held;
717 (1 9 3 6 )2 5  C rA p p R  204
718 [1969] Crim. L.R. at 486
7,9 Hirock and Others [1970] 1 QB 67
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..when a judge’s interventions were on such a scale as to deprive the 
accused o f the chance, to which he was entitled under the adversarial 
system, o f developing his evidence under the lead and guidance of 
defending counsel, the trial must be regarded as a mistrial even in the 
absence o f an allegation that the judge’s questioning was hostile to the 
accused.”720
In Perks, the Court o f Appeal stressed that excessive intervention from the trial judge 
may prevent a fair trial;
“It was the duty of prosecuting counsel, and not o f the judge to cross- 
examine. If during or after cross-examination the judge felt that 
questions were not asked which should be asked he was free to 
intervene within the limits o f propriety. But until that point he would 
be wise to limit his interventions to a minimum and principally to 
intervene only to clarify answers for the assistance o f the jury.”721
The Court o f Appeal in 1994 underlined the limits upon judicial intervention and the 
dangers o f overstepping the boundaries;
“A judge should not intervene, when cross-examination is being 
conducted by competent counsel, save to clarify matters which he did
not understand or thought that the jury might no have understood.... If
the judge’s interventions and criticisms o f counsel are unnecessary and 
unjustified, this can result in the quashing of the conviction on the 
ground of a material irregularity in the trial.”722
The Court o f Appeal in the case of Sharp also referred to the dangers o f intervention
during the cross-examination o f witnesses;
“the judge may be in danger of seeming to enter the arena in the sense 
that he may appear partial to one side or the other. This may arise from 
the hostile tone of questioning or implied criticism of counsel who is 
conducting the examination or cross-examination, or if  the judge is 
impressed by the witness, perhaps suggesting excuses or explanations 
for a witness’s conduct which is open to attack by counsel for the 
opposite party.”723
720 Gunning, [1980] Crim.L.R. 592
721 [1973] Crim.L.R. 388
7J2 (1994) 98 CrApp R. 144
R v Sharp [ 1993] 3 All Er 225, 235, cited in Jackson, J., Doran, S., Judge Without Jury: Diplock 
Trials in the Adversary System, (1995, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 100
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It is the quality and not the quantity of interventions that is significant. In Matthews, 
where the trial judge put 524 questions to counsel’s 538, the Court o f Appeal stated;
“On any basis the number of interventions and questions asked by this 
judge were extremely great, and seemed to be more than ought to have 
been necessary for him to fulfil his functions in supervising the 
conduct of the trial. However, it appeared that he did not commit the 
cardinal offence o f diverting counsel from the line of the topic o f his 
questions into other channels. In spite of the exceptional number of 
interventions there was no ground for thinking that the convictions 
were unsafe.”724
Where a trial judge intervenes to protect a complainant during cross-examination, he 
or she runs the risk of being deemed to have interfered unduly with counsel’s 
presentation o f the defence. A lawyer commenting on the Mason case highlighted the 
dilemma faced by the trial judge, Ann Goddard, QC;
“She is a very tough cookie. But had she intervened too much, she 
would have had any verdict against Edwards open to appeal on the 
grounds that he had not been allowed to present a proper defence.”725
Stephen Holt, prosecuting counsel in the Mason case, claimed in a letter to The Times 
that the trial judge was powerless in law to stop Edwards in his questioning of Julia 
Mason;
“The judge could have stopped the cross-examination but the Court of 
Appeal would be bound to quash any conviction if the defendant could 
show that he had been prevented from putting his case.”726
As discussed in Chapter six, in adversarial proceedings ‘presenting a proper defence’ 
necessarily entails an aggressive attack upon a complainant’s character, her lifestyle, 
her sexual conduct. Conducting a proper defence involves blaming victims, calling 
witnesses liars, and having no regard for the welfare o f complainants. A number of
724 (1983) 78 C rA p p R ep 23
7"' The Daily Telegraph 24 August, 1996
726 The Times 24 August, 1996
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commentators sought to portray the Mason case as an isolated incident. The gruelling 
nature of her cross-examination was attributed to the fact that Ralston Edwards, the 
defendant, chose to represent himself. However, research into the conduct of rape 
trials has shown that cross-examination is routinely a humiliating ordeal for rape 
complainants. In fact, in a rape trial reported only days after the Mason case, the 
complainant, a Japanese student who had been gang raped, spent 31 hours in the 
witness box reliving the ordeal.727
1.23.2. A Threat to Judicial Impartiality?
Judicial neutrality is fundamental to adversarial theory and intervention from the trial 
judge should not threaten impartiality by seeming to favour one side. The trial judge 
may intervene in the interests of justice but not to advance the case o f one side. In the 
English adversarial criminal trial the jury is the fact-finder and the judge should be 
wary o f interfering with this function by asking questions that suggest satisfaction of 
either the guilt or innocence of an accused.728 The trial judge must not invite the jury 
to disbelieve the defendant.
“Added to the basic adversarial principle that each side should proceed 
largely unhindered to present its case is the real danger that a judge 
who intrudes will improperly influence the lay fact-finder.”729
Judicial intervention to prevent insensitive, hostile, questioning of a vulnerable 
complainant may well be interpreted within the framework o f adversarial procedure as 
a departure from impartiality and neutrality. It is feared that such intervention may 
unduly influence the jury.
“It is always open to the judge to probe, but the tradition is strong that 
he is an arbiter and not an inquisitor and that the coming to the aid o f a 
party in distress might impair his impartiality.”730
7-7 The Times 7 September, 1996
728 Rabbitt, (1931) 23 Cr App R 112
729 Doran, S., “Descent to Avernus”, (1989) 139(ii) N.L.J. at 1147
710 Devlin, P., The Judge, (1979, Oxford:Oxford University Press), at 62
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The conflict between the role of the trial judge as umpire and the duty to protect 
witnesses is apparent.
7.2.3.3. Ill-Equipped for intervention
The adversarial system ill-equips trial judges for effective intervention on behalf o f 
vulnerable complainants. Prior to a criminal trial the judge will only be familiar with 
the basic facts o f the case. The trial judge will hear a fuller rendition o f the facts only 
once the trial has commenced and prosecution counsel delivers his or her opening 
speech. Within the English adversarial system the trial judge takes no part in the 
preliminary investigative stages of a criminal prosecution and is not furnished with an 
investigative file. This state o f ignorance is seen to enhance judicial impartiality as the 
trial judge necessarily comes to a case free of preformed opinion.
“The ignorance and unpreparedness of the judge are intended axioms 
o f the system.”731
The trial judge therefore possesses only a partial knowledge o f the material facts. In 
such circumstances intervention may well be inappropriate and ineffective.
“The judge views the case from the peak o f Olympian ignorance. His 
intrusions will in too many cases result from partial or skewed insights.
He may expose the secrets one side chooses to keep while never 
becoming aware of the other’s. He runs a good chance of pursuing 
inspirations that better informed counsel have considered, explored, 
and abandoned after fuller study. He risks at a minimum the supplying 
o f more confusion than guidance by his sporadic intrusions.”732
The role o f the defence lawyer is to act on his client’s instructions. The trial judge will 
not know whether an assertion made by defence counsel during his cross-examination 
o f a rape complainant is simply a ruse, designed simply to humiliate the complainant,
731 Frankel, M„ “The Search for Truth:An Umpireal V iew ”, (1975) 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1042
732 ibid
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or whether it is based on allegations made by the defendant. Consequently, scope for 
judicial intervention is severely curtailed.
The role of the trial judge as umpire is a prerequisite of an adversarial system. When 
the arbiter has not participated in the investigative process, adversarial theory claims, 
impartiality is better achieved. The duty of the trial judge to protect witnesses from 
improper questioning is ultimately incompatible with the role of passive umpire.
7.2.4. Summary
The lack o f judicial intervention in rape cases has been cited as evidence of 
indifference on the part of trial judges to the anguish of women alleging rape. Trial 
judges are accused o f colluding with defence lawyers in their attacks upon the 
character and behaviour of rape complainants. Comments made by trial judges 
presiding in rape trials certainly reveal the sexist and prejudiced assumptions held by 
some members o f the judiciary;
“As the gentlemen on the jury will understand, when a woman says 
“no” she doesn’t always mean it.”733
“Women who say no do not always mean no.”734
“The victim was guilty of a great deal of contributory negligence.”735
The attitudes o f trial judges certainly play a role in the treatment of rape complainants 
in court. This section has sought to show however, that judicial protection of 
vulnerable witnesses is necessarily problematic within the adversarial trial. There is a 
conflict between the duty of trial judges to protect witnesses and the function o f the 
trial judge as umpire o f adversarial proceedings. The trial judge who intervenes to 
shield a complainant from the barraging of a defence barrister picks a precarious path;
733 Judge Dean, cited in Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 262
7,4 Judge David Wild, cited in Smith, J., Misogynies, (1993, London:Faber & Faber), at 15
735 Judge Bertrand Richards, cited in ibid at 15
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“A judge or magistrate treads a judicial tightrope when he or she 
intervenes in the course o f a criminal trial. The court’s motives may be 
entirely proper: to protect witnesses from unnecessary bullying, to 
prevent insensitive questions being put, or, to rule on a point of 
procedure or evidence. But if  the Judge or magistrate gets it wrong, 
then he/she may be the subject o f a successful appeal and possible 
criticism because the appearance of justice may have been unduly 
tainted.”736
This study argues that it is time to stop simply blaming trial judges and to redirect 
criticism at the adversarial system which demands that defence advocates mount such 
ruthless verbal assaults upon vulnerable complainants and effectively denies them 
protection in court.
736 (1994) 158 J.P. at 217
276
7.3. Prosecution Counsel and the Protection of Rape Complainants
This section examines the criticism directed at prosecution counsel for their failure to 
protect complainants in court and to subject defendants to a vigorous interrogation 
comparable to attacks upon rape complainants. It is argued that the lack of protection 
afforded complainants by prosecution barristers is attributable to the role played by 
prosecution counsel in the English adversarial trial.
7.3.1. Criticism of Prosecution Counsel
Interviews conducted by Victim Support with a number of rape victims revealed 
disappointment with the performance of prosecuting counsel in court;
“I felt totally and utterly unsupported by the CPS - they did not 
intervene.”737
“I feel that victims are just not represented in court. The control that is 
taken away from you when you are raped is repeated.”738
Chambers and Millar also identified disillusionment with prosecution counsel;
“Women felt particularly let down by the prosecutor who they thought 
could have acted in a more robust way to provide protection from 
defence questioning.”739
7 ,7 Victim Support, Women, Rape and the Criminal Justice System, (1996, London: Victim Support), 
at 26  
7jS ibid at 35
7’J Chambers, G., Millar, A., “Proving Sexual Assault:Prosecuting the Offender or Persecuting the 
Victim?”, in (eds), Carlen, P., Worral, A., Gender, Crime and Justice, (1987, Milton 
Keynes:Open University Press), at 64
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Adler’s research revealed that prosecution counsel routinely fail to secure protection 
o f the rape complainant from questioning that should be excluded under the Sexual 
Offences Amendment Act 1976. Adler found that in the majority o f cases prosecution 
counsel failed to intervene in any way when defence counsel asked questions 
expressly prohibited by the Act.740 Brown et al, in a study of sexual offence trials 
within the Scottish criminal justice system, identified the failure o f prosecution 
counsel to intervene when defence counsel were engaged in speculative questioning;
“It is possible that a more spirited resistance to such innuendo on the 
part o f the prosecution could have an effect and this should be 
encouraged, just as the prosecution should be encouraged to attack 
routinely the character of the accused if such tactics are made on the 
complainer.”741
As well as failing to protect rape complainants during cross-examination, prosecution 
counsel have also been criticised for their failure to challenge the use o f sexist 
stereotypes and rape myths by the defence and to mount an effective counter-attack 
upon the character o f the defendant.742
“Certainly, in rape trials in Britain the prosecution rarely presents a 
convincing case for the complainant.”743
Prosecution counsel are criticised for failing to attack defendants as ruthlessly and 
aggressively as defence barristers attack complainants. According to Lees, the focus in 
rape trials upon the character of the complainant should be counterbalanced with an 
equally vigorous examination of the defendant’s character. Lees argues that 
prosecuting barristers should be asking the following questions;
“What evidence is there o f his views of women and sex? Is he prone to 
violent behaviour? Why not ask questions that make evident the
740 Adler, Z., “Rape -the Intention o f  Parliament and the Practice o f  the Courts”, (1982) 45 M.L.R. 
at 674
741 Brown, B., Burman, M., Jamieson, L., Sex Crimes on Trial, (1993, Edinburgh:Edinburgh 
University Press), at 209
742 Lees, S., “Judicial Rape”, (1993) 16 Women’s International Forum at 26
743 ibid at 24
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implicit sexist assumptions o f the defence’s questioning. Why was the 
defendant out late on his own? Why did he go to a late-night disco?
How much did he have to drink? How much does he usually have to 
drink?”744
Lees argues that in order to present a more effective case, prosecution counsel should 
be encouraged to focus on a number of points. Prosecution counsel should determine 
the circumstances of the alleged rape;
“Did the defendant desire the complainant? Was the desire reciprocal?
What exactly led up to the alleged rape? Was there any foreplay? What 
exactly did the couple say to each other? What evidence was there of 
consent?”745
This includes where the alleged rape took place. If it took place in an unlikely venue, 
such as in an alley or on waste ground, prosecution counsel should press the defendant 
for the reasons for this. Counsel should also inquire whether there was any discussion 
about birth control or protection from sexually transmitted diseases including AIDS. 
Lees also argues that evidence should be introduced as to the effect of the alleged rape 
upon the complainant;
“Evidence of the effect of the experience on the woman’s life is rarely 
given- has she changed her job, been unemployed, moved house, 
changed her sexual habits, suffered from anxiety or ill-health? Has she 
suffered from unreasonable fears, horror o f smells, panic attacks or 
other such symptoms, often described as ‘rape crisis syndrome”.746
The comparative passivity o f prosecution counsel in rape trials is, according to Lees, 
partly due to the fact that prosecutors belong to male dominated profession that share 
the same sexist prejudices about female rape complainants as defence barristers. In 
addition, Lees argues, male prosecutors simply do not comprehend the anguish of 
complainants;
744 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 254
745 ibid at 253
746 ibid at 254
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“Part o f the difficulty is that the prosecutors are usually male and often 
have no idea what the woman has been through.”747
The failure o f prosecution barristers to mount an effective case is also attributed to the 
fact that barristers generally do not meet complainants before a trial.
“Not meeting the complainant beforehand must contribute to the 
prosecution counsel’s often appearing disinterested and failing to 
object to the cross-examination of the claimant’s character and past 
sexual history which was evident in my monitoring of trials.”748
It is unlikely that the prosecuting barrister and the complainant will have met before 
the trial. Certainly, the two will not have discussed the case. Prosecution counsel 
consequently confront no direct challenge to any misconceptions about rape that they 
may have. Prosecution counsel will have only limited information as to the character 
o f the complainant, her version of events, and the impact the alleged rape has had 
upon her life. The ability o f the prosecution barrister to counter the defence’s 
portrayal of the complainant is therefore limited.
“ ..the prosecution often does little to refute such outlandish accusations 
and, since he or she has not even met the complainant beforehand, is in 
no position to do so.”749
This o f course, applies to other categories o f complainants. No alliance is formed 
between the prosecutor and the victim. The Bar Council Code o f  Conduct (1991), has 
been amended to allow prosecution barristers to introduce themselves to prosecution 
witnesses before the trial. A number of the complainants interviewed by Victim 
Support however, claimed that no such approach was made;
“I didn’t even know who my barrister was.”750
“The worst thing in the world is not being able to talk to the CPS and the 
prosecution barrister and not knowing the law. Its so evil. In court the
Lees, S., (1993), op cit at 26
74s Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 106
749 ibid at 125
7'1 Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 28
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prosecuting barrister nods at you from the other end of the room when 
the defendant is chatting to his barrister.”751
“I was annoyed I didn’t get to see a barrister the defence gets everything. 
I walked into the court and I had never seen the barrister before.”752
A further reason offered for the failure of prosecution counsel to object and intervene 
during the cross-examination o f key prosecution witnesses is that such action is 
perceived as ineffective. The research o f Chambers and Millar revealed a certain 
resignation on the part of counsel for the prosecution. It was well recognised that 
defence counsel employed ‘dirty tactics’ and engaged in speculative questioning but 
prosecution counsel saw no available means o f countering such defence techniques.
“Our own analysis of prosecution decision-making suggests two 
things: first, it had come to be expected by the prosecution that illegal 
tactics would be employed by the defence and that nothing could be 
done about this.”753
“At present the prosecutor’s case is often undermined and demoralised 
by passive acceptance o f what is pessimistically perceived as the 
inevitable impact on a jury of defence attacks on the woman’s 
credibility.”754
The reasons cited above undoubtedly play a part. However it is submitted that central 
to the perceived passivity of prosecution barristers in rape trials is the role of the 
prosecutor in the adversarial process.
7.3.2. The Role of the Prosecutor in Adversarial Proceedings
7.3.2.I. Representative of the State
751 ibid  at 37
752 ibid at 40
753 Chambers, G., Millar, A., (1987), op cit at 76
7:4 ibid at 78
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Disappointment with the performance o f prosecution counsel in court is not confined 
to rape complainants but has been expressed by complainants in general. Rock 
identified this dissatisfaction in interviews with prosecution witnesses following their 
involvement in criminal proceedings. The prosecution witnesses interviewed by Rock 
appeared to have expected the prosecutor to have represented their interests at the 
trial. They were in turn let down when the prosecutor did little to protect them in the 
courtroom.
“Prosecution counsel turn out not to be ‘their’ champion at all.”755
The prosecutor represents the State not the complainant in a criminal case. This is in 
contrast to the role of the defence counsel which is to vigorously defend his or her 
client. There is a lawyer-client relationship between the defendant and the defence 
counsel. The defence counsel is clearly “on the side” of the defendant. In contrast, 
prosecutors feel no direct responsibility for complainants. The complainant is simply 
another prosecution witness. Brown et al observed this abdication of responsibility of 
prosecutors towards complainants in criminal cases within the Scottish system.
“Most interviewees were emphatic that the prosecution did not have 
what one judge termed, any “direct” responsibility for the 
complainer.”756
Prosecution counsel do not perceive themselves as allies o f complainants and 
consequently, they do not judge it to be their role to offer them protection during 
cross-examination.
7.3.2.2. A ‘Minister of Justice’
The role of prosecuting counsel in adversarial proceedings was examined in Chapter 
one. It was argued that prosecuting counsel, as ministers o f justice, should present the 
prosecution case fairly and dispassionately. The prosecutor, it is claimed, should
7'5 Rock, P., “Witnesses and Space in a Crown Court” (1991) 31 Brit. J.Criminol. at 279  
7''’ Brown, B., et al, (1993), op cit at 172
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remain indifferent to the outcome o f the case. In contrast, the role o f the defending 
advocate is to defend his or her client vigorously. However, the adversarial criminal 
trial is structured as a contest, a dispute between two sides. Prosecution counsel are 
engaged in a partisan presentation o f the facts. Prosecutors also talk o f ‘winning’ and 
‘losing’. The adversarial trial should therefore not be presented as a one-sided contest. 
Prosecutors are far from impartial figures within the English adversarial trial. 
However, it is not open to prosecution counsel to mount as unrestrained an attack 
upon defence witnesses as defence advocates may upon prosecution witnesses. 
Defence lawyers simply have a freer rein.
“In action, both are impersonal, but whereas some element o f the 
theatrical, or forensic emotion is still permitted to the defence, any 
passion of argument, any grandiloquence of phrase or ‘playing to the 
gallery’ is out of place in the presentation of the Crown.”7:i7
“The function o f the prosecutor is not to tack as many skins o f victims 
as possible to the wall but to present the case fairly and completely.”758
The restraints placed upon prosecution counsel have led Brown et al to describe the 
adversarial as “asymmetric” .759 Brown et al recognise that defence counsel are 
permitted to present their cases with a “greater gusto”.760 This ‘inequality’ helps 
explain the perceived ambivalence o f prosecution counsel in rape trials.
“While both prosecution and defence advocates bring prior experience 
o f presenting evidence in ways which they believe will impress the 
jury, the defence have a much freer rein. It is the defence who more 
often conjure up popular stereotypes in their character constructions, 
like the ‘loose woman’ or the ‘precocious, seductive girl’. For the 
prosecution, discrediting defence witnesses is only embarked on when 
professional judgement deems it appropriate; for the defence 
discrediting key prosecution witnesses, particularly the complainer in a 
rape trial, is stock-in-trade.” 761
757 Humphries, C. “The Duties and Responsibilities o f  Prosecuting Counsel”, [1975] Crim.L.R. at
746
758 Pannick, D., Advocates, (1992, Oxford:Oxford University Press), at 114
759 Brown, B., et al, (1993), op cit at 188
760 ibid
761 J
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7.3.3. Strategic Non-intervention
A further possible explanation for the prosecutor’s failure to protect the rape 
complainant during cross-examination can be found in the adversarial structure o f 
English criminal proceedings. The adversarial trial is structured as a contest. The 
actions o f advocates in criminal trials are governed in part by strategic considerations. 
Such considerations will also govern intervention by prosecution barristers during the 
cross-examination o f prosecution witnesses. The prosecutor it is submitted, will only 
be inclined to object to lines o f questioning pursued by the defence if  he or she 
perceives it to be strategically advantageous to intervene. Where the prosecutor 
perceives no tactical advantage in an objection, none will be made. In addition, from 
the point o f view of the prosecutor, an aggressive attack on the complainant, that 
results in considerable visible distress, may serve to alienate the jury from the defence 
and therefore benefit the prosecution case. The prosecuting counsel may decide not to 
intervene on strategic grounds. The prosecutor’s primary allegiance is to the 
prosecution case. In adversarial proceedings, the case takes precedence over the 
welfare o f the complainant.
A further strategic consideration that may serve as a disincentive to raising objections 
in court, is the potential effect o f such action upon the jury. As explained in Chapter 
six, in the adversarial trial the performances of all the central protagonists can be 
decisive. Prosecution counsel must always be aware of the impression he or she is 
conveying to the jury. Frequent objections it is feared, may alienate the jury. Advice 
offered by Sir David Napley, suggests that such fears on the part of prosecution 
barristers are justified;
“The prosecutor, who gives the impression of an overweening anxiety 
to secure a conviction, who feels the need to interrupt or nullify every 
point made for the defence however small, or to cross-examine in an 
aggressive fashion is far more likely to arouse the displeasure o f the
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court, or even psychologically to enlist its sympathy in favour of the 
defence.”762
The prosecutor that frequently objects to defence questions may be perceived as 
seeking to unfairly undermine the defence case. For a number of reasons objections by 
prosecution counsel are not commonplace in the English courtroom. There appears to 
be a norm o f not objecting.
“In England it is rare for counsel on either side to object to evidence 
offered by the other side.” 763
7.3.4. Summary
It is not the role o f prosecution counsel to protect rape complainants from improper 
and distressing questioning during cross-examination. Prosecution counsel have no 
direct responsibility for the interests and welfare o f complainants in court. The 
adversarial process also generates a number o f disincentives to intervention. The 
claim that there is a norm of not objecting in criminal trials in England and Wales is 
supported by the fact that advocacy manuals which advise advocates on their 
courtroom technique are silent on the circumstances in which barristers should or 
should not intervene on the part of their own witnesses during cross-examination. The 
Code o f  Conduct o f  the Bar o f England and Wales is also silent on the matter.
Critics o f prosecution counsel have advocated the introduction o f training and 
education initiatives;
“Prosecution counsels should undergo training before they undertake to 
represent women in rape cases.
752 Napley, D., The T echn ique o f  Persuasion, (1970, London:Sweet & M axwell) at 71
763 Karlen, D., Anglo-American Criminal Justice, (1967, Oxford), at 186
764 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 253
285
It is submitted, that within the existing adversarial structure of criminal trials, training 
will have a limited impact on the protection afforded rape complainants during cross- 
examination. As long as criminal proceedings are structured as a contest between two 
opposing sides, prosecutors will always put the prosecution case before the individual 
interests o f prosecution witnesses. The interests of complainants and prosecutors are 
not necessarily compatible but may diverge sharply. The prosecutor will only step in 
and protect the complainant where he or she believes such intervention will serve the 
prosecution case. Where the prosecution case will derive no direct benefit from 
intervention or in fact, the raising o f objections may harm the prosecution case, 
protection will not be forthcoming. Prosecutors may sacrifice the interests of 
vulnerable complainants in order to secure a tactical advantage at the trial.
While this chapter has argued that the relative passivity of prosecution barristers in 
rape trials may, in part, be attributed to the role played by the prosecutor in the 
adversarial criminal trial, it is submitted that the adversarial process need not bar 
prosecution barristers from challenging the sexist stereotyping which plays a central 
role in rape trials. For example, as Lees suggests, through putting to defendants the 
questions typically put to complainants in rape cases and exposing the implicit sexist 
assumptions o f defence questioning. It is therefore submitted that while training may 
have little impact upon the protection afforded rape complainants by prosecution 
barristers, training may have a beneficial impact upon the performance o f prosecutors 
in court.
It is also submitted, that encouraging prosecution barristers to engage in the same 
tactics as defence advocates, to be equally belligerent, will ultimately do little to 
improve the treatment of rape complainants in court. Such a move would only serve to 
compound the combativeness o f the adversarial process and make for a bloodier fight. 
Rather an alternative to cross-examination should be sought.
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7.4. Legal Representation for Rape Complainants
“The failure to provide a barrister for the complainant or the alternative 
of a different relationship between the prosecution and the complainant 
results in a highly disinterested representation on the woman’s 
behalf.”765
The lack o f protection afforded rape complainants in court has led a number of 
commentators to advocate the introduction o f legal representation for rape 
complainants. In this section arguments for and against legal representation are 
examined. It is argued that while victim advocates may have a valuable role to play in 
the provision o f information and support to complainants, their impact on the 
treatment o f rape complainants in court would necessarily be very limited.
7.4.1. Calls for o f Legal Representation
Research conducted by Victim Support suggests that many women feel unrepresented 
in criminal proceedings. One woman interviewed by Victim Support stated;
“It is unfair that you are not allowed any legal help. That was very hard 
to deal with. I felt left out of the proceedings.”766
Having researched the conduct o f rape trials in England and Wales, Temkin has 
advocated legal representation for rape complainants.
“There is clearly a strong case for permitting a complainant to be 
accompanied by a lawyer. His presence is bound to be reassuring and
Lees, S., (1993) op cit at 23
7<’6 Victim Support, (1996), op cit at 34
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should make the prospect o f confronting the defendant, his family and 
friends less intimidating.”767
Temkin appears to have based her recommendations on her research of rape trials in 
Denmark and Norway, where rape complainants are entitled to legal representation. 
Temkin argues for a victim advocate with a clearly defined and limited role. The 
victim ’s legal representative would not act as another prosecutor. According to 
Temkin, victim advocates should be able to do three things. Firstly, the victim 
advocate should be permitted to object to improper questioning during cross- 
examination. Secondly, the victim advocate should be allowed to contest applications 
made under Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 section 2 . Thirdly, the victim 
advocate could assist the complainant in seeking compensation.768 Helena Kennedy, 
QC, advocates representation for rape complainants but with a more restricted role;
“We should explore the possible role of a victim representative in the 
court, whose function it is to explain the process to the witness and 
familiarise her or him with the procedure without treading in the realm 
o f evidence, so that coaching is avoided. The victim counsel or 
“amicus”, would act only in sensitive cases and would not participate 
in the adversarial process in front of the jury. However, they could 
participate in arguments to the judge about the admissibility of 
evidence concerning the victim’s history.” 769
Kennedy envisages a situation whereby victim advocates would only participate at the 
pre-trial stage rather than having an active role at the trial. Yaroshefsky also argues 
against participation at the trial;
“The role o f counsel, however, should not be expanded to allow the 
victim’s counsel to participate in the trial. While victim’s counsel can 
play a critical role in empowering the victim, allowing the victim’s 
attorney to examine prosecution and defence witnesses threatens to be 
unwieldy, time consuming, and impractical for the prosecution, the 
defence and the court. ”770
767 Temkin, J., Rape and the Legal Process, (1987, London:Sweet & M axwell), at 184
768 Temkin, J., (1987), op cit at 187
769 Kennedy, H., Eve was Framed, (1992, London:Chatto & Windus ), at 138
7711 Yaroshefsky, E., “Balancing V ictim ’s Rights and Vigorous Advocacy for the Defendant”, [1989] 
1 Ann. Surv. Am. L. at 146
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While not specifying the appropriate role o f a victim advocate, McEwan argues that 
all complainants would benefit from legal representation;
“Certainly, legal representation would alleviate the position of all 
victims who give evidence for the prosecution.”771
Legal representation for vulnerable complainants would appear to have a number of 
attractive benefits. Primarily, the victim advocate could prove a valuable source of 
information and support.
7.4.2. Provision of Information
In 1986, Shapland et al identified a lack of information as one of the main causes of 
victim dissatisfaction with the trial process.772 The researchers found that victims were 
provided with insufficient information as to the progress of a case and their role 
within the criminal process.
“In general, one has the impression o f victims being isolated and 
confused at court, not knowing what they may be required to do or 
what they are allowed to do. They do not realise what is happening 
around them and it is rare for anyone to explain it to them.”773
A recent study conducted by Victim Support into the treatment of rape victims within 
the criminal justice system examined the provision o f information.774 A survey of 
Witness Services suggests that victims of rape are still facing difficulties in obtaining 
information. Victims, the survey found, were not kept informed about the progress of 
their case especially with regard to bail decisions and not informed when cases were
771 McEwan, J., (1992), op cit at 111
772 See Shapland. J., Willmore, J., Duff., P., Victims and the Criminal Justice System, (1985, 
Aldershot:Gower)
773 ibid at 69
7 /4 Victim Support, Women, Rape and the Criminal Justice System, (1996, London: Victim Support)
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dropped due to insufficient evidence.775 The victim advocate could therefore prove a 
valuable source o f much needed information.
7.4.3. Provision of Support
Shapland and et al reported in 1985 that victims were offered no support when they 
attended court.776 The experience o f being a witness was presented as an isolating and 
lonely one.
“The experience o f victims waiting outside the courtroom was one of 
feeling superfluous and ignored.”777
Rock’s study of criminal proceedings in Crown Courts confirmed that prosecution 
witnesses were often ignored by court officials.778 According to Rock, the police were 
the only professionals to spend time with victims at court.779 In addition, complainants 
often expected a reassuring word, or at least acknowledgement, from prosecution 
counsel but this was not forthcoming.780
“Few talk to witnesses as they sit, frequently in dejection, on the 
yellow metal benches outside the courtroom.”781
Rock reports that prosecution counsel readily deny any responsibility for the 
complainant or prosecution witnesses in general. One barrister interviewed by Rock is 
reported as stating;
775 ibid at 10
776 Shapland, J., et al, (1985), op cit at 63
777 ibid
778 See Rock, P., The Social World o f  the English Crown Court, (1993, OxfordiClarendon Press)
779 Rock, P., “The Victim in Court Project at the Crown Court at Wood Green”, (1991a), 30, Howard 
Journal, at 308
780 Rock, P., “Witnesses and Space in a Crown Court”, (1991,b), 31, Brit. J. Criminol. at 279
7M Rock, P., (1991a), op cit at 308
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“A distressed witness is none o f my business- the police will look after 
prosecution witnesses.”782
Until recently, the Code o f  Conduct o f the General Council o f the Bar o f England and 
Wales effectively barred prosecution barristers from talking to prosecution 
witnesses.78. The rule against consulting with witnesses was aimed at preventing 
briefing or coaching. Rock reports that prosecution counsel would actively avoid 
contact with the victim and other prosecution witnesses outside the courtroom;
“It should be noted that even to be seen with victims was thought 
reprehensible.”784
The Code has since been amended and barristers may now introduce themselves to 
prosecution witnesses. The Victims Charter 1996 states that a victim may expect a 
Crown Prosecution Service representative to introduce themselves and tell them what 
to expect.785 Rock’s research however strongly suggests that complainants may still 
not look to prosecution barristers for support.
7.4.3.1. Outsiders
Rock argues that prosecution barristers and other professional court users deliberately 
avoid complainants. According to Rock, victims threatened the conduct of cases, and 
the “appearance o f neutrality so carefully cultivated by staff’786.
“Lawyers, judges jurors and staff kept their distance from prosecution 
witnesses for fear o f appearing to conspire, collude, and coach. 
Witnesses were isolated, not to talk with anyone about their 
evidence.”787
Victims and prosecution witnesses are ‘outsiders’;
Rock, P., (1993) op cit at 171
7S; General Council o f  the Bar o f  England and Wales, Code o f Conduct o f the Bar o f  England and 
Wales, (1991, as amended, London:Bar Council)
784 Rock, P., (1993), op cit at 171
785 Home O ffice, (1996), op cit at 4
lhh Rock, P., (1993), op cit at 179
787 ibid at 89
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“Together with others collectively labelled ‘the public’ the defendants, 
spectators, support teams and friends and relations of the belligerents, 
they were thrust to a distance, never fully trusted, denied knowledge 
about much of what transpired, relegated to the safe, outer margins o f 
the court’s social organisation. Victims were outsiders. That was a 
most fundamental division.”788
While indispensable in criminal trials, Rock observed that victims are kept at a safe 
distance.
Recent research conducted by Victim Support indicates that rape complainants feel 
this lack o f support keenly.789 One woman interviewed by Victim Support 
complained;
“I felt like everything was working against me- really let down. I felt 
totally abandoned by the whole system. I received no professional help 
from anybody.”790
Another interviewee commented;
“I would have liked to have met the CPS before the case. I was on his 
side but there was no chance to get a rapport. You are anxious anyway 
and it makes it worse that you don’t know who is who.”791
A victim advocate could compensate for the lack of a lawyer-client relationship 
between the prosecutor and the rape complainant. The victim advocate could be an 
ally for the rape complainant and a source o f much needed support. The complainant 
would have the benefit o f seeing that someone was on “her side” and consequently, 
would no longer be so isolated and marginalised within the criminal justice system. 
Legal representation may alleviate feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness.
788 ibid at 179
7S9 Victim Support, Women, Rape and the Criminal Justice System , (1996, London:Victim Support), 
at 55
790 ibid at 35
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“The lawyer-client relationship may be the most important component 
of empowering victims of crime. The adversary system, which is 
dependent upon case presentation by attorneys, does not provide for 
representation for the person who has been injured and is now asked to 
participate in the criminal justice process.”792
7.4.4. In Court
It has been argued that the very presence of a victim advocate in court may discourage 
defence barristers from embarking upon ruthless attacks upon rape complainants 
during cross-examination;
“Very often, the mere presence in court of a lawyer for the complainant 
is sufficient to ensure that she is properly treated.”793
Alternatively, it is argued that the presence o f the victim advocate in court may 
encourage the prosecutor to adopt a less passive stance and to object more frequently 
to improper questioning. Berger claims that the presence o f a representative;
“ ..may subtly spur the prosecutor to put forth his most vigorous 
efforts.”794
However, it is submitted that allowing a victim advocate an active role at trial would 
not necessarily lead to the better treatment of rape complainants in court. The 
preceding chapters have sought to show that the ordeal of rape complainants in court 
is largely attributable to the adversarial structure of criminal trials. It is submitted that 
legal representation for rape complainants fails to address the ultimate source o f the 
complainants treatment in court and consequently, would do little to improve the 
situation o f rape complainants during cross-examination. In Chapter six it was
791 ibid at 25
792 Yaroshefsky, E., (1989), op cit at 145
793 Temkin, J., (1987), op cit at 176
794 Berger, V ., “Man’s Trial, W oman’s Tribulation:Rape Cases in the Courtroom”, [1977] 1 Colum. 
L. Rev. at 86
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claimed that the ruthless and degrading treatment of rape complainants by defence 
barristers is, to a great extent, attributable to the role and nature of cross-examination 
within the adversarial trial. It was argued that the bullying and humiliation of 
complainants is an inevitable consequence of the adversarial fact-finding process. It is 
therefore improbable that the presence o f the victim advocate would inhibit the attacks 
mounted by defence counsel. In fact, the presence o f the victim advocate in court may 
well result in a more vitriolic attack from a defence counsel who perceived the victim 
advocate to represent an unfair advantage to the prosecution.
In this chapter it has been argued that the perceived passivity of prosecution counsel is 
largely due to the role o f the prosecutor in the English adversarial trial. The presence 
o f a victim advocate is therefore, it is submitted, very unlikely to influence the 
performance o f prosecution barristers or encourage barristers to object to improper 
questioning by defence barristers.
This chapter has also sought to demonstrate that the lack of protection afforded rape 
complainants by trial judges is also in part, a structural consequence o f the adversarial 
process. As it would be the task o f trial judges to rule on the validity o f a victim 
advocate’s objections, it is submitted that to side too frequently with the victim 
advocate would carry the same dangers as personal intervention by the trial judge. 
Allowing victim advocates a participatory role in criminal proceedings would not 
guarantee rape complainants fairer treatment in court.
In addition, it is difficult to envisage how a third party could practically be injected 
into the trial process. The adversarial trial is structured as a contest between two sides. 
Were victim advocates to be given an active role in court this would undoubtedly 
upset the balance of the party contest. If victim advocates were to be given so limited 
a role that proceedings were not disrupted, the value of their presence would be 
questionable.
As an alternative to the introduction o f legal representation for rape complainants it 
has been argued that the role of prosecutors could be reformed to more closely 
resemble representatives o f the complainant. Lees advocates a closer relationship 
between the complainant and the prosecutor in line with the United States;
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it is essential for the woman to prepare her case with the 
prosecution counsel as is the case in the San Diego system in the 
United States.”795
Lees also advocates a reformed Crown Prosecution Service which would be 
responsible for informing complainants about the criminal process and providing 
information and support.796 However, reforming the role o f prosecution counsel so 
that the prosecutor may be more accurately described as the complainant’s 
representative would, it is submitted, clearly conflict with the prosecutor’s role in 
England and Wales as a ‘minister of justice’.
7.4.5. Summary
There is a case, it is submitted, for the introduction of legal representation for rape 
complainants and for other vulnerable complainants including children and adults 
with learning difficulties. The victim advocate could assume responsibility for 
providing vulnerable complainants with information about their case and be a source 
o f support in a criminal justice system in which complainants are reportedly shunned 
by other criminal justice professionals. It is however submitted, that allowing victim 
advocates to play an active role in court would not lead to a marked improvement in 
the treatment of rape complainants. The victim advocate would not prevent or 
compensate for the ruthless attacks mounted by defence lawyers during cross- 
examination and neither would the presence o f the victim advocate lead to the greater 
protection o f rape complainants in court.
79' Lees, S., (1993) op cit at 34
796 Lees, S., (1996), op cit at 253
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7.5. Conclusion
Trial judges and prosecution barristers have been criticised for their failure to provide 
rape complainants with adequate protection during cross-examination. They have 
been accused o f indifference and collusion with defence lawyers. It is undoubtedly 
true that there are trial judges and advocates who are ignorant o f the effects o f rape, 
who believe the myths that most allegations of rape are false, that women are 
ultimately responsible for rape and consequently, that complainants in rape cases are 
‘fair game’.797 This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the lack of protection 
afforded women during cross-examination is also largely attributable to the 
adversarial process and the roles prosecuting counsel and trial judges are required to 
play in criminal proceedings. While the adversarial process provides the complainant 
with a formidable opponent in the form of the defence lawyer, it offers her no 
protector, no ally. This chapter has also sought to show that injecting a ‘victim 
advocate’ into the present procedural framework would not necessarily lead to the 
increased protection of rape complainants in court. While cross-examination is 
retained as the mechanism for testing evidence in rape cases, the secondary 
victimisation or ‘judicial rape’ of rape complainants will continue.
797 McEwan, J., (1992), op cit at 103
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Chapter Eight - The Examination of Rape Complainants in 
Dutch Criminal Proceedings
8.1. Introduction
In Chapter six it was argued that cross-examination is an inappropriate device for 
testing the evidence o f rape complainants and that an alternative mechanism should be 
sought. In the Netherlands there is no such thing as cross-examination. As a general 
rule, rape complainants in the Netherlands are examined at a pre-trial hearing by an 
examining magistrate and a defence lawyer. This chapter examines criticism of the 
treatment o f rape complainants at pre-trial hearings. Namely, that rape complainants 
are asked improper and offensive questions by defence lawyers and that they are 
inadequately protected by examining magistrates.798 Comparative literature on Dutch 
criminal procedure contains little discussion of the examination of witnesses in the 
Netherlands. There is also limited empirical research data on the questioning of rape 
complainants at pre-trial hearings. To compensate for this, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with two groups of Dutch practitioners. Firstly, a group o f lawyers 
belonging to all-women law firms who had represented victims o f rape in criminal 
proceedings. These were lawyers who had observed both trials and pre-trial hearings 
in rape cases. The second group of practitioners interviewed were examining- 
magistrates who had conducted pre-trial hearings in rape cases. These two groups 
were chosen, as opposed to public prosecutors or police officers for example, because 
of their first-hand experience of pre-trial hearings. Both groups were in a strong 
position to comment upon the treatment of rape complainants during examination. 
The aim o f the interviews was to provide supporting evidence for claims made by
7IS Van Driem, G., “Waarom slachtoffers van seksueel geweld het strafproces moeten mijden” in 
(ed) Soetenhorst de Savorin Lohmen, Slachtoffers van misdrijven: ontwikkelingen in 
hulpverlening recht en beleid (1989, Arnhem:Gouda Quint)
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feminist lawyers in the Netherlands regarding the treatment of rape complainants at 
pre-trial hearings.
Elsewhere in this study it has been argued that Dutch criminal procedure holds a 
number of significant advantages for vulnerable complainants. An aim o f this chapter 
is to explore whether a shift towards inquisitorial style proceedings would mark a 
departure from gruelling and demeaning interrogation in rape cases.
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8.2. Criticism  o f Defence Lawyers
Van Driem, a lawyer who has attended pre-trial hearings and trials in the capacity o f a 
rape complainant’s legal representative, has described the treatment o f rape 
complainants at pre-trial hearings in terms of secondary victimisation. Van Driem 
claims that women are subjected to a painful and sexist interrogation.799 The group o f 
Dutch lawyers interviewed were also very critical of the treatment o f rape 
complainants at pre-trial hearings. Defence lawyers were the focus of considerable 
criticism. In a number o f ways the criticisms voiced reflected those o f researchers of 
rape trials in England and Wales. Defence lawyers were accused o f blaming women 
for rape, o f suggesting outlandish reasons for a false allegation o f rape and of 
requiring complainants, in certain circumstances, to provide irrelevant details o f a past 
sexual relationship.
8.2.1. Victim-Blaming
Van Driem claims that victim-blaming is common place in rape cases in the 
Netherlands.
“It is almost impossible for the lawyer o f a suspect of sexual violence 
to defend his client without simultaneously laying blame on the 
behaviour o f the victim.”800
According to Van Driem, in rape cases, defence lawyers present their client as the true 
victim and question the propriety of a complainant’s behaviour prior to an alleged 
rape. Typically, rape complainants are required to account for their ‘risky’ conduct. 
Among the questions routinely put to complainants in rape cases Van Driem cites;
7QI’ Van Driem, G., (1989), op cit at 53
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“Why did you let your ex-boyfriend in and offer him a cup of
coffee.?”801
Leuw claims that a common defence strategy in rape cases involves the defendant 
blaming the woman.802 The defendant excuses his actions, and thereby seeks to escape 
criminal sanction, by ascribing responsibility for what took place to the 
complainant.803
The interviewees also claimed that defence lawyers frequently suggest that a woman 
has acted with implausible naivety or foolishness when, for example, she invited a 
male acquaintance into her home or accepted a lift. In Chapter six, it was explained 
that the ‘culpability’ o f the victim plays an important role in rape trials in England and 
Wales. Women are blamed for creating opportunities assailants to rape them or for 
failing to take evasive action. According to the lawyers interviewed, the 'culpability’ 
o f a complainant is thoroughly explored in at pre-trial hearings in rape cases. The 
interviewees also explained that suggestions that a complainant precipitated or in 
some way ‘contributed to’ her assault can be devastating for victims.
According to the interviewees, complainants in rape cases are also blamed for not 
resisting enough. Victims o f rape, the lawyers explained, are expected to vigorously 
resist their attackers and have sustained physical injuries in the process. Women, it 
was alleged, are rarely believed when there is little evidence of physical injury. Leuw 
claims that it is common for defendants in rape cases to present what took place as an 
‘unfortunate misunderstanding’.804 According to the interviewees, defence lawyers 
blame women for such ‘misunderstandings’. Complainants are asked for example, 
whether they invited the advances of a defendant, whether they were unequivocal in 
their refusal, whether it is possible that a defendant misinterpreted their protestations 
or that their behaviour was misleading. Again, a woman’s behaviour is scrutinised for 
culpability. Doomen provides an example of questions typically put to complainants;
801 ibid
802
800 ibid
Leuw, E., “De Behandlung van Verkrachtinszaken voor de Rechtbank”, (1985) TvCr. at 147
804 ibid
803 ibid
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“..did you go out together, did you kiss him, at what moment and how 
did you make it clear that his advances were not welcome, how did you 
behave during the rape, did you continue to resist, did he hit you, did 
he threaten you, why did you submit, what happened after the rape.”805
According to the lawyers interviewed, a woman will also find the ‘appropriateness’ of 
her behaviour after an alleged rape questioned. Complainants will be asked why they 
did not report an alleged sexual assault immediately. Defence lawyers will argue that 
a time lapse is indicative of fabrication, claiming that a ‘genuine rape victim’ would 
have made a prompt report. As discussed in Chapter six, research has demonstrated 
that the reactions o f women both during and after rape vary. There is no typical 
response to rape.
8.2.2. Why Women Lie About Rape
Van Driem claims that defence lawyers in rape cases routinely claim that their client 
is the victim of a mendacious, vindictive or deluded woman.806 The lawyers 
interviewed were also critical of the likely motivations suggested by defence lawyers 
for an allegation of rape. According to the interviewees, complainants in rape cases 
are accused of being malicious, jealous and unstable. Other reasons offered by defence 
lawyers in rape cases observed by the lawyers interviewed included blackmail, 
fantasy, and guilt. The claims of the Dutch lawyers interviewed suggest that rape 
complainants in the Netherlands are accused of lying about rape for reasons as 
outlandish and out-dated as those introduced in rape trials in England and Wales.
8.2.3. Irrelevant Sexual Details
Where a complainant has had a sexual relationship with the defendant the 
interviewees claimed, she will often be asked to give unnecessary sexual details. 
According to the interviewees, women they had represented found giving intimate
805 Doomen, J., Heb Je Soms Aanleiding Gegeven, Handeleiding voor Slachtoffers van Verkrachting 
bij de Confrontie met Politie en Justitie, (1978, Amsterdam), at 39
so<’ Van Driem, G., (1989), op cit at 54
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details about a previous sexual relationship very distressing. Leuw states that giving 
evidence in a rape case will inevitably be a painful experience as a complainant will 
have to talk about explicit details.807 However, the interviewees claimed that defence 
lawyers routinely ask intrusive and unnecessary questions about a complainant’s 
sexual relationship with a defendant.
8.2.4. Sexual History Evidence
The lawyers interviewed were asked whether complainants in rape cases were 
questioned about their sexual history or their reputations at pre-trial hearings. In 
marked contrast to the experience of rape complainants in England and Wales, the 
interviewees reported that a woman’s sexual character does not play an important role 
in rape cases. The appearance of a complainant, her clothes, her make-up, it was 
claimed, were matters not generally explored. The number of sexual partners a woman 
has had would also not generally be investigated. It was explained that the sexual 
character o f a rape complainant was considered more relevant five years ago when 
rape complainants were asked questions about their sexual history and their 
appearance at the time o f an alleged sexual assault.
8.2.5. Lifestyle
The interviewees were also asked whether the lifestyle of a complainant played an 
important role in rape cases. Again, in contrast to the experience of rape complainants 
in England and Wales, the interviewees claimed that the ‘respectability’ o f a 
complainant was generally not explored at pre-trial hearings. In the same way that the 
sexual character o f complainants had, according to the interviewees, become less 
significant over the last five years, so too it was claimed, had the importance attached 
to the ‘respectability’ o f complainants. Research into the conduct of rape trials in 
England and Wales has shown that rape complainants are frequently questioned for
807 Leuw, E., (1985), op cit at 139
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example, about their financial situation, their use o f drugs and alcohol. According to 
the interviewees, rape complainants are generally not asked about such matters at pre­
trial hearings.
8.2.6. Summary
The criticisms of the Dutch lawyers interviewed parallel, in many ways, those raised 
by researchers o f rape trials in England and Wales and provide support for claims 
made by Van Driem. Defence lawyers are criticised for being insensitive in their 
handling o f rape cases, they are accused of asking irrelevant and offensive questions. 
Defence lawyers are also criticised for invoking stereotypes of appropriate female 
behaviour and for blaming women for rape. Interviews with Dutch lawyers also 
suggest important differences between the questioning of rape complainants in 
England and Wales and the Netherlands. Namely, that rape complainants in the 
Netherlands are generally no longer subjected to ruthless character assassinations 
based upon their sexual history and personal lives.
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8.3. R esponse o f Exam ining M agistrates
The examining-magistrates interviewed were asked to respond to the criticisms 
outlined above. The examining-magistrates rejected the claim that rape complainants 
are victimised at pre-trial hearings and that complainants are subjected to painful and 
sexist interrogations. One examining-magistrate accepted that the questioning of 
complainants at pre-trial hearings could be ‘tough’ to compensate for the fact that rape 
complainants were generally not examined in court. The same examining-magistrate 
however maintained that the majority o f defence lawyers are considerate in the way 
they ask questions in rape cases;
“Lawyers try to find a way between defending their client and not
hurting the feelings of the victim.”
When asked if it was common for defence lawyers to criticise the behaviour of rape 
complainants prior to an alleged rape, the majority accepted that defence lawyers do 
suggest that complainants in rape cases have acted foolishly or recklessly. One 
examining magistrate declared however, that a defence lawyer “would not dare” 
suggest that a victim deserved or had asked to be raped while she was presiding over 
proceedings. While conceding that defence lawyers often seek to ascribe 
responsibility to complainants, the examining magistrates were keen to stress that 
they, and the majority of their colleagues, did not engage in ‘victim blaming’. The 
examining magistrates maintained that such attitudes were no longer expressed. One 
interviewee stressed that this was also true of his older, male colleagues.
It was also accepted that defence lawyers accuse women o f lying about rape for many 
reasons including jealousy, fantasy, spite, and fear of parental disapproval. Where a 
defence lawyer made such an accusation, it was explained, a complainant would 
generally be questioned about it. The examining magistrates rejected any suggestion 
however, that allegations o f rape are generally met with scepticism.
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With regard to the sexual character o f rape complainants, the examining magistrates 
confirmed the situation described by the lawyers interviewed. It was claimed that a 
complainant’s sexual reputation or sexual history was regarded as largely irrelevant. 
The sexual reputation of a complainant it was maintained, no longer played a 
significant role in rape cases. Typical responses from examining magistrates included;
“In my opinion there is no difference when the victim is a prostitute or 
a 16 year old virgin.”
“A woman can have the sex life that she wants, she is still entitled to 
say no.”
The examining magistrates also supported the claim that a complainant’s lifestyle and 
her ‘respectability’ were generally not the focus of defence questioning in rape cases. 
The examining magistrates explained that a complainant’s lifestyle, like her sexual 
history, would be considered largely irrelevant. It was conceded that the respectability 
of complainants may have been considered pertinent five years ago but attitudes had 
changed and this was no longer the case.
“Nowadays the lifestyle o f the complainant does not play an important 
role.”
The examining magistrates explained that they would be far more concerned with the 
facts surrounding an alleged rape than with the general character and lifestyle o f a 
complainant. More attention, it was claimed, would be paid to any inconsistencies 
between a complainant’s police statement and her evidence at the pre-trial hearing and 
any weaknesses in her story.
8.3.1. Summary
Generally, the examining magistrates interviewed rejected the idea that rape 
complainants are treated unfairly at pre-trial hearings or are subjected to improper 
questioning by defence lawyers. The examining magistrates did however confirm that
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the importance attached to the sexual history or ‘respectability’ of complainants in 
rape cases had diminished in recent years.
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8.4. L im itations placed upon Q uestioning
The ineffectiveness o f the limitations placed upon cross-examination by defence 
lawyers in England and Wales was examined in Chapters six and seven. In Dutch 
criminal proceedings there are few rules regarding the examination of witnesses. 
There are no rules specifically governing the questioning o f rape complainants. There 
is for example, no equivalent of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 section 2 
regulating the introduction of sexual history evidence.
“There is no special regulation for victims of rape in the black letter
law.”808
The examining magistrates interviewed explained that the only limits placed upon the 
questioning o f rape complainants at pre-trial hearings are those imposed by examining 
magistrates. It is the examining magistrate that conducts the hearing and has the 
power to disallow questions that are deemed irrelevant or improper. No similar 
restraints are imposed upon examining magistrates. The examining magistrate 
therefore plays a decisive role in the questioning of rape complainants.
Van Driem claims that examining magistrates routinely fail to object to the improper 
interrogation of rape complainants by defence lawyers.809 The reason offered by Van 
Driem for the failure of examining magistrates to object to improper lines of 
questioning is largely inexperience. According to Van Driem, the examining 
magistrates who preside at pre-trial hearings are often young and inexperienced and 
consequently do not appreciate the traumatic effects of rape on victims and the need to 
protect women from unnecessary and distressing questioning;
808 Nijboer, J.F., “Protection o f  Victims in Rape and Sexual Abuse Cases in the Netherlands”, in (ed) 
Nijboer, J.F., Proof and Criminal Justice Systems, (1995, Frankfurt:Peter Lang), at 116
80‘’ Van Driem, G., (1989), op cit at 53
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“Most examining magistrates have absolutely no experience o f hearing 
victims o f sexual violence.”810
In this section the views o f both groups of practitioners as to the effectiveness o f the 
limitations placed upon the questioning o f rape complainants at pre-trial hearings are 
discussed.
8.4.1. Criticism of Examining Magistrates
The lawyers interviewed claimed that they had attended pre-trial hearings where 
examining magistrates had not intervened to protect a complainant from irrelevant and 
offensive questioning. They also cited ignorance o f the impact of rape on victims as 
underlying the failure o f examining magistrates to intervene. It was conceded that 
there are some examining magistrates who are sympathetic to the plight of rape 
complainants and who do object to defence questions. However, the interviewees 
maintained that in their experience, many examining magistrates do not seek to 
control or regulate defence questioning o f rape complainants. The level of protection 
afforded complainants, it was claimed, ultimately depends upon the individual 
examining magistrate.
“Different judges have different criteria for what is improper.”
The failure of examining magistrates to protect rape complainants from improper 
questioning, it was argued, leaves women very vulnerable. In the absence of empirical 
research in this area it is impossible to identify clearly the extent of the problem. I he 
interviews with Dutch practitioners provide some support for the claims made by Van 
Driem and would indicate that at least some examining magistrates are failing to 
protect rape complainants at pre-trial hearings.
810 ibid
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8.4.2. Criticism of Trial Judges
The lawyers interviewed also directed criticism at trial judges. Trial judges, the 
interviewees claimed, fail to object to the disparaging comments and unsubstantiated 
accusations made by defendants in rape trials. In Dutch criminal trials, defendants are 
free to address the court.811 The interviewees claimed that in rape cases, defendants 
use this opportunity to make insulting and unfounded remarks about complainants.812 
As discussed in Chapter three, rape complainants are rarely examined in court. 
According to the lawyers interviewed, it is however, common for women, provided 
they have been informed of the date of the trial, to attend court and observe 
proceedings from the public gallery. The interviewees claimed that a source of 
frustration and distress for rape complainants within Dutch criminal proceedings, is 
the fact that they are given no opportunity to rebut or answer the improper 
insinuations and observations made by defendants in court and the fact that trial 
judges do not prevent defendants making such denigrating comments. Again, it is 
impossible to draw firm conclusions as to the extent of this problem.
8.4.3. Views ofExamining Magistrates
The examining magistrates interviewed claimed that they saw themselves as under a 
positive duty to protect vulnerable complainants from improper questioning. One 
examining magistrate stated;
“It is part of the role of the Rechter-Commissaris to protect witnesses.”
Commenting on the questioning o f rape complainants another examining magistrate 
stated;
“There are no legal rules but there are ethical rules.”
8,1 See Chapter One
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The majority o f examining magistrates interviewed, claimed that they would, and 
regularly did, object to questions asked by defence lawyers and inform complainants 
that they were not obliged to answer improper questions. When asked in what 
circumstances they would intervene typical responses included;
“When a lawyer goes too far.”
“If a defence lawyer is too rude.”
One examining magistrate interviewed however explained that he rarely objects to 
defence questions on the grounds that arguing with a defence lawyer “takes up too 
much time”. The same examining magistrate added that if  the questions were 
“especially hurtful” or “very distressing” and also irrelevant, he would inform the 
complainant that she need not answer those questions. One examining magistrate 
admitted that he would be more protective o f a rape complainant if  she was young and 
visibly distressed and stated;
“I like to think of myself as a person who takes care of witnesses.”
All the examining magistrates claimed to be particularly protective of young 
complainants. The majority of the examining magistrates interviewed stressed that 
they appreciated that women who had been raped had suffered a traumatic experience 
and this knowledge shaped their handling o f pre-trial hearings. It was explained that 
the primary consideration however, would be the relevance of the question. It was 
explained that if an examining magistrate deems defence questioning to be irrelevant 
he or she will intervene or require the defence lawyer to explain the relevance of a 
specific question. It was accepted that different examining magistrates would have 
differing views as to what constituted relevant questioning and in turn, that the 
protection afforded rape complainants could vary considerably;
“Lawyers and judges are human and they do not all treat rape 
complainants in the same way.”
812 See also Doomen, J., (1978), op cit at 41
310
However, all the examining magistrates interviewed claimed that the introduction of 
further limitations upon the questioning of rape complainants would be unnecessary. 
It was claimed that examining magistrates exercising their discretion constituted a 
sufficient safeguard.
With regard to comments made by defendants in court, the examining magistrates 
claimed that trial judges are particularly vigilant in rape cases and would object to 
improper and offensive remarks and accusations made by a defendant. Although, 
again it was it accepted that this would depend on the individual trial judge.
8.4.4. Summary
Interviews with Dutch practitioners suggest that judicial discretion does not prove to 
be an effective limitation upon the questioning of rape complainants in all cases. The 
lawyers interviewed attributed this largely to the inexperience and indifference of 
many examining magistrates. In Chapter seven, it was argued that the documented 
failure of trial judges and prosecution barristers to intervene effectively during cross- 
examination in rape trials may not simply be attributed to indifference to the plight of 
rape complainants or to social prejudices. It was argued that the limited protection 
afforded vulnerable complainants in criminal trials in England and Wales is in part, a 
structural consequence of the adversarial process. The section below explores whether 
examining-magistrates in the Netherlands are subject to similar structural constraints.
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8.5. Structural C onstraints?
In Chapter seven it was argued that the duty of trial judges to protect witnesses from 
improper questioning conflicts with the role o f the trial judge within adversarial 
proceedings as a neutral umpire. Firstly, it was claimed that the trial judge risks his 
efforts to protect a vulnerable complainant being interpreted as a departure from 
impartiality. If, on appeal, it is decided that the jury were unduly influenced by the 
actions o f a trial judge a conviction could be found unsafe. Secondly, it was argued 
that the trial judge must be wary that his interventions do not in any way compromise 
the ability o f the defence barrister to conduct his or her case. A conviction may be 
overturned where it is considered that a trial judge unduly interfered with counsel’s 
presentation o f the evidence.
The role of the Dutch examining magistrate may be clearly distinguished from that of 
the English trial judge. The role of the examining magistrate is not that of umpire, he 
or she is an active investigator. As stated in Chapter one, the role of the examining 
magistrate is to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation and to ensure that the 
dossier is a legally competent basis for judgment at trial. Whereas the English trial 
judge is largely confined to the evidence presented by the parties, the examining 
magistrate is under a duty to gather relevant evidence and to play a dominant role in 
proceedings. The examining magistrate for example, will be the primary interrogator 
o f witnesses. While the examining magistrate is expected to be impartial, he or she is 
not required to be passive. In the Netherlands, great faith is placed in the impartiality 
o f examining magistrates despite their active, inquiring role. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that intervention by an examining magistrate on behalf of a vulnerable complainant 
would be perceived as a threat to impartiality in the Netherlands.
In England and Wales, the defence barrister is charged with presenting the case for the 
defence. It is accepted that defence counsel should be allowed to tell his or her story 
without unnecessary interference and this includes intervention from the bench. In the 
Netherlands, the defence lawyer is not a storyteller. It is not the role o f the defence
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lawyer to present the evidence for the defence. In the Netherlands evidence is not 
presented as such. It is submitted therefore, that the examining magistrate who objects 
to defence questioning may not be deemed to have compromised the ability o f the 
defence lawyer to present his or her case.
In Chapter seven, it was argued that the adversarial process ill-equips trial judges for 
protecting complainants from irrelevant and offensive questioning. The 
unpreparedness o f the trial judge, it was claimed, necessarily limits the scope for 
effective intervention. The examining magistrate in the Netherlands will have had 
access to the police file containing the statements of the complainant, the defendant 
and other witnesses. The examining magistrate is therefore, it is submitted, in a 
stronger position to distinguish between lines of questioning relevant to the defence 
case and irrelevant and improper questioning.
In Chapter seven the perceived failure of prosecution counsel to object to offensive 
and irrelevant defence questions in rape cases was also examined. It was argued that 
prosecution barristers fail to intervene on behalf o f complainants in part, on strategic 
grounds. It was claimed that the prosecutor may, for example, allow a particularly 
ruthless attack upon a complainant in the belief that it may enlist the sympathy o f a 
jury. In addition, it was claimed that prosecution counsel may refrain from 
intervention for fear of alienating the jury themselves by appearing to compromise the 
ability o f the defence barrister to present his case. As a impartial investigator 
conducting an official investigation, the examining magistrate clearly secures no 
tactical advantage from non-intervention.
8.5.1. Summary
In Chapter seven it was argued that there is a conflict, a tension, between the role of 
the English trial judge to protect witnesses from improper questioning and the trial 
judge’s role in adversarial proceedings. A similar argument was advanced with regard 
to prosecution counsel. In the Netherlands there does not appear to be a conflict 
between the duty of examining magistrates to protect witnesses and their duty to 
conduct a thorough and impartial inquiry. It would appear that the failure o f some
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examining magistrates to protect rape complainants during defence questioning may 
not be attributed to structural constraints within the Dutch fact-finding process. In the 
absence of perceptible structural constraints, it is submitted that the answer must lie in 
the attitudes and beliefs o f individual examining magistrates. Interviews with 
examining magistrates provided some support for this claim. One examining 
magistrate interviewed claimed not to intervene on behalf of complainants as it 
‘wasted time’. All claimed that the primary consideration would be the relevance of 
defence questioning. There is no legal test for relevance, it is a subjective concept. In 
deciding the relevance of evidence, the examining magistrate will draw upon his or 
her personal experiences and beliefs. When deciding in a rape case whether a line of 
questioning is irrelevant or improper, the examining magistrate will draw upon his or 
her understanding of the nature o f rape. It is therefore unsurprising that the Dutch 
lawyers interviewed claimed that the protection afforded rape complainants at pre-trial 
hearings could vary considerably depending on the examining magistrate in question.
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8.6. C alls for Reform
Both groups of practitioners were asked what they believed could be done to improve 
the position o f rape complainants within Dutch criminal proceedings. The 
recommendations of both groups are discussed below.
8.6.1. Recommendations of Dutch Lawyers
Among the recommendations advocated by the group of Dutch lawyers interviewed, 
was the introduction of a procedure whereby a defence lawyer would be required to 
submit his or her questions to the examining magistrate prior to a pre-trial hearing. 
The examining magistrate would then rule on the acceptability of defence questions. 
W ithin present procedure, an examining magistrate may only advise a rape 
complainant that she is not obliged to answer a question. The interviewees argued that 
often the asking o f insulting and offensive questions itself causes complainants 
considerable distress. Compulsory training for examining magistrates was also 
recommended, as well as training courses for lawyers to raise awareness of the effects 
of rape and to encourage defence lawyers to employ greater sensitivity in their 
questioning of rape complainants.
The need for legal representation for all rape complainants was also strongly 
advanced. The lawyers interviewed belonged to law firms who offered women in rape 
cases legal representation. The interviewees explained that only a small minority of 
rape complainants had such representation as women were represented at their own 
cost. The interviewees were very critical o f the fact that a victim’s legal representative 
has no legal right to attend either a pre-trial hearing or a trial. It was explained that 
whether to permit the presence of victim’s lawyer is a matter o f discretion for 
examining magistrates or trial judges. While a victim’s lawyer may attend a trial as an 
ordinary member o f the public, a victim’s legal representative may be excluded from 
the pre-trial hearing. According to the interviewees, a defence lawyer will be asked by 
the examining magistrate whether he or she has any objections to the presence o f the
315
complainant’s lawyer and the wishes o f the defence lawyer will prevail. According to 
Van Driem, the policy o f examining magistrates allowing the legal representatives of 
victims to attend pre-trial hearings varies between districts. Van Driem reports that in 
some districts victims’ lawyers are welcomed and in others they are excluded, there is 
no national policy .813
The lawyers interviewed were also very critical of the very narrow role ‘victim 
lawyers’ are permitted to play in Dutch criminal proceedings. The practitioners 
criticised the fact that even where a complainant’s lawyer is permitted to attend either 
a pre-trial hearing or a criminal trial, she has no official status within Dutch criminal 
proceedings. A victim’s legal representative, it was explained, may not intervene in 
the legal process in any way. The victim’s lawyer may not put questions to the 
defendant, the complainant, or any other witness and may not call witnesses. The 
complainant’s lawyer may not even object to what she perceives to be improper and 
offensive questioning. The interviewees regarded the exclusion of a victim’s legal 
representative as indefensible. It was argued that victims’ legal representatives should 
be granted a wider role and permitted to participate fully in the criminal process. 
Primarily, it was argued, a victim’s lawyer should be entitled to object to improper 
questioning at pre-trial hearings. Van Driem also advances this argument;
“The victim’s lawyer should have the opportunity to disallow all the 
improper questions o f the examining magistrate and the defence 
lawyer.”814
It was also argued that a victim’s lawyer should also be allowed to call and examine 
witnesses at pre-trial hearings. The interviewees also advocated a wider role for 
victims’ lawyers in court. It was argued that the victim’s lawyer should again be 
entitled to object to the offensive remarks and insinuations made by defendants and be 
entitled to call and examine witnesses on behalf o f the complainant.
8,3 Van Driem, G., (1989), op cit at 52
814 ibid at 53
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8.6.2. Recommendations of Examining Magistrates
When asked what they believed could be done to improve the position o f rape 
complainants within Dutch criminal proceedings the examining magistrates all 
claimed that no changes were necessary. It was argued that rape complainants did not 
require any further protection or support. One examining magistrate stated;
“Nowadays, we are doing the maximum we can do. Others may say 
that this is ridiculous but we have a good system. It can’t be done any 
better.”
All the examining magistrates interviewed opposed the idea o f an increased role for 
victim advocates. The examining magistrates argued that there was no role for a 
victim lawyer within criminal proceedings. It was frequently stated that it was the 
duty o f examining magistrates and trial judges to protect complainants and therefore 
there was no need for legal representation. One examining magistrate interviewed 
claimed;
“The way o f questioning her just by me and the defending lawyer may 
be very stressful but not so stressful that she needs a lawyer.”
All the examining magistrates interviewed expressed the belief that an enhanced role 
for complainants’ lawyers would result in adverse interference in the criminal process. 
One examining magistrate argued that as a complainant is not the one on trial she has 
no need for legal advice. One examining magistrate was particularly scornful o f the 
lawyers acting for rape complainants who he had encountered. He argued that lawyers 
needs to retain a degree o f objectivity and detachment from their clients and that a 
lawyer should never seek to become the ‘friend’ of a client. In this respect, the 
examining magistrate argued, these lawyers are “bad lawyers”.
“They become too attached to their clients and as a result, are 
invariably prejudiced.”
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A further argument against legal representation for rape complainants put forward by 
the examining magistrates, was that it would lead to calls by complainants o f other 
offences for the same treatment. The practitioners claimed that it would be difficult to 
justify special treatment for victims o f rape. Generally, the examining magistrates 
interviewed were hostile towards legal representation for rape complainants. Victim 
lawyers were viewed as unnecessary and potentially disruptive influences upon 
criminal proceedings. The practitioners rejected the need for reform favouring instead 
retention o f the present system.
The examining magistrates explained that in the Netherlands it is possible for a 
support person, hulpverlener, to accompany a complainant at a pre-trial hearing. This 
could be a friend or a volunteer of a victim support organisation. Again, whether a 
support person is permitted to attend a pre-trial hearing is a matter for the examining 
magistrate. It was also emphasised that a support person attends only to provide moral 
support. As one examining magistrate explained, to “hold her hand”. The examining 
magistrates interviewed claimed that some of their colleagues were in favour of 
support persons accompanying complainants while others firmly opposed the practice. 
One examining magistrate interviewed claimed that she never allowed support 
persons to attend pre-trial hearings. She explained that she believed that complainants 
were less inclined to tell the truth when a support person was present. One examining 
magistrate claimed that in general, he was quite willing for a support person to be 
present but that he would never allow police officers to attend in this capacity. The 
examining magistrate explained that it was possible for a bond to form between a 
police officer and a complainant and a complainant may consequently feel less 
inclined to depart from her original statement in his or her presence.
8.6.3. Summary
The two groups o f Dutch practitioners clearly had very different views on the need to 
improve the treatment o f rape complainants at pre-trial hearings. The examining 
magistrates advocating no change and the lawyers recommending a series o f reforms.
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The reforms recommended by the Dutch lawyers such as training for examining 
magistrates and lawyers and the introduction o f legal representation for rape 
complainants, are recommendations that have been made by researchers in England 
and Wales. In Chapter seven it was argued that training would have a minimal impact 
on the treatment of rape complainants in court in England and Wales. It was argued 
that although the attitudes o f key criminal justice professionals played a role in the 
secondary victimisation of rape complainants, the trial process itself played a major 
part and therefore changing attitudes would not significantly improve the treatment of 
rape complainants. It is submitted, that within the framework o f Dutch criminal 
proceedings, training aimed at raising the awareness of criminal justice professional to 
the reality o f rape, may go some way to improve the treatment of rape complainants in 
the Netherlands.
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8.7. Discussion
The limited Dutch literature supported by interviews with Dutch practitioners suggest 
both important similarities and marked differences in the treatment o f rape 
complainants in England and Wales and the Netherlands. In both countries it would 
appear that women find the ‘appropriateness’ or propriety o f their behaviour before, 
during and after an alleged rape questioned. For example, women are called to 
account for their ‘risky’ or imprudent behaviour. They are asked to explain why they 
were out alone at night or why they accepted a lift from a stranger. It was agreed 
however by both groups of practitioners interviewed that a complainant’s sexual 
character and her ‘respectability’ generally no longer played an important role in rape 
cases in the Netherlands. This is in marked contrast to the experience o f rape 
complainants in England and Wales, where women continue to be subjected to a 
demeaning character assassinations based upon their sexual history and lifestyles. In 
this section possible explanations for both these differences and similarities are 
explored.
8.7.1. Cultural Differences
A possible explanation for the reported lack of importance attached to sexual history 
evidence and the ‘respectability’ o f complainants in rape cases in the Netherlands may 
lie in Dutch culture. When asked why the sexual character o f rape complainants was 
not generally explored at pre-trial hearings a number o f practitioners cited the liberal 
attitude o f Dutch society towards sexual conduct. Nijboer supports this view;
“There are no obstacles when presenting the victim’s prior sexual 
conduct. One should consider this against the background o f a society 
that does not have a lot o f trouble with rather “liberal” sexual 
behaviour in general.”815
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One examining magistrate explained that the women’s movement in the Netherlands 
had altered common perceptions about rape. All the examining magistrates 
interviewed appeared eager to demonstrate that they belonged to a generation who no 
longer ascribed to sexist and old fashioned assumptions about women and rape. 
Tolerance o f most lifestyles within Dutch society was also cited by a number of 
interviewees as the reason why the personal lives of complainants were generally not 
explored in rape cases.
8.7.2. Judge vs. Jury
A further possible explanation offered by the examining magistrates interviewed for 
the lack o f importance attached to sexual history evidence was the absence o f a jury in 
Dutch criminal trials. A number o f practitioners expressed the belief that jurors were 
far more likely to be influenced for example, by sexual history evidence than career 
judges. Defence lawyers are aware, it was claimed, that trial judges are not impressed 
by such evidence and consequently do not seek to introduce it. The claim that trial 
judges are less likely to be swayed by sexual history evidence would undoubtedly be 
rejected by researchers who have reported how trial judges allow such evidence to be 
routinely introduced in rape trials in England and Wales. In addition, it has been 
claimed that rape complainants in England and Wales have suffered cross- 
examination similar to that endured in court at committal proceedings which are held 
before a magistrate and not a jury. The Runciman Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice expressed concern for the treatment of complainants at committal proceedings 
in its Report.816 One rape victim interviewed for a Victim Support study, described her 
experience o f committal proceedings;
“Nothing till the day I die can be worse than the committal hearing- it 
was worse than the crime. When I was being questioned the defendant 
began to talk as well. There was no control. The CPS did nothing.
They sat and let me and my life be ripped to pieces for hours and 
hours.”
815 Nijboer, J.F., (1995), op cit at 123
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As stated in Chapter six, given the absence o f research into jury decision making in 
rape trials, it is impossible to draw conclusions as to the role played by the jury 
system in the treatment of rape complainants in England and Wales.
8.7.3. Contest vs. Inquiry
The possibility that explanations may also lie in the divergent structure, and 
evidentiary safeguards o f English and Dutch criminal procedure is discussed in this 
section.
In Chapter six, it was argued that the degrading treatment of rape complainants during 
cross-examination may, in part, be attributed to the form in which evidence is 
presented in adversarial proceedings; courtroom stories. The adversarial trial is 
structured as a contest. Evidence is presented in the form of conflicting stories told by 
advocates in court. The role of the advocates is to construct and present polarised 
versions o f events. As discussed in Chapter four, the adversarial trial process requires 
black and white interpretations o f the evidence. The role of the defence lawyer is to 
provide a rival interpretation of events to that presented by the prosecutor. As stated in 
Chapter six, the story told by the defence will necessarily include an alternative 
portrayal o f the complainant; a disparaging portrayal. It is the role of the defence 
lawyer in the adversarial trial is to vilify the victim. In constructing his portrait of the 
complainant the defence barrister is largely free to examine a complainant’s private 
life and to dig up incidents from her past. The complainant’s sexual history and 
lifestyle simply become part o f the defence’s story. As discussed in Chapter six, 
victims of sexual violence are particularly vulnerable in this storytelling arena. In rape 
cases defence barristers have a wealth of cultural myths and stereotypes upon which to 
draw. The presentation of evidence in the form of competing stories allows defence 
advocates to present the court with a demeaning and humiliating portrayal of the
816 Home Office, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report, (1993, London:HMSO), at para. 24
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complainant. It also means that the character o f complainants will always play a major 
role in criminal trials.
In the Netherlands, criminal proceedings are structured not as a contest waged in court 
but rather as an official inquiry. Evidence is presented not in the form o f courtroom 
stories constructed and told by advocates but in the form of written statements 
contained in the dossier. In the Netherlands the advocates are not charged with the 
presentation o f evidence, they are not storytellers; it is the dossier that tells the story. 
The defence lawyer is not charged with presenting a rival interpretation o f events. 
More importantly, the defence lawyer is not charged with presenting a disparaging, 
one-sided portrayal of the complainant. The defence lawyer is therefore not compelled 
to examine a complainant’s general character, to explore her private life for facts 
which may be used to support a such a portrait. This does not mean that defence 
lawyers in the Netherlands will not question a complainant about her private life in 
order to cast doubt upon her evidence but only that the defence lawyer in the 
Netherlands is not compelled to do so.
An insistence upon direct oral evidence is a defining characteristic of the adversarial 
process. Oral testimony in court is believed to be a superior form of evidence. As 
discussed in Chapter one, one reason for this is the assumption that the demeanour of 
a witness in court provides valuable clues as to the sincerity o f the witness. In 
adversarial proceedings great significance is attached to the oral performance of 
witnesses in court. In fact, the complainant, defendant, witnesses, the trial judge and 
the advocates are all performers in the adversarial trial with the jury their audience. 
Knowing that a flustered, disconcerted witness is likely to appear less credible to a 
jury, defence barristers employ an array o f tactics during cross-examination designed 
to undermine the oral performance o f a complainant in court. As discussed in Chapter 
six, defence advocates in adversarial proceedings have much to gain from 
embarrassing, confusing and intimidating a complainant. In England and Wales, 
complainants are asked degrading and humiliating questions that are aimed not at 
introducing factual evidence but at shaking their performance.
323
In the Netherlands, live testimony in court is replaced by written evidence. The 
observation o f witness demeanour is not accorded much importance within the Dutch 
fact-finding process. Witnesses are generally questioned pre-trial, back-stage. In the 
Netherlands great faith is placed in the ability of trial judges to evaluate evidence and 
in most criminal cases the trial judges will reach a verdict having never seen the 
complainant.
“The Dutch system relies on the skill and competence of the 
professional judge to decide on the basis o f cold files.”817
Rape complainants in the Netherlands are not required to perform. Consequently, 
defence lawyers have little to gain by asking questions designed simply to embarrass, 
intimidate or antagonise a complainant. Within Dutch criminal proceedings witnesses 
are not set up as targets to be shot down by opposing advocates. Complainants in the 
Netherlands are the focus o f an inquiry not a battle played out on stage. The weapons 
o f adversary advocacy are therefore not adopted by Dutch defence lawyers.
In Chapter six it was argued that the ruthlessness of cross-examination is, in part, 
attributable to the combativeness and competitiveness of the adversarial trial. It was 
claimed that advocates are required to be belligerent in their cross-examination of 
witnesses and to be indifferent to the impact of cross-examination upon a vulnerable 
complainant. Cross-examination is wielded as a weapon in the battle between 
advocates and opposing witnesses. The adversarial trial is also a competitive arena. 
An environment in which advocates will attempt to push the boundaries during their 
questioning of complainants, to do all they can ‘get away with’. Dutch criminal 
proceedings lack both the combativeness and competitiveness of adversarial 
proceedings. Dutch proceedings are structured as an inquiry and not a conflict. In 
place o f confrontation and partisanship, Dutch criminal procedure relies upon co­
operation and relationships o f trust between officials. It would be inappropriate to
817 Beijer, A., Cobley, C., Klip, A., “Witness Evidence, Article 6 o f  the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Principle o f  Open Justice”, in (eds) Harding, C., Fennell, P., Jorg, N .,
Swart, B., Criminal Justice in Europe A Comparative Study, (1995, Oxford:Clarendon Press), at 
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refer to any stage of Dutch criminal proceedings as a fight or a battle or to advocates 
as gladiators or combatants. In the context o f Dutch criminal procedure it is also 
inappropriate to speak in terms o f ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. The attendant pressures of 
the adversarial contest or conflict which compel defence advocates to mount ruthless 
and aggressive attacks upon vulnerable complainants are therefore not a feature of 
Dutch criminal proceedings.
8.7.4. Cultural Myths
The limited Dutch literature, supported by interviews with Dutch practitioners, 
suggest that, as in England and Wales, attention often focuses on the behaviour o f the 
complainant in rape cases in the Netherlands. It would appear that the concept o f the 
‘ideal rape’ which prescribes the ‘appropriate’ behaviour of women before, during and 
after rape plays an important role in rape cases in the Netherlands and so too a number 
o f the myths which surround rape. As in England and Wales, the complainant in the 
Netherlands may find her conduct before an alleged rape scrutinised. As stated above, 
she may be asked why she invited an acquaintance into her home or why she was out 
alone at night. Such questioning, it is submitted, draws upon the pervasive myth that 
women are ultimately to blame for rape and the myth that women either provoke rape 
through their inappropriate conduct or through failing to avoid rape by taking evasive 
action. Responsibility for rape is effectively shifted to women. Until responsibility for 
rape is shifted to men, it is submitted, the ‘culpability’ o f the victim of sexual violence 
will continue to play a central role in rape cases irrespective of the legal system in 
question.
In the ideal rape the victim is expected to resist vigorously and sustain physical 
injuries. She is also expected to report an attack immediately. Despite the evidence 
that there is no typical response to rape, defence lawyers in both England and Wales 
and the Netherlands continue to use this stereotype to cast doubt upon women’s 
stories. Women continue to be judged by a standard infused with erroneous 
assumptions and rape mythology.
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The pervasive myth that women lie about rape also appears to inform defence 
questioning in the Netherlands. As in England and Wales, complainants are asked 
whether their allegation is motivated by jealousy, spite or fantasy. Again, women are 
judged on the basis of out-moded assumptions.
It is clear that the treatment o f rape complainants in the Netherlands is, in part, shaped 
by the cultural myths and stereotypes which surround rape. The prevalence o f rape 
myths, mythen over verkrachting, within Dutch culture was identified by Doomen 
writing in 1978.8'8 Among the myths cited by Doomen were the myth that women 
enjoy and fantasise about rape and the myth that rapists are psychologically abnormal 
and sexually disturbed.819 It is submitted that the pervasiveness of rape mythology 
explains, in part, similarities in the treatment o f rape complainants in England and 
Wales and the Netherlands.
818 Doomen, J., Heb je  soms aanleiding gegeven: handleiding voor slachtoffers van verkracting bij 
de confrontie metpolitie en justitie,{ 1978) See also Davelaar-van Tongeren, V ., Verkrachting. 
Strafrechter, wat moet je  ermee?, in (eds) Davelaar-van Tongeren, V., K.eijzeren, N .. Strafrecht in 
Perspectief (1980, Arnhem:Gouda Quint)
8,9 ibid at 10
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8.8. Conclusion
Interviews with Dutch practitioners provided support for the claims made by Van 
Driem that rape complainants are subjected to improper and irrelevant questioning at 
pre-trial hearings and that the protection afforded rape complainants is often 
inadequate. The interviews also provided a valuable insight into how the examination 
o f rape complainants had altered in recent years. Namely, through the claims that rape 
complainants are generally no longer questioned about their sexual history or their 
lifestyle. In addition, the interviews provided a broader insight into the role played by 
examining magistrates at pre-trial hearings and the decisive role they play in the 
treatment o f complainants in the Netherlands.
It is clear that a shift towards inquisitorial style proceedings would not necessarily 
result in rape complainants being treated with respect and sensitivity. Such a shift 
would not necessarily mark an end to rape complainants being asked irrelevant and 
improper questions or herald the greater protection of rape complainants during 
examination by defence lawyers. This is because the treatment of rape complainants in 
any legal system will, in part, be determined by the attitudes and beliefs o f the 
criminal justice professionals they encounter and shaped by the myths and social 
prejudice which surround rape. A primary aim of this study is to demonstrate that the 
adversarial trial process plays a major role in the secondary victimisation o f rape 
complainants in England and Wales and because of this, the extent to which the 
treatment of rape complainants may be improved is severely limited. This study 
argues that the fair and just treatment of rape complainants in England and Wales can 
not be achieved without far-reaching structural reform. It is submitted that the Dutch 
trial process does not in itself represent an obstacle to the decent treatment of victims 
of rape. Therefore, initiatives aimed at challenging rape myths and encouraging 
criminal justice professionals to exercise greater sensitivity in their handling o f rape
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Conclusion
As a comparative study o f rape trials in adversarial and inquisitorial criminal justice 
systems this study has had a number of specific aims. One aim of this study was to 
establish the role played by the adversarial process in the secondary victimisation of 
rape complainants in court in England and Wales. The adversarial criminal trial 
process is structured as a contest in which the prosecution bears the burden of proof. 
The focus is upon the trial where evidence is presented before an unprepared fact­
finder. Proceedings are dominated by the parties with the trial judge performing the 
role o f umpire. The presentation of evidence is organised around storytelling. The 
court is largely confined to the evidence presented by the parties. There is little 
evidence that the adversarial process, its underlying assumptions and its implications, 
have been thoroughly examined. The implications for complainants in criminal 
proceedings have certainly not been fully explored. This study has focused upon its 
implications for one category of complainant, the complainant in a rape trial. A 
common assumption contained in much of the literature on rape trials is that 
complainants is rape cases are treated differently from complainants of non-sexual 
offences. It is assumed, for example, that the types o f questions routinely put to rape 
complainants during cross-examination would be considered unacceptable in other 
trial contexts. Consequently, attention has focused heavily upon those factors which 
separate rape trials from other criminal trials. These include the cultural myths which 
continue to surround rape, the emphasis in rape trials upon the issue of consent and 
the introduction of sexual history evidence. This narrow focus has led to a flawed 
understanding of the treatment o f rape complainants in court and has allowed the 
criminal trial process itself to escape examination and escape criticism. This study has 
sought to fill a gap in the analysis of rape trials by examining the role played the 
adversarial process in the secondary victimisation of rape complainants in court.
This study has identified and examined the assumptions which inform and shape the 
adversarial criminal trial process and explored their meaning for complainants in rape 
cases. This study concludes that the adversarial process plays a major role in
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secondary victimisation or ‘judicial rape’ o f rape complainants in court. Much o f the 
distress caused rape complainants stems from the insistence upon direct oral evidence 
in criminal proceedings. Compelled to give evidence in court, complainants are forced 
to confront their alleged attackers, to relive their ordeal in public in the imposing 
surroundings o f the courtroom. The inability of complainants to tell their stories in 
their own words is attributable largely to the presentation of evidence in criminal trials 
in the form of competing stories told by advocates. In adversarial proceedings lay 
stories are subject to a distinct filtering process and the narrative freedom of witnesses 
is severely curtailed. The treatment o f complainants during cross-examination is also 
lirmly rooted in the structure and function of the adversarial criminal trial. Cross- 
examination was identified in this study as a device used to denigrate, intimidate and 
confuse complainants. This study also concludes that the lack o f protection afforded 
rape complainants in court may, in part, be explained in terms of the structural 
constraints which operate upon trial judges and prosecuting counsel in criminal trials.
A second aim o f this study was to challenge key assumptions o f the adversarial fact- 
finding process. The adversarial system is very much a taken for granted institution. 
Its claims are rarely countered and its underlying assumptions rarely challenged. This 
study has argued that the experiences of rape complainants in court raise serious 
questions about the value o f key evidentiary safeguards o f the adversarial trial 
process. In particular, this study challenged the assumptions which underlie the 
insistence upon direct oral evidence in criminal proceedings. In England and Wales, 
rape complainants are compelled to give evidence in the presence of their alleged 
assailants and in public despite the absence of any evidence to support the assumption 
that the presence o f a defendant and an audience promotes truthful testimony and in 
the face o f evidence that giving evidence in such a stressful environment may have a 
deleterious impact upon the fullness and accuracy of testimony. Faith in demeanour 
evidence persists despite mounting psychological research which strongly suggests 
that evidence o f non-verbal behaviour is at best unreliable. The insistence upon direct 
oral evidence is however largely attributable to the fact that such evidence may be 
tested by cross-examination. Cross-examination continues to be viewed a vital 
safeguard o f the adversarial trial process despite research on suggestibility which
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indicates that leading questions, the mainstay of cross-examination, may be truth 
distorting and the fact that it is a device used as much to prevent truths emerging as to 
expose them. This study concludes that the traditional justifications for requiring rape 
complainants to give evidence in court are, on examination, unconvincing.
A third aim o f this research was to demonstrate the inability o f the adversarial trial 
process to accommodate the basic needs and interests o f vulnerable complainants. 
I his study focused upon a rape complainant’s need to be protected from unnecessary 
distress and anxiety, to be able to describe freely what happened to her, and to be 
treated with sensitivity and respect throughout criminal proceedings. The limited 
protection that can be offered vulnerable complainants within the context of 
adversarial criminal proceedings has been highlighted in this study. Significantly, rape 
complainants may not be spared the ordeal of a courtroom appearance. The 
assumptions which underlie the adversarial fact-finding process dictate that rape 
complainants confront their alleged attackers in court, give evidence in a hostile and 
intimidating arena and relate information of a sexually explicit nature in public. Were 
measures introduced to allow rape complainants to give evidence via a TV-link or 
even give video-recorded evidence, the benefits o f such measures would be limited as 
complainants would still be subjected to live cross-examination, arguably the most 
traumatic aspect o f criminal proceedings.
This study has also sought to demonstrate that the reconstruction of evidence into 
competing courtroom stories and the exclusionary character of the law of evidence 
mean that complainants’ stories may not be told in adversarial criminal trials. The 
advocate may not grant a complainant free rein without risking the introduction of 
unsolicited, damaging information or the introduction of inadmissible evidence. Lay 
stories may simply not be accommodated within the adversarial criminal trial.
This study claims that the degradation and humiliation o f rape complainants in court 
is a structural consequence o f the adversarial process. As such, this study argues that 
little may be done to improve the treatment o f rape complainants during cross- 
examination. This study concludes that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the 
use o f cross-examination as a mechanism for testing evidence and the decent 
treatment o f complainants. A common theme in the literature on rape trials is that
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defence barristers act improperly in rape trials and single rape complainants out for 
special treatment. This study challenges this assumption claiming that defence 
advocates are often only doing what the adversarial process demands or compels them 
to do and that the strategies employed by defence barristers during the cross- 
examination o f rape complainants are the stock-in-trade tactics o f adversary advocacy. 
Once this fact is recognised it becomes clear that measures aimed at sensitising 
defence lawyers, for example, to the effects of rape would have a necessarily limited 
impact. This study also argues that the introduction o f legal representation for rape 
complainants would not necessarily improve the treatment of rape complainants 
during cross-examination. The injection o f a victim advocate into the trial process 
would alter neither the role nor nature o f cross-examination nor be likely to influence 
the performances o f defence barristers, prosecution barristers or trial judges.
W ithin the context o f adversarial criminal proceedings any modification to trial 
procedure to lessen the ordeal o f rape complainants would be seen as either a direct 
threat to the rights of defendants or to the reliability o f evidence. There is an 
irreconcilable conflict between the interests of vulnerable complainants and the basic 
assumptions o f the adversarial fact-finding process. This study therefore concludes 
that solutions to the plight o f rape complainants must be sought outside the structural 
constraints o f the adversarial process.
In the search for an alternative procedure this study examined rape trials in the 
Netherlands. This research was based upon a consolidated analysis of Dutch literature 
supported by original interviews with Dutch practitioners. An aim o f this research was 
to provide a fuller exposition o f the experiences o f complainants in adversarial and 
inquisitorial criminal justice systems than contained in existing comparative literature. 
Complainants, their position and treatment, are rarely the focus of comparative 
research. As a result, fundamental differences between adversarial and inquisitorial 
criminal proceedings have been either neglected or their implications for complainants 
never fully explored. By examining such features as the nature o f advocacy, the role 
of storytelling and the law of evidence this study has sought to provide a broader
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insight into the treatment o f rape complainants in England and Wales and the 
Netherlands.
This study has also sought to establish whether the Dutch trial process holds any 
significant advantages for complainants in rape cases. A number o f advantages were 
identified. First and foremost, the reliance upon written evidence in Dutch criminal 
trials and the general tolerance of hearsay evidence means that rape complainants are, 
as a general rule, kept out o f court. Dutch trial procedure does not require that 
complainants give evidence in public, confront their alleged assailants or be subjected 
to live cross-examination. If called to give evidence at trial, the Dutch trial process 
allows rape complainants to give evidence via a TV-link.
This study also addressed the ability o f rape complainants to tell their stories in Dutch 
criminal proceedings. It was argued that the process of case construction in the 
Netherlands is subject to fewer structural constraints and that the need to control 
witness testimony is greatly reduced. This study concludes that lay stories could be 
accommodated within the Dutch trial process. Rape complainants could be allowed 
greater narrative freedom. Any obstacles to granting complainants this freedom were 
identified as attitudinal rather than structural.
The research o f rape trials in the Netherlands also aimed to establish whether a shift 
towards inquisitorial style proceedings would mark an end to the degrading and 
insensitive questioning of complainants in rape cases. The treatment of rape 
complainants in criminal proceedings is determined not only by structural factors. The 
attitudes o f examining-magistrates were identified in this study as a decisive factor in 
the level o f protection afforded rape complainants at pre-trial hearings in the 
Netherlands. The pervasiveness of rape mythology was also used to explain 
similarities in the questioning of rape complainants in England and Wales and the 
Netherlands. Structural reform alone therefore would not necessarily ensure that rape 
complainants were handled with sensitivity and respect. It would however, this study 
concludes, broaden the scope for improvement.
In recent years positive steps have been taken to improve the treatment o f victims of 
crime within the criminal justice system of England and Wales. The Victim’s Charter
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1990, published by the Home Office, claimed to set out for the first time the 
legitimate rights and expectations o f victims of crime. The Charter states;
“They deserve to be treated with both sympathy and respect.”820
“Many victims of crime suffer severely. Their subsequent unavoidable 
involvement with the criminal justice system may add to that trauma. It 
is essential that every possible step is taken to minimise the upset and 
even hardship which may be caused.”821
It is difficult to reconcile the concern expressed in the Victim’s Charter 1990 with the 
continuing degradation and humiliation of rape complainants in court. The criminal 
justice system is failing victims o f rape in its treatment o f complainants. 
Complainants, this study argues, have a right to equality of concern and respect. This 
study therefore calls for the reconceptualisation of a fair trial. The concept, it is 
submitted, should reflect not only the rights of defendants but also recognise and 
respect the interests and needs of complainants. As Helen Reeves, director o f Victim 
Support has stated;
“The defendants have rights of course, but you can’t have a fair trial if 
the witness can’t cope with the way the trial is conducted.”822
A fair trial process would seek to strike an appropriate balance between the interests 
of defendants and complainants. The adversarial trial process clearly fails to achieve 
this balance. Our commitment to the adversarial process demands that we ignore the 
high price it exacts from vulnerable complainants. It demands that we overlook 
mounting evidence o f its short-comings. This study concludes that we should question 
this commitment and explore whether a better system, a fairer system could be 
devised.
s J' Home Office, Victim’s Charter: A Statement o f the Rights o f Victims o f  Crime, (1990, 
London:HMSO), at 8
821 ibid
s"~ The Guardian September 7 1996
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